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Dale v. Whiteman
202 N.W.2d 797
Mich.
1972
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*1 388 Mich v DALE WHITEMAN Liability Statutes—Negligence—Car 1. Automobiles —Owner’s — Wash. negligent An operation owner of an automobile is liable for the use; therefore, he has the automobile when consented to its defendant who to a took automobile car wash is liable to plaintiff, employee wash, of the owner of the car who was injured employee when a fellow drove defendant’s automobile (MCLA though into 257.401). even defendant was without fault Indemnity Equity—Restitution. 2. — upon The basis for indemnification has been said to rest equitable principle right to restitution. Indemnity Contracts—Negligence—Torts. 3. — implied indemnity An contract of arises favor of a who part exposed without fault on his is com- and pelled pay damages negligence on account or tortious another; indemnity principle act is this based on everyone responsible is for his own and exists statute, independently of or not whether contractual rela- parties, negli- tions exist between the and whether or not the gent person special particular legal duty owed the other a negligent. to be Indemnity 4. Liability—Equity. —Automobiles—Car Wash — owner, being An automobile whose car while driven an em- [7] [8, [4] [5] [6] [3] [2] [1] 9] 61 Am 41 Am Jur 58 Am Workmen’s 58 Am 8 Am Jur 8 Am Jur 41 Am Jur 8 Am Jur Jur, Jur, Jur 2d, 2d, 2d, Indemnity 2d, Indemnity 2d, Workmen’s 2d, References Automobiles Automobiles and Pleadings Automobiles and Compensation Compensation §§ § § 20. 19 et Points Highway Highway 162. seq. Highway in Headnotes § 48.§ 358. Traffic 571§ Traffic 582. Traffic 598. § et seq. Whiteman Dale v wash, ployee another of the car of a car wash indemnity upon from the car wash owner entitled to equitable principle automobile owner was without should fall fault as best *2 adopt preventive thereby measures reduce the situated to injury. likelihood of Compensation Remedy Employer’s Lia- —Exclusive — 5. Workmen’s bility. remedy provision Compensation of the Workmen’s

The exclusive only against action Act is intended to be bar employer by employee or one which is the derivative from his 411.4). (MCLA claim Compensation Indemnity—Statutes. 6. Workmen’s — Compensation the An has a under Workmen’s Act paid by for workmen’s benefits to be indemnified by employee in an action him to his or "having legal employer against anyone liability” to the injured employee. Pleading 7. —Court Rules —Claims—Defenses. (GCR 1963, permits A court rule inconsistent claims or defenses 111.9[2j).

Dissenting Opinion Kavanagh, T. E. and T. G. JJ. Brennan Liability Statutes—Negligence. 8. Automobiles —Owner’s — impos- Liability of of a motor vehicle under the owner a statute ing liability upon negligence operating him for the of another derivative, permission negligence with the former’s being owner; operator imputed of the vehicle to the accord- liable, ingly, operator where the is not whether his freedom part from arises from a want of on his from the existence of such a relation himself and between person injured preclude part any liability as to on his for the injury, independent liability the statute does not create an on (MCLA257.401). part of the owner Liability 9. Automobiles —Owner’s —Derivative Action —Statutes Compensation. —Workmen’s vehicle, against purely An action the owner of a which was derivative, recovery no should lie where there could be driver, against who was a natural in the same compensa- employ plaintiff’s employer, as since the workmen’s 388 Mich provides operator tion a defense statute of the vehicle 413.15). (MCLA Appeal Appeals, from Court of 2, Division Quinn, J., Targonski, JJ., P. and Danhof and af- firming Genesee, remanding part Elza H. (No. 3, Papp, J. Submitted October 1972. 5 October 53,844.) 1972, Term Docket No. Decided December 21, Rehearing 1972. January denied 1973. App Mich affirmed.

Complaint by Robert A. Dale against Ernest Whiteman damages injuries for for sustained when struck by Third-party complaint automobile. Whiteman Carl Goldfarb for indemnifica- tion. Counterclaim Whiteman for reimbursement *3 paid plaintiff. Judgment

benefits plaintiff. for Judgment granting for Whiteman indemnification. Judgment noof cause of action for Goldfarb on his counterclaim. Defendant Whiteman and third- appealed defendant Goldfarb to the Court of Appeals. Affirmed in part and remanded. Goldfarb appeals. Affirmed.

