Daggett v. KimmelmanDaggett v. Kimmelman
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Fisher
OPINION
CLARKSON S. FISHER, Chief Judge.As a result of the 1980 decennial census, the New Jersey Legislature was required to reapportion the state’s congressional districts from 15 to 14. Eventually, the legislature enacted what has been referred to as the “Feldman Plan,” which was signed into law by the then Governor of New Jersey on January 19, 1982. Quickly, several individuals, including the incumbent Republican members of Congress, filed suit declaring that the Feldman Plan violated article I, section 2 of the United States Constitution. Named as defendants were Governor Kean, Attorney General Kimmelman, and Secretary of State Burgio (State Defendants). The New Jersey Legislature and the incumbent Democratic members of Congress (Legislature-Intervenors and Congressional-Intervenors, respectively) intervened to defend the constitutionality of the Feldman Plan.
After conducting a hearing on March 3, 1982, a three-judge district court, by a two-to-one vote, issued an opinion and order declaring the Feldman Plan unconstitutional. Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 F.Supp. 978 (D.N.J.1982). The three-judge court enjoined the State Defendants from conducting elections under the Feldman Plan, but on application of the Legislature-Intervenors and Congressional-Intervenors, Justice Brennan, as Circuit Justice, stayed the district court’s order pending appeal to the Supreme Court. Karcher v. Daggett, 455 U.S. 1303, 102 S.Ct. 1298, 71 L.Ed.2d 635 (1982) . Plaintiffs’ motions to vacate the stay and expedite the docketing of the appeal were denied, 456 U.S. 901, 102 S.Ct. 1745, 72 L.Ed.2d 157 (1982), and probable jurisdiction was noted at 457 U.S. 1131, 102 S.Ct. 2955, 73 L.Ed.2d 1347 (1982). The Supreme Court’s affirmance of the district court’s holding by a five-to-four vote, 462 U.S. 725, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983) , restored the injunction.
When the New Jersey Legislature failed to enact a constitutional congressional redistricting plan by February 3, 1984, the three-judge district court held a hearing for further relief and unanimously adopted the plan submitted by plaintiffs because it achieved the lowest population deviation and most compact districts.
Daggett v. Kimmelman,
580 F.Supp. 1259 (D.N.J. 1984). The intervenors presented Justice Brennan with an application for a stay; he referred the application to the entire Court and, on March 30, 1984, by a six-to-three vote, the application was denied.
Karcher v. Daggett,
— U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 1691, 80 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984). A few days later the Court denied intervenors’ motion to expe
Two motions emanating from this litigation are now before this court. On November 15, 1984, plaintiffs filed an application for an attorney’s fee award of nearly $600,-000 under
With respect to the pending motions, the court now has before it documents and additional information supplied by plaintiffs in support of their fee application: the affidavit and a supplemental affidavit filed by State Defendants in support of their motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel discovery; all of the parties’ briefs; and the almost weekly submissions by plaintiffs and State Defendants. Moreover, the court entertained additional oral argument on July 30, 1985. Notwithstanding the State Defendants’ position, this court is of the view that there is enough information and documentation to decide the fee application without further submissions or an evidentiary hearing. Compare O’Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich., 722 F.2d 313, 314 (6th Cir.1983); Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1982).
The court will deny as moot the State Defendants’ motion and turn its attention to the issues of liability for fees and the amount to be awarded. Plaintiffs seek an award against the State Defendants and the Legislature-Intervenors, but not against the Congressional-Intervenors. The two branches of the state government contend that they are not liable for an assessment, but that if they are, then only for a small portion of that which plaintiffs have requested. All of the arguments have been considered by the court and, for the reasons expressed herein, plaintiffs are entitled to an award to be assessed against the Legislature-Intervenors, but not the State Defendants, in the amount of $253,-461, which amount includes costs and disbursements.
