Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger

why reason defensible logically legally reasonable, imposing without and gitimate to seek not be able should recovery. Ketchmarks the impediment any artificial result- trauma emotional recovery for the sentiments paternalistic the Compare of the destruction complete the ing from in 1897 with court the Kalen uttered nearly for had lived they in which home of Court the expressed those re- Accordingly, I would century. a half State, 52 Haw. v. Rodrigues Hawaii summary of grant court's the trial verse court (1970), the in which P.2d remand favor and their in NIPSCO's pursue judgment plaintiffs permitted of emotional proceedings. infliction for further negligent for claim flooding of from the resulting distress occupy they could before home new

it: claims administered which

Courts inde- to an incident distress

of mental just as com- are action cause

pendent when claims to administer

petent independent as an raised are

they judging In damages.

ground dis- of mental claim of a

genuineness 'the may look to juries tress, and courts CHRYSLER DAIMLER and proof genuineness and quality CORPORATION, Appellant-Defendant, contemporary an extent rely to profession medical of the

sophistication jury to and court ability of the Yaeger, Diane YAEGER Samuel In cases claims' dishonest out weed Appellees-Plaintiffs. dis- of mental proof where than other nature, medically significant is of tress No. 55A405-0402-CV-65. required proof standard general is distress of mental of Indiana. Appeals a claim support in the genuineness guarantee some 1, 2004. Dec. case. cireumstances omitted).1 (citations at 519-20 Id. Ha- Supreme Court with agree

I rationale, no I see enlightened

wail's recovery for recognize not or should should opinion, dissenting response to a decided We have not stated, distress. mental majority Rodrigues 'attachment put on be a value should juries holding it is said Against the decision that that but possessions' material the law and that restraint' 'without are now be should which a function properly is to mate- encourage 'attachment should Moreover, jury is jury. with shared has age when man an 'in possession' rial 'rea- under the restraint 'without no less pletho- a veritable himself surrounded established we have standard man' sonable Indeed, our possessions.' of material ra cases negligence other than in innumerable burden of part of the does shift decision standard man' where a 'reasonable in- distress administering of mental claims applied and principles are general tort juries. by the courts ordinately assumed of whether issue preliminary where cases, jury, tort mental in other As reason- questions on presents commu- case section a cross representing court. disagree for the men would able consider position to nity in a better society n. 8. at 521 Rodrigues, 472 P.2d circumstances particular what - - - Kammey- Smith, Randall W.

Jeffrey P. Appel- for IN, Attorneys er, Wayne, Fort lant. Barker, Chica- Cohen, D. John M.

Seott Appellees. for IL, Attorneys go, OPINION possession Cruiser, of the PT the vehicle began to exhibit power defects HOFFMAN, Judge. Senior mechanism, steering engine, and the Defendant-Appellant blower motor. ("Daimler") Corporation appeals the trial The Yaegers took the vehicle to Daim- court's denial of its motion to dismiss and ler repairs occasion, more than one compel Plaintiffs-Appellees Samuel Yae- they but were not satisfied with the re- ("the ger and Yaeger Diane Yaegers") to sults. 9, 2002, On December submit to arbitration. We reverse and notified Daimler of their intent to revoke remand with instructions. acceptance of the vehicle. Due to Daim- We consider the following issues in our ler's recognize refusal to the request review of the trial court's determination: revocation of acceptance, the Yaegers filed I. appeal Whether Daimler's should a complaint alleging breach of express

be dismissed because it failed to warranty, breach implied of warranty, vio- certify its interlocutory appeal un- lation of the Indiana Motor Vehicle Pro- der the Indiana Appellate Rules of ("Indiana tection Act Law"), Lemon Procedure. revocation of acceptance pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss II. Warranty Whether the trial court Act. - erred as a matter of law in determining that Daimler filed a motion compel arbi- Yaegers did not consent to the tration and to dismiss the Yaegers' appeal. arbitration provisions of the con- The trial court heard oral argument on the tract when applied Diane for and motion and then issued an order denying obtained special financing for the (1) the motion on the bases that Samuel purchase of the vehicle. Yaeger did not consent to binding arbitra- III. Whether the trial court erred aas tion and Diane Yaeger did not knowingly matter of law in determining that consent to binding arbitration; the ar- provision arbitration of the bitration clause contained in the contract is

contract prohibited by the Mag- unenforceable under Magnuson-Moss nuson-Moss Act. Act; and there was no evidence that Daimler's arbitration plan IV. had been ap- Whether the trial court erred aas proved by the Indiana Attorney matter of General. law in determining that Appellant's App. at 5. subse- should be quently filed this interlocutory appeal. held unenforceable it because was not approved by the Indiana At- I.

