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DWIGHT DALEY v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., ET AL.
(AC 39835)
DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Moll, Js.
Argued October 11, 2018—officially released February 5, 2019
Syllabus
The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia, a violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-60 et seq.) in connection with the termination of the plaintiff’s employment. The day after the jury returned its verdict in favor of the plaintiff, one of the jurors, R, appeared at the courthouse and notified court staff that she was ready to continue jury deliberations. After the trial judge reminded R that the jury had returned its verdict the day before and of the amount of the verdict, R became visibly upset and stated that she did not remember the jury concluding its deliberations or returning its verdict. The court subsequently held a status conference in which it informed the parties’ attorneys of the events that had transpired with R. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion seeking a new trial or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing regarding the competency of R. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion seeking a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, finding that the parties had deemed R to be an acceptable juror during jury selection, and that the parties did not challenge the competency of R during the evidentiary portion of the trial, jury deliberations or the return and acceptance of the jury’s verdict. On the defendants’ appeal and the plaintiff’s cross appeal, held that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in failing to hold a postverdict evidentiary hearing to examine R’s competency during trial; there must be a preliminary showing of strong evidence that the juror likely was incompetent during his or her jury service before a trial court is required to conduct a full postverdict inquiry into the juror’s competency, as that standard serves the interests of the avoidance of postverdict harassment of jurors, the preservation of the finality of judgments, the discouragement of meritless applications for postverdict hearings, and the reduction of the likelihood of and temptation for jury tampering, and there was sufficient evidence in the present case indicating that R likely was not competent to serve on the jury, as R’s statements to the trial judge and in a letter she had submitted to the court, in which she stated that she had experienced a memory gap with respect to the deliberations and the verdict, that she was concerned that she may have suffered other mental lapses during the trial and that she planned to undergo a medical evaluation to determine whether she suffered from dementia or Alzheimer’s disease, constituted strong evidence that R likely had been incompetent during her jury service, such that a full inquiry by the court into R’s competency was necessary.
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, wrongful termination of employment, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the jury before Hon. William B. Rush, judge trial referee; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff; thereafter, the court denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial and their motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the defendants appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Christopher M. Hodgson, with whom, on the brief, was Warren L. Holcomb, for the appellants-cross appel-
Francis D. Burke, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).
DWIGHT DALEY v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., ET AL.
(AC 39835)
DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Moll, Js.
Argued October 11, 2018—officially released February 5, 2019
Opinion
MOLL, J. The defendants, J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (J.B. Hunt), and David Bryant, appeal, and the plaintiff, Dwight Daley, cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court rendered in accordance with a jury verdict returned in favor of the plaintiff. The threshold issue raised by the defendants on appeal that we must resolve is whether the court erred in declining to conduct a postverdict evidentiary hearing to determine whether one of the jurors, R.L.,1 had been competent to serve on the jury. We conclude that the court committed error, and we reverse in part the judgment of the court and remand the case for further proceedings while retaining our jurisdiction over the remaining claims on appeal and over the cross appeal pending the outcome of the proceedings on remand.
The following facts, as found by the trial court in its memorandum of decision or as undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the threshold issue before us. In December, 2013, the plaintiff commenced the underlying action against the defendants. In the operative complaint (complaint), the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants terminated his employment despite previously having assured him that he could return to work after he recovered from injuries he had sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident unrelated to his employment. The complaint included, inter alia, the following counts asserted against the defendants: violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-60 et seq.; promissory estoppel; negligent misrepresentation; fraudulent misrepresentation; and, as to J.B. Hunt only, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants denied the plaintiff’s substantive allegations and raised several special defenses. The plaintiff denied the allegations of the defendants’ special defenses.
The case was tried to a jury over the course of seven days in August, 2016. Shortly after 5 p.m. on Thursday, August 11, 2016, following less than one day of deliberations,2 the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $200,000 in economic damages and $25,000 in noneconomic damages. In reaching its verdict, the jury answered several interrogatories.3 On the record, the clerk twice read the jury’s verdict and its answers to the interrogatories, and, after each recitation, the clerk asked the jury to confirm its verdict. All of the jurors, including R.L., replied ‘‘yes’’ on both occasions.4 The trial court, Hon. William B. Rush, judge trial referee, thereupon accepted and recorded the verdict at 5:08 p.m.
On Friday, August 12, 2016, R.L. appeared at the courthouse where the underlying case had been tried and notified court staff that she was ready to continue
On September 16, 2016, the defendants filed a motion seeking a new trial on the ground that R.L. had been incompetent during the trial, thereby depriving them of their right to due process.7 As alternative relief, the defendants requested that the court conduct an evidentiary hearing to evaluate R.L.’s competency.8 The plaintiff opposed that motion.