The threshold issue is whether the constitutional violation involved in this case is cognizable under
The majority opinion of the three-judge district court and the Supreme Court in this case held that the congressional redistricting plan was unconstitutional under article I, section 2 as interpreted by the Court in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, 84 S.Ct. 526, 529-30, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). See Daggett, 535 F.Supp. at 981; 462 U.S. at 730, 103 S.Ct. at 2658. Writing for the Court in Wesberry, Justice Black held that, construed in its historical context, article I, section 2, which provides that representatives of Congress be chosen “by the People of the several States,” means that as nearly as practicable, one person’s vote in a congressional election is worth as much as another person’s vote. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8, 84 S.Ct. at 529-30. In powerful language, the Court concluded
[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right.
Id. at 17-18, 84 S.Ct. at 534-35.
Although the Wesberry court did not reach the arguments that the challenged districting statute violated the equal protection and other clauses of the fourteenth amendment, id. at 8 n. 10, 84 S.Ct. at 530 n. 10, the overriding constitutional principle of equal representation espoused and vindicated in Wesberry is basically the same principle enunciated in cases holding that “the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats ... of a bicameral state legislature ... be apportioned on a population basis.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1385, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08, 82 S.Ct. 691, 704-05, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The problem faced by the Wesberry and Reynolds Courts was the same — under the existing apportionment schemes, votes in some thinly populated districts were given equal or greater weight than the value given votes in larger districts. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545-46, 84 S.Ct. at 1373; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8, 84 S.Ct. at 530.
The State Defendants concede that the state legislative districting cases, grounded on the equal-protection clause, secure individual rights protected by
Moreover, defendants have pointed out, Congress has enacted relevant statutes that provide a mechanism for challenging the constitutionality of apportionment of congressional districts and for states’ conducting at-large elections if necessary.
In addition,
Finally, as to the State Defendants’ contention that article I, section 2 is merely concerned with the allocation of power between the federal and state governments,
Wesberry,
376 U.S. at 7, 17-18, 84 S.Ct. at 529, 534-35, states that article I, section 2 is concerned with the principle “one person, one vote.” Even if, historically speaking, article I, section 2 does not mean “one person, one vote,” see
Wesberry,
376 U.S. at 24-26, 84 S.Ct. at 538-540 (Harlan, J. dissenting), that would not mean that plaintiffs’ rights in this case are not cognizable under
Defendants have contended further that even if plaintiffs are entitled to an attorney’s fee respecting the successful challenge of the Feldman Plan, plaintiffs
After the Supreme Court affirmed the decision invalidating the Feldman Plan, the three-judge court fixed a date by which the State of New Jersey could enact a congressional redistricting plan that passed constitutional muster, and a date for a hearing on further proceedings if New Jersey were unable to adopt such a plan. The New Jersey Legislature adopted a plan, but it was vetoed by the Governor, and there was insufficient support in the Legislature to override a veto. Thus, a hearing was held, at which time various parties submitted six redistricting proposals. Daggett v. Kimmelman, 580 F.Supp. at 1260-61. Defendants have opined that the plans they submitted were good plans and constitutionally’ unassailable, but defendants concede, as they must, that the three-judge district court and the Supreme Court accepted and adopted the plan submitted by plaintiffs.
Both plaintiffs and the State Defendants have directed the court’s attention to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Webb v. Board of Educ. of Dyer County,
— U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1923, 85 L.Ed.2d 233 (1985). In
Webb,
a public school teacher contended that his termination was racially motivated in violation of his constitutional rights.
Id.