torney General. Yaegers responded to ap 16, 2002, On or about May the Yaegers peal by filing a motion to dismiss.1 In purchased a PT Cruiser motion, Yaegers contend that Community from Motors. The vehicle was Daimler failed comply require Daimler, manufactured which warrant- ments of appellate rules that govern ed that years for three thirty-six thou- the filing of an interlocutory appeal. sand it miles would repair any defects in materials or in workmanship or on the The trial court's order denying Daim- vehicle. Shortly after the Yaegers took ler's motion to compel arbitration and to 1. The denominate the motion as a request is to this court dismiss Daimler's motion to "strike." The intent of the appeal. motion who parties prejudice without severable interlocutory order. Certain anis dismiss subsequent proceed aggrieved by Ap- may be in Indiana listed orders interlocutory 66(B). App.R. 14(A) trial court...." ings in the may appealed be Rule pellate improperly appeal "declined to dismiss a notice of have by filing right of matter jurisdiction the or- retained entry of brought appeals thirty days within 66(B)] motion [App.R. denying Daimler's under appeal The order der. listed Subsection interest and public order type significant is not cases appealable in a (A), therefore be raised it is issue would the same where 14(A). also appeal An App.R. Mutual under Northwestern right appeal."2 new Life interlocutory or- other from taken may be Stinnett, 698 N.E.2d Insurance Co. court, 14(B) if the trial previous (Ind.Ct.App.1998). We App.R. ders discretion, order and certifies issue of arbitration in its held that "the ty jurisdiction over accepts Appeals possibility importance because party requires the rule appeal. to useless submitting parties ap- interlocutory discretionary pursuing Id. unnecessary proceedings." certifica- requesting motion to file a peal Evansville-Vanderburgh School (citing - - App.R. court under trial by the tion Association, Teachers Evansville Corp. v. a motion 14(B)(1) file subsequently and to (Ind.Ct.App.1986)). N.E.2d under by this court acceptance requesting is also true that further held haveWe "this 14(B)(2). file ei- did not Daimler App.R. submitting parties of possibility by App.R. required motions ther should when there proceedings trial court 14(B). that Id. We note be arbitration." first App.R. and remand rely appeal on either Daimler's Daimler does dismissal court, to later determine only the trial 14(A) (B) App.R. on instead relies or but have been arbitrat should the matter interlocu- that 14(C), "[oJther that which states only provid- as may taken appeals be tory time and a waste of ed, in would result unnecessary that its contends Daimler and an parties statute." money ed for under Accordingly, authorized is interlocutory appeal trial court. upon the burden Act, Arbitration App.R. Uniform under the Indiana our discretion we exercise taken may be appeal that an states ap 66(B) Daimler's to dismiss and decline compel an order to the denial from peal. See, § 34-57-2- Ind.Code

arbitration. - IL. relief 19(a)(1). no provides This statute however, appeals Daimler, arbitration, because compel motion In its sales, leases, loan con- were that consumer observed from Daimler from exempted specifically tracts are on the price purchase a discounted given Act. Conse- the Arbitration coverage of pur employee through Daimler's vehicle raise its failed to has Daimler quently, further observed Daimler program. chase any pro- interlocutory appeal discount, Diane to receive order containing provi a "claim form"

