D.W. v. J.W.B.D.W. v. J.W.B.
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Moore
Lead Opinion
D.W. (“the father”), who is undisputedly the biological father of B.W.B. (“the child”), appeals from a judgment on partial findings entered by the Mobile Probate Court (“the probate court”) denying his contest to the adoption of the child by J.W.B. and J.J.B. (“the petitioners”) and from a final judgment of the probate court granting the adoption of the child by.the petitioners. We affirm the judgment on partial findings in part and reverse it in part. We reverse the final judgment granting the adoption of the child, and we remand the case for further proceedings.
Procedural History
On June 8, 2013, the petitioners filed a petition seeking .to adopt the child. On August 16, 2013, the father filed a motion to contest the adoption of the child. On December 17, 2013, the petitioners moved to dismiss the father’s contest on the ground that he had failed to register with the Alabama - Putative Father Registry within 30 days of the child’s birth. After a trial, the probate court entered a judgment on partial findings on October 15, 2014, finding that the father had not been married at common law to J.B. (“the mother”), the mother of the child, and that the father lacked standing to contest the adoption of the child because he is not the presumed father of the child and because he did not register with the Alabama Putative Father Registry.
Analysis
to 05 I ? s CO O o Qu CD
The father first contends that his consent to the adoption is required because he is the presumed father of the child under
“(a) Consent to the petitioner’s adoption ... shall be required of the following:
[[Image here]]
“(3) The adoptee’s presumed father, regardless of paternity, if:
“a. He and the adoptee’s mother are or have been married to each other and the adoptee was born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage was terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation was entered by a court.”
The elements of a common-law marriage are “1) capacity; 2) present, mutual agreement to permanently enter the marriage relationship to the exclusion of all other relationships; and 3) public recognition of the relationship as a marriage and public assumption of marital duties and cohabitation.” Boswell v. Boswell,
“ ‘ “[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the.mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a level of .proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence, or the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”
Dyess v. Dyess,
The evidence in the record pertinent to this aspect of the appeal is as follows. The father testified that he and the mother had been ceremonially married on January 25, 2011, and had divorced after a hearing that had occurred on May 15, 2012. He testified that a child named L.W. had been born of the marriage on September 1, 2011.
The father testified that he and the mother had reconciled the same day as the hearing in the divorce case. He-testified that, after the divorce, the mother had stayed with him at his. apartment between four and six nights a week, that she had received her mail at the apartment, and that she had kept personal items and clothing there. The father’s sister and sister-in-law also testified that the mother had often stayed at the apartment after the divorce. The mother testified that, after the hearing in the divorce case, she had visited the father at his apartment because he had indicated that he was suicidal. The mother denied that she had spent the night with the father on ' that occasion, and she testified that she had not spent one night at the father’s apartment following the divorce. The mother admitted,- however, that she had used the father’s apartment to receive mail.
The father and members of his family testified that, following the divorce, the mother had referred to the father as her husband and that the father had referred to the mother as his wife. Several witnesses testified that the mother and the father had been seen together at church softball games subsequent to the divorce. A pastor also testified to having seen the mother and the father at church as a couple,-although the pastor acknowledged that unmarried couples also had attended church. The father testified that he had never seen the mother use her maiden name. The mother denied that she had referred to the father as her husband after the divorce. The mother also denied having attended church with the father after the divorce.
The father testified that,, on February 20, 2013, he and the mother had filed their income-tax returns for the 2012 tax year as a married couple and that the'mother had signed the income-tax returns as his spouse, using his last name and listing her address as the address of the father’s apartment. The mother admitted that she had filed a false affidavit indicating that she had not filed a joint income-tax return with the father, but she testified that she had been manipulated into filing that income-tax return. The evidence also shows that the mother had indicated on a Medicaid application that she completed in October 2012 that, at that time, she . was married to the father and was living with him. The mother testified that she had misrepresented her marital status and living arrangement to Medicaid at that time. On a March 31, 2013, Medicaid application, the mother had indicated that. she was divorced.
The father testified that, in July 2012, he had purchased a ring for the mother because they were working out their differ-éncés, that, around Christmas 2012, he had given the mother the ring and had asked her to marry him, and that the mother had agreed. The mother denied that she had received a new wedding ring. The mother and the father applied for a marriage license on March, 20, 2Ó13. The mother testified that she had applied for the mar
The father testified that, following the divorce, he had helped support the mother and L.W. On October 29, 2012, the mother filed a motion seeking to hold the father in contempt for failing to pay child support for L.W. The father did not raise in that action any claim that he and the mother were common-law married. The father testified that the mother had said that she would take care of the contempt action and for the father not to worry about it, but, he said, the mother had not dismissed the action because she had not wanted her parents to be angry. A judgment for a child-support arrearage had eventually been entered in that case.
