*1 53037-8, 53335-1, February 18, En 53681-3. Banc. [Nos. 1988.] City Appellant, Daggs, Seattle, Victor v. The Respondent. City E. Stephens, al, et Appellants, Rosalie Seattle, Respondent. Norma J. Respondent, Johnson, Mattson, al, v. Jane et City ,
Defendants, of Seattle Petitioner. *2 appellant Daggs. Howell, G. Lembhard for (of McCauley), Stritmatter, L. Kessler & Keith Kessler appellants Stephens. for
Douglas City Attorney, Crandall, Jewett, N. Gordon F. Roger M. Assistant, Senior and J. Nowell and Victoria City Seitz, Assistants, for the of Seattle. Knopp,
Schroeter, & G. Goldmark Bender and Matthew respondent Johnson. Bryan Whaley P. Harnetiaux and Robert H. on behalf of Washington Lawyers Association, Trial amici curiae. City's injured plaintiffs claim J. Three Dore, filing Municipal ordinance, 5.24.005, Code Seattle City requires which a tort victim file a claim with the days bringing suit, invalid. The and then wait 60 before days point they required out if to wait victims were subject filing they claims, new after their would be Act), (hereinafter Laws of Reform tort reform act Tort superior applies 305, filed court 1986, to cases ch. August 1, after 1986. Facts
Daggs. January injured Daggs 12, 1986, was Victor pursued being was with a van which when his car collided speed Department patrol chase a Seattle Police high car. conducted the Daggs alleged police negligently speed damages chase and he a claim for with the high filed City on June 1986. Pursuant to the Seattle claims ordinance, days was to wait 60 before Daggs required However, the new superior suit court. because Tort Reform Act would take August effect on cases filed after 1986, Daggs days did not wait the and instead required filed suit on June 1986. 1, 1986,
On August City dismiss Daggs' moved to complaint because of his failure comply with SMC 5.24- .005. The trial court granted motion, this later denied motion Daggs' for reconsideration. then moved for Daggs court, direct review by which was on March granted 1987.
Stephens. On January William was Stephens driving a motorcycle on North 50th Street Seattle when motorcycle his struck a curb which allegedly protruding was into the roadway. Stephens suffered severe brain damage because of this accident parents and his have been *3 appointed guardians as his and coconservators of his estate. 1986, July 6,
On his parents counsel, contacted and days City later a claim was filed with the alleging damages poorly 11, from the constructed curbing. July On court, counsel in superior filed suit try prevent to to the application of the Tort Reform July 29, Act to the case. On 1986, the City moved to dismiss the suit for failure to com- ply with the 60-day waiting period, and this motion was granted Stephens November 1986. this dis- appeals missal, and this case was consolidated with suit to Daggs' 5.24.005(c). determine validity the of SMC Johnson, Johnson. Christopher 6-year-old a boy, was in day enrolled a care center in day Seattle. The care work- ers took Christopher to Gas Sep- Works Park Seattle on tember 1983. At the park, Christopher played allegedly "play barn" apparatus. area and fell from an He suf- skull, fered a fractured as well as other injuries. July 18, 1986, Christopher's
On filed a claim with mother ad City guardian for on her behalf and as damages the own later, days Christopher's litem for Christopher. Three against filed court Christopher superior mother and suit City City and other defendants. The moved to have to comply both causes of action dismissed failure 5.24.005(c). court, however, denied this SMC trial City petitioned Appeals the Court of for dis- motion. cretionary review, subsequently was and this case consoli- Daggs Stephens. and brought by with the suits dated City Christopher's At conceded that argument, oral pursuant to should not have been dismissed mother's suit 5.24.005(c), cannot be invoked when as ordinance SMC limitations to applicable cause the statute of to do so would September Christopher's run. mother had until suit, 60-day period waiting file application until prevent Christopher's mother from suit 5.24.005(c) Chris- apply does still after date. SMC however, statute of limitations topher, applicable tolled until he 18. RCW 4.16.190. reaches To Enact Claims Ordinances
Power 4.96.010, which In RCW Legislature enacted politi- for the immunity sovereign of abolished the doctrine RCW 35.31- This statute cal subdivisions the state. precedent .030, however, a condition that as require com- party must court, an injured an action maintaining laws, laws. These ply applicable with the an injured 5.24.005, require typically including SMC subdivision, describing political file claim with the party address, and the amount accident, current party's the claim. subject been have and ordinances Certain claims statutes 35.31.020, required RCW in recent cases. to attack days cities within filed with certain claims be *4 unconstitutional accident, held to be of the was date amount of arbitrarily shortened the it court because bring action injured party could an in which an time
gg
Equal protec-
subdivisions.
against
political
the State or its
the same amount of time to
requires
party
tion
that a
have
as he or she
bring
against
government
a tort action
private
tortfeasor.
bring
against
would have to
the action
Sch.,
High
Hunter v. North Mason
85 Wn.2d
539 P.2d
(1975);
State,
Jenkins v.