signed arising every dispute required sion its re- noted in However, Daimler as ato be submitted the transaction out of motion, appel- our Yaegers' to the sponse included process resolution dispute court discretion give rules late the form Specifically, arbitration. are issues as adjudicated "pass upon decided, 4(E) App.R. contained is now App.R. was of former time Stinneft 2. At the 66(B). App.R. content 4(B) to this issue. was relevant stated that "in consideration for the dis- tion provision and because Diane did not received, count sign the discount claim form on the "cus- [the will customer] not be able to bring a any lawsuit for disputes line, tomer" they have facts, established relating Instead, to this vehicle. [the cus- which when construed in favor, lead agree[s] to tomer] submit and all dis- to the denial of Daimler's motion. putes through the Chrysler Daimler Vehi- Initially, we note that in making its de Process, cle Resolution which includes termination the trial court had before it mandatory arbitration that is the affidavits submitted the Yaegers. both and [the custom- court, Where the trial in ruling on a mo Appellant's App. at 41. The form er." tion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule also provides that the customer represents 12(B)(6), considered matters by signing the document that outside the pur- before pleadings, the motion will be reviewed as a chasing or leasing a vehicle under the em- motion for summary judgment. See In re ployee purchase program, the customer Bender, Estate (Ind. 806 N.E.2d "received and Program read the Rules and Ct.App.2004). Summary ..., judgment ap is Provisions specifically including a propriate where copy evidence shows there document entitled Vehicle genuine no issue of Resolution material fact Process-Binding and the Arbitra- - - moving party tion'" Id. program judgment entitled to rules outline the matter of various law. procedures, King resolution v. Terry, in- 805 N.E.2d cluding the final 399 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). of binding arbi- tration, and state that the "may customer

not bring separate a lawsuit." Id. at Furthermore, we hold as a matter of law that Diane's signature on the claim In response to Daimler's motion to com- form not only manifested her consent to pel arbitration, Diane contended in an affi- the benefit conferred in the form of a davit that although she signed the claim discount but also legal her consent to the form for the discount she did not intend to conspicuously placed provision. arbitration agree to the arbitration requirement. Di- Indiana, In person "a signs contract, who a ane also contended that signed she the without reading same, the will be by bound document because that is what she had to its terms." Weaver v. Co., American do Oil "in get order to my discount" and that 257 Ind. 276 (1971). N.E.2d "at 152 point no did I ever consent to resolve principle This applied to legal against discourage claims reli through [Daimler] upon ance assertions, arbitration." as those Appellant's now App. at by Diane, made T7. She also that are in contended that conflict with the arbitra- the provision tion clear terms of the agreement. claim form should not See be Plymale enforced v. Upright, because she did not sign N.E.2d form on the (Ind.Ct.App.1981). "customer" line. In Samuel arriving con- at our tended that he holding, should not concluded, be we have by bound after examin arbitration provision ing because he the complaint did not and affidavit, Diane's sign the claim form. that there is genuine contend no issue of material that because Daimler's motion fact compel to regarding the fact that Diane pur arbitration also requested dismissal of chased the that, vehicle so, and in doing their complaint, all facts must applied be con- she for and received special strued Diane and Samuel's favor. They discount. We decline to accept her invita reason that they because aver that they tion to elevate form over substance never intended to be bound the arbitra- accepting her claim that she should receive these advance 2302(a). to to the In order subject § not be but discount 2310(d) provides signed goals, the MMWA she § because provisions to consum- action right of statutory private line. wrong on the form claim supplier, of a failure by the "damaged ers is bound that Samuel hold alsoWe comply warrantor, contractor or service provisions. form's claim by the chapter, or this any obligation both pleadings from clear It is warranty, warranty, implied under written Diane that affidavits Samuel's Diane's contract...." or service en joint in a engaged were and Samuel Da from the vehicle purchase terprise may es- MMWA, warrantors Under enterprise, furtherance imler. mech- dispute settlement "informal tablish special eligible Diane, was who goal congressional further anisms" awas brother her because discount warrantors consumers encouraging re for and applied employee, 15 U.S.C. disputes. to settle Diane Both the discount. ceived "Congress 2310(a)(1) that (providing § dis the benefit accepted Samuel en- policy to it be hereby declares Diane's from resulted that price counted proce- to establish warrantors courage matter form, and as the claim signing are disputes consumer whereby dures deny from estopped nowis Samuel of law through settled expeditiously fairly and form's the claim effect ing mechanisms"). settlement dispute informal Corp. Land Standard See provisions. "informal not define does The MMWA Ind.App. Bogardus, Indiana proce- or mechanisms settlement" (holding 803, 824 N.E.2d if a warran- dure, provide it does but the benefits accepted knowingly "one who 2310(a) informal dis- §a incorporates tor estopped conveyance or of a contract or mechanism settlement pute himon binding effect validity or deny the must warranty, into the conveyance"). contract of such requirements minimum comply with determining that pre- erred court The trial Trade Commission the Federal by bound were 2810(2)(@). and Samuel Diane If § 15 U.S.C. scribes. in the claim found provisions mechanism arbitration settlement informal Diane. by mini- signed the FTC's form with complies procedure written if the requirements, mum IIL. "re- consumer requires warranty contend pursuing before to such sort Daimler dispute with re- section under remedy legal War Magnuson-Moss prohibited the consumer warranty, such specting argue ("CMMWA"). Yaegers Act ranty civil action... a commence may not binding arbitration of the enforcement unless (d) this section subsection contract procedure...." to such initially resorts he Congress intent frustrate would 2310(a)8)(C)®). 15 U.S.C. through relief obtain allow consumers actions. of civil filing the Yae- addressing directly Before put first must we arguments, gers in 1975 the MMWA Congress passed 1925, Congress in context. issue information adequacy "improve Act Arbitration Federal passed consumers, deception, prevent available hostility longstanding ("FAA") to reverse marketing in the competition improve arbitra- place "to towards 15 U.S.C. products...." consumer 534