The father testified that he and the mother were married at common law in September or October 2012, but, he said, he could not determine the exact date the common-law marriage began. He acknowledged, however, that he and the mother had not believed that they needed a mutual agreement to be married at common law and that, if mutual agreement was an element of a common-law marriage, his claim would fail.
We conclude that the probate court received conflicting evidence on whether the mother and the father entered into a common-law marriage. The father argues that this court should not consider the mother’s testimony because it was rife with admitted misrepresentations; however, it was for the probate court, who viewed the witnesses, to determine which testimony was to be believed. See Etheridge v. Yeager,
II.
“(a) Consent to. the petitioner’s adoption. ... shall .be required of the following:
[[Image here]]
“(3) The adoptee’s presumed father, regardless of paternity, if;
[[Image here]]
“d. . He received the adoptee into his home and openly held out the adoptee as his own child.”
The father argues on appeal that, under
A close review of the pleadings and motions in this case shows that'the father did not expressly raise that claim below. Based on the state of- the pleadings, on July 28, 2014, the probate court entered an order identifying the “triable issues” as:
“a. ■ Whether [the father] is a ‘presumed' father’ for purposes of the Alabama Adoption Code, which centers on whether [the father] was the common law spouse of [the mother] at the' time of the birth of [the child].
“b. Whether or not [the father] has standing to file the opposition to the adoption of [the child].
“c. Whether or not [the father] has impliedly consented to the proposed adoption.
“d. Whether the adoption of [the child] should be granted.”
At the outset of the trial on October 14, 2014, the probate-court judge reiterated that “the primary issue” to be decided was whether the mother and the father had entered into a common-law marriage. The father did not object to that characterization.
Early in the trial, the attorney for the father began questioning the father’s sister regarding the father’s prebirth conduct toward the child. When the petitioners’counsel objected on hearsay grounds, the father’s attorney responded: “[I]t’s offered to prove the common law marriage that he said this and she said this and they held this child out to be their own and he supported this child.” The probate court sustained the objection. The father later introduced evidence of how he had held out the unborn child as his own, had brought the mother and the unborn child into his home, had attended to the medical needs of the unborn child, and had cared for the mother during her pregnancy. However, throughout the trial, the probate court consistently reminded the parties that the only claim being litigated was the father’s common-law-marriage claim.
Under Rule 15(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which applies in adoption proceedings before a probate court, see Rule 1, Ala. R. Ciri P., “[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.”
“ ‘[I]mplied consent of the parties can be inferred from an opposing party’s failure to object to introduction of evidence raising the disputed issue initialfy.’ International Rehab. Assocs., Inc. v. Adams,613 So.2d 1207 , 1213 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis added). An opposing party’s failure to object to the introduction of evidence raising an unpleaded claim or defense permits, but does not require, the inference that the opposing party has impliedly consented to litigate the disputed issue. That is so because evidence that supports an un-pleaded claim or defense often overlaps with evidence that supports a pleaded claim or defense, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Modern Elec., Inc. v. Ideal Elec. Sec. Co.,81 F.3d 240 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (evidence related to unpleaded claim of quasi-contractual unjust enrichment was also relevant to pleaded claim of quantum meruit based on contract implied in fact). Therefore, consent should not be inferred from the failure to object ‘absent a clear indication that the party who introduced the evidence was attempting to raise a new issue,’ International Harvester Credit Corp. v. East Coast Truck and R. V. Sales, Inc.,547 F.2d 888 , 890 (5th Cir.1977), and that the relevance of the evidence to the new issue was reasonably apparent to the opposing party whose failure toobject can be deemed to indicate an intent to litigate the new issue, see Nicholls v. Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc., 367 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (although defendant in copyright-infringement action did not assert the affirmative defense of independent creation in his responsive pleading, the issue was tried by the consent of the parties because evidence was introduced at trial without objection and both parties understood that the defense was at issue). The rule in such cases has been explained as follows:
“ ‘[W]hen the evidence that is claimed to show that an issue was tried by consent is relevant to an issue already in the case, as well as to the one that is the subject matter of the amendment, and there was no indication at trial that the party who introduced the evidence was seeking to raise a new issue, the pleadings will not be deemed amended under Rule 15(b)(2)[, Fed.R.Civ.P.]. The reasoning behind this view is sound since if evidence is introduced to support basic issues that already have been pleaded, the opposing party may not be conscious of its relevance to issues not raised by the pleadings unless that fact is made clear.’
“[6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil,] § 1493 at 34-40 [ (2010) ] (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).”
