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Daly v. Daly
533 P.2d 884
Utah
1975
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*1 prior In view of our decisions we was not a this case that there

conclude taking and the decision of the court below No costs awarded. reversed. must ELLETT, HENRIOD, J., C. MAUGHAN, JJ., con- CROCKETT cur. DALY, the Estate M. Executrix

Leah Deceased, Daly, Plain- Eva Dean Respondent, tiff and Appellant. George DALY, F. Defendant No. 13517. Supreme Court Utah.

March Knowlton, Gale, Og- David Vlahos & J.

den, Knowlton, City, Horace Salt Lake J. appellant. for defendant and Macfarlane, Sr., City, Salt Lake Grant plaintiff respondent. HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal judgment in a from divorce part Affirmed in and reversed tion. part.

Plaintiff, Daly, Leah M. Executrix Daly, wife Eva Dean the deceased Mrs. defendant, original which latter was the action, started this plaintiff plaintiff by such order of substi- was made *2 885 ticipated, the trial by court. Such in clear enough language, tution entered stated opinion and in our the governing substitution was error rule that: Al- to was to a motion vacate.1 vulnerable When the death parties of one the may been though we think the error have occurs after the a entry of divorce de- dispositive procedurally, case we do of this cree and before the decree is final the issue, with concern ourselves such not decree becomes to ineffective dissolve it, pressed but think the solu- since no one marriage, the having death terminated tion case in particular to this be found personal that relationship. However, the follows, elimi- what we believe will which occurrence of death does not abate the procedural nate considerable circumlocu- itself and prop- action to the extent that ultimately would arrive at the tion that erty rights are determined the decree anyway. same result it remains effective and becomes final in the same manner and at same the time Daly, wife of defendant Eva Dean living persons. as one between sued him di many, many years, an decree vorce and obtained language Such fully would warrant de three The to become final in months. Eva, the awarding (or home to her devi- home, jointly cree awarded her the owned heirs), sees case of her death $8,000 equita parties, subject to an the interlocutory period, the and died ble lien in favor of defendant. Eva enough to affirm the trial court’s award to period, midway and of the three-month plaintiff’s the side of this case. This we Leah, Executor, plaintiff, as her was made do, an subject decree, to to amendment She, plain as reflected above. ostensible order, which also awarding we the home to tiff, awarded, subject a in de to lien the devisee or devisees or the heirs of Eva $8,000, the fee title to fendant deceased, Daly, Dean provided in naming property, of Leah as trans which mentioned, subject statutes lien men- error, such a feree since we consider tioned, subject proper to administra- case, representative the facts of this tion probate of her estate via the side of seem, grantee. it cannot be made the would the court.6 This, con so far at as one reason is least property real vests in cerned—that the theAt same affirm time we heirs the will2 or in the devisees under award, hereby prospectively we reverse representative, sub possession with part Harper’s In re decision in ject probate,3 to and encumbrances.4 Estate, supra, having to do with determina Estate,5 brings In re property hereby us tion of rights, order 1954, repre decided adjudge this court when the death of one or parties sents the law in State at the time Eva both of entry occurs after the case, opinion, died. That in a unanimous of a decree and before present par final, in which one of our members the decree becomes ineffective Hanson, 29, 37, 1. 60 4. At Price Utah 206 P. best decree should have awarded devisees, (1922) seeking property to : “A to intervene Eva’s or to her law- appear heirs, disposed make ful not it by will, subject including rights proper probate that he would have been at least a creditors, taxes, liens, (including equit- to the action when it was commenced case), en in this and that he would have been able lien etc. separate titled he to the relief seeks supra. 1, 5. Footnote Harper’s Est., 1 action.” also re See fact, ; (an 6. trial should determine the whether The (1954) Utah P.2d 1005 subject testamentary was the independent action). intestacy. disposition, or 74-1-36, 1953. Title Code Annotated Utah 3. Title Code 74- Annotated 4-

is deemed and held to be of no further are but obiter dicta unnecessary force or effect.7 decision in this case.

Second, applied that as facts, to its CALLISTER, TUCKETT, J., J., good law; C. and it is regret- table concur. that those long-buried bones should