Not all claims
invalidated.
filing
were
Claims
laws serve the
important
fostering
function
inexpensive
proce-
settlement of tort claims. So
as the
long
burdens of
rea-
dural
claims with the
are
government
sonable,
Niemer,
the claims laws are valid. Hall v.
(1982).
Wn.2d
RCW 35.31.010 mandates that claims filed with charter cities information, such as Seattle must contain certain such as the current residence of the claimant. RCW 35.31- in provides, part: .010
Whenever a claim in damages sounding against tort any city permitted by presented law to have a charter is to and filed with city compliance clerk ... valid charter provisions thereof . . . such claim must in ... contain addition to requirements city the valid charter claimant. a statement of the actual residence of the
. . plaintiffs argue that this statute only requires claim, certain information be included also but man- dates that any claims filing requirement be contained city charter, charter. Seattle has a but the charter does not Instead, contain claims filing provision. provision ordinance, contained an plaintiffs and the assert impermissible. this is plaintiffs rely on the in Amende v. holding Bremer-
ton,
(1950)
36 Wn.2d
the damages" a "claim for plaintiff making that the was held The claims section. comply must with the applicable claim required a then held that since no state statute court any charter filed, and did not have be since Bremerton could claims, damages claim for regarding the provision decide, however, Amende, at 338. The case did not proceed. have filing a Bremerton claims ordinance whether valid. been nor 35.31.010 City
The neither RCW contends that only that the method holding Amende mandates the by amend valid would be enacting filing provision a claims of RCW 35.31- city purpose charter. The agree. the We ing City with his or the provides is to ensure a claimant .010 indi the statute wording of current address. While the her with valid compliance "in claim must be cates require . provisions .", explicitly . it does charter itself. in the charter provision filing claims be found did not Moreover, Amende case above, as mentioned validly enacted whether Bremerton could have decide filing ordinance. charter section Seattle Article 15 of the current city powers. council broad imparts legislative shall, enumerated City powers to the addition Charter, hereafter have now or powers in this all other of like or by municipal corporations exercised granted by . . the same degree may . and exercise character and not otherwise. ordinance cities such repeatedly has held that first class court
This any not contravene may enact ordinance which does Seattle Chemical constitution, charter. city state statutes or the (1983); WPPSS, 772, 792, P.2d 329 99 Wn.2d v. Bank Yakima, P.2d 873 52 Wn.2d Winkenwerder from Seattle provisions preclude of thesé none (1958). Since was ordinance, the ordinance by law a claims enacting enacted. validly
Equal
Guaranties
Protection
ordinance
the claims
also assert
plaintiffs
Const,
found
art.
guaranties
equal protection
violates
plaintiffs
Amendment. The
the Fourteenth
12 and
§
tort victims of
reason exists to make
that no valid
argue
when other vic-
days
filing suit
wait 60
before
government
may file suit
by private persons
committed
tims of torts
plaintiffs
to the
immediately. The detrimental
effect
cáse, as cases
in this
60-day period
particularly strong
the new Tort
August
subject
filed after
are
Thus,
governmental
injured
Reform Act.
individuals
*6
(or
1,
1
individuals
August
June
but
agency after
before
not file a
who did
plaintiffs
such as the
these actions
1)
individu-
differently from
claim before June
are treated
assert that
by
plaintiffs
a
injured
private
als
tortfeasor.
equal protection guaranties.
this difference violates
matter,
as to what
preliminary
parties argue
As a
If
cre-
proper standard of review should be.
an ordinance
classification,
on race or
suspect
ates a
such as one based
scrutiny.
the statute
be
to strict
alienage,
subjected
will
820,
Ass'n,
818,
Bar
Washington
Nielsen v.
State
90 Wn.2d
(1978).
not
P.2d 1191
Statutes and ordinances which do
585
or create
rights
suspect
affect fundamental
classifications
subjected
judicial scrutiny.
to minimal
Peter-
generally
are
421,
(1983).
State,
444,
sen v.
100 Wn.2d
their to new Tort Reform being under the v. North Mason They point Act. the decision Hunter Sch., High (1975), P.2d which Wn.2d held personal injuries is a right be indemnified for
[t]he property right, only monetary substantial but value in many cases to the injured person's fundamental physical ability and to live a well-being continue life. decent equal pro-
The decision Hunter went on on to invalidate grounds tection claims statute that shortened filing however, Significantly, opinion statute of limitations. not specify applied. did of review it standard
The more
surrounding
recent decisions
claims
scrutiny
and
minimal
appear
ordinances
statutes
to follow a
State,
See, e.g.,
v.
93 Wn.2d
standard of review.
