Dairyland Ins. Co. v. MarksDairyland Ins. Co. v. Marks
Ellen McKnight, plaintiff-appellee, in pro. per.
Leo J. Berggreen, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee Freddie Marks.
Thomas A. Lane, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Before WATKINS, CRAIN and ALFORD, JJ.
OPINION
CRAIN, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the City Court of Baton Rouge which held that the automobile liability insurance policy issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) to Freddie Marks, (Marks) was in effect on December 18, 1981.
This case arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on December 18, 1981. Mrs. Ellen McKnight (McKnight) was stopped in the southbound lane on South Acadian Thruway. Mrs. Virgie McNeely (McNeely) and a guest passenger, Mr. Amos Charlton, were stopped directly behind the McKnight vehicle. Before the traffic light turned green, the Marks’ vehicle struck the McNeely vehicle causing it to collide with McKnight‘s vehicle. McNeely and the guest passenger sustained personal injuries and McKnight‘s vehicle was damaged.
At trial of the consolidated suits arising from the accident, all parties stipulated that Marks’ fault was the sole cause of the accident and to the amount of damages. The only remaining issue is whether the policy issued by State Farm to Marks was effective on December 18, 1981, the date of the accident. State Farm maintains that the policy was cancelled on December 15, 1981, three days before the accident. State Farm alleges that the city court erred in not finding that the policy was properly cancelled pursuant to documents received
It is undisputed that there was a premium finance agreement between Marks and Regal wherein Regal financed the insurance premiums due to State Farm. Under the agreement, Marks was to pay to Regal $28.80 per month on the 11th of each month.2
Prior to the enactment of
A careful review of the notice sent from Regal to Marks convinces us that the trial court was correct in concluding the
The insurer argues that when the premium finance company certifies cancellation in accordance with
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the city court is affirmed at State Farm‘s costs.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
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(2) Upon default of insurance premium contract by the debtor, the premium finance company may mail a notice of cancellation to the insured, at his last known address as shown on the records of the insurance premium finance company. A copy of the notice of cancellation of the insurance contract shall also be mailed to the insurance agent negotiating the related insurance contract whose name and place of business appears on the premium finance agreement. Such notice of cancellation shall show the name of any governmental agency, mortgagee or third party also requiring notice of cancellation as shown on the insurance premium finance contract.
(3) Ten days after notice of cancellation has been mailed to the insured, if the default has not been cured, the insurance premium finance company may thereafter effect cancellation of such insurance contract or contracts by mailing to the insurer a copy of the notice of cancellation together with a statement certifying that:
(a) The premium finance agreement contains a valid power of attorney as provided in paragraph (1) above;
(b) The premium finance agreement is in default and the default has not been timely cured;
(c) Upon default, a notice of cancellation was mailed to the insured as provided in paragraph (2) above, specifying the date of mailing by the premium finance company to the insured; and
(d) Copies of the notice of cancellation were mailed to all persons shown by the premium finance agreement to have an interest in any loss which may occur thereunder, specifying the names and addresses of any governmental agencies, mortgagees or third parties to whom the insurance premium finance company has sent notice of cancellation.
Upon receipt of such notice of cancellation and statement from the premium finance company, the insurer shall be entitled to consider that cancellation of the insurance contract or contracts has been requested by the insured but without requiring the return of the insurance contract or contracts and the insurer may proceed to cancel such contract or contracts as provided in
. . . . .