Opinion
—Plaintiff Da Loc Nguyen appeals from the trial court’s order granting the motion of his former employer, defendant Applied Medical Resources Corporation, to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in his employment application. The court ordered plaintiff to submit his individual claims to arbitration and struck all class and representative claims except for the representative Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.; PAGA) 1 cause of action.
Plaintiff contends the order is immediately appealable based on the death knell doctrine, which makes an order terminating class allegations but allowing individual claims to continue immediately appealable. He argues
Munoz
v.
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
(2015)
As to the merits of the appeal, plaintiff asserts the court erred in finding the arbitration clause was not unconscionable, severing the cost provision, and dismissing the class claims with prejudice. We reject all but the last argument. Based on the recent case of
Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc.
(2016)
We shall issue a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to vacate that portion of its order dismissing the class claims to allow the arbitrator to decide whether the arbitration clause permits arbitration on a classwide basis. In all other respects, the peremptory writ challenging the order compelling arbitration is denied. We grant plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, amended and effective June 1, 2009, *241 Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, amended and effective November 1, 2009, and Supplemental Rules for Class Arbitrations.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant manufactures surgical products and sells or distributes them nationwide. After plaintiff completed a job application, defendant hired him to work in the production line of its surgical products.
The application consisted of five pages. The first three pages asked for general information such as address, phone number, education and work history. The last two pages instructed the applicant in all capital letters to “PLEASE READ CAREFULLY, INITIAL EACH [OF FOUR] PARAGRAPH^] AND SIGN BELOW.” Plaintiff signed the application after initialing all four of the paragraphs, including the third one, which states: “I hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims arising out of or relating to the submission of this application. I further agree, in the event that I am hired by the company, that all disputes that cannot be resolved by informal internal resolution which might arise out of or relate to my employment with the company, whether during or after that employment, will be submitted to binding arbitration. I agree that such arbitration shall be conducted under the rules of the [AAA], This application contains the entire agreement between the parties with regard to dispute resolution, and there are no other agreements as to dispute resolution, either oral or written. However, the company and I shall each pay one-half of the costs and expenses of such arbitration, and each of us shall separately pay our counsel fees and expenses. The prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses. The arbitration shall be held in Orange County, California. It shall be governed by California law without regard to California choice-of-law statutes, rules and cases.”
In 2014, plaintiff brought a putative class action against defendant, asserting causes of action under the Labor Code, the unfair competition law, and PAGA. The action sought unpaid overtime, meal and rest period compensation, penalties, plus injunctive and other equitable relief.
Counsel for both parties met on multiple occasions to discuss a potential stipulation to submit the claims to arbitration and stay the PAGA cause of action. Defendant offered to pay for the costs of arbitration, including the initiation fees and compensation for the arbitrator, effectively agreeing to strike the cost-splitting provision. Plaintiff rejected it.
*242 Defendant moved to compel arbitration of the individual claims, strike the class allegations, and stay the PAGA cause of action. Plaintiff opposed the motion.
The trial court granted the motion, ordering plaintiffs individual claims to arbitration, striking or dismissing the class action allegations with prejudice, and directed defendant to “pay all costs of the arbitration other than those that plaintiff would necessarily pay in a court proceeding.” In doing so, it found (1) the contract was still a contract even if it may be one of adhesion because plaintiff was required to sign it in order to obtain employment; (2) plaintiff was not credible in claiming he was “not fluent in speaking or reading English,” as he states in his application “he has English as a special skill or talentf] . . . checked the appropriate boxes on the application which require such an understanding, and ... is a civil engineer trained in Australia”; (3) the failure to attach or provide the AAA rules “may make the application procedurally unconscionable” but not “substantially] oppressive[] ... [as i]t would seem unlikely that a civil engineer, with six years of college, could not traverse the internet to find such rules[ a]nd, even if the application is procedurally unconscionable, it is not substantively unconscionable”; (4) the costs provision was “easily severable” and did “not permeate the application with substantive unconscionablity”; and (5) nothing in the arbitration provision indicated “class actions or representative claims were included” and the words used did not relate to or arise out of other employees’ employment.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Appealability
“An order compelling arbitration is not appealable.”
(Garcia v. Superior Court
(2015)
The death knell doctrine does not apply in this case. “[Ojrders that only limit the scope of a class or the number of claims available to it are not similarly tantamount to dismissal and do not qualify for immediate appeal under the death knell doctrine; only an order that
entirely terminates
class claims is appealable.”
