OPINION OF THE COURT
The City of Schenectady appeals as of right, upon a two-
The FOIL requests followed news reports that, in the late evening of May 11, 1997, a chartered bus load of off-duty law enforcement officers, celebrating a police officer’s bachelor party, became involved in a confrontation with two civilians in an automobile. During the incident, the bus occupants reportedly pelted the civilians’ vehicle with raw eggs. The Schenectady police chief confirmed that the egg-throwing incident had occurred, that, under a promise of confidentiality, 18 Schenectady police officers had admitted their participation in the incident in various degrees, and that disciplinary sanctions were imposed ranging from written reprimands to loss of vacation dаys and overtime pay. News articles additionally reported that the officers had agreed to pay the owner of the automobile for the cost of repairs of damage sustained in the incident.
When the Police Department refused to furnish petitioners additional information concerning the disciplinary action, they filed FOIL requests seeking, respectively, “all documents related to disciplinary actions,” or the identities of the sanctioned officers and the specific punishment imposed upon each. These requests were rejected by the City’s records officer, and that determination was upheld on administrative appeal to the Mayor of the City.
Petitioners then brought these proceedings in Supreme Court to compel disclosure. Supreme Court rejected all the grounds for nondisclosure advanced by the City other than the FOIL exception for records that “are specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute” (Public Officers Law § 87 [2] [a]). The court concluded that these records were specifically exempted under Civil Rights Law § 50-a. The first subdivision of that section provides:
“All personnel records, used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion [of police officers, correction officers or firefighters] * * * shall be considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review without the expresswritten consent of such [officers] * * * except as may be mandated by lawful court order.”
Subdivisions (2) and (3) of section 50-a set forth a procedure to obtain a court order of disclosure, giving any interested party an opportunity to be heard. Subdivision (4) exempts from the confidentiality of such records a disclosure to the Attorney-General, a District Attorney or County, Town or Village Attorney, a Grand Jury and any governmental agency requiring records “in the furtherance of their official functions.”
The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the records of the disciplinary actions taken against the 18 officers, albeit part of their personnel files and pertinent to evaluate the officers regarding continued employment or promotion, were nevertheless not exempt from FOIL disclosure under Civil Rights Law § 50-a.
On the City’s appeal from the reversal of Supreme Court’s determination, petitionеrs essentially reiterate their successful position before the Appellate Division. They read our decisions in
Matter of Capital Newspapers v Burns
(
In our view, petitioners’ exceedingly narrow interpretation of the Civil Rights Law § 50-a bar to FOIL disclosure conflicts with the plain wording of the statute, is contrary to its legislative history and is inconsistent with our FOIL precedents. It would undermine the paramount objectives of the Legislature in enacting section 50-a.
First, the literal language of the statute is inconsistent with petitioners’ position that access to police and correction
The legislative history of Civil Rights Law § 50-a, as originally adopted and later amended, likewise simply cannot be read to support petitioners’ construction of its limited reach and application in connection with a FOIL request — i.e., that derogatory and potentially injurious information in an officer’s personnel records may .lose its statutory shield of confidentiality and unqualifiedly become public knowledge if the entity seeking FOIL access is a news-gathering organization that is not contemplating suit. Section 50-a was first enacted into law (L 1976, ch 413) some two years after passage of the original FOIL legislation (L 1974, ch 578) granting public access to the kinds of records sought here. The Legislature was well aware of the use of FOIL to obtain such records.
The statute was designed to prevеnt abusive exploitation of personally damaging information contained in officers’ personnel records — perhaps most often in connection with a criminal defense attorney’s FOIL application for purposes of general cross-examination of a police witness in a criminal prosecution. Undeniably from the legislative record, however, the legisla
The legislative history also amply demonstrates awareness that Civil Rights Law § 50-a as initially enacted would have the effect of insulating the kind of disciplinary records sought here frоm disclosure upon mere request. Thus, the Memorandum of the Division of the Budget described the sponsors’ and supporters’ position that the bill was necessary to prevent police witnesses from being discredited by confrontation with irrelevant “complaints, disciplinary proceedings or reprimands filed against them in the past” (Mem of Div of Budget, Bill Jacket, L 1976, ch 413 [emphasis supplied]). Moreover, it was recognized that the legislation would have some restrictive impact on open public access such as petitioners are requesting here. Thus, opposition to the bill was expressed on the ground that the needs to prevent oppressive use of police personnel records “do not offset the benefits of assuring the availability to the public of the performance evaluation of its servants” (Mem of Special Deрuty Atty-Gen Joseph P. Hoey, Special Prosecutor Suffolk County, Bill Jacket, L 1976, ch 413).