CVS/Caremark Corp. v. Washington,
In this case, the evidence upon which the father relies on appeal to prove his unpleaded claim that he is the presumed father of the child under
In its judgment, the probate court granted the petitioners’ motion for a judgment on partial findings by determining that the mother and the father had' not been common-law married and, thus, that the father was not a presumed father with standing to contest the adoption of the child. The father did not file a post-judgment motion arguing that the probate court had overlooked any alternative claim that he was the presumed father based on his conduct of openly holding out the unborn child as his own and taking the unborn child into his home as required by
III. The Putative Father Registry Act
The Putative Father Registry Act (“the PFRA”),
“Any person who claims to be the natural father of a child and -fails to file his notice of intent to-claim paternity pursuant to subsection (a) prior-to or within 30 days of the birth of a child born out of wedlock, shall be deemed to have given an irrevocable implied consent in any adoption proceeding.”
§ 26-10C-l.(i), Ala.Code 1975. A putative father who complies with the PFRA is entitled to notice of adoption ¡proceedings under
In this casé, it is undisputed' that the father did not file a notice of intent to claim paternity in compliance with the PFRA. However, he maintains on’ appeal that he was prevented from filing the notice within 30 days after the birth of the child because the mother misrepresented that the child had died shortly after his birth. The undisputed evidence at trial showed that the mother gave birth to the child at a Mobile hospital while the father was away for work in Gulf Shores. The mother concealed the birth of the child from the father, and, after several days, she misrepresented to the father that the child had died shortly after his birth and that she was going to have the remains of the child cremated,' going so far as to produce a fake death certificate to support her lie. The mother testified that she then coaxed the father into moving to Colorado by saying she and their other child would follow; however, she admitted that she had had no intention of joining the father in Colorado. The father testified that, in August 2013, an attorney for the Alabama Department of Human Resources.had telephoned him and had asked for his consent to the adoption of the child, which, the father said, was how he had found out that the child was alive.
During the trial, the father’s counsel began to question the mother about whether she had misrepresented the death of the child in order to prevent the father from registering with the Putative Father Registry. The petitioners’ counsel objected, stating, among other things: “That’s not why we’re here.” The probate court overruled the objection, but admonished the father’s counsel to stay focused on the only issue before the court—the existence vel non of a common-law marriage. The father did not further raise or argue the point that he now maintains on appeal, i.e., that his failure to register under the PFRA should be excused by the mother’s misconduct. The probate court did not address that contention in its judgment because that contention was not properly raised in the proceedings below. The record does not contain any mention of the legal argument that the father now makes for the first time on appeal. We therefore conclude that the father did not preserve this argument for appellate review. See Bevill v. Owen,
IV. The Constitutional Claim
Finally, the father argues that his due-process rights have been violated by the probate court’s decision not to consider his objection to the adoption.
“I would like to make the argument that under the Fourteenth Amendment, under these facts where you have a father who has supported the mother and the child, has - been a responsible father, even if Your Honor finds that he is not a common law spouse, to deprive him of his fundamental right of .parentage would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, due process clause.”
The father cited caselaw from the United States Supreme Court recognizing the fundamental rights of parents to the custody of their natural children, see Prince v. Massachusetts,
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, that “[n]o State.shall ,.. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.,... ” .
“We have long recognized that the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, ‘guarantees more than fair process.’ Washington v. Glucksberg,521 U.S. 702 , 719 (1997). The Clause also includes a substantive component that ‘provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty. interests.’ Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores,507 U.S. 292 , 301-302 (1993).”
Troxel v. Granville,
In Lehr, supra, the Supreme Court summarized its easelaw on the subject:
“When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to' the responsibilities of parenthood by com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ Caban[ v. Mohammed], 441 U.S. [380], at 392 [ (1979) ], his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause. At that point it may be said that he ‘act[s] as a father toward his children.’ Id., at 389, n. 7. But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds. ‘[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in “promot[ing] a way of life” through the instruction of children as well as from the fact of blood relationship.’ Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,431 U.S. 816 , 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,406 U.S. 205 , 231-233 (1972)).
“The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings, of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interest ] lies.”
Lehr and its predecessors transformed prior adoption law that had given little to no recognition of the rights of unwed fathers. Ardis L. Campbell, Rights of Unwed Father to Obstruct Adoption of His Child by Withholding Consent,
In an' influential law-review article, Professor Elizabeth Buchanan wrote that, under Lehr, “the state may not deny biological parents the opportunity to establish a protected custodial relationship.” Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State L.J. 313, 351 (1984). This “opportunity interest',” as she labeled it, id. (citing Lehr,
The California Supreme Court relied on the “opportunity interest” when it determined that a newborn child of an unwed father could not be adopted unless awarding custody to the unwed father would be detrimental to the child. In re Baby Girl M.,
“[U]nwed fathers gain from their biological connection with a child an opportunity interest, to develop a relationship with their -children which is constitutionally protected. This opportunity interest begins at conception and endures probably throughout the minority of the child.”
