Dale Properties, LLC v. State

pute process prompt certification is “the PROPERTIES, DALE

and economical medical and resolution LLC, Respondent, without disputes rehabilitation the need Jorgenson attorney involvement.” Novak-Fleck, Inc., 2001 WL Minnesota, Petitioner, STATE of (Minn. 2001). *3 Aug. WCCA We also Appellant. agree process is not “a mere No. C3-00-837. Id. technicality ignored.” that may be jurisdiction *4. But the has no department Supreme Court Minnesota. primary liability determine issues. 7, 2002. Feb. (2000).2 176.106, § In Minn.Stat. subd. asmuch department juris as the has no dispute

diction to resolve a em

ployer deny primary and insurer liability, Moreover, superfluous.

certification is deny

would inequitable fees when employer and insurer not raise the in response

issue believe what requiring

be a claim certification. We

therefore reverse the WCCA and rein the compensation decision of

judge and the award based thereon.

Reversed and judge’s

award reinstated.

Employee in attorney is awarded $600

fees. 176.106, provides § department

2. Miim.Stal. subd. 8 5220.2620. Because the has no issues, jurisdiction authority primary liability "[t]he commissioner does not have over relating to make request "mistakenly determinations medical or when medical form is genu- rehabilitation benefits when there is a filed in a case initial in which issues liabili- exist,” dispute ty injury initially department ine over will refer the matter employment, arose out of and the course of for a settlement conference before a workers' except provided by Typ- judge, section 176.305.” division or advise the ically, requesting disputes employee party petition in medical a claim to file or process appropriate insurer subp. initiates the claim with a take other measures. Id. at request "medical See form.” Minn. R.

OPINION PAGE, Justice. presents the issue of whether

This case immediate access a landowner whose di- highway has been limited cross- by the closure of a median rection from the over is entitled in value of resulting state for the reduction appeals re- property. The court the state summary judgment for versed and remanded for a determination “reasonably con- remaining access was reverse, We con- venient suitable.” that a owner who retains cluding in one direct access to traffic in the other direction although losing it crossover, to the closure of a median due a matter of retains reasonable access as law. (Dale), Properties, owns LLC land, undeveloped

roughly 29 acres of Oakdale, farming, it uses for located Minnesota. of the intersection of quadrant southeast Highway and Trunk Interstate 694 west, Highway 1-694 on the bounded north, right-of-way a railroad on the on the south, undeveloped owner’s another property on the east. Dale’s limited to a 30-foot prop- access at the northeast corner erty. September the Minnesota Department Transportation closed an opening along Highway in the median point. directly across from Dale’s access lanes of closing, Due to the the westbound for Highway longer 5 are no available di- Hatch, General, Attorney Mike David egress proper- from the ingress rect General, Jann, Attorney Michael Assistant ty. Paul, Attorneys Appellants. for St. median crossover was closed After the Klecker, Lang, Thomas P. Mes- John W. direct access to Dale was left with Kramer, P.A., Minneapolis, Attor- & serli Highway only the eastbound lane of neys Respondent. for wishing those to enter Consequently, lane have

property from the westbound five-eighths of a had to travel an additional onto the east- mile and make U-turn granted reach access The district court property’s bound state’s lane to summary motion judgment, finding point. exiting the Dale Those unnecessary to consider the travel west have had travel wishing to remaining reasonableness Dale’s mile as well make U- additional “compensable to the highway because no Dale, According turn. to commercial taking” appeal, had occurred. On the at trucks are unable to make U-turns the court of appeals concluded the district that property. closest to the intersections court by failing erred to consider whether closure, alleged difficul- Due to the Dale remaining Dale’s “reasonably access was development ty property, the of the convenient suitable.” Dale Props., and industrial office the is zoned (Minn. v. LLC portion, general northern industrial the App.2000). ap As the court of portion, guided southern commercial peals part reversed and remanded. Id. that, before generally. Dale claimed the at 573. highest use of closing, the and best the I.