Gault, Bowers, Davison & for defendant and third-party plaintiff Whiteman. Whinham, Jr.,

E. R. for third-party defendant Goldfarb.

Adams, J. Proceedings Facts,

I. The Question and The statement proceedings of and facts this case is set forth by Judge Quinn opinion his Appeals as follows: Dale v Whiteman 1967, 4,

"December Whiteman took his automobile to by a car wash Goldfarb and turned it owned over to an washing. Whiteman had attendant for used this car pulled through vehicle was wash before. The the auto- chain; matic line car was then wash driven to Fox, drying employee the tiff, an area Goldfarb. Plain- Goldfarb, drying was another auto- plaintiff mobile. Fox Whiteman’s car into causing drove injuries. severe complaint against "Plaintiff his filed Whiteman under (Stat statute,

the owner’s MCLA 257.401 Ann §9.2101). a third-party Rev Whiteman filed com- plaint against claiming Goldfarb indemnification and cross-complaint seeking Goldfarb filed a reimbursement paid plain- for benefits he had workmen’s tiff. (GCR 1963, for summary judgment "Plaintiff moved

117.2) liability. on the issue Whiteman’s Whiteman summary judgment moved for against indemnification summary judgment and for Goldfarb of no against plaintiff. cause for action Goldfarb moved for summary judgment of no action cause for as to White- man summary judgment for reimbursement plaintiff. paid benefits pleadings, depositions, of the "On the basis undis- puted parties, the briefs facts and the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and Whiteman’s motion for All jury indemnification. other motions were denied. A $100,000 against Whiteman; damages awarded $100,000 granted against Whiteman indemnification Goldfarb, gave a verdict of no cause for action on cross-claim Goldfarb Whiteman. Judgments accordingly, entered and Whiteman and (1971). appeal.” App 36 Mich 534-535 *4 of Appeals

The Court held Goldfarb independent breached duty he owed to White- man operate through to the car latter’s vehicle negligence. plaintiffs wash without It reduced judgment by the amount of against Whiteman paid workmen’s benefits 388 Mich 698 Whiteman’s judgment and reduced by Goldfarb in indemnification a similar amount. Co, Power

In Husted v Consumers 376 Mich 41 (1965), opinion, in curiam which dealt with per joinder employee’s employer of an as a 56): defendant, (p it was concluded third-party (Hertel- not sue his "Thus if Husted could not, Hertel-Deyo he could Deyo), and we know joint tort-feasors law. Consum- Consumers cannot be Hertel-Deyo sue ers therefore cannot contribution plaintiffs damages.” respond should be held to 56): It say (p went on to be, deciding carefully

"We avoid there cannot relationship any circumstances of noncontractual be- plaintiff’s employer, and the tween a sued defendant * * * obliga- recovery employer. . An over implied by equitable princi- tion to reimburse can be ples, provided always the relator is without fault.”

Though question carefully now before us was Husted, preserved passed upon and not largely upon decision of the trial court was based from Husted and the just-quoted statement decision of the Court of based Appeals was Corp, White v McLouth Steel App 18 Mich (1969), following Husted. remedy provision Michigan

The exclusive (Part I, 4; MCLA law 17.144), 411.4; MSA reads: this act

"Where the conditions of under exists, compensation bene- recovery to the *5 703 Dale v Whiteman

fits, provided, shall be the remedy as herein exclusive against employer.”1 taking into account argued

It is that one of the of the workmen’s law —to purposes liability employer an to his establish limits language of the injuries statute —the the exclusive provides remedy Since is any receiving situation. bene- employee, fits from as an Goldfarb main- 4 claim him tains bars other than one for workmen’s benefits. plaintiff, liability though Whiteman’s even he Rumisek, Frazier v fault, In was without is clear. 455, (1960), 358 Mich 457 Justice Talbot Smith, Court, writing for the said: liability passed "The statute owner before us was response overwhelming public to an need. Common-law circumscribed liability, by as it was the doctrine of bailment, superior, like, respondeat agency, and the was cope rising injuries resulting unable to with the tide of mechanism, from the use of the new Principal among the automobile. legislative answers were the owner purpose, liability laws. Their as Mr. Justice Edwards Palmer, [1957], 350 held Moore v Mich 363 was to complement legisla- extend and the common law. The theory simple broadly applicable: tive An owner was machine was to state and negligent operation for the liable him he had owned when consented to its liability imposed by The use. doctrine of is broader than that * * * respondeat superior .” Band, In Ladner v Vander 321, 376 Mich 331- (1965), involving for a car not owner public pri- driven on a rather in a highway, but lot, concurring sepa- vate parking Justice Black, rately, wrote: repealed by This act was 1969 PA 317. The new section is MCLA