tion agreements on the same footing as (1) Congress' intent: the text of the stat other contracts." (2) See ute; Davis v. Southern the legislative history of the stat Homes, Energy Inc., 1268, 305 ute; F.3d 1271 whether "an inherent conflict (11th Cir.2002), denied, between arbitration and the underlying cert. 945, 538 U.S. 1633, 123 S.Ct. 155 L.Ed.2d 486 purposes [of the statute] exists." Id. at (citing House, Inc., In applying the EEOC v. test, McMahon 534 Waffle 279, 754, U.S. 122 761, S.Ct. "questions 151 L.Ed.2d arbitrability must be ad (2002); Gilmer v. dressed with a healthy regard Interstate/Johnson for the fed Lane Corp., 20, eral policy U.S. 1647, S.Ct. favoring Gilmer, arbitration." 1651, (1991)). 114 L.Ed.2d 26 111 S.Ct. at 1652 (quoting Cone, The Su Moses H. preme 941). Court has at interpreted Thus, S.Ct. the FAA analyze we each "a congressional factor in turn declaration of a liberal determine whether Con policy federal gress favoring clearly expressed arbitration agree an intention to ments." preclude Moses H. Cone Hospi Memorial arbitration of MMWA tal v. Mercury Construction claims. Corp., 460

U.S. 103 S.Ct. 74 L.Ed.2d 765 The MMWA neither expressly prohibits " (1983). There is 'a liberal federal policy nor directly mentions either binding arbi- favoring arbitration and the Supreme tration FAA, or the and the concept of Court has read the FAA to establish a binding arbitration is not included in the presumption in favor of the enforceability statute's reference to informal dispute set- of contractual arbitration agreements.'" tlement procedures The MMWA re- Walton v. Rose LLC, Mobile Homes 298 quires that where a warrantor creates in- (5th Cir.2002). F.3d "Only a con formal dispute procedures, settlement trary congressional command can override consumer must exhaust them before filing the dictates of the FAA." Id. In cases suit. Binding arbitration, on the other involving the interpretation FAA, hand, does not contemplate the filing of a Court has recognized that lawsuit. As the Fifth and Eleventh Cir- "[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory cuits recently recognized, "binding arbi- claim, a party does not forgo the substan tration generally is understood to be a tive rights statute; afforded it only substitute for filing lawsuit, not a pre- submits to their resolution arbitral, in an requisite." Davis, 1274; 305 F.3d at Wal- rather judicial, than Gilmer, forum." 111 ton, 298 F.3d at 475. S.Ct. at 1652. Furthermore, the express provision In order to overcome this pre of informal dispute procedures settlement sumption in favor of arbitration, party the does not necessarily preclude the enforce opposing arbitration bears the burden of ment of agreement an to participate in a demonstrating that "Congress intended to procedure formal such as arbitration. See preclude a judicial waiver of remedies for In re American Lancaster, Homestar of the statutory rights at issue." Shears 480, 50 (Tex.2001). S.W.3d 487 Gilmer, In Express, McMahon, the Supreme Court noted that on/American Inc. v. the Age 220, 482 U.S. 107 2332, S.Ct. 2343-46, 96 Discrimination in Employment Act impos L.Ed.2d 185 (citing Mitsubishi Mo es a similar prerequisite. 111 S.Ct. at tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 1647. Specifically, a claimant must file a Inc, 614, 473 U.S. 3346, 105 S.Ct. 87 charge with the EEOC before pursuing a (1985)). LEd.2d 444 McMahon, In court, claim in and the EEOC the engage must court announced three factors that bear on in "informal methods of conciliation, con-