In 1990,- Louisiana’s private-adoption laws allowed an unwed mother to surrender her child for adoption without the' consent of an unwed father whose name did not appear on the child’s birth certificate and further provided that the unwed father could not place his name on the child’s birth certificate without the mother’s consent. • Thus, an unwed mother who refused to allow an unwed, father to place his name on a child’s birth certificate could unilaterally give up her child for adoption. The Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the private-adoption scheme violated the due-process rights of a fit, fully committed unwed father of a newborn child who, if he has taken concrete actions to come forward to participate in the rearing of the child and if he has taken some measure of responsibility to make valuable contributions to the future welfare of the child, “has a constitutionally protected interest in his opportunity to develop a mutually beneficial emotional. or psychological bond
That same year, the New York Supreme Court relied on the “opportunity interest” of unwed fathers when it struck down a provision of the state’s adoption code pursuant to which an unwed father’s consent to the adoption of his under-six-month-old child was required only when he had openly lived with the child or the mother for six continuous months before the placement of adoption. In re Raquel Marie X.,
In Appeal of H.R., supra, a per curiam decision, the District, of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a court must give preference to a fit unwed father who has grasped his opportunity interest over unrelated persons seeking to adopt the unwed father’s newborn child. In reaching that conclusion, Associate Judge Ferren, writing the main opinion, distinguished Lehr, in which. an unwed father had allowed his child to bond with the mother’s husband for the.first two years of the child’s life without taking any steps to form a “significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship” with the child or seeking “to establish a legal tie” to the child. Lehr,
“when an unwed mother has relinquished her right to custody of a child at birth for adoption by strangers, the unwed father’s interest in developing a custodial relationship with his child is entitled to substantial constitutional protection if he has early on, and continually, done all that he could reasonably have been expected to do under the circumstances to pursue that interest.”
In Adoption of Kelsey S., supra, the California Supreme Court held that the father of a child born out of wedlock may not be denied the right to withhold his consent to his child’s adoption by third parties when he has made diligent and legal attempts to obtain custody of his child and to rear the child himself, absent any showing of the father’s unfitness as a parent. The evidence in the case showed that, during' her pregnancy, the mother had blocked all of the father’s attempts to receive the child into his home, thereby preventing him from acquiring'the'status of a presumed father under California law. As merely a putative father, the unwed father did not have a statutory right similar to that of the mother or of a presumed father to object to the adoption of the child. The lower court could, and did, authorize the adoption of the child based solely on its determination that adoption served the best interests of the child. The California Supreme Court held that an unwed father who “promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities— emotional, financial, and otherwise—” has a “federal constitutional right to due process” that “prohibits the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent.”
This court first discussed the “opportunity interest” established by Lehr in M.V.S. v. V.M.D., supra. In that case, the father, a 43-year-old man married to another woman, impregnated the 18-year-old mother during an illicit affair. After the mother refused to consent to an abortion, the father ended the relationship and discontinued all financial assistance to' the mother. The mother gave birth to the child and acted as the child’s sole custodian for nine months before consenting’ to the adoption of the child by a third party. During those nine months, the father saw the child on three occasions, never treating the child lovingly, and gave the mother a
Since M.V.S., all of this court’s cases citing Lehr approve of the concept that the constitution protects an unwed father who has cultivated a substantial relationship with his child. See, e.g., R.K. v. R.J.,
In this case, the father argues that he had demonstrated the requisite commitment to fatherhood before the birth of the child such that he retained a constitutional right to object to the adoption of the child by the petitioners regardless of the operation of the PFRA or the AAC. The father testified that he and the mother had participated in consensual sex on multiple occasions after their divorce.