418.131, 17.237(131). MSA 388 Mich op legislature

"I do not see how could have titled plainer general then declaration of written a owner qualified liability; only which the ex- press exceptions no one of are set forth in said section present body concern. That which is told us *6 any injury liable for that the owner 'shall be occasioned negligent operation the of such motor vehicle.’ It did say that such should be limited negli- to It did employ gent operation 'upon public highway.’ prior adjective pronoun 'any,’ 'injury to the occasioned negligent operation vehicle,’ of such by the motor which courts, pronoun lawyers lay folk have ever looked upon synonymous 'every,’ as with and 'each one of all.’ Harrington v Inter-State See detailed discussion Ass’n, Business Men’s Accident 327, 330, 210 Mich at [1920]; following approved quotation ap- also the Co., Agricultural in Gibson v Life Ins. of Amer- pearing ica, 282 Mich 282 at 289 [1937]: " which, "any,” 'The the word clause uses to the ordinary understanding implies every "of kind.” The negatives word mean the idea of exclusion and would seem to ” just says.’ it what Since is also clear that Whiteman "is without fault”, question obliga- the is whether an tion to implied by equitable reimburse can be principles sweeping in the face of the language of the workmen’s law. Indemnity

II. The basis for indemnification has been said to upon rest the equitable principle right of a to grounds restitution. Courts have found various granting simplest the situa- indemnity. Probably tion is one in parties which the have entered into clearly a written contract has party which one agreed to indemnify the other. Next are those cases where the contract terms are such that Ryan right implied. indemnification can be See Co, Stevedoring Steamship Inc v Pan-Atlantic Dale v Whiteman op 232; Ct 100 L Corp, 350 US 124; 76 S Ed 133 v Corp Aircraft Hartman- McDonnell (1956); Co, Painting (Mo, Hanks-Walsh SW2d 788 1959). are those cases where the courts Then there agreement parties the the have written into indemnify upon based to implied contract oral, party, per- one written undertaking product or furnish a a certain service form Telephone State See Diamond Co v party. other 1970). Delaware, (Del, 269 A2d 52 University on special are based rela- Other decisions as a tionship parties bailment. between —such cases, given has a right In the bailor been these the bailee. See Lunderberg v indemnification from Bierman, 349; (1954); Minn 63 NW2d 355 (1944). 200; Baugh Rogers, v 24 Cal 2d 148 P2d 633 a number of cases in there are which Finally, to be indemnified based entitled to indemnification theory *7 opposed a tortfeasor as to the "ac- "passive” was See Larson v Min- tort other party. tive” of some neapolis, Daly 142; (1962); 114 68 262 Minn NW2d (1964). Bergstedt, v 244; Minn 126 242 267 NW2d courts, be followed the theory may Whatever in 42 principle up the has been summed CJS as follows: well-recognized implied "It is a rule that an contract indemnity arises in favor of a who without part exposed com-

any fault on his is to and pelled pay damages negligence on account of the or another, having right of tortious act of the former a * * * (42 CJS, indemnity action the latter for .” 596.) 21, p § right principle indemnity "This is based on the responsible everyone is for his own * * * statute, whether independently . It and exists parties, or not relations exist between contractual the other negligent person or not the owed whether 698 Mich op legal duty special particular negligent.” to be 597). (42 CJS, 21, p case,

In to indemnity this might be bailment, predicated upon theory as was Lunderberg, supra. might done in Or it implied be part undertaking as a of Goldfarb to wash fashion, the car in a workmanlike as was done in Co, Telephone supra. Diamond State prefer We equitable such right upon principle base Whiteman was without fault or as the reasoned in Italia Supreme United States Court per Navigazione v Oregon Societa Azioni di Steve- Co, Inc, doring 324; 84 748; 376 US S Ct 11 L (1964): Ed 2d 732 should "[Liability fall adopt preventive best situated to measures thereby to reduce the likelihood of injury.” Compensation III. Act Workmen’s Exclusive Remedy Numerous courts have had occasion to consider whether the exclusive remedy provision of a work- men’s compensation statute is a bar to a claim of indemnity. great majority, interpreting The statutes, varying language of their have found that it is not. Lighting Westchester Co v Westchester

In Small County Corp, Estates 175; NY 15 NE2d (1938), majority opinion stated: provided by "It 11: section 'The of an employer prescribed preceding by the last section shall *8 place any liability be exclusive and in of other whatso- ever, employee, representatives, personal or next of to such his husband, kin, parents, dependents anyone damages, otherwise entitled to recover or otherwise on account of such at common law * * * injury or death .’ Whiteman Dale v by the defendant is that made these point "The whole action. present provisions bar has no warrant the text position "We think this the statute. Plaintiff does not quoted from that has been of death. Plain- Haviland’s damages 'on account for sue tiff recovery for breach of an asserts its own obligation by owed to it duty or alleged independent defendant.” Kittleson, Telegraph Co v District

In American 1950), (CA8, the Circuit Court of F2d 946 act, construing the Iowa Appeals, said: nothing language of the Iowa "We can discover indicating purpose to abolish com-