535 to a law citation Instead, rely on a they 29 U.S.C. persuasion" ference, and history. the discussing article review nevertheless Court 626(b). Supreme provi express ADEA's the that concluded ambiguity the that note We is resolution" dispute "out-of-court for sion addressed history was legislative MMWA's agree contractual awith inconsistent not in Davis: Circuit the Eleventh FAA. Gil the under arbitrate to ment draft of considering preliminary When mer, 1d. that reflected MMWA, the Senate the that warrantors MMWA intent Congress' that the addition, fact "it is the

In with cooperate products concurrent with forum of consumer judicial grants to es agencies for private courts and federal government in state jurisdiction settlement dispute that evidence informal tablish is insufficient claims MMWA consumer binding ar care of take that preclude to mechanisms intended Congress litigation (citing aid of 1274 the Davis, F.3d at without 305 grievances bitration. No. 91- 2338, reject S.Rep. which at arbitration." McMahon, 107 S.Ct. or formal added). arbitra "compulsory that argument (emphasis 876, ed at 22.28 concluded, Act of Exchange "there the Securities Fifth Cireuit As the tion pro intended Congress the statute that because improper no evidence 1934 is still an considered to be of the Unit binding arbitration courts district [tlhe vides jurisdic procedure. have exclusive ... dispute shall settlement ed States informal title....'" dis informal violations fact that tion of Therefore noted that at which be non Gilmer, must 111 S.Ct. procedure settlement pute jurisdiction Congress of concurrent grant imply that Congress' not binding, does arbitration, for ADEA courts binding federal preclude in state to meant Walton, arbitra binding is consistent nature." claims a different is of which like agreements, "arbitration McMahon, tion because the Su 476. F.3d at 298 jurisdiction, for concurrent arbitration upheld Court preme allowing objective Exchange advance the Securities though serve even history implied to select legislative right Act of 1934's a broader [claimants] it be whether disputes, adopt resolving intended forum Congress otherwise"). 427, 74 S.Ct. Swan, U.S. judicial [v. Wilko (1953)] attitude L.Ed. merely the MMWA is that upshot in forum inadequate an an to include option a warrantor gives claims. statutory enforce which in settlement informal at S.Ct. McMahon, at 482 U.S. speak not "It does warranty. its written pro intent congressional Any disputes be settling means to other legis MMWA's hibit binding arbitration." parties, tween clear considerably less history is lative Homestar, at 487. S.W.3d American Secu history legislative than the MMWA text of that the conclude Act Exchange rities Yae- invalidate not does prohibit held did arbi engage agreement gers' McMahon. in binding tration. added). (emphasis 1276 at F.3d 305 in statements bold make Yaegers The decision Court's Supreme light history of legislative about brief appellate the federal in McMahon our deter- upon effect and its the MMWA per- Davis in Walton however, decisions court neglect, Yaegers The mination. factor, conclude we this taining to history in their brief. any of recite to 536

Yaegers have carry failed to their burden 305 F.3d at 1276 (citing Basic Inc. v. Lev of showing a clear congressional intent inson, to 224, 485 U.S. 978, 985, 108 S.Ct. 99 prohibit arbitration of MMWA (1988), L.Ed.2d 194 which states that a claims. the absence any mean- fundamental purpose of the Securities Act ingful legislative history barring binding is the disclosure of information to potential arbitration, coupled with the unquestiona- investors; and Rodriguez Quijas de ble policy federal favoring arbitration," we Express, Inc., Shearson/American 490 conclude that Congress did not express a 477, 485-86, U.S. 1917, 109 1922, S.Ct. 104 clear intent in the legislative MMWA's his- (1989), L.Ed.2d 526 par holds that tory to bar binding arbitration agreements may ties arbitrate Securities Exchange Act such as the one between the Daimler and claims). of 1984 "[Elven claims arising the Yaegers. Davis, See id. under a designed statute to further impor The Yaegers argue that the binding ar- tant social policies may be arbitrated be bitration provision in their contract with cause so long as the prospective litigant Daimler is contrary to the purposes of the effectively may vindicate [his or statu her] MMWA. Specifically, Yaegers refer to tory cause of action in the forum, arbitral their belief that binding arbitration would the statute serves its function." (quot Id. conflict with the MMWA's intent to pre- ing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, vent warrantors from making bold prom- 79, 531 U.S. 121 513, 521, S.Ct. ises that were overridden "tiny type (2000)). L.Ed.2d 373 set [that] forth grossly unfair terms and has held that consumers are able to vindi away took rights more than they gave." cate their rights in an arbitral forum. See Appellee's Brief at 22. The Yaegers fur- Allied-Bruce Dobson, Terminix Cos. v. ther refer to their belief that just "it does 513 265, 280, U.S. S.Ct. not make sense to strictly regulate other (1995) L.Ed.2d 753 (holding that "Con types of dispute resolution yet allow gress, when enacting [FAA], had the the warrantor free rein impose to needs of mind"). consumers ... terms it chooses." agree with these cases that arbitration Id. at 28. does not work against the purposes of the above,