Coulter
(1980). However,
procedural victims as may placed governmental burdens be *7 long are not substantial as such burdens for govern- relief do not mental a real to impediment constitute tort victims. is focused on question this therefore before court imposes a "real this claims filing requirement
whether an impedi- If such impose to relief". it impediment does used, the ment, review of the standard of regardless then protection guaranties. equal statute will violate affect the amount is ordinance does It clear the However, it does not may recover. damages plaintiffs lawsuit, plaintiffs' right affect to institute a and the ordinance was not enacted to accelerate the date on which Furthermore, Act would Tort Reform become effective. dicta, held Hall: as court 60-day period the is buffer between a claim and suit reasonably related to achieving negotiation and settle- long such provision ment. As as a not shorten does bringing suits, statute limitations such would they . . be valid . (Italics ours.) Hall, at 584 n.4. The Hall decision indicates long plaintiff as the can courts, seek redress a period waiting short before a brought suit can be is permis- sible.
Moreover, in an analogous situation, we held a tortfeasor has no right vested a common law bar Thus, recovery. State, Godfrey v. 84 Wn.2d (1975), P.2d 630 we held that the statute which abolished contributory negligence defense, as a 4.22.010, former RCW apply could to torts committed before the statute became Equally true, effective. believe, we is that a tort victim has no right to recover under the old system, common law even if the new Tort Reform Act adversely affect total amount he or she would damages. receive as The mere fact that an ordinance which otherwise effectuates valid state interest causes a delay thereby changes whether plaintiff proceed can system under the tort or the new old one, does not violate the plaintiffs' equal protection or due rights. process Conclusion
SMC 5.24.005 is validly enacted ordinance which requires plaintiffs to days wait 60 suit in prior bringing superior The plaintiffs court. did fulfill this valid con- precedent dition and their cases should have been dis- missed. The court's dismissal suits Daggs' Stephens' affirmed, and the denial of the motion to dismiss Chris- topher mother, Johnson's case is reversed. Christopher's *8 58 case, City has con-
however, as the proceed with her may of limitations statute applicable that because ceded 5.24.005(c) apply not to her suit. does run, SMC JJ., concur. and Durham, Goodloe, Dolliver, Callow, majority holds that (dissenting) J. Brachtenbach, —The duty claim of by imposes itself RCW 35.31.010 rather than a by an ordinance supplemented and is can be provision. charter of the statute plain reading contrary to a holding
This is court, of this directly contrary opinions to three years. for 76 unchallenged of which has been first 35.31.010, it statute, clearly is RCW at the Looking first city, the a charter against claim in the case of a stated that provi- charter with valid compliance filed in must be claim with an comply is not to the claim Note that sions thereof. charter. ordinance, comply provisions but must information require specific on goes The statute city charter requirements valid addition to "the (Italics mine.) relating thereto". requirements applicable has no charter Here Seattle 581, Niemer, P.2d 97 649 claims. Hall v. Wn.2d these (1982). 98 when the stat- say that the statute to majority
The reads really means charter or it provisions ute refers to charter by prior, our reading precluded is a an ordinance. That specifically point. holdings viable P. 113 Spokane, 66 Wash. Wolpers In 1909, ch. (1912), interpreting the court was Laws § and identical predecessor is the of RCW 35.31.010 only be can The court held that the statute purpose. specific reference to the charter. Since invoked requirement in the no such was not charter requirement charter, i.e., required. it it existed, if is not is the ordinance here; is not in the charter and is true it same not valid. court said: The first section of the act of 1909 it manifest makes law, that first provisions relating cities of the class, can be independent They only have no force. *9 by charter, invoked to the city applying and reference prescribed to compliance claims and filed "in with valid provisions city." charter of That such law does notice, the in requirement extend of either as contained any city itself, charter or as contained in the law to other persons or other contemplated by torts than those such city charter. charter require presen- the does not the If tation or in any notice claim case such as of of consideration, here under then the law 1909 requires none. (Italics mine.) Wolpers, at 635. Seattle, v.
Maggs 427, 428, (1915) 86 Wash. P. 612 150 same "Independent to the effect: of some valid charter provision requiring presentation the claim, and filing of a of 1909 no merely this act has force. It adds a new require- (Italics made by mine.) ment to those the charter." Ellis' in Judge Haynes Seattle, concurrence v. 87 Wash. (1915) P. refers to the act now contained 35.31.010, in RCW "it stating only can be invoked refer- city (Italics mine.) to the ence charter". me the proposition
To is very simple. The statute claim approves filing requirements charter, in city the but only in the city charter. The cases are in absolutely clear that holding the statutory only authorization extends in provisions the charter. It may be easier and less cumber- try some to impose delay claim and of suit requirement by ordinance, but only point, the statute in cases, the and mandate that requirements such be charter. majority says explicitly the statute "does not
require be found filing provision charter itself." Majority, be at 54. How the statute could escapes more clear me. When the states that the fil- statute ing compliance provisions" must be with valid "charter must and contain "in addition to the information valid requirements city appears charter" it me mine.) (Italics requirements in the charter. refers to statute plain language reading Any ignores statute. other meaning- majority's holding renders the statute In fact less. Stephens, Daggs and
I reverse the dismissals affirm Johnson. JJ., concur Pearson, C.J., and Utter Andersen, J. Brachtenbach, February En Banc. 1988.] 53176-5. [No. Department Appellant, Regnier, Stella *10 Respondent. Industries, Labor