Compensation mon law actions Act employer except as between in tort language contrary, the Act employee. On the and relied on 85.3 By points way. the other section by appellees required to subject to the Act is every employer * ** personal inju- for and all 'pay ries sustained course of the arising in the employee out of and by an cases, in such the em- employment, and liability recovery from other for ployer shall be relieved damages compensation for such or other quoted imposes the em- language injury.’ The provided by Act to an liability ployer extent employment, employee injured in the course his liability to em- employer from further relieves the ployee. from for the third language relieves an say To that this employ, party, one not in his to a third damaging such employer’s act something that read into the Act party is to Moreover, expressly 85.22 not there. section plainly is in tort abolished the common law actions shows that the Act were employer and exclusively those between employee’s provision that when legal creating a under circumstances injury is caused employer, than the against some other against such an action employee may maintain the third pre- of the Act damages. This section in tort law actions employee the common serves to the *9 388 Mich 698 Opinion Court arising out of his relation with his and is express legislature recognition by the Act operate beyond does not that field.” The reasoning of the Federal Court was subse- the Iowa quently adopted by Supreme Court City Pork, Inc, Blackford v Sioux Dressed 254 Iowa (1962). 845; 118 NW2d 559 Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc, In Moroni v 24 Ill App 534; (1960), 2d NE2d the Appellate Court Illinois, District, Division, First First said: legislature "The intention of the when it included the exemption blanket clause of from liability is indicated by the words 5 abolishing used Section any common statutory right law or to recover injuries for such 'to any one wholly partially dependent or upon him [the injured man], legal representatives estate, of his any one otherwise entitled to damages recover for such injury.’ appears It to us that this limitation indicates legislature that attempt had in mind those might who through to recover relationship some with the injured party, and not one such as the counter- case, claimant duty separate in the instant who seeks to recover on a apart owing from that injured to the employee.” We believe the reasoning in the above cases to be correct and that the exclusive remedy provision Compensation Workmen’s Act is intended to be a bar only any action against an employer by the employee or one which is derivitive from his case, claim. In this if passing pedestrian had been injured Goldfarb, instead an employee of clearly Whiteman’s vicarious pe- to that destrian should be indemnified by Goldfarb. We can see no reason for a different result here.

Under Act, Compensation Workmen’s in an action by the employee or the employer anyone "having a legal liability” to an Dale Whiteman v Brennan, Dissenting T. E. J. right a statutory has to be

employee, Goldfarb benefits indemnified for By injured employee. its hold- by him to paid preserved this Appeals right ing, out cancelling Goldfarb’s of re- and Whiteman’s judgment covery from Whiteman the amount of against Goldfarb *10 paid by Goldfarb. by third-party

A issue raised defend- secondary prevented that was goes the claim ant regarding plaintiff of fact from issue litigating 1963, GCR contributory negligence. possible Dale’s 111.9(2) or inconsistent claims defenses. permits never raised at the trial court question The was pass not it at this therefore do on time. level. We appel- The is affirmed. Costs to Appeals Court of lee. J., Black, Swainson, Kavanagh, and

T. C. M. Adams, Williams, JJ., with J. and concurred Brennan, (dissenting). pre- The T. E. J. case impression jurisdic- in this one of sented is first tion, a split which there is and it is one authority elsewhere. view, the rule that stated in

In better is my 2d, Automobiles, 152: p Am Jur liability "The owner of a motor vehicle under the negligence imposing liability upon him for the statute permission the is operating of derivative, it with former’s another of the negligence operator the of the vehicle It held that no being imputed to owner. has been the owner, liability part independent of the on the of the statute, driver, so the is created the operator, liability if is the act of that no created Accordingly, imposed upon the there none owner. is liable, operator his freedom where the whether negligence on his liability from arises from a want of 388 Mich Brennan, Dissenting by T. E. J. part from the existence such a relation between person preclude himself and as part on for the injury, the statute does not create an independent part on of the owner.” Michigan

Since our 413.15; 17.189, statute MCLA MSA provides defense to the operator vehicle which in- Dale, jured being defense Fox, the operator, was a natural in the employ plaintiff’s same as the employer, there recovery by could be no Dale against Fox. That being case, the action against Whiteman, vehicle, being derivative, owner purely should not lie.

I would the judgments reverse of the courts judgment below enter a of no cause for action the plaintiff the third-party plaintiff. *11 J.,

T. G. with T. concurred E. Bren- Kavanagh, J. nan,

Case Details

Case Name: Dale v. Whiteman
Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 21, 1972
Citation: 202 N.W.2d 797
Docket Number: 5 October Term 1972, Docket No. 53,844
Court Abbreviation: Mich.
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