(In re Baycol Cases I & II
(2011)
“In any event, because of the remaining PAGA claim, plaintiff has not established the second rationale for the death knell doctrine: that ‘ “the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered.” ’ ”
(Young, supra,
Plaintiff contends Munoz was “wrongly decided” and should not be followed. We disagree.
*244
Contrary to plaintiffs claim,
Munoz
did not set forth a “financial incentive” rule that conflicts with
Baycol.
As
Young
explained, “[t]he focus of the death knell doctrine is whether plaintiff has a sufficient incentive to proceed and here, as in
Munoz,
the PAGA claim provides that incentive.”
(Young, supra,
Plaintiff maintains a PAGA claim “belong[s] to the state, not the putative class members,” who “should not be required to await the outcome of [plaintiffs] case in order to appeal an order that is final to them” because as to them “the action has terminated.” We disagree. “[I]f an employee plaintiff prevails in an action under the act for civil penalties by proving that the employer has committed a Labor Code violation, the defendant employer will be bound by the resulting judgment. Nonparty employees may then, by invoking collateral estoppel, use the judgment against the employer to obtain remedies other than civil penalties for the same Labor Code violations. If the employer had prevailed, however, the nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.”
(Arias v. Superior Court
(2009)
Plaintiffs final concern is that the “putative class members must appeal now or forever lose the right to appeal.” But
Baycol
rejected such an argument and held the death knell doctrine did not apply where there was no risk that “an individual plaintiff may lack incentive to pursue his individual claims to judgment, thereby foreclosing any possible appellate review of class issues.”
(Baycol, supra,
Plaintiff requests that we treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. “[W]rit review of orders compelling arbitration is proper in at least two circumstances: (1) if the matters ordered arbitrated fall clearly outside the scope of the arbitration agreement or (2) if the arbitration would appear to be unduly time consuming or expensive.”
(Zembsch v. Superior Court
(2006)
*245
In
Elijahjuan v. Superior Court
(2012)
A similar unusual or exceptional situation exists here in light of
Sandquist, supra,
B. Applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
At the outset, we address defendant’s contention the arbitration agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; FAA). Defendant is correct.
The FAA reflects a “ ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,’ ” and the “ ‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.’ ”
(AT&T Mobility LLC
v.
Concepcion
(2011)
“The FAA applies to any ‘contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ that contains an arbitration provision. [Citations.] ‘[T]he phrase “ ‘involving commerce’ ” in the FAA is the functional equivalent of the term “ ‘affecting commerce,’ ” which is a term of art that ordinarily signals the
*246
broadest permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce clause power.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the commerce power: (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.’ [Citation.] [¶] The party asserting FAA preemption bears the burden to present evidence establishing a contract with the arbitration provision affects one of these three categories of activity, and failure to do so renders the FAA inapplicable.”
(Carbajal, supra,
Here, defendant presented the declaration of its in-house counsel, Cynthia Bonner. Bonner attested that defendant designs and manufactures surgical products, which it sells and distributes worldwide, and that plaintiff worked on the production line for those products. Plaintiff presented no contrary evidence and in fact failed to address the issue at all. The uncontroverted evidence thus shows plaintiff’s employment with defendant bears on interstate commerce such that it falls within the scope of the FAA.
C. Unconscionability
Unconscionability “ ‘ “refers to ‘ “an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” ’ [Citation.] As that formulation implicitly recognizes, the doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.” ’ ”
(Baltazar
v.
Forever 21, Inc.
(2016)
“ ‘[T]here are degrees of procedural unconscionability. At one end of the spectrum are contracts that have been freely negotiated by roughly equal parties, in which there is no procedural unconscionability. . . . Contracts of adhesion that involve surprise or other sharp practices lie on the other end of the spectrum. [Citation.] Ordinary contracts of adhesion, although they are indispensable facts of modern life that are generally enforced [citation], contain a degree of procedural unconscionability even without any notable surprises, and “bear within them the clear danger of oppression and overreaching.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We have instructed that courts must be ‘particularly attuned’ to this danger in the employment setting, where ‘economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute.’ ” (Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244.)
*247
Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present for the court to refuse to enforce a contract under the doctrine of unconscio-nability, although “ ‘they need not be present in the same degree.’ ”
(Baltazar, supra,
“The ultimate issue in every case is whether the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair, in view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should withhold enforcement.”
(Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC
(2015)
The trial court’s unconscionability determination, absent conflicting extrinsic evidence, is question of law subject to de novo review.