be disinterred to become controversial *3 again. ELLETT, (concurring and dis- Justice Third, and important, most senting) : divorce cases equitable are respects, in all particularly r except I concur I can see no reason fo here as rights. many, overruling Harper’s prospec In re Estate instances, not most once there has been lit tively. If it is bad law for the next case it igation and property rights have been de is bad law for this one. No one involved termined, they settled, should remain unless any the instant matter has sustained good cause shown the persuad court is upon Harper harm or loss reliance the ed that for equitable they considerations case and for that reason I think the real be changed. should sup conclusion is property should be awarded to the surviv ported by express the wording of our ing spouse. statute,2 which is the logical result of its development, historical and our deci- any equitable rights If has daughter the law, sional including Harper case re they in and to the would not be to, ferred which has stood as our law for affected this decision. years; any and change (which therein I I let his would each bear own think is neither necessary desirable) nor costs. legislative. be appreciated It is that there are some cas- CROCKETT, (concurring in re- Justice es, mostly of older vintage, say which sult, dissenting part): but upon the death of one during an in- terlocutory period the divorce action I am in agreement opin- with the main However, abates. the broad assertion that ion’s judgment affirmance of the of the aspects includes all of the action in- trial court. This, because I believe its volves a distinguish failure to between the respects tion was correct in all in har- such, marital status as as distinct from mony requirements equity with the of property rights. Whereas, accept justice. However, impelled amI to voice view cases, of better considered ap- disagreement opinion’s with the criticism proach the matter more realistically, and of the case In re Estate1 for the regard the whole proceeding equitable, following reasons: any and so treat subsequent change of the First, opinion correctly states, as the justice decree equity as the of each point may raised; require. was not and the comments (1954). among reasons, 1. 1 We do this 265 P.2d 1005 for a number of 1) which are: That decision was opinion. impractical unreasonable, splitting main Footnote an nullify important action to its basic and most 30-3-7, aspect divorce, sanctify property 2. Sec. U.O.A.1953. “When decree of —that rights marriage, becomes absolute. —The decree of divorce shall which without never expiration illogical become absolute would have at of three existed. Besides such an entry thereof, Harper, legislature, from the result since months unless . upon 30-3-7, U.C.A.1953, Title . . for sufficient cause emasculates the court application interlocutory appeal upon provision, its motion or if the court own any waiting period person, orders." orders a shorter or . otherwise no at all. instances, requirements most primary ruling equity A reason for the of some justice served, may cases that action abates derives from and best that the be de- final; procedure, pro- cree become espe- former where statutes and that be cially property rights, vided what is sometimes called a de- true as where a nisi, is, decree; only controversy re-run litiga- cree conditional extensive tion judgment and final could be that no actual avoided. elapse could entered until after nisi, Inasmuch as the decree condi- interlocutory period; an and it then tional decree has been abolished favor separate applica- that there be a a definite judgment, which becomes fi- judgment tion new and final be en- and a ordered, unless nal otherwise tered. Prior 1913 this the law given for the abatement of di- so-called provided our state. The former statute exist, vorce decree thus ceased having that the “declaring The situation go rule should with it. *4 party a is entitled to ... divorce” prime example here is a of the lament of expiration after the of six months that effect that: Holmes to the “There Justice a “final decree shall then be and absolute nothing revolting to one’s sense of more application by upon entered to court justice that than have it asserted some- to ” unless cause . . . some thing way must it be done that because However, contrary.3 shown to reign Henry was so laid in the of down Chapter 49, changed law to S.L.U.1913 our IV; so, it if is even more whatever state divorce that “the decree of shall be- way long doing reason for it that has since expiration six come absolute after the vanished.” proceedings months . . unless for review the court pending, are go It should to hardly be be- . otherwise sufficient cause yond plain statute, wording of our orders.” firmly supported by long our established case, justi- decisional to law in the why There is reason known to me no it fy the herein But conclusion advocated. that given statute should not effect will be well found that there are some con- terms, cording to its and the divorce ours, sidered cases such as under statutes regarded good unless as absolute for some They which are make distinc- accord. shown, cause the court otherwise orders. proper- tion between the divorce status This the whole matter be dealt leaves ty rights and the decree becomes hold that with equity the demands of court as final, property rights, at least as un- justice require, it should Re- be.5 less some affirmative action taken to many flection make one aware that di- will prevent Garrity’s doing it In In re so. vorce re- litigation cases involve extensive property Estate6 there had been a settle- sulting in determination of settle- and/or agreement in the approved ment rights. (Particularly ment so during the in- decree. The died husband in late marriages, many prone which are period; petitioned terlocutory and the wife spouses to fall apart.) If one of the dies appointed pur- to be administratrix for period, pose It undoing it is not the settlement. settlement, only with the held that accord mandate of statute, decree, approved many, and the the court the di- if not had been why proper Chapter 109, 3. no circum- S.L.U.1909. 5. see not, of a stances death ground regarded provision court, has remained same so constitute through law, setting except the revisions of our aside the decree. 55, S.L.U.1957, it, substituting Ch. re-enacted “three months” “six months.” 6. 22 P.2d 217. Wash.2d by the proceeding, was not affected

vorce husband’sdeath. COMMISSION, UTAH STATE ROAD Appellant, Plaintiff that a divorce action does not The idea automatically on death of abate RANCH, Corporation, The STEELE a Utah support Cap- also finds the Ohio al., Respondents. et Defendants Caprita.7 rita v. There the case had been No. tried its and the court had announced Supreme Court of Utah. it judgment, but had not caused to be April 3, 1975. “journalized” husband died. before the (abate) Defendant wife moved to dismiss grant action. The court refused to appeal sustaining

motion. In it was pointed authority out that had the court

enter a decree at the time it rendered the proper- judgment; and that the decree and ty award should not be disturbed. regard Leah,

In daughter execu- trix estate, being for her mother’s substi- party: harmony tuted as a with what above, has my opinion been stated it *5 authority. trial court acted within his If a pe- dies riod appear and it is made to court controversy there over the decree; interests settled and that it or desirable that there be fur- therein, ther proceedings I can see no rea- why son a party’s executor or administra- substituted, tor should not be the same as any action, 25, provided other in Rule Recognition principle U.R.C.P.8 of the herein stated: that the decree of divorce

as to rights after the continues death of a indicated the case Allred,9 plaintiff of Allred where the (cid:127)wife was attempting to collect the de- from payments

ceased husband’s estate accrued support money. consequence of what I have said above, judgment, would affirm the attempting without disturb the law as set in the forth case of In re Es- emphasis (All tate. added.) 5, 483, 25, U.R.C.P.; Bradbury 7. 145 Ohio St. 60 N.E.2d 158 A.L.R. Rule see v. Rasmus- 1204; Am.Jur.2d, sen, and see also 2d Divorce 16 Utah 401 P.2d 710. Separation, Sec. 435. 9.12 366 P.2d 478. 8. That the executor or administrator substituted for a in accordance with

Case Details

Case Name: Daly v. Daly
Court Name: Utah Supreme Court
Date Published: Mar 28, 1975
Citation: 533 P.2d 884
Docket Number: 13517
Court Abbreviation: Utah
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