On October 11, 2016, the trial court heard argument on, inter alia, the defendants’ motion seeking a new trial or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing addressing R.L.’s competency during trial. By way of a memorandum of decision dated November 4, 2016, the court denied the motion seeking a new trial, including the alternative request for an evidentiary hearing.9 The court found that, during jury selection, the parties had deemed R.L. to be an acceptable juror, and that none of the parties had challenged the competency of R.L. during the evidentiary portion of the trial, jury deliberations, or the return and acceptance of the jury’s verdict. It also found that R.L., along with the other jurors, twice confirmed the verdict on the record.
In addition, the court determined that, although a
The threshold issue raised by the defendants on appeal is whether, in light of the events involving R.L. that transpired on Friday, August 12, 2016, the trial court erred in declining to conduct a postverdict evidentiary hearing to determine whether R.L. had been competent to serve as a juror during the trial. We conclude that, under the unique circumstances of the present case, the court committed error in failing to hold a postverdict evidentiary hearing to examine R.L.’s competency.
We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review. ‘‘We consistently have held that, unless otherwise required by statute, a rule of practice or a rule of evidence, whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing generally is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Customers Bank v. CB Associates, Inc., 156 Conn. App. 678, 695, 115 A.3d 461 (2015). The defendants have not identified a statute, a rule of practice, or a rule of evidence that required the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to evaluate R.L.’s competency and, thus, we review the court’s decision declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing under the abuse of discretion standard of review.
As an initial matter, we note that, in cases involving
In Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465, 467–68 (2d Cir. 1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a trial court erred in failing to conduct a complete postverdict inquiry into a juror’s competency. In Sullivan, approximately one month following a criminal jury trial in which the petitioner had been found guilty of two counts of murder and one count of illegal possession of a weapon, one of the jurors contacted the local district attorney to complain that he was being harassed by ‘‘voices.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 466. The juror was brought before the trial court for questioning to determine whether he had been competent during the trial. Id. The juror presented testimony suggesting that he had experienced delusions or paranoid sensations during the trial and that he had heard ‘‘vibrations’’ throughout the trial that seemed amplified in the jury room. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. He testified that he had heard a ‘‘voice, [he had] heard [his] name,’’ and that ‘‘they were spying maybe in favor of the [petitioner],’’ but that the ‘‘voices’’ had not influenced him in reaching his verdict. (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id. He further testified that he previously had heard ‘‘voices’’ while serving as a juror in a prior unrelated criminal trial, which had resulted in a conviction. Id. The trial court appointed a psychiatrist to perform an independent evaluation of the juror. Id. In a written report submitted to the court, the court-appointed psychiatrist determined that, although the juror appeared to have a ‘‘schizoid personality with paranoid features . . . vulnerable to a paranoid psychotic decompensation,’’
On appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner claimed that his right to due process had been violated as a result of the trial court’s failure to conduct a full and fair hearing to evaluate the juror’s competency. Id. The Second Circuit agreed with the petitioner that a full inquiry into the juror’s competency was necessary. Id., 467–68. In reaching that conclusion, the Second Circuit pronounced: ‘‘Due process requires that jurors be sane and competent during trial. . . . Once a preliminary showing of incompetence or juror misconduct has been made there is a corresponding right to an inquiry into the relevant surrounding circumstances. . . . Where the allegations involve considerations internal to the jury deliberation process, such as juror insanity, this court has required strong evidence that it is likely that the juror suffered from such incompetence before ordering a post-verdict inquiry. . . . This high threshold is intended to avoid post-verdict harassment of jurors, preserve the finality of judgments, discourage meritless applications for post-verdict hearings, and reduce the likelihood of and temptation for jury tampering.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 467. The Second Circuit determined that there had been a ‘‘sufficient showing of incompetence to justify, indeed to require, a further inquiry’’ into the juror’s competency, emphasizing in particular the juror’s unsolicited statements that were ‘‘strongly suggestive of incompetence during trial and deliberations.’’11 Id. As relief, the Second Circuit reversed the habeas court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state reopened the hearing and provided the petitioner with an opportunity to cross-examine the court-appointed psychiatrist or the petitioner was granted a new trial. Id., 468.