(Pinnacle, supra,
1. Procedural Unconscionability
Plaintiff contends the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable to a “strong degree” 2 because it was an adhesion contract offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no opportunity for negotiation, compounded by the failures to attach the AAA rules or explain either the application or the meaning of the word “arbitration.” We disagree.
*248
Defendant acknowledges the arbitration clause “was presented as a ‘take-it- or-leave-it’ contract of adhesion in the employment context.” “The [employment application] and its arbitration provision therefore contain at least some degree of procedural unconscionability . .. .” (Carbajal,
supra,
Carbajal,
however, determined the level of unconscionability in that case rose “to a moderate level because the Agreement requires Carbajal to arbitrate her claims ‘in accordance with the rules of the [AAA]’ without identifying which of AAA’s nearly 100 different sets of active rules will apply. Before requiring Carbajal to sign the Agreement, CW Painting did not provide Carbajal a copy of the rules it thought would govern, tell her where she could find a copy of the rules, offer to explain the arbitration provision, or give her an opportunity to review any rules.”
(Carbajal, supra,
But a month after Carbajal was published, our Supreme Court in Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th 1237, rejected a similar claim. Baltazar began by noting that “[t]he adhesive nature of the employment contract requires us to be ‘particularly attuned’ to [the plaintiff’s] claim of unconscionability [citation], but we do not subject the contract to the same degree of scrutiny as ‘[contracts of adhesion that involve surprise or other sharp practices’ [citation].” (I d. at p. 1245.) Plaintiff here does not claim he was lied to or otherwise manipulated into signing the application. (Cf. ibid.)
The plaintiff in
Baltazar
“argue[d] that a somewhat greater degree of procedural unconscionability . . . warranted] closer scrutiny of the substantive fairness of the agreement’s terms—because Forever 21 did not provide Baltazar with a copy of the AAA’s rules for arbitration of employment disputes, which, by the terms of the arbitration agreement, govern any arbitration between the parties. Baltazar relies on
Trivedi
[v.
Curexo Technology Corp.
(2010)
The same applies here. Plaintiff does not claim anything was hidden in the AAA rules. Rather, she contests only matters related to the agreement itself. Therefore, following Baltazar, the failure to attach the applicable AAA rules did not increase the procedural unconscionability of the application or its arbitration provision.
Neither did the mere failure to explain the meaning of the word ‘“arbitration.” In
Carbajal,
we found the procedural unconscionability had ‘“rise[n] to a moderate level” based on several factors, one of which was that defendant had not “offer[ed] to explain the arbitration provision.”
(Carbajal, supra,
As to these cases,
Baltazar
removed the nonprovision or nonattachment of the AAA rules as a basis for increasing the procedural unconsciona-blity level, leaving only the failure to explain the meaning of arbitration. But “simply because a provision within a contract of adhesion is not read or understood by the nondrafting party does not justify a refusal to enforce it. The unbargained-for term may only be denied enforcement if it is also
substantively
unreasonable.”
(Gutierrez
v.
Autowest, Inc.
(2003)
In Carmona, “[w]hat elevate[d] [that] case to a high degree of procedural unconscionability . . . [wa]s the element of surprise regarding a key clause— the enforceability clause. . . . The car wash companies hid the enforceability clause and the entire confidentiality subagreement by failing to translate that portion of the agreement into Spanish. Esteban and Matute Casco could not read English, and yet the car wash companies provided the enforceability clause in English only. The car wash companies evidently knew plaintiffs required Spanish translations because they provided some translation. The *250 record does not reveal why the car wash companies did not translate the entirety of the employment agreement. In sum, with both oppression and surprise present, there is no question the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable.” (Carmona, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 85, fn. omitted.)
Here, in contrast, the trial court specifically found ‘“[pjlaintiff s assertion that he is not fluent in speaking or reading English is not credible, as he indicates otherwise in his application, attesting to the fact that he has English as a special skill or talent. He checked the appropriate boxes on the application which require such an understanding, and as he is a civil engineer trained in Australia.”
We disregard plaintiffs claims to the contrary because ‘“[w]e must resolve all conflicts in the evidence and draw every reasonable inference to support the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] Because neither side requested a statement of decision, we also must presume the court made all necessary findings supported by substantial evidence.”
(Carbajal, supra,
For the above reasons, we are not persuaded by plaintiff’s factual distinctions of this case from
Roman v. Superior Court
(2009)
2. Substantive Unconscionability
Plaintiff argues the arbitration clause is substantively unconscionable because it lacks mutuality, requires him to pay arbitration fees, gives defendant a ‘“free peek” at his claims, and fails to satisfy the requirements of
*251
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.