Certainly, later amendments underscore that confidentiality of officers’ personnel records was intended to go well beyond merely shielding them from abusive use in an actual litigation context. The legislative history of the 1981 amendment to section 50-a, adding correction officers to the protected clаss, declared that the described abuses of personnel information it was designed to prevent included “harassment or reprisals” against an officer (Mem of Senator Marino and Member of Assembly Kremer, Bill Jacket, L 1981, ch 778) or “his/her family” (Mem of Div of Budget, Bill Jacket, L 1981, ch 778).
An agency’s inquiry into, or reliance upon the status and motive of a FOIL applicant would be administratively infeasible, and its intrusiveness would conflict with the remedial purposes of FOIL
(see, Matter of Farbman & Sons v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,
Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs. (supra),
our other major precedent on the interplay between Civil Rights Law § 50-a and FOIL, also eschews reliance on the litigious purpose of, or anticipated use in a lawsuit by, the person seeking access to the personnel records. There we recognized that a legislative objective of Civil Rights Law § 50-a was to protect correction officers “from the use of records * * * as a means for harassment and reprisals” (
“Contrary to the dissent, the conclusion that records may be protected from disclosure under section 50-a, even though not sought for actual litigation, is entirely consistent with the statutory scheme” (id., at 32 [emphasis supplied]).
Repeatedly, in
Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs.,
we recognized that the decisive factor in determining whether an officer’s personnel record was exempted from FOIL disclosure under Civil Rights Law § 50-a was the potential
use
of the information contained therein, not the specific purpose of the
“Documents рertaining to misconduct or rules violations by corrections officers — which could well be used in various ways against the officers — are the very sort of record which * * * was intended to be kept confidential. * * * The legislative purpose underlying section 50-a * * * was * * * to protect the officers from the use of records * * * as a means for harassment and reprisals and for the purposes of cross-examination” (73 NY2d, at 31 [emphasis supplied]).
“The construction petitioner urges seems inimiсal to the very statutory purpose of preventing the use of personnel records as a device for harassing or embarrassing police and correction officers” (id., at 32 [emphasis supplied]).
“[T]he legislative intent * * * was to prevent release of sensitive personnel records that could be used in litigation for the purpose of harassing or embarrassing correction officers” (id., at 33 [emphasis supplied]).
Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs.,
and
Matter of Capital Newspapers v Burns (supra)
point to the approрriate criteria for the disposition of petitioners’ FOIL request for full access to the disciplinary information on the egg-throwing incident contained in the 18 officers’ personnel records. On the one hand, to prevent FOIL disclosure of officers’ personnel records, it is not sufficient merely to demonstrate that the recorded data may be “used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion” of the officers — literally the sole standard for confidentiality set forth in Civil Rights Law § 50-a. That comprehensive statutory exemption must be tempered when it interacts with the competing, equally strong legislative policy of open government through broad public access to governmental agency records embodied in the FOIL legislation
(see, Matter of Capital Newspapers v Burns, supra,
Hence, when access to an officer’s personnel records relevant to promotion or continued employment is sought under FOIL, nondisclosure will be limited to the extent reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of Civil Rights Law § 50-a — to
On the other hand, under
Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs. (supra),
if the potential for the previously described abusive exploitation of the personnel data exists, confidentiality under Civil Rights Law § 50-a will not automatically be defeated solely because the person seeking access is a representative of a news-gathering organization, not contemplating litigation, and imbued with the purpose of disseminating information to the general public on a matter of legitimate societal concern. The Legislаture has made the policy choice to shield law enforcement officers from personnel disclosures that “could be used in litigation for the purpose of harassing or embarrassing [them]”
(Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs. v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., supra,
As with all statutory exceptions to FOIL disclosure of governmental agency records, the agency or other party opposing disclosure of officers’ personnel records carries thе burden
It is possible that, in a close case, the status and purpose of the applicant may have some relevancy in determining the risk of oppressive utilization of the materials sought. Moreover, disclosure for uses that would not undermine the protective legislative objectives could be attained either by a restrictive formulation of the FOIL request itself, or through redaction by thе agency having custody of the records, tailored in either case so as to preclude use in personal attacks against an officer which Civil Rights Law § 50-a was enacted to preclude.
(See, Matter of Scott, Sardano & Pomeranz v Records Access Officer of City of Syracuse, supra,
In the case at bar, the subject of petitioners’ request itself demonstrates the risk of its use to embarrass or humiliate the officers involved. Petitioners seek comprehensive access to all records of the disciplinary action taken against the 18 police officers, including their identities and individual punishments, for possibly very serious misconduct. In
Matter of Prisoners’ Legal Servs. (supra),
we held that “[documents pertaining to
misconduct
or
rules violations
by correction officers * * * are the very sort of record which, the legislative history reveals, was intended to be kept confidential” (
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the petitions dismissed.
Order reversed, etc.