2013 Ohio 4765
Ohio
2013

WOLFE v. OHIO INVESTIGATIVE UNIT

Supreme Court of Ohio

137 Ohio St.3d 410

Pfeifer, J., dissenting

Id. at 186-187 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).

{¶ 42} Unfortunately, nothing has changed in the meantime. The example I gave in Wolfe, that the attorney general, the chief law officer for the state, does not meet the statutory requirements to be a county sheriff, is still true. And today, this court holds that a person who has been the assistant director of the Department of Public Safety is unqualified to be a county sheriff.

{¶ 43} I would liberally construe the qualifications contained in R.C. 311.01. In my opinion, a person who served within the qualifying time period as an enforcement agent of the Ohio Investigative Unit of the Department of Public Safety satisfies the requirements of R.C. 311.01. In my opinion, a person who served as the full-time assistant director of the Department of Public Safety and who in that capacity worked with agents in the field and in surveillance, made arrests on search warrants and raids, and carried a badge and a weapon satisfies the requirements of R.C. 311.01. In my opinion, a person who directed the State Highway Patrol, Emergency Management Agency, and the Ohio Investigative Unit satisfies the requirements of R.C. 311.01. That the person also supervised the human-resources office, defined the department‘s goals, and formulated the department‘s policies is more an indication of competence than, as stated in the majority opinion, a reason for automatic disqualification.

{¶ 44} I dissent.

O‘NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, Gregory A. Beck, and James F. Mathews, for relator.

Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Thomas L. Rosenberg, and Michael R. Traven, for respondent.

DAGGETT, APPELLANT, v. BRADSHAW, WARDEN, APPELLEE.

No. 2013-0562

Supreme Court of Ohio

Submitted October 9, 2013—Decided November 6, 2013.

[Cite as Daggett v. Bradshaw, 137 Ohio St.3d 410, 2013-Ohio-4765.]

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals granting the motion to dismiss of appellee, Margaret Bradshaw, warden of the Richland Correctional Institution, and dismissing the petition of appellant, Leotis M. Daggett, for a writ of habeas corpus. On June 15, 2011, as part of a negotiated agreement, Daggett pled guilty to a charge of robbery and was sentenced to six years in prison. The sentencing entry stated that the robbery was a felony of the fourth degree. The sentencing court issued two nunc pro tunc orders to correct an error in the original entry. The first again said that the charge was a felony of the fourth degree; the second, issued on July 8, 2011, corrected the entry to reflect that the charge was a second-degree felony.

{¶ 2} Daggett argues that the sentencing court lacked authority to issue the nunc pro tunc entries and that he has already served the maximum sentence for a fourth-degree felony.

{¶ 3} Daggett‘s claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus, because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal, and in general, sentencing orders are not cognizable in habeas corpus. State ex rel. Sneed v. Anderson, 114 Ohio St.3d 11, 2007-Ohio-2454, 866 N.E.2d 1084, ¶ 7.

{¶ 4} Moreover, a nunc pro tunc order correcting a clerical error in a sentencing entry violates neither Crim.R. 32(C) nor State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163. State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, 128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, 943 N.E.2d 1010, ¶ 15; State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 17-20.

Judgment affirmed.

O‘CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O‘NEILL, JJ., concur.

Leotis M. Daggett, pro se.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Thelma Thomas Price, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.