(2000)
a. Mutuality
Plaintiff contends the arbitration clause lacks mutuality, referencing the sentences beginning with the word “I” (e.g., “I hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration ....”; “I further agree . . . that all disputes . . . which might arise out of or related to my employment with the company . . . will be submitted to binding arbitration”; ‘“I agree that such arbitration shall be conducted under the rules of the [AAA]”). According to him, such language requires only him but not defendant to submit to binding arbitration. We disagree.
One of the issues upon which review was granted in
Baltazar
was whether ‘“an arbitration clause in an employment application that provides ‘I agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims arising out of the submission of this application’ unenforceable as substantively unconscionable for lack of mutuality, or does the language create a mutual agreement to arbitrate all such disputes? (See
Roman[, supra,] 172
Cal.App.4th 1462,
Baltazar did not explicitly answer this question. (See Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1241 [‘“primary question before us is whether [a] clause [stating ‘that, in the event a claim proceeds to arbitration, the parties are authorized to seek prelintinary injunctive relief in the superior court’] renders the arbitration agreement unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, because it unreasonably favors the employer”].) But it did address the plaintiff’s argument ‘“the arbitration agreement at issue is unfairly one-sided because it lists only employee claims as examples of the types of claims that are subject to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1248.) Baltazar disagreed, stating: ‘“The arbitration agreement at issue here makes clear that the parties mutually agree to arbitrate all employment-related claims: that is, ‘any claim or action arising out of or in any way related to the hire, employment, remuneration, separation or termination of Employee.’ That provision clearly covers claims an employer might bring as well as those an employee might bring.” (Id. at p. 1249.)
The arbitration clause in this case similarly provides for arbitration of ‘“all disputes and claims arising out of or relating to the submission of [the] application” and ‘“all disputes . . . which might arise out of or relate to my
*252
employment with the company.” Under
Baltazar,
such language created a mutual agreement to arbitrate all employment related disputes.
(Baltazar, supra,
Baltazar
is not entirely dispositive, however, because the agreement there apparently “provide[d] that the parties ‘mutually agree’ to arbitrate.”
4
(Baltazar, supra,
In
Roman, supra,
We also decline to find that ‘“the mere inclusion of the words T agree’ by one party in an otherwise mutual arbitration provision destroys the bilateral nature of the agreement.”
(Roman, supra,
Plaintiff urges us not to follow
Roman
because it was “wrongly decided,” “never explained its reasons,” erroneously distinguished
Higgins
v.
Superior Court
(2006)
The other cases cited by plaintiff are to the same effect.
(O’Hare v. Municipal Resources Consultants
(2003)
In
Zullo
v.
Superior Court
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
477,
486 [
b. Free Peek at Plaintiff’s Claims
We also disagree with plaintiffs contention that the arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable because it provides defendant a free peek at his claims before arbitration. The bilateral nature of the dispute resolution procedure distinguishes the parties’ agreement from the employment contract analyzed in
Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
(2004)
But the arbitration provision here, aside from being bilateral, states that “all disputes that cannot be resolved by informal internal resolution . . . will be submitted to binding arbitration.” The provision does not “require” disputes be resolved through “informal internal resolution,” which is not defined in the application, and nothing limits such “informal internal resolution” to claims brought by plaintiff—unlike the cases cited by plaintiff. (See
Nyulassy, supra,
120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1282-1283;
McKinney
v.
Bonilla
(S.D.Cal., July 16, 2010, No. 07cv2373 WQH (CAB))
The arbitration agreement in
Serpa
v.
California Surety Investigations, Inc.
(2013)
c. Payment of Arbitration Fees
Plaintiff asserts the arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable because it requires him to pay half the costs of the arbitration without considering his ability to do so and misinforms him he had to pay all his own attorney fees. 6 “[W]hen an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 110-111.) Recognizing this, the trial court ordered defendant to “pay all costs of the arbitration other than those that plaintiff would necessarily pay in a court proceeding.” It found “[t]he issue of the costs provision is not a substantial issue” and “is a term easily severable” as it “does not permeate the application with substantive unconscionability.”
Defendant maintains the cost-splitting requirement cannot be severed because “it is permeated with unconcionability” by lacking mutuality, giving defendant a free peek at his claims, and failing to comply with Armendariz s requirements. We have already rejected plaintiff’s first two claims. As we shall discuss in the next section, his last contention lacks merit as well.