property threefold: a convenience was pumps, store with a hotel with a res- gas I, Article section of the taurant, buildings and office ware- Minnesota provides Constitution that space. house Dale claimed after the “[pjrivate taken, property shall not de closing, highest stroyed damaged public the and best use resi- or use without just therefor, development. paid dential Dale asserted that first or 117.025, § secured.” the the caused the Minnesota Statutes closure of crossover (2000), “[tjaking subd. defines and all drop by approxi- value of to property the phrases import” words in $800,000. like mately interference, “every clude the right under court petitioned Dale the district for a domain, possession, of eminent with the seeking compel writ of mandamus the enjoyment, private property.” or value of proceedings state to condemnation initiate occur taking both as result or, alternative, pay damages the al physical appropriation of property by legedly the closure the medi caused with as the result interference the the crossover. contended ownership, possession, enjoyment, or value property longer no had conve property. Plymouth, v. City Johnson highway, nient access and suitable to the (Minn.1978). 263 N.W.2d In ei impaired substantially the closure case, analysis ther the our same. develop ability property, at Bldg. Blaine 566 N.W.2d significantly proper closure decreased the Property who state owners believe the has value, ty’s fair market and that the closure taken constitutional their constitutionally damaged may petition the court for a writ of sense thereby amounting taking to a violation compel the to initiate mandamus to of both the Minnesota and the United proceedings. Gibson v. response, In States Constitutions. Highways, 287 Minn. Commissioner of summary judgment, state moved for as 495, 498, (1970); 178 N.W.2d serting that Dale’s had §§ see also Minn.Stat. 586.01-12 required this court’s by II. decision in County Anoka (Minn. Building Corp., gov 566 N.W.2d 331 case is The resolution 1997), taking and that no occurred. erned our decisions Hendrickson v. without strips traffic median or dividers payment compensation.” rel. Mondale Gannons ex

(1964), State 21-22, doing (1966), 145 N.W.2d 327-28. 145 N.W.2d 321 so, the “law is well Building Corp., noted that recently, court and, most in this state and other states settled at 331. 566 N.W.2d roadway by of a state’s con Hendrickson involved the subject of made the or dividers cannot be that denied the freeway struction in condemnation.” Id. direct access abutting property owner at 329. 436-39, 127 Minn. at highway. Building Corp., in Recently, owner’s at 167-69. of traffic ac considered whether the loss was indirect only highway to the direction, due to the construc frontage a road. cess one by way of and circuitous median, may be included when 439, We held tion of Id. at at 169. 127 N.W.2d value of the re availability determining the market that, notwithstanding the partial taking. after a 566 road, compensa- maining land suffers frontage an owner answering ques at 334. if the to which the N.W.2d damage highway ble “ tion, dividing of again we stated that ‘the immediate and un had previously by median or dividers existing on is rebuilt limited access subject compensa of cannot be made the in manner that denies the right-of-way condemnation,’ where, tion in as and convenient suitable traffic access in one owner loses thoroughfare main at least 445-46, direction, but retains access the other.” Id. at 127 N.W.2d one direction. Id. holding that the state’s at 172-73. While the facts police power, on exercise of its concluding The rationale for that loss of compensable in a