105 S.Ct. at 1925. Under Tennessee law, Mr. Webb was entitled to a hearing with respect to the charges of dismissal but, after the series of hearings with the school board proved unsuccessful, petitioner commenced an action in federal court alleging violations under
In affirming, the Supreme Court stated that Congress authorized an attorney’s fee award under
In one sense, the State Defendants have argued persuasively that plaintiffs’ participation in the remedy stage was not necessary to protect their constitutional rights. Once the Feldman Plan was declared unconstitutional, a constitutional plan had to be adopted. If the Legislature failed to do so, then the court was obligated to do so. Nevertheless, this court concludes that plaintiffs’ participation in the remedy stage, after New Jersey failed to enact a redistricting plan, was “useful and of a type ordinarily necessary” to enforce
Although without plaintiffs’ participation, the court would have adopted a plan that passed constitutional scrutiny, plaintiffs’ participation vindicated their civil rights completely because the court adopted plaintiffs’ plan, which was the one of all considered by the court that best achieved the “one person, one vote” constitutional criterion. There appears to be a paucity of cases treating extensively the issue of whether a “prevailing party” is entitled to an attorney’s fee award for work performed in the remedy stage of redistricting/reapportionment litigation. There are reported decisions, however, in which an attorney’s fee was awarded for work performed during the remedy stage. In re Kansas Congress. Dist. Reapportionment Cases, 745 F.2d at 612-14; see also Connor v. Winter, 519 F.Supp. 1337, 1341-46 (S.D.Miss.1981) (fees awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in remedy stage even when reapportionment plan ultimately put into effect was enacted by Mississippi Legislature, whose plan superseded court-approved plan).
As mentioned, defendants in this case have contended that at the remedy stage all parties, including plaintiffs, were really concerned with advancing their own partisan political interests, rather than attempting to vindicate civil rights which the court had already accomplished when it invalidated the Feldman Plan. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 610 F.Supp. 29, 30-31 (N.D.Ill.1985). This court would be naive if it did not recognize the appeal of defendants’ argument. It cannot be maintained seriously that at the remedy stage the parties were not interested at all in promoting politically favorable plans. The fact that the remedy stage was not completely untainted by political issues does not preclude plaintiffs from recovering an attorney’s fee award for vindicating constitutional rights. See In re Kansas Congress. Dist. Reapportionment Cases, 745 F.2d at 613-14.
Continuing this argument, defendants have asserted that given plaintiffs’ position at oral argument at the remedy stage, the law firm is unable now to steer the course between the rocky shores of Scylla and the whirlpool of Charybdis. That is, on the one hand, if the law firm achieved exactly what its client desired, then an attorney’s. fee should be denied at the remedy stage because the plan the eourt adopted merely implemented plaintiffs’ partisan political objectives. On the other hand, if the law firm advocated a plan that came closest to satisfying the “one person, one vote”- criterion with mathematical precision, the clients’ partisan political interests notwith
The answer to defendants’ argument is that, while plaintiffs may very well have been happier if the plan submitted by the law firm on behalf of plaintiffs favored their partisan political interests more than it did, the plan “achieve[d] the lowest population deviation of any plan ... presented.” Daggett v. Kimmelman, 580 F.Supp. at 1264. While it is beyond cavil that the Feldman Plan was disadvantageous with respect to Republican Party political interests, this lawsuit was, nevertheless, brought to vindicate civil rights — to invalidate a constitutionally infirm redistricting plan and ensure that the court adopted a plan that best satisfied the “one person, one vote” constitutional principle. Perhaps a different result would be warranted if all of the plaintiffs had rejected the plan argued for by the law firm, so that it could be contended that the law firm acted as a maverick. That is not this case, however. Only one plaintiff terminated the law firm’s authority to act on his behalf, and all of the other plaintiffs capitulated to the law firm’s good judgment respecting what kind of plan was likely to be most acceptable to the court as consistent with the “one person, one vote” principle. See id. The law firm acted with the authority of the remaining plaintiffs, and the court’s adoption of the redistricting plan proposed by plaintiffs vindicated their rights; thus, plaintiffs were the prevailing party at the remedy stage. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433-34, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40.