We review the trial court’s ruling on severance of an unconscionable provision for abuse of discretion.
(Lhotka, supra,
181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 820-821.) Absent the fee-splitting provision, we ascertain no other
*256
possibly substantively unconscionable provision in the arbitration clause. (See
Armendariz, supra,
d. Annendariz
As an independent ground, plaintiff argues the arbitration clause fails to satisfy the five minimum requirements set forth by
Annendariz
for a valid arbitration agreement. Under
Armendariz,
“an arbitration agreement is lawful if it ‘(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.’ ”
(Armendariz, supra,
*257 D. Dismissal of Class Claims
Plaintiff contends the court erred in dismissing the class claims with prejudice. We agree. Under
Sandquist, supra,
Sandquist
rejected the defendant’s argument ‘“that state law requires harmless error review in all cases before reversal will follow. [Citations.] . . . [S]ome errors are reversible per se. The error here falls within that class requiring automatic reversal because its effects are ‘ ‘“unmeasurable” ’ and ‘ ‘‘deI]y| analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.” ’ [Citations.] We cannot say whether an arbitrator would have decided the issue the same or differently. Indeed, to deny remand by insisting an arbitrator would surely have agreed with the trial court’s view or our view of the merits of class availability is to recommit the very error complained of—deprivation of a decision by a contractually agreed-upon decision maker. The denial of the parties’ right to their agreed-upon decision maker is thus the sort of miscarriage of justice that requires reversal without further harmless error analysis.”
(Sandquist, supra,
In its supplemental brief, defendant seeks to avoid this outcome and merely argues this issue may not be considered on appeal. It asserts plaintiff ‘“waived his right to challenge the trial court’s authority to rule on the arbitrability of his class claims” by urging it to determine whether the arbitration agreement encompassed class claims and not raising the issue in the trial court. Such waiver, according to defendant, cannot be excused on the basis Sandquist constituted new law because its rule ‘“was not an unforeseeable departure from existing law.”
Defendant further contends the issue may not be considered for the first time on appeal as a ‘“purely legal issue” because ‘“the question of who decides whether an arbitration agreement is a mixed question of fact and law.” Citing
*258
Parsons v. Bristol Development Co.
(1965)
Here, defendant has not identified any conflict in the evidence. Thus, even assuming there was a waiver, the issue is a purely legal one that we have discretion to consider.
(People
v.
Superior Court
(Ghilotti) (2002)
“ ‘In determining whether an arbitration agreement applies to a specific dispute, the court may examine only the agreement itself and the complaint filed by the party refusing arbitration . . . .’ [Citation.] . . . Where, as here, ‘there is no
“factual
dispute as to the language of [the] agreement” [citation] or “conflicting extrinsic evidence” regarding the terms of the contract [citation], our standard of review of a trial court order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1281.2 is de novo.’ [Citation.] ‘We are not bound by the trial court’s construction or interpretation.’ ”
(Rice v. Downs
(2016)
To do so, we follow
Sandquist’%
application of the law to the facts in that case.
Sandquist
began by determining whether federal or state law governed its determination of “the ‘who decides’ question.”
(Sandquist, supra,
Applying state law,
Sandquist
examined the three arbitration provisions contained in the form agreements the plaintiff was required to sign.
Sandquist
noted: “All three arbitration provisions share the same basic structure and much of the same language. All three contain two inclusive clauses that define the range of disputes that must be ‘submitted to and determined
exclusively
by binding arbitration.’ Two of the three add an exclusive clause that sets out a specific, limited set of disputes, otherwise covered by the clause’s inclusive language, that are nevertheless withdrawn from the arbitrator’s purview.”
(Sandquist, supra,
Turning to the language of the provisions, Sandquist noted the following similarities. “First, the provisions extend to ‘any claim, dispute, and/or controversy . . . between [me/myself] and the Company.’ This language is comprehensive. If a dispute or controversy is between Sandquist and Lebo Automotive, as the one before us surely is, and if it might otherwise be permissibly submitted to a court, as the question whether class arbitration is available surely could be, this portion of the arbitration clause suggests a choice to have the decision made by an arbitrator.