Although a father cannot exercise custody of an unborn child gestating in its mother’s womb, a father still plays a role in the life of a developing, but unborn, child. See In re Raquel Marie X., supra. Our caselaw holds that a father, whether married to the mother or not, owes a duty to support his unborn child. See Ex parte C.V.,
Because of the disputes in the evidence, we cannot hold that the'father proved his constitutional claim as a matter of law. We hold only that it is apparent that, in rejecting the father’s constitutional arguments, the probate court did not determine whether the father had grasped his constitutionally protected “opportunity interest” by his prebirth conduct toward the mother and the child and his postbirth actions to protect his legal relationship with the child. Thus, we reverse the judgments and remand the case to the probate court for it to make that fact-sensitive determination. We instruct the probate court, on remand, to consider any indicia of the unwed father’s commitment to the child or lack thereof, including, but not limited to,, the manner in which the child was conceived; any expressions by the unwed father toward or regarding his unborn child, or his role as a parent to that child; the openness and consistency of the unwed father’s acknowledgment of paternity of the unborn child; - the measure of the financial, emotional, and other support and care provided, to the mother and the child by the unwed father during the mother’s pregnancy and the promptness and continuity of that support; the sincerity of any attempts by the unwed father to stabilize his relationship with the mother and to legitimate the child through marriage or other means; any manifestations of the unwed father’s intent as to future parental involvement with the child; any harm the unwed father may have caused his unborn child or the mother through any act or omission; any failure by the unwed father to follow statutory -safeguards or to take legal action designed to protect his parental interest, in the child before birth and the reasons therefor; any efforts -by the unwed father to pursue and protect a legal or actual parental relationship with the child after birth; and any actions taken by the mother intended.to thwart the unwed father’s opportunity to develop a parental relationship with the child after birth and the reasonableness of the unwed father’s conduct in attempting to overcome those actions. See Appeal of H.R., supra.
Because the probate court limited its earlier- inquiry solely to the question of whether the child was born of a common-law marriage between the mother and the father, the probate court may, if requested, hold an additional evidentiary hearing regarding the father’s constitutional claim. However, to forestall further protracted proceedings in this case, the probate court shall conclude its fact-finding duties and issue a judgment on the father’s constitutional, claim within 30 days of the date the probate court is - reinvested with jurisdiction in this case. Any determination the probate court makes as to the father’s constitutional claim shall contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law to expedite any further appellate review.
Based' on the foregoing, we reverse the judgments of the probate court and remand this case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Notes
. Although the parties and the probate court referred to the judgment as a judgment as a matter of law, because this action was tried without a jury, the judgment is more properly referred to as a Rule 52(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., judgment on partial findings. See Lawson v. Harris Culinary Enters., LLC,
. The petitioners argue that the father waived this argument by failing to serve the attorney general in tills action; .We-interpret the father’s argument as an "as applied” challenge, which does not require service on the attorney general. See IEC Arab Alabama, Inc. v. City of Arab,
. The father raised other constitutional challenges, but, on appeal, he argues only that the judgment of the probate - court violates his due;-process rights under the federal constitution. Hence, we consider those other arguments raised before the probate court, but not argued on appeal, to be waived, and we'do not address them in this opinion. See Curvin v. Curvin,
.- The mother testified that she had not consented to any of their sexual encounters. The constitutional protections outlined in Lehr and its progeny do not extend to unwed fathers who produce a child out of wedlock through nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the mother. See Adoption of Kelsey S.,
. Section 26-10A-9(a)(i), Ala.Code 1975, impliedly recognizes that duty by providing 'that consent to adoption is not required' from a father who fails, “with reasonable knowledge of the pregnancy, to offer financial and/or emotional support for a period of six months prior to the birth.” See Ex parte F.P.,
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with Parts I, II, and III of the main opinion. I do not believe D.W. adequately raised a claim that his constitutional rights were being deprived in the probate court; therefore, I respectfully dissent as to Part IV of the main opinion.
I note initially that D.W. did not serve the attorney general of this state with any pleading challenging the constitutionality of any statute as required by
In addition, the probate court’s judgment cannot be reversed for the failure to do something the probate court was never asked to do. “[An appellate court] is limited to a review of the record alone, and an issue not reflected in the record as having been raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Totten v. Lighting & Supply, Inc.,
“But I would like to make the argument that under the Fourteenth Amendment, under these facts where you have a father who has supported the mother and the child, has been a responsible father, even if Your Honor finds that he is not a common law spouse, to deprive him of his fundamental right of parentage would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, due process clause. It would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, privileges and immunities clause—as the state statute would apply to the facts of this case, and also would violate the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause.”
“In order for an appellate court to review a constitutional issue, that issue must have been raised by the appellant and presented to and reviewed by the trial court .... Additionally, in order to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, an appellant must identify and make specific arguments regarding what specific rights it claims have been violated.”
Alabama Power Co. v. Turner,
I believe that D.W. was required to specifically identify what state statute or legal principle being applied by the probate court infringed upon a specific constitutional right and to ask for specific relief from the probate court. Because I find the requests made by D.W.’s counsel too vague and unspecified for purposes of appellate review, I would affirm the probate court’s judgment in its entirety.
THOMPSON, P.J., concurs.