presented, could result is noncom- traffic access one direction loss, of examples a number of we set forth pensable direct traffic access re po exercises of state’s noncompensable mains in direction can be found the other 440-41, Id. at 127 at power. lice upon prior in our cases and example the con 169-70. One such was and Gan which we relied Hendrickson strips prohibiting or of “median struction Inc. nons Collectively, the reasons lane of traffic from one limiting crossovers First, as follows: the construction stated Id. The other examples in another.” medians constitutes an exercise highway of one-way establishment cluded police power furtherance of the traffic; on streets and lanes of restrictions public safety duty to ensure on state’s U-turns, turns, parking; and right left and Hendrickson, 267 442, at roadways. size, weight, regulations governing Highway 170; State at 127 N.W.2d Id. The court noted speed vehicles. Burk, 200 211, Comm’n v. 265 P.2d Or. regulations that these restrictions (1954); Pennysavers Oil Co. v. 783, 792 compensable damages rise to be give State, (Tex.Civ. 546, 334 S.W.2d motorists, including all they “govern cause Second, the restrictions on App.1960). are on abutting property owners once highway that result from the use travel portion thoroughfare.” the traveled travel affect all members medians Id. unique abutting are not ing public and Hendrickson, In that the trial owners. we held 170; Iowa State 441, 127 to “instruct on at court erred when failed Smith, 869, Highway v. Comm’n 248 Iowa to control police power of the state (Iowa 755, 1957); opposed Holman dians as to the closure of highway Cal.App.2d P.2d reason, median crossovers. We see no (1950). Third, long as as however, distinguish between the two high owners have access to the abutting situations when looking at the underlying direction, inway at least one the use of rationale for holding that the construction highway prohibit medians that crossover of a highway median cannot be made the merely from one traveled lane to another Therefore, compensation. route, circuity opposed results to conclude that the closure of the median impairment of substantial of ac opposite crossover Dale’s access Gibson, cess. noncompensable exercise of the state’s 730; People Sayig, Cal. police power because Dale lost traffic ac- (1951); App.2d 226 P.2d cess but retained access in Mabe v. 83 Idaho 360 P.2d the other direction.1 summary Reversed and judgment rein- Additionally, it is obvious that the divid stated. ing highway will have a marked effect patterns on traffic and access situa Concurring Specially, PAUL H. tion. Gannons 275 Minn. at 145 ANDERSON, GILBERT, J. and J. Although N.W.2d at 328. not a reason in (concur- ANDERSON, H. PAUL Justice today, and of itself for our conclusion ring specially). wary are creating legal environment I concur majority’s with the conclusion in which the cost of regulating traffic and the district court did not err aas improving roadways prohibitive. becomes matter of law when it found that Langley Shopping Ctr. v. State Roads state’s closure of the median crossover did Comm’n, 213 Md. 131 A.2d compensable not constitute a taking. But (1957) that, if (noting the state were re I separately clarify specific write to factual quired compensate property to owners for case, aspects of this to address the rele- damages resulting from the construction vancy of County Anoka v. Blaine Build- medians, doing the cost of so could be ing Corp., (Minn.1997), 566 N.W.2d 331 (“If prohibitive); Sayig, 226 P.2d at express and to concerns about the breadth compensation entitled to of the holding. court’s highway because divided is constructed in front of his then the same First, important it is clarify to the factu- logically result would one-way follow when setting al In arguments this ease. streets are created in cities to control traf before both the district court and the court fic, or even where a double white line is appeals, Properties Dale asserted placed highway prohibits traffic the 1973 Final Certificate issued at the crossing from that lane lawfully, and thus pro- conclusion of the earlier condemnation permits only traffic in one-way front of the ceedings granted Properties right Dale property.”). point. to the median crossover Both lower Hendrickson, Inc.., grant- courts concluded that the certificate Building Blaine right. our ed no such The statements fo- issue of the 1973 cused on the construction of highway me- Final Certificate is not ap- before us on conclusion, arriving 1. We note require that in at our one direction would one to traverse hard-pressed imagine we were to a situation expanse just of a state to make a U-turn. whereby having not approach A and more coherent therefore, lower better ruling peal; to majority would have been law of the case. issue is the court on this Prop- exclusively rely partial takings on cases ruling places Dale court’s The lower condem- making similar to other its decision. Inverse in a situation erties Properties Dale can- are instituted a landown- abutting landowner. nation cases the result of an earlier has been try prove not claim that as to to er spe- proceeding, Building Corp., prop- retained In Blaine taken. crossover. to the median was no rights cific had been taken and there erty Therefore, an in- Properties asserts the fact that dispute as to claim, takings verse condemnation in other required, as is case claim. the line of takings cases. partial are, as presented by the Second, majority uses Blaine Build- out, helpful in pointed “not the dissent case, support takings ing, partial only address the issue case, though here result reached even taking has oc- compensable noted, previously is an inverse condem- as light prop- little on the curred shed part un- case. This confusion is nation when, here, damages er measure of in Blaine because the court derstandable indisputa- Building distinguish failed between ble.” But condem- types two of cases. inverse partial dispositive are not nation cases Building irony citing As I stated the dissent takings cases. in the case support the result reached Building, “inverse condemnation today is that the inverse condem- before us precedent confuses the threshold issue upon in inappropriately relied nation cases is entitled to whether a our appropriate are in with the true issue compensation Nevertheless, impor- it is analysis here. of Building]: whether evidence [.Blaine keep partial takings in mind that tant to diminished access is admissible to establish have and inverse condemnation cases damages measure of when proper the per- and we should not pedigrees different partial taking.” a 566 there has been of the two petuate any erroneous confusion N.W.2d concepts. analysis with the court’s problems