“Second, the provisions extend to all claims ‘arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my seeking employment with, employment by, or other association with the Company . . . .’ (Italics added.) The underlying claims in the first amended complaint assert that Lebo Automotive harassed and discriminated against Sandquist on the basis of race in the course of his employment, created a hostile work environment, and ultimately constructively discharged him. They plainly arise from Sandquist’s employment with Lebo Automotive. The procedural question those claims present—whether Sandquist may pursue his claims on a class basis—directly arises from his underlying claims. Given that the provisions are intended to sweep in disputes ‘having any relationship or connection whatsoever’ with Sandquist’s employment, that the issue before us arises from a lawsuit over Sandquist’s employment would appear enough to satisfy this nexus requirement.” (Sandquist, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 245-246.)
Here, the arbitration clause similarly applies to “all disputes and claims arising out of or relating to the submission of this application” and “all
*260
disputes . . . which might arise out of or relate to my employment with the company.” Such language ‘“suggests the ‘who decides’ question is an arbi-trable one, but they are by no means conclusive.”
(Sandquist, supra,
Sandquist
thus considered ‘“other principles applicable to the interpretation of arbitration clauses and contracts generally.”
(Sandquist, supra,
Because ‘“Lebo Automotive could have written the description of matters within the arbitrator’s purview less comprehensively,” so as to ‘“explicitly address[] any unstated desire to have the availability of class arbitration resolved by a court,” but did not, ‘“it is Lebo that ‘drafted an ambiguous document, and . . . cannot now claim the benefit of the doubt.’ ”
(Sandquist, supra,
Sandquist
controls our interpretation of the arbitration provision at hand. Given the similarities between the arbitration clauses in that case and here, and the other principles addressed by
Sandquist,
we conclude the decision
*261
regarding whether class arbitration is available was one that should have been made by the arbitrator in the first instance. Under Sandquist, the trial court’s error in deciding the issue itself is reversible per se.
(Sandquist, supra,
Ill
DISPOSITION
The request for judicial notice is granted. The appeal from the order granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is treated as a petition for writ of mandate. The petition is granted in part and denied in part. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the superior court to vacate that portion of its order dismissing the class claims to allow the arbitrator to decide whether the arbitration clause permits arbitration on a classwide basis. In all other respects, the peremptory writ challenging the order compelling arbitration is denied. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs in this proceeding.
Notes
“Under PAGA, ‘an “aggrieved employee” may bring a civil action personally and on behalf of other current or former employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations. [Citation.] Of the civil penalties recovered, 75 percent goes to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, leaving the remaining 25 percent for the “aggrieved employees.” ’ ”
(Miranda
v.
Anderson Enterprises. Inc.
(2015)
According to plaintiff, “the trial court conceded that the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable” but failed to determine whether it was a strong or modest showing. That is inaccurate. The court said the failure to attach or otherwise provide the AAA rules “may make the application procedurally unconscionable” (italics added), but even if it was, there was no substantive unconscionability. It thus never reached the issue of whether any procedural unconscionabilty was strong or mild.
Gutierrez
v.
Sea World LLC
(S.D.Cal., Sept. 26, 2014, No. 14-CV-0131-BTM-JMA)
It is unclear if the words “mutually agree” were contained in the arbitration agreement itself or if Baltazar was referring to its conclusion that the words used indicated the agreement was mutual. The opinion does not quote the entire arbitration provision.
To support is contention the arbitration provision was bilateral, defendant asserts it “has demanded arbitration against [plaintiff] before AAA, and that arbitration is currently pending.” We do not consider this fact as our role is to review the record before the trial court when it ruled
(In re Zeth S.
(2003)
Defendant points out the arbitration provision does not contain any language requiring plaintiff to “pay ... all of the fees for any attorney he hired” and that the statement is from plaintiff’s declaration in opposition to the motion to compel arbitration.
As Lane explains, “the rules of the AAA . . . give the arbitrator the authority ‘ “to order such discovery, by way of deposition, interrogatory, document production, or otherwise, as the arbitrator considers necessary to a full and fair' exploration of the issues in dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration.” ’ [Citation.] As to discovery sufficient to vindicate unwaivable statutory rights, in Armendariz. the California Supreme Court concluded that by agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims, the employer impliedly agreed to all discovery necessary to adequately arbitrate the claims. [Citation.] The Roman court determined that ‘[t]here appears to be no meaningful difference between the scope of discovery approved in Armendariz and that authorized by the AAA employment dispute rules . . . .’ [Citation.] Thus, whether implied or in fact, the discovery permitted by the expressly referenced AAA rules satisfied the requirements of Armendariz for arbitration of statutory claims. In short, the lack of an express provision for discovery did not render the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable.” (Lane, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 692-693.)