We adopt the standard set forth in Sullivan, namely, that there must be a preliminary showing of strong evidence that a juror likely was incompetent during his or her jury service before a trial court is required to conduct a full postverdict inquiry into the juror’s competency. Id., 467. We are persuaded that such a standard serves the interests identified in Sullivan, namely, the
In the present case, the defendants assert that there was sufficient evidence in the record indicating that R.L. likely was not competent to serve on the jury and, therefore, the court should have held a postverdict evidentiary hearing to inquire into R.L.’s competency. In response, the plaintiff argues, inter alia, that there was no evidence in the record suggesting that R.L. had been incompetent during her jury service. We agree with the defendants. One day after the jury had finished deliberating and returned its verdict, R.L. spoke with Judge Rush personally and informed him that she could not recall the conclusion of the jury’s deliberations or the return of the verdict. In addition, in her letter submitted to the court, R.L. wrote that she was ‘‘surprise[d]’’ to learn that the jury had returned its verdict, she ‘‘definitely’’ had experienced a ‘‘memory gap’’ with respect to the jury’s deliberations and the return of the verdict, and she was concerned that she may have suffered other mental lapses during the trial. She further wrote that she planned to undergo a medical evaluation, which had been recommended to her by a caregiver, to determine whether she suffered from ‘‘dementia/Alzheimer’s [disease],’’ particularly given that her mother had been diagnosed with early onset Alzheimer’s disease at approximately her age. Although there had not been any overt indication prior to the jury returning its verdict that R.L. may have been suffering from a medical condition that rendered her incompetent during her jury service, we conclude that R.L.’s statements to Judge Rush and her letter submitted to the court constitute strong evidence that R.L. likely had been incompetent during her jury service, such that a full inquiry by the court into R.L.’s competency was necessary.12 Thus, the court erred in failing to hold a postverdict evidentiary hearing to determine whether R.L. had been competent to serve as a juror during the trial.13
Having concluded that the trial court committed error in failing to conduct a full postverdict inquiry into R.L.’s competency during the trial, we reverse the portion of the judgment denying the defendants’ motion seeking a new trial or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing addressing R.L.’s competency and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether R.L. had been competent to serve as a juror.14 Deciding the form and scope of the hearing to be held on remand is within the discretion of the trial court.15 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Fogg, supra, 613 F.2d 468 (trial court has discretion to determine form of postverdict evidentiary hearing examining juror’s competency); see also, e.g., State v. Biggs, 176 Conn. App. 687, 709, 171 A.3d 457 (trial courts have wide discretion in conducting evidentiary hearings
This conclusion effectively disposes of the threshold issue before us. In addition to appealing from the trial court’s denial of their motion seeking a new trial or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing addressing R.L.’s competency, the defendants claim that the court erred in denying (1) their motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and (2) a request submitted by them to charge the jury on mitigation of damages. In his cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erroneously denied (1) his motion for punitive damages, (2) his motion seeking postjudgment interest,18 and (3) a request submitted by him to charge the jury on retaliation in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. Rather than addressing these other claims at this time, we believe that the wiser approach, under the unique circumstances of this case, is to retain our jurisdiction over the remaining claims on appeal and over the cross appeal pending the outcome of the proceedings on remand, which may obviate the need for appellate review of these other claims. See, e.g., Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 688, 986 A.2d 290 (2010) (reversing judgment denying motion to dismiss and remanding case for further proceedings while retaining jurisdiction over appeal to review, as necessary, other claims raised on appeal); Higgins v. Karp, 239 Conn. 802, 811, 687 A.2d 539 (1997) (reversing judgments and vacating denials of motions to set aside defaults, and remanding case for redetermination of whether good cause existed to set aside defaults while retaining jurisdiction over appeal to review other claims raised on appeal in event that trial court did not find good cause to set aside defaults); Gilbert v. Beaver Dam Assn. of Stratford Inc., 85 Conn. App. 663, 675, 680–81, 858 A.2d 860 (2004) (affirming in part and reversing in part judgment and remanding case for additional proceedings on plaintiff’s claims under Common Interest Ownership Act, General Statutes § 47-200 et seq., while retaining jurisdiction over appeal to consider plaintiff’s claim regarding validity of association’s bylaws pending outcome of proceedings on remand), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 912, 866 A.2d 1283 (2005); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Patriot General Ins. Co., 45 Conn. App. 630, 633, 697 A.2d 694 (1997) (ordering limited remand for trial court to assure compliance with applicable notice requirement while retaining jurisdiction over case); O’Bymachow v. O’Bymachow, 10 Conn. App. 76, 78–79, 521 A.2d 599 (1987) (setting aside judgment declining to consider motion to open and remanding case to trial court to adjudicate motion to open while retaining jurisdiction over appeal
The judgment is reversed only as to the denial of the defendants’ motion seeking a new trial or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We retain jurisdiction over the case in order to resolve, as necessary, the remaining claims presented in the appeal and the cross appeal pending the outcome of the proceedings on remand.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.