In further support of their contention that no attorney’s fee should be awarded at the remedy stage, defendants have noted that a taxpayers political action committee (PAC) submitted two redistricting plans to the three-judge district court, but that nobody could argue seriously that this PAC should be eligible for an attorney’s fee award. The taxpayers PAC is not entitled to an attorney’s fee award because neither plan it offered was adopted by the court, so that it could not be deemed a prevailing party. Whether the taxpayers PAC would be entitled to an award of an attorney’s fee if the court had adopted one of the plans submitted by the PAC is not an issue before the court, and need not be decided. If, however, defendants believe that the taxpayers PAC is precluded from recovering an attorney’s fee under
In United States v. Board of Education, etc., 605 F.2d 573, 574-76 (2d Cir.1979), after the Government sued a board of education alleging violations of the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the parties entered into a consent decree in which the board of education was required to devise a desegregation plan. The board of education proposed a remedial plan, and “[t]he South End Education Committee, an organization of Puerto Rican parents and community leaders, along with several individuals, was allowed to intervene____” 605 F.2d at 574. Intervenor convinced the court to enjoin implementation of the board of education’s plan. This scenario continued for approximately three years until the court finally accepted a plan proposed by “the Barnard school P.T.A.” Id. at 574-75. Subsequently, intervenors filed a motion for attorney’s fees. Id. at 575.
Reversing the district court’s order denying the motion on the grounds that intervenor was not a prevailing party, the Second Circuit held that intervenor was a party within the meaning of
The next question facing the court is who is liable for the attorney’s fee award. At oral argument plaintiffs informed the court that they were not seeking fees from any member of Congress and no award shall be assessed against the Congressional-Intervenors. See May v. Cooperman, 578 F.Supp. 1308, 1313 n. 3 (D.N.J.1984). 1 Plaintiffs are seeking fees from the state, not from any individual, but from the executive and legislative branches of the government of the State of New Jersey. With respect to the liability of the executive branch, the State Defendants, and the legislative branch, the Legislative-Intervenors, this court agrees with that which was said by Judge Debevoise in May v. Cooperman.
In May v. Cooperman, the Legislature passed a “moment of silence” statute and overrode the Governor’s veto. 572 F.Supp. 1561, 1562-65 (D.N.J.1983). The Attorney General of New Jersey stated publicly that he would neither defend the constitutionality of the statute nor discipline teachers who refused to implement the “moment of silence.” The New Jersey Department of Education and its Commissioner, the named defendants, sent copies of the statute to local school boards, but apparently did nothing to ensure that the local boards were implementing the “moment of silence.” 578 F.Supp. at 1310-15. Judge Debevoise concluded that under these circumstances, where the state defendants did nothing to enforce the unconstitutional statute and “consistently [took] a principled position in refusing to defend a statute which the state’s highest executive legal authority deemed unconstitutional,” an award of fees against the state defendants would be unjust. Id. at 1315-16.
On the other hand, Judge Debevoise awarded fees against the defendant-intervenor, the New Jersey Legislature. Inasmuch as the state defendants refused to defend the “moment of silence,” the Legislature, which had enacted the statute, “actively litigated this case from the day plaintiffs filed suit,” Id. at 1316. Conceding that under Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732-34, 739, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1974-76, 1978, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980), the New Jersey Legislature enjoyed absolute immunity for promulgating the “moment of silence” statute, Judge Debevoise held that once the Legislature intervened it “abandoned [its] legislative role and took on a quasi-enforcement role by intervening to defend the statute,” and was therefore no longer shielded from an assessment of an attorney’s fee. May v. Cooperman, 578 F.Supp. at 1316-17.
The principal distinction between
May v. Cooperman
and the present case, in this court’s view, is that in the former the Governor of New Jersey vetoed the “moment of silence” statute, but in the latter the Governor signed the Feldman Plan into law. For purposes of the motions now before this court, however, this distinction is not meaningful. The rationale behind the parties’ liability for fees in
May v. Cooperman
seems to be whether the party enforced or defended in litigation the statute that was declared unconstitutional.
See
578 F.Supp. at 1313, 1315-17. If a legislature is shielded from an assessment
The State Defendants have not defended the Feldman Plan in litigation; no party has argued to the contrary. For the most part, the State Defendants were silent during this litigation; they did not enforce the Feldman Plan, and really did not take a position on the constitutionality of the Feldman Plan. While the State Defendants submitted two redistricting plans during the remedy stage,
Daggett v. Kimmelman,
580 F.Supp. at 1263-64, and conducted the 1982 congressional elections under the Feldman Plan after Justice Brennan issued the stay,
Karcher v. Daggett,
455 U.S. at 1307, 102 S.Ct. at 1300, these facts do not warrant, in this court’s view, an assessment of fees against the State Defendants. At oral argument plaintiffs urged that the State Defendants’ failure to take a position in this litigation amounted to taking a position, but the court does not find this argument persuasive. The State Defendants neither defended nor enforced the Feldman Plan, except after Justice Brennan’s stay, and the court agrees with Judge Debevoise’s conclusion that, under these circumstances, the State Defendants should not be held liable for an award of an attorney’s fee.
