518 N.E.2d 582 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1986
Defendant appeals an order by which, pursuant to its purported inherent power, the trial court vacated its judgment entry granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. We reverse. *259
Plaintiff, Donovan Dahl ("Dahl"), brought an action against his dentist, defendant-appellant Albert G. Kelling, D.D.S. ("Kelling"). On August 15, 1985, the trial court granted Kelling's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the statute of limitations had run. On August 20, 1985, Dahl filed a "Motion for Reconsideration." The trial court held a hearing on the motion and both parties submitted additional briefs.
On December 20, 1985, Dahl filed a motion to deem his motion for reconsideration as a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, as a motion to vacate judgment. On February 27, 1986, the trial court ruled, in part:
"In view of this court's error in interpreting the law, the court under its inherent power to do so hereby vacates the August 15, 1985 judgment entry in which it granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is overruled."
Kelling appeals.
Prior to the enactment of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, it was an accepted common-law doctrine that a court, during the same term, had inherent power, in the exercise of sound discretion, to vacate its own judgment. McCue v. Insurance Co. (1979),
This court ruled in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. McMasters (Aug. 15, 1979), Summit App. No. 9188, unreported, that, whether within term or not, the power of a court to alter its judgment must be consistent with the rules. After determining that there is no "motion for reconsideration" under the rules for trial court practice, this court then analyzed the motion under Civ. R. 60(B). Holding that the judgment of the trial court vacating its previous summary judgment was contrary to law, the court noted that neither a "motion for reconsideration" nor a motion under Civ. R. 60(B) is a substitute for a timely appeal. Id. at 6-7.
The application of the statute of limitations to the facts of the case, if erroneous, was judicial error of the sort normally remedied by direct appeal. See Cale Products, supra, at 379, 8 OBR at 492,
Kelling's assignment of error is sustained. (We are not here called upon to decide if a trial court retains inherent power to vacate its own judgment if appeal time has not yet expired.)
We now consider Dahl's cross-assignment of error.
The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a motion for reconsideration after final judgment in the trial court, and the application for such a motion is a nullity. Pitts v. Dept. ofTransportation (1981),
In Blasco v. Mislik (1982),
The second cross-assignment of error is overruled.
The judgment is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
MAHONEY, P.J., and BAIRD, J., concur.