As noted MMWA. With MMWA ex reference to the Yaegers' pressly states purposes: specific three concerns, there is no indication improve the adequacy of information avail the inclusion of a binding arbitration consumers; (2) able to prevent decep clause would bring back the days where tion; improve competition in the contractual obligations are overridden marketing of products." consumer contrary provisions agate type. Fur § U.S.C. 2302. Despite the Yacegers' Wil thermore, it is perfectly consistent for the ko-like disdain for arbitration, we conclude MMWA regulate informal dispute mech purposes of the MMWA and the anisms that are controlled by the warran FAA are not in fact, conflict.3 In tor, "the while not closely regulating third-par Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced ty controlled arbitrations.

arbitration of statutory claims where the underlying purpose of the statutes is contend that we protect and inform Davis, consumers." should defer to the Federal Trade Com- above, 3. As we Swan, note quate forum in which to in Wilko v. statutory enforce U.S. 74 S.Ct. However, (1953), 98 L.Ed. 168 claims. against this bias arbitra- the Court held that arbitration was an inade- tion was abandoned in McMahon.

537 on construction its own impose simply pro- which ("FTC") regulations, mission's necessary in the statute, be as would the the arbitration hibit interpreta- an administrative of the FTC absence authorizes MMWA MMWA. or Rather, is silent if the statute MMWA's tion. the for regulation promulgate to specific to the respect with ambiguous procedures. settlement internal court is for the 2310(a). issue, question has the The FTC § 15 U.S.C. See is based answer ageney's not indi- the shall whether warrantor "[a] that stated of the statute. warranty or service construction permissible a any written in cate indirectly that directly or either contract 843-44, at 2781-82. 104 S.Ct. at U.S. 467 warrantor, con- service of the the decision of the prong first the addressing In is party third tractor, any designated examining begin we inquiry, Chevron concerning any dispute binding in final or enforcement of the language the 16 contract." warranty or service the Davis, (quot 1278 F.3d at 305 itself. See 708.1(e). C.F.R. Telecommunica v. BellSouth ing Smith feder- courts, state both Numerous (11th Cir. tions, Inc., 273 F.3d find the this issue. al, considered have already discussed 2001)). As we to be in Davis analysis Cireuit's Eleventh directly address above, did not Congress Davis, the court In persuasive. most the text or in the anywhere binding arbitration we determining whether in that noted first Be of the MMWA. history legislative of interpretation the FTC's defer should unclear, we Congress is of the intent cause Supreme the MMWA, we look of prong to the second proceed must U.S.A., Inc. in Chevron decision Court's analysis.4 Chevron Inc., Council, Resources Natural Defense the Chevron prong L.Ed.2d the second Under 104 S.Ct. 467 U.S. to determine required are we inquiry, Chevron, (1984). In construction the FTC's whether stated: de- making that is reasonable. statute con- agency's an a court reviews When be- the rationale termination, look it adminis- "we which statute of the struction Davis, 805 construction." FTC's hind the questions. two ters, confronted it is regulations, legislative In its at 1278. F.3d whether question First, is the always, regard- a decision that reasoned the FTC pre- to the directly spoken has Congress may not be warranty dispute ing intent of If the at issue. question cise 110(d) gives Act clear, the end "section because that Congress over jurisdiction courts and federal state court, well as matter; for warranty and service breach unambig- suits to the effect give must agency, Davis, (quoting id. See If, contracts." Congress. intent uoustlyexpressed FTC 700.8). Interestingly, $ CFR. Congress however, determines the court convinced now "is not that it has declared precise directly addressed has not [referred any guidelines that issue, court does at question MMWA, controlled FAA passing the in Walton, Circuit the Fifth in We note 4. court, court, the Davis unlike Walton evince and the Congress did not because held prong the second examine prohibit did not intent clear courts reach MMWA, congressional Although intent both analysis. clear "[the Chevron - agree- conclusion, adopt the we enforcing valid favor ultimate the same at F.3d case." is not Congress' in this controls intent ments approach that Davis was determination court's Walton clear. Congress' clear intent belief on its based binding arbitration] could ensure sufficient plaining about product, who need a protection for Davis, consumers." See id. expensive less litigation"). alternative (quoting 60167, (1975)). 40 Fed.Reg. 305 F.3d at 1279. agree In light of the FTC's declared basis for FTC's interpretive regulations are unrea its interpretation MMWA, the Davis sonable in light of clear Supreme Court court held that precedent.5 provision

