Daddis v. Navajo Arts & Crafts EnterpriseDaddis v. Navajo Arts & Crafts Enterprise
Lead Opinion
OPINION
filed the opinion of the Court.
This appeal concerns the dismissal of an employee’s complaint upon an employer’s motion to dismiss and whether an eviden-tiary hearing rather than a hearing on the motion was required. The Court reverses the dismissal on the ground that an evi-dentiary hearing was required and remands the case.
I
Karen Daddis (Appellant) filed a Complaint against Navajo Arts and Crafts Enterprise and TEME, Inc. (together referred to as “NACE”) under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act on January 18, 2011. Appellant claimed NACE terminated her employment without written notice setting forth just cause on or about January 2009. NACE filed an Answer on February 18, 2011. A hearing was immediately scheduled but continued numerous times by the parties before it was set for March 15, 2012. On February 14, 2012, NACE filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting Appellant failed to satisfy the requirement of 15 N.N.C. § 610(J)(l)(b) that “[t]he underlying Charge was filed within the time limits prescribed in § 610(B)(6).” Section 610(B)(6) requires a Charge to be filed within one year after the accrued claim constituting the alleged violation. In response to the motion, on February 24, 2012 Appellant submitted an affidavit attesting she was terminated by NACE “on January 29 or January 30, 2009.”
The Commission held a hearing on NACE’s motion to dismiss on March 13, 2012. Both parties appeared with legal counsel. At the hearing, the Commission found the Charge did not state the date of separation from employment and the Complaint indicated “on or about January 2010
Appellant contends the Commission erred in dismissing an action based upon factual conclusions that she was terminated on January 15, 2009 when it did not permit an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 15 N.N.C. § 611(A). Appellee contends no errors and does not cross appeal.
II
The issue is whether the Commission erred in dismissing an employee’s complaint upon an employer’s motion to dismiss claiming a jurisdictional condition for filing a complaint had not been satisfied as required by 15 N.N.C. § 610(J)(1) when an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 15 N.N.C. § 611(A) was not held.
III
The Supreme Court reviews Labor Commission decisions on an abuse of discretion basis. Jackson v. BHP World Minerals,
IV
Proceedings before the Commission are initiated upon the filing of a written complaint, which prompts a hearing under 15 N.N.C. § 611(A). Section 611(A) states “The Commission shall schedule a hearing within 60 days of the filing of a written complaint by a petitioner with the Commission.” In preparation for this hearing, the Commission may “issue subpoenas compelling the disclosure by any person evidence relevant to the Complaint.” 15 N.N.C., § 611(A)(2). The Commission is authorized to administer oaths and compel attendance of any person at this hearing and to compel production of any documents. 15 N.N.C. § 611(A)(3). Section 611(A) thus requires an evidentiary hearing to be scheduled and subsequently held.
Although Appellant asserts the Commission’s finding that she was terminated on January 15, 2009 is incorrect and that she is fairly certain about the date range of her termination because she tied it to the termination of another employee, we need not consider those arguments. Our civil appellate rules state “If the appellant intends to argue on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.” N.R.C.A.P. 9(b)(1). Because Appellant decided not to file a transcript of the proceeding, such arguments are beyond the scope of our review. These arguments should be considered at the evidentiary hearing to be scheduled upon remand.
V
The decision of the Commission is REVERSED and REMANDED. The Commission shall reinstate the Complaint and schedule an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss.
Notes
. Should state “on or about January 2009" instead of 2010.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
For the reasons that follow, I respectfully disagree with the majority and offer my dissent.
This case concerns jurisdictional conditions of a complaint as specified in 15 N.N.C. § 610(J)(1). Section 610(J)(1) states:
J. Initiation of Commission Proceedings. Proceedings before the Commission shall be initiated upon the filing of a written complaint by a petitioner with the Commission.
1. Complaints shall satisfy each of the following conditions:
a. The petitioner is authorized to file the Complaint under the terms and conditions prescribed by this Section;
b. The underlying Charge was filed with the time limits prescribed in § 610(B)(6); and
c. The complaint was filed within 360 days following the date on which the underlying Charge was filed.
15 N.N.C. § 610(J)(l)(a)-(e) (2000).
Satisfaction of each condition by the petitioner (employee) is clearly required before the Commission assumes jurisdiction. An employer is permitted to raise a jurisdictional challenge by filing a § 610(J)(2) motion. “Upon motion of respondent and a showing that any one or more of the foregoing conditions has not been satisfied, the Commission shall dismiss the complaint[.]”
“Failure to file a Charge within the time limitations prescribed [by § 610(B)(6) ] shall bar proceedings on the related claim before the Commission or in any court of the Navajo Nation.” 15 N.N.C. § 610(B)(6)(b) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this provision, if a Charge is shown to be untimely filed, further proceedings are barred for lack of jurisdiction, including a hearing under 15 N.N.C. § 611(A). Unlike the majority, I refrain from requiring an evidentiary hearing.
Even if I were to accept the majority’s holding that an evidentiary hearing is required even to consider a § 610(J)(2) motion, which I do not, the Commission is not bound by any formal rules of evidence. 15 N.N.C. § 611(C)(1). The Commission shall conduct the hearing in a fair and orderly manner and extend to all parties the right to be heard. 15 N.N.C. § 611(C). There is nothing in the record to suggest the parties, who were both represented by experienced attorneys, were not given their day in court to present arguments and evidence. There is also nothing in the record to suggest the March 13, 2012 hearing was not evidentiary in nature. Moreover, there is no law that prohibits a hearing on a § 610(J)(2) motion.
. There is an exception for any allegation of a pattern or practice that persists during the time limits prescribed in § 610(B)(6). That exception, however, does not apply in this case concerning an alleged wrongful termination.