Aрpellees, Rodney and Earlean Fields, rented an apartment from Gary Ross who had recently acquired the property from Dalrymple. A fire in the apartment destroyed the Fiеlds’ personal property and they filed suit to recover against Ross. Ross filed a third party complaint against Dalrymple and plaintiffs amended their complaint against Ross to recover punitive damages from Dalrymple. A jury awarded the Fields a judgment for $6,000 compensatory damages and $7,500 in punitive damages. They allocated the negligence of Ross аt 15% and Dalrymple at 85%. The jury also awarded Ross $10,000 compensatory damages but no punitive damages against Dalrymple. Dalrymple’s motion for a new trial was denied, and this appeal results.
Appellants argue three points for reversal: (1) the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) the trial court erred in allowing proof of Dalrymple’s financial status; and, (3) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of unrelated violations of the building code and regulations. We agree thаt there was no evidence to support a verdict for punitive damages and that Dalrymple’s financial status was not properly in issue. Also, we agree that it was error to allоw evidence of unrelated building code violations.
There seems to be no serious dispute but that a fire in the Fields’ rented apartment, which was owned by Ross, resulted from defective wiring nеar a hot water heater which was encased in a crawl space and was unavailable for inspection by the Fields. The Fields were not at home at the time of the fire but uрon returning home and discovering the fire Mrs. Fields, who was pregnant, became very upset and ill. Her baby was born slightly premature approximately a month later. There was evidencе that she did have ailments and complaints related to the loss of their property in the fire. The suit was filed on October 1, 1979, by the Fields against Ross. They alleged he knew or should have known of the dangerous situation and that he had been notified that some irregularity existed concerning the hot water heater and their high electric bills. They alleged he took no action in regard to the situation. The complaint alleged that Ross breached the warranty of habitability by furnishing an unsafe dwelling place. Ross entered a general denial and filed a third pаrty complaint against Baseline Corporation, Dalco Corporation and Ociad Corporation as well ás John and Barbara Dalrymple. All parties agreed that the foregoing corporations and Dalrymple were one and the same. The complaint by Ross alleged negligence through unworkmanlike construction and improper maintenance and repairs. On February 18,1981, the third party complaint was amended to allege that Dalrymple was guilty of gross and wanton conduct and negligence in complete disregard to the consequences of human safety. It alleged a conscious knowledge on the part of Dalrymple. The Dalrymples entered a general denial. On March 2,1981, the comрlaint of the Fields was amended to seek punitive as well as compensatory damages. Also, on the same date the Fields filed a complaint against the third party defendant in which they accused him of conduct giving rise to punitive damages.
We first consider whether the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion for a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on a motion for a new trial. Before punitive damages may be allowed it must be shown that in the absence of proof of malice or willfulness there was a wanton and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others on the part of the tortfeasor. Tucker v. Scarbrough,
In viewing the record we do not find any evidence that either Dalrymple or Ross wеre guilty of activities which would give rise to exemplary damages. The issue in question was well-stated in the case of Hodges v. Smith,
... negligence alone, however gross, is not sufficient to justify the award of punitive damages. There must be some element of wantonness or such a conscious indifference to the consequences that malice might be inferred. In other words, in order to warrant a submission of the question of punitive damages, there must be an element of willfulness or such reckless conduct on the part of the defendant as is equivalent thereto.
Appellants also insist that the court erred in allowing the plaintiffs access to Dalrymple’s financial status and allowing it to be presented to the jury. One of our leading cases on this point is Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Padgett,
Thе plaintiffs and Ross presented evidence of several other code and ordinance violations. The ordinances, or the pertinent parts, were treated as having bеen introduced into evidence. However, a search of the record on appeal indicates that the ordinances or the perinent parts thereof were nеver introduced into the trial court’s record. We have held as far back as Pugh v. The City of Little Rock,
We note appellees’ objection to appellants’ argument that the issue of substantial evidence was not preserved. However, ARCP Rule 50 (e) quoted by appellees states on its face that the sufficiency of the evidence is preserved when there has been a motion for a j udgment notwithstanding the verdict or a motion for a new trial.
Earlean Fields claimed personal injury as a result of this incident. However, she was not injured by the fire and suffered no direct trauma or anything of that nature. We have сonsistently held that a claimant’s right to recover for emotional distress and related injuries may be had only upon proof of the existence of willful and wanton wrongdoing on the pаrt of the tortfeasor. M.B.M. Co., Inc. v. Counce,
A review of the record indicates that the jury had ample evidence to find the appellants and Ross had breached the warranty of habitability at the Fields’ rented apartment. However, we feel that by introducing evidence of Balrymple’s financial status, the jury may well have been improperly influenced in their allocation of compensatory damages. Therefore, we must remand for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.