[A] statute's judicial for a fo rum preclude does not IV. enforcement of a binding arbitration agreement under the The Yaegers contend that (citation omitted). FAA. Thus, of the claim FTC's motive legislative behind the reg form is not enforceable under Indiana's ulation is contradictory Supreme "Lemon Law." The argue that rationale, Court and we conclude that its the Lemon Law "makes it clear that a interpretation is unreasonable. See consumer does not need to resort to arbi McMahon, 238, 482 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. at tration where an automobile manufactur 2343 (refusing to follow Congress' prohi er's arbitration mechanism is not certified bition of arbitration in the Securities by the Indiana Attorney General as com Exchange Act of legislative 1934's histo plying with federal and state require law ry when Congress' motive was contra ments." Appellants' Brief at 25. The dictory to Supreme rationale). Court Yaegers point out that Chrysler's arbitra We also conclude that the FTC's addi tion procedure is not by certified the attor tional rationale is unreasonable. Al ney general, "(tlo and they argue that though the FTC first stated that it require the Yaegers to submit to 'binding looked to a subcommittee staff report arbitration' with an uncertified program (which appears to be no longer be at would thwart protection afforded con tainable) to determine Congress' intent, by sumers Law], [Lemon which incor the FTC continued evincing major porates the regulations FTC's under the concern that an arbitral forum will not [MMWA]." Id. adequately protect individual con Yaegers' contention is sumers. based upon Court in McMa interpretation of § hon, Ind.Code 24-5- however, rejected this same hostili 13-19, ty by shown states that buyers the SEC. 482 cannot U.S. at 234 3, avail n. themselves of protection S.Ct. at 2341 n. 3 (declining to Lemon defer to Law if they the SEC's interpretation "first resort- ed to Securities an Exchange informal procedure Act of 1984 based established manufacturer or in attitude). which a manufacturer SEC's Wilko Instead, the Supreme Court participates." holds that arbitra This limitation upon buyers tion is favorable applies to the only individual. if See is certified Cos., the attorney general Allied-Bruce "(A) Terminix U.S. at complying 279, 115 S.Ct. at 842-43 all respects with 16 C.F.R. 702" and (noting that "arbitration's advantages "(B) often would complying other rules con- seem helpful individuals, say, com- cerning certification adopted by the attor- Davis, Walton, In addition to preme American in Borowiec Gateway Homestar, we have found holding 209 Ill.2d 283 IIl.Dec. 808 N.E.2d Michigan Supreme Court in Abela v. General persuasive to be on the issue of Corp., Motors 469 Mich. 677 N.W.2d 325 whether the MMWA forbids pre- the use of (2004) and holding binding arbitration. of the Illinois Su- I would Consequently, 66(B). to limited Rule not late including but ney general, appeal. the dismiss pursuant hearings, oral of requirement the Furthermore, statute the ways 4-222." three to IC 14 provides Rule Appellate apply not does interlocutory limitation the that an hear provides to for this "adequate not received has buyer 14(A) the if allows (1) Rule Appellate appeal: of manufacturer Ap- the from right; notice as of interlocutory appeals written procedure." the discretionary of 14(B) the existence permits Rule pellate trial court "if the interlocutory appeals above, binding discussed have weAs Appeals of and the Court order its certifies procedure informal not an is and appeal"; the over jurisdiction accepts Accord the MMWA. under contemplated 14(C) other authorizes Rule Appellate proper not a is binding ingly, by as only provided interlocutory appeals a it is not and C.F.R. of 16 subject under not fall does appeal This statute. the by certified can be that procedure interlocu- listed categories any of the the with accordance attorney general Additionally, right. as tory appeals if were we Even regulations. federal inter- this authorizing no statute there is statute that the proposition the accept Daimler Finally, because locutory appeal. arbitration, Yaegers the speaks requesting a motion not file did Chrysler the emphasis prevail. cannot still file then court and trial by the certification a upon put limitations the upon is statute this by acceptance requesting a motion the under recover ability buyer's discretionary interlocu- Court, not a this is not Law; does the statute Lemon Indiana Nevertheless, majority the appeal. tory by the not certified procedure that state this to hear it has discretion that found Furthermore, is invalid. attorney general 66(B). Rule Appellate under appeal the on argument the that note we 66(B) provides: Rule Appellate same upon premised Law Lemon right their as of as be dismissed presumption shall appeal faulty No Wilko-based dis- finally Con the MMWA. case was argument because previous arbi belief, binding or Administra- trial court in the Yaegers' posed trary to inexpen comparatively parties, a fair to all issues Agency tration tive may consumers discovery of such suggestion upon sive but its discre- may, both situation, under the Court rights enforce disposi- until Law. Lemon consideration tion, suspend Indiana MMWA may issues, itor of such made tion is instruct court trial reverse as are issues adjudicated upon pass suit. Yaegers' to dismiss court parties prejudice without severable subsequent aggrieved may be who RILEY, J., concurs. Admin- court or trial in the proceedings separate VAIDIK, J., with dissents Agency. istrative opinion. Scroghan, v.Co. Insurance In Allstate dissenting. VAIDIK, Judge, de trans. (Ind.Ct.App.2004), N.E.2d other that acknowledged nied, court majority agree with I sug have appeals court panels interlocu- raise failed to has jurisdiction find may we gested provisions any of under tory appeal outside interlocutory appeal However, an I hear 14. Rule Appellate Indiana However, 195. Id. at Rule Appellate we majority disagree the rea- to follow opted court the Allstate Appel- appeal to hear discretion soning of INB National Bank v. 1st Bank, (Ind.Ct.

