Rucker v. Secretary Of The TreasuryRucker v. Secretary Of The Treasury
USTC P 9115
Dalleen RUCKER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Kathy Warner, Intervenor-Appellant,
v.
The SECRETARY OF the TREASURY OF the UNITED STATES, and The
United States of America, Defendants-Appellees,
Rosa Ortega, Intervenor.
No. 83-1804.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 28, 1984.
Glenn Meyers of Colorado Rural Legal Services, Inc., Denver, Colo. (Jacquelyn Higinbotham of Colorado Rural Legal Services, Inc., Fort Morgan, Colo., with him on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant and intervenor-appellant.
Jo-Ann Horn, Atty., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Robert N. Miller, U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., of counsel; Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael L. Paup and Richard Farber, Attys., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., with her on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before SETH, BREITENSTEIN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Dalleen Rucker brought this class action against the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States, challenging the application to her of section 464 of the Social Security Act,
I.
BACKGROUND
This case involves the federal-state intercept program authorized by section 2331 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub.L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 860 (1981) (Omnibus Act). Under this program, federal income tax refunds due a taxpayer may be transferred to a state to the extent of a taxpayer's past-due child support obligations. Two provisions of the Omnibus Act are relevant here. The first is an amendment to the Social Security Act,
Plaintiff Dalleen Rucker is a married woman and a Colorado resident. Her husband is indebted to the State of Colorado for his failure to make required support payments to the children of his prior marriage.4 In April 1982, Rucker and her husband filed a joint 1981 Federal income tax return, expecting to receive $1,124 back from the Internal Revenue Service. This sum consisted of an income tax refund and an earned income credit. In June 1982, the IRS notified the Ruckers by letter that this sum was being withheld to satisfy Mr. Rucker's child support obligations. In August 1982, Rucker filed an amended tax return seeking a refund of that portion of the overpayment of income taxes and the earned income credit allocable to her. She subsequently received a refund of $126, which represented the entire amount of her excess wage withholdings and a portion of the earned income credit.5
Immediately after filing her amended tax return, and before receiving the $126 refund, Rucker brought this action claiming that defendants exceed their statutory authority by intercepting and withholding funds owed to a taxpayer who is the nonobligated spouse of a child support obligor. She also claimed that defendants' taking money due to a married taxpayer to satisfy obligations of a spouse, without affording the taxpayer notice and an opportunity to contest the liability, is a taking of property without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims on the grounds of mootness.6 Rucker v. Secretary of the Treasury,
MOOTNESS
Defendants assert that there is no case or controversy to support federal court jurisdiction, as required by article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, because Rucker has received her allocable share of the earned income credit. Defendants claim that it was unnecessary and purely advisory for the trial court to consider whether the earned income credit could be withheld under
This argument misconceives the nature of Rucker's claim. As we read Rucker's complaint, she is clearly claiming that defendants have exceeded their statutory authority by withholding any of the earned income credit due to her and her husband as a family unit. The IRS refunded only what it determined to be the portion of the credit allocable to her alone. The remaining portion of the credit has not been refunded to the Ruckers and Mrs. Rucker's claim to the remainder provides the necessary controversy needed to support federal court jurisdiction. In arguing to the contrary, defendants assume the very issue in this case: whether the earned income credit can be allocated among spouses and a portion of it withheld under
III.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Defendants argue that if Rucker's claim is not moot, it is barred by her failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of the Internal Revenue Code,
A number of courts have addressed this very issue in the context of challenges to the intercept program. Almost all have concluded that claims to withheld tax refunds and earned income credits are not barred by
IV.
EARNED INCOME CREDIT WITHHOLDING
As noted above,
The earned income credit is a benefit available to certain families with dependent children and with an earned family income of less than $10,000 per year. See
Defendants argue, however, that while
Courts that have faced this issue have reached conflicting results. Compare Nelson,
As the Nelson court notes, the term "overpayment," broadly defined in
Defendants claim and the district court agreed, that the tax intercept program's goal of enforcing child support obligations should take priority over the policies underlying the earned income credit. See Rucker,
The judgment is reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Notes
"Upon receiving notice from a State agency administering a plan approved under this part that a named individual owes past-due support which has been assigned to such State pursuant to
"The amount of any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support (as defined in section 464(c) of the Social Security Act) owed by that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State in accordance with section 464 of the Social Security Act. The Secretary shall remit the amount by which the overpayment is so reduced to the State to which such support has been assigned and notify the person making the overpayment that so much of the overpayment as was necessary to satisfy his obligation for past-due support has been paid to the State. This subsection shall be applied to an overpayment prior to its being credited to a person's future liability for an internal revenue tax."
Mr. Rucker's former wife assigned her right to support payments to the State of Colorado. See note 1, supra
The refund to Rucker consisted of $31 in excess wage withholdings and $95 of the earned income credit. The record does not reflect the dollar amount of the earned income credit withheld to satisfy Mr. Rucker's support obligation. We assume that some portion of the credit was withheld, inasmuch as the defendants concede that Rucker received only a "proportionate" share. Appellees' Brief at 4; see Rucker v. Secretary of the Treasury,
The court also dismissed intervenor Warner's claims. Warner had not received from the IRS any portion of the earned income credit to which she claimed entitlement. The court apparently reasoned that having adopted the allegations of Rucker's complaint, Warner lacked independent jurisdictional grounds once Rucker's claim was dismissed as moot. In light of our decision concerning the dismissal of Rucker's claim, we need not reach this issue
"No suit or proceeding under
(b) If the amount allowable as credits under section ... 43 (relating to earned income credit) exceeds the tax imposed by subtitle A ... the amount of such excess shall be considered an overpayment."