See May v. Cooperman,
578 F.Supp. at 1314 n. 4, 1315-16;
but see Singer v. State,
95 N.J. 487, 493-94, 472 A.2d 138
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 121, 83 L.Ed.2d 64 (1984) (the power, if not the duty, to enforce the state’s laws satisfies prerequisite of state action and defendants do not enjoy immunity from claims brought under
As to the Legislature-Intervenors, this court is also in accord with the analysis set forth in May v. Cooperman. The New Jersey Legislature was absolutely immune from an award of an attorney’s fee for enacting the Feldman Plan, but once the Legislature intervened to defend the statute, even if it did so because the executive branch refused to defend the statute, the Legislature took on a quasi-enforcement role, and gave up its immunity. See 578 F.Supp. at 1317; Consumers Union of U.S. v. Virginia State Bar, 688 F.2d 218, 220-21 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1137, 103 S.Ct. 3124, 77 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1983). Therefore, regardless of the Legislature’s good faith, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1415, 63 L.Ed.2d 673, reh’g denied, 446 U.S. 993, 100 S.Ct. 2979, 64 L.Ed.2d 850 (1980), the Legislature-Intervenors in this case are liable for an assessment of an attorney’s fee.
A few issues must be treated before the “lodestar” is determined. First, under rule 46 of the general rules of this court, effective October 1, 1984, plaintiff’s application for an attorney’s fee should have been filed “within 30 days of the entry of judgment or order, unless extended by the Court.” Litigation on the merits of this case ended with the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of the district court’s adoption of plaintiffs’ proposed plan.
Karcher v. Daggett,
— U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2672, 81 L.Ed.2d 869 (1984). At the very latest, plaintiff’s application for an attorney’s fee should have been filed by the end of October 1984, but it was not filed until the middle of November. At the hearing held January 15, 1985, plaintiffs’ counsel represented that the fee application was not filed until November 15, 1984, because the law firm did not want the motion for an attorney’s fee in this redistricting case to influence the November 1984 elections. While the court does not question the motive behind this decision, permission for an extension of time to file from this court was neither requested nor granted. All of the parties opposing the fee application have contended that the untimely motion should be dismissed because it would cause undue surprise and prejudice. Although
Rule 46(B) of the general rules of this court requires the attorney seeking compensation to “include an affidavit describing all fee agreements____” Although plaintiffs’ pleadings indicated that a
The starting point for determining a reasonable attorney’s fee is multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate; this is the “lodestar.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1543-44, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939. The opposing parties’ most vehement objection to an award is directed at the remedy stage; these parties have argued that plaintiffs cannot be compensated for work done on state-law issues, such as preserving municipal and county boundaries. This argument must be rejected for two reasons. First, plaintiffs’ plan was accepted by the three-judge district court because it sacrificed the state-law concerns in order to achieve the lowest population deviation possible; it satisfied better than the other plans submitted the “one person, one vote” constitutional standard.
Second, while it would be ridiculous to think that plaintiffs ignored completely municipal boundaries, whether incumbents would be pitted against one another, and compactness, etc., these state-law issues and concerns of which the opposing parties speak were not separate and distinct issues from the constitutional claim that is the subject of this litigation.