The opin- the court’s Finally, the breadth of Building recently were summa- majority, ion is troublesome because In that rized in a law review article. court, resolves the issue like the district article, the commentator said: adopting position that by before us crossover can never removal of a median Building Corp., in Blaine ma- compensable taking. There- argu- a spends opinion much of the constitute

jority fore, not address the majority does denying compensa- ing the reasons convenient and suitable tion, reasonably of the issue of whether or not issue However, long recognized have access. we will awarded is not be that owners en- principle rea- dispute, discussing instead of “reasonably convenient joy why sons as to the evidence diminish- that abut highways access to suitable” ed access is not admissible. Case, Midden, Note, 25 Wm. Mitchell Property— Median In a Takings Case 1. Alison J. added) (1999) (emphasis Taking Supreme Court L.Rev. Access: Minnesota (citations omitted). Evidence Declines to Allow Admission of Access Due to Installation Diminished City m one direction still property. Plym reasonably their Johnson must be (Minn.1978); outh, not, If it N.W.2d convenient suitable. is there taking subject Mondale v. 275 is a State ex rel. (1966). proceeding. N.W.2d principle

We reiterated holding The articulated by “a Building when we said is so “in broad one direction” compensable damage suffers when the Properties’ property to Dale could roadway changed way that the is such inbe Wisconsin and at the other in reasonably convenient and owner is denied South Dakota. Such access not would be main thoroughfare suitable access reasonably convenient and suitable and Bldg. in at one direction.” Blaine least subject compensation. would be Fortu- Gannons, (citing 566 N.W.2d at 334 nately, that is not the situation 326; 275 Minn. at Hen facts, have us. before Based on the 436, 437, drickson Properties has not demonstrated that it (1964)). 165, 168 See also Recke v. has been denied convenient and 500, 502, access in at least suitable one direction. import this statement Therefore, it is not entitled to relief roadway changed, is is clear—when Here, inverse condemnation proceeding. be “rea property owner denied when the state closed median cross- sonably convenient and suitable access” over, properly police power exercised its at least one direction. duty public furtherance of its to ensure It likely confusion has been creat- safety on There no Highway 5. com- ed sentence But, pensable taking matter as a of law. follows the aforementioned statement. majority, unlike the I am unwilling This second sentence reads as follows: as an absolute rule as a matter of * * * is well that the “[T]he law settled law, there never be a compensable can taking when a median crossover closed. or dividers cannot made the Therefore, I would reverse the court of condemnation,” compensation in appeals summary judgment, reinstate where, do so on more substantially but would loses traffic access in one but grounds limited than those articulated Gannons, retains access the other. the majority.

Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 334. GILBERT, special- (concurring Justice construes this statement ly)- mean join in special I concurrence of Jus- dividers, ergo of a medi- removal tice Paul H. Anderson. crossover, can never be the compensation in condemnation. Such a juxtaposition

reading ignores the of “rea-

sonably convenient and suitable access”

the first and “retains sentence access” direction in the least one second sen- together, principle

tence. When read

articulated in Blaine that the main thoroughfare

retained access to the

Case Details

Case Name: Dale Properties, LLC v. State

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Feb 7, 2002

Citation: 638 N.W.2d 763

Docket Number: C3-00-837

Court Abbreviation: Minn.