263 Pa. 109 | Pa. | 1919
Opinion by
F. E. Dainty was employed by the Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., as a locomotive engineer; on February 24, 1917, he reported for work at the usual hour, and started his engine; subsequently he left the locomotive in charge of a fireman, who operated it for several trips, Dainty in the meantime retiring to a nearby shanty on his employer’s premises; “while there the assistant general labor foreman and yardmaster, Mr. Thompson, spoke to him and asked what was the matter, and if he had too much pay day; he responded, ‘No, not exactly, that he was mad at himself and everybody else’; Mr. Thompson then said, ‘If that is the way you feel, you had better take a night off’; he replied ‘All right,’ but still remained about the premises, and about 7:30 or 7:45
The proceeding was under the Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, and, on the foregoing findings, inter alia, the referee made an award of compensation to the widow and children of the deceased'; an appeal was taken to the compensation board, on questions of fact, and, in affirming, Commissioner Scott, speaking for the board, states: “The referee has found as a fact that, at the time the employee suffered the injury, he was in the course of his employment and engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of his employer, on the employer’s premises. The assistant labor foreman, S. E. Thompson, had a conversation with Dainty, some time before the accident, and,, from what passed between them at the time, it is contended by defendant that Dainty was dismissed from his employment for the night, that the relation of employer and employee was suspended for the time at least, that he was not in the course of his employment, as contemplated by the act, when killed, and that the claimant is not entitled to compensation as dependent widow. Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the finding by the referee is the decisive matter in the case. When all the testimony bearing on the question of the employee’s alleged dismissal by the labor foreman is fully considered, we think there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the finding.” *
An appeal was then taken to the Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which tribunal reversed the compensation board, stating: “To make a successful claim
The compensation board properly disposed of this case, and its adjudication should have been affirmed by the court below. The ultimate findings and conclusions of the referee are, in substance, correctly reported by Commissioner Scott, and the mere fact that each finding of the referee is not formally labelled by him as a finding of fact or conclusion of law, in no way changes their actual character; again, where a series of facts are found, showing, in themselves, that an employee was injured upon the premises of his employer (as in the present case), the lack of a formally stated conclusion that the injury so occurred is not fatal to the referee’s adjudication. As stated in Flucker v. Carnegie Steel Co. (decided herewith), 263 Pa. 113, “under the [compensation] act, those charged with the grave responsibility of finding the facts are not required to be learned in the law, and, in many cases, they lack the assistance of trained practitioners; hence the same precision in their adjudications as otherwise might be looked for, expected and required, can not be insisted upon.”
The controlling question concerns the alleged discharge of Dainty prior to the accident which caused his death, and the answer to that involves the deter
The issue of the alleged discharge being decided against the employer, the conclusion, on the other findings in the case, that the deceased met an accidental death during the course of his employment with defendant company, follows as a matter of course; hence the court below erred in setting aside such conclusion and substituting therefor its own “deduction.”
The judgment of the common pleas is reversed and the order of the referee, approved by the compensation board, is affirmed.