Compare In re Kansas Congress. Dist. Reapportionment Cases,
745 F.2d at 613-14. This is not a case in which plaintiffs lost on the
Only hours reasonably expended on the litigation are compensable under
Plaintiff’s affidavit of services rendered indicates that 65.5 hours were spent preparing the memorandum of law in opposition to the first stay application filed in the Supreme Court; 7.5 hours were expended by Mr. Hellring, 14.75 by Mr. Goldstein, 12.25 by Mr. Raymar, and 31 by Mr. Dreyfuss. With respect to the February 26, 1982, hearing before the three-judge court in Trenton, Mr. Goldstein has billed 7 hours, Mr. Raymar 6.5, and Mr. Dreyfuss 6.5. All four of the attorneys have billed 6.5 hours for oral argument at the Supreme Court on March 2, 1983, and in addition, although Mr. Hellring who argued before the Court has billed approximately 35 hours solely for preparation for oral argument, Mr. Goldstein has also billed 11.5 hours for oral argument preparation, Mr. Raymar 8 hours, and Mr. Dreyfuss 15.5 hours. Plaintiffs’ affidavit of services and client service records are replete with instances in which three or four attorneys billed large numbers of hours for strategy and other conferences (see Affidavit of Services Feb. 27 to Mar. 6, 1982; Mar. 15 to 18, 1982; July 8, 1983; July 12, 1983; Feb. 2 to 3, 1984).
In this court‘s opinion, the attorneys did not in every instance need to spend all of the hours each of them did on legal research, three and four attorneys were not necessary in court, not all of the time spent preparing for oral argument by all four attorneys was necessary, and not every attorney should be compensated for time spent in conference. See May v. Cooperman, 582 F.Supp. at 1460-61. Rather than making a determination respecting each piece of the litigation as to “whether a particular motion could have been done in 9.6 hours instead of 14.3 hours,” see Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 903 (D.C. Cir.1980) (en banc), this court, in its discretion, will reduce the number of hours requested by ten percent. See Louisville Black Police Off. v. City of Louisville, 700 F.2d at 279. This reduction will be applied to each attorney on a pro rata basis, so that of the 1,697.76 hours reasonably expended (1,886.4 requested), Mr. Hellring will be treated as having expended 485.46 hours (539.4 requested), Mr. Goldstein at 507.97 (564.41 requested), Mr. Raymar at 162.30 (180.33 requested), and Mr. Dreyfuss at 542.03 (602.26 requested).
Having calculated the number of hours reasonably expended, the court’s next inquiry is the reasonable hourly rate. What plaintiffs have asked for in determining the lodestar is high. Mr. Hellring’s customary hourly rate is $300, Mr. Goldstein’s $200, and Messrs. Dreyfuss and Raymar bill at $150. The court must look to what the attorney’s time normally commands in the marketplace, Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d at 267-68, as well as “to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 104 S.Ct. at 1547.
Although the court must look to the relevant community, it is interesting to note that in other recent legislative and congressional redistricting cases; a Topeka, Kansas, firm was awarded an attorney’s fee at an hourly rate of $75, and a large Chicago firm was compensated at the hourly rate of $100 to $175 for partners and $65 to $79 for associates.
See In re Kansas Congress. Dist. Reapportionment Cases,
745 F.2d at 613;
Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections of State of Ill.,
584 F.Supp. 849, 858
In their brief in support of the application for an attorney’s fee, plaintiffs have brought to the attention of this court several cases in the District of New Jersey in which judges awarded hourly rates ranging from $60 to $250. Despite this court’s belief that the hourly rates charged are high, see Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838, 841 (3d Cir.1984), plaintiffs have sustained their burden of establishing the reasonableness of the $200 hourly rate charged by Mr. Goldstein as well as the $150 hourly rates charged by Messrs. Ray-mar and Dreyfuss. See Council Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlantic City, 200 N.J.Super. 431, 446-47, 491 A.2d 789 (Law Div. 1984). The $300 hourly rate charged by Mr. Hellring, however, is excessive when compared to the prevailing market rate in the community in which he practices and will be reduced to $250. As will be explained below, the amounts calculated from these hourly rates must be reduced to reflect the fact that only partners worked on this case, and some of the tasks performed during the litigation cannot be compensated at partner rates. Once again, a few examples will suffice.