Source 567 N.E.2d 1200

App.1991),wherein the court held: ASHBA, Brian K. Appeliant-Defendant, 66(B) [Rule should ] not be interpreted v.

as an alternative authorization to liti- gants to initiate interlocutory appeals STATE Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. apart from, or in to, addition the author- No. 06A01-0310-CR-383. provided ization by [Rule 14]. addi- tion, we Court of Appeals believe it would of Indiana. constitute an abuse of discretion for this court Dec. 2004. grant an interlocutory appeal cognizable ORDER 14(B)] [Rule where trial court, here, has expressly The Court notes refused or opinion in Bri denied certification. an K. Ashba v. State Indiana was cor rectly electronically transferred to the Id. at 1202. I by my stand previous deci Clerk's office but incorrectly forwarded as sion in Allstate and echo its reasoning that copy hard to West. if we were to allow the use of Appellate Therefore, the Court directs 66(B) Rule to supplement jurisdiction our opinion as reported in 808 N.E.2d 670 to hear interlocutory appeals under Appel (Ind.App.2004) be vacated and the at- late Rule then the limitations of Appel tached opinion shall be substituted and late Rule 14 would become meaningless. (816 published. 862). N.E.2d Allstate, 196; 801 N.E.2d at see also Buet er Brinkman, v. (Ind.Ct. 776 N.E.2d 910

App.2002) (refusing 66(B) to apply Rule

"rescue" an appeal). Additionally,

case is more compelling than Allstate be case,

cause in that Allstate requested certi fication court, trial but the court Steven WRIGHT, Appellant-Defendant, Here, denied it. did not even request certification. Accordingly, I

would hold that this Court does not Indiana, STATE of Appellee-Plaintiff. discretion to hear this appeal and there No. 49A02-0405-CR-405. fore would dismiss it.

Court of Appeals of Indiana. Dec. 2004. Rehearing Denied Jan.

Case Details

Case Name: Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger

Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals

Date Published: Dec 1, 2004

Citation: 818 N.E.2d 527

Docket Number: 55A05-0402-CV-65

Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.