Plaintiffs’ affidavit of services rendered indicates that from July 8 through November 10, 1982, approximately 190 hours were spent on preparation of the Supreme Court brief. Of those hours, most were expended by Mr. Hellring (49) and Mr. Dreyfuss (133.9). Under plaintiffs’ fee schedule, the lowest hourly rate charged for any of the work done on the Supreme Court brief was $150. It is this court’s opinion that at least some of that work could have been performed by associates and billed at a lower rate. See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir.1983); McMullan v. Thornburgh, 570 F.Supp. 1070, 1073-75 (E.D.Pa.1988).
Plaintiffs’ time sheets show trips to the airport, New Brunswick, and Washington, D.C., to meet with clients and adversaries and to appear in court, but these records are inadequate as to how much time was spent in travel and how much in conference or in court (see Affidavit of Services and time sheets of Mar. 1, June 22, and July 21, 1983). Although plaintiffs have explained that they were able to discuss strategy and perform other work related to the case while at the same time accomplishing the journey, their records are insufficient to support this assertion.
Rather than fixing different rates for different kinds of legal services performed by the same attorney and reducing greatly the rates for time spent travel-ling or filing papers in court, see Brewster v. Dukakis, 544 F.Supp. 1069, 1080 (D.Mass.1982), the court will reduce the lodestar by twenty percent. It was the fee applicant’s prerogative to staff every task involved in this case with partners, but that does not automatically entitle the law firm to recover “partner rates” for everything. See Poston v. Fox, 577 F.Supp. 915, 919-20 (D.N.J.1984). The lodestar is calculated as follows:
Mr. Hellring 485.46 hours X $250 $121,365.00
Mr. Goldstein 507.97 hours X $200 101,594.00
Mr. Raymar 162.3 hours X $150 24,345.00
Mr. Dreyfuss 542.03 hours X $150 81,304.50
Totals 1,697.76 hours $328,608.50
The lodestar amount of $328,608.50, reduced by twenty percent to reflect the aforementioned considerations, leaves plaintiffs with an award of $262,886.80. Plaintiffs have also requested a fifty percent upward adjustment of the fee. In short, the quality of the work rendered by the Hellring firm, the complexity of the case and its contingent nature are all adequately reflected in the hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S.Ct. at 1548-49. Any upward adjustment would produce a windfall for the law firm. See id.; May v. Cooperman, 582 F.Supp. at 1461-63.
Plaintiffs already have been paid $15,000 for services rendered, which, when subtracted from $262,886.80 leaves $247,-886.80. Plaintiffs are also entitled to costs and disbursements. See Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). The amount plaintiffs have requested, $7,432.26, however, must be reduced. Inasmuch as the number of hours requested was reduced to reflect duplication, costs and disbursements also will be reduced to reflect this factor. If it is excessive for four partners to travel to Washington, D.C., and bill oral argument time, then some of the costs and disbursements incurred are also excessive. Moreover, because plaintiffs’ costs and disbursements records are not explained in detail, this court cannot determine exactly what has been requested. It is very possible, if not probable, that plaintiffs have included in their request “[t]he expenses of printing briefs, motions, petitions or jurisdictional statements” to the Supreme Court, but under rule 50.3 of the rules governing that court, these costs “are not taxable.” See also Grehdel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d at 957. In this court’s discretion, costs and disbursements will be reduced 25 percent to $5,574.20.
Therefore, the total amount to which plaintiffs are entitled, to be paid by the Legislature-Intervenors, is $253,461. An order accompanies this opinion.
Notes
. The decision declaring the “moment of silence” statute unconstitutional is reported at 572 F.Supp. 1561 (D.N.J.1983). Judge Debevoise‘s reconsideration of his decision denying an award of an attorney’s fee is reported at 578 F.Supp. 1308 (D.N.J.1984), and the decision as to the amount awarded is reported at 582 F.Supp. 1458 (D.N.J.1984). The case has been appealed to the Third Circuit, before whom oral argument was held. May v. Cooperman, appeal argued, Nos. 83-5890 and 84-5126 (consol.) (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 1984), appeal reargued (Aug. 13, 1985).