D.W., as Executor De Son Tort of the Estate of M.C., a minor, and on behalf of the Estate of M.C. and the Survivors of the Estate, v. GRINDR, LLC
Case No: 8:25-cv-1260-TPB-AEP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
June 27, 2025
TOM BARBER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Document 14, PageID 231
This matter is before the Court on “Plaintiff‘s Motion for Leave to Proceed Anonymously,” filed on May 16, 2025. (Doc. 2). Defendant Grindr, LLC, has not yet appeared in the case. Upon review of the motion, court file, and record, the Court finds as follows:
Background1
This case stems from the brutal torture and murder of M.C., a 16-year-old girl from Pinellas County, Florida. On February 14, 2025, M.C. met a 35-year-old man on Grindr, a dating app designed to facilitate primarily homosexual romantic
M.C., the man, and the woman lived together for a few days before their relationship turned violent. Allegedly, the three got into a dispute, and as a result, the man and woman severely beat M.C. The beating was extreme, torturous, and continued for several days. On or about February 24, 2025, M.C. was killed when a pool ball wrapped in a sock was shoved into her mouth, and then her head and face were wrapped in saran wrap, obstructing M.C.‘s airways and suffocating her. Following her death, the man transported M.C.‘s body to another location before he dismembered M.C.‘s body with a chainsaw. He then disposed the remains in a dumpster in Ruskin, Florida, which was eventually taken to an incinerator. The man and woman have been charged with first-degree murder, and their criminal trials are currently pending.
Plaintiff D.W., the presently anonymous executor de tort of M.C.‘s estate, filed a complaint against Grindr on May 16, 2025, which was amended on May 18,
Legal Standard
“In determining whether these exceptional circumstances exist, the district court should consider whether a plaintiff (1) challenges government activity; (2) must disclose information of the utmost intimacy; and (3) must admit an intent to engage in illegal conduct, risking criminal prosecution.” Tessa G. v. Sec‘y, United States Dep‘t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 24-11764, 2025 WL 1342339, at *3 (11th Cir. May 8, 2025) (citing Francis, 631 F.3d at 1316). “The inquiry also does not stop there, as [the Eleventh Circuit] ha[s] further directed courts to consider whether (1) a plaintiff wishing to proceed anonymously is a minor, (2) a plaintiff would be threatened with violence or physical harm by proceeding in the plaintiff‘s own name, and (3) anonymity poses a unique threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant.” Id. at *3 (citing Francis, 631 F.3d at 1316). No one factor is dispositive, and courts should “review all the circumstances of a given case [before] decid[ing] whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff‘s identity should yield to the plaintiff‘s privacy concerns.” Francis, 631 F.3d at 1316 (emphasis in original). Mere embarrassment is insufficient to warrant permitting a party to appear anonymously. Id. at 1316. Only in rare circumstances does a party‘s interest in privacy outweigh the “customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.” In re: Chiquita Brands Int‘l, Inc., 965 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2020); Francis, 631 F.3d at 1315.
Here, Plaintiff is not challenging governmental activity, nor does this case involve any intent to engage in illegal conduct. Instead, Plaintiff requests to proceed in this lawsuit anonymously on the basis that it “involves the sexuality of [M.C.] – a minor, the threat of social sigma, and the threat of physical harm and harassment resulting from identifying [D.W.], [M.C.], or the survivors.” The Court recognizes that M.C. is a minor; however, this fact is not dispositive and other considerations must be weighed.
The Court turns to matters of intimacy (here, sexuality) and the threat of social stigmatization. As an initial matter, it may be important to distinguish between the interests of D.W. and M.C. Plaintiff D.W. is an executor of M.C.‘s estate, although the exact nature of their relationship is unknown. Plaintiff D.W.‘s interest, if any, is largely vicarious in nature, which may be insufficient to outweigh public interest in disclosure. See Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 794 F. Supp. 72, 74-75 (D.R.I. 1992) (noting that in Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 744 F. Supp. 40 (D.R.I. 1990), the parents of deceased individual had a privacy interest at stake that was “largely vicarious” and ultimately did not support request to proceed under fictitious names). Considering M.C.‘s privacy interest, because M.C. is deceased, she will suffer no stigmatization following the disclosure of her identity to the extent that this case could reveal her sexual preferences and practices. See id. (finding that disclosure of deceased individual‘s sexual preferences and practices could not result in stigmatization).
Although unclear, Plaintiff may be arguing that the amended complaint discloses M.C.‘s sexuality because of her use of Grindr, which is designed to facilitate mainly homosexual romantic encounters. Though disclosure of a party‘s sexuality could play a role in permitting a party to proceed anonymously, it has typically been applied in situations where the sexual conduct was illegal or the facts
Plaintiff also appears to argue that there is a threat of physical harm to the parties because “the non-parties may feel threated by this matter and seek to influence the same by threatening or harassing [D.W.] or the survivors.” However, Plaintiff does not sufficiently explain who these “non-parties” are, or on what basis they may seek to threaten anyone involved in this case. More significantly, Plaintiff has not submitted any particularized evidence to support these conclusory allegations. See Doe v. City of Vero Beach, No. 2:19-14212, 2019 WL 4277045, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2019) (concluding that a conclusory statement that a plaintiff or
The Court also considers the substantial news coverage about these events, including national reporting and a corresponding unsealed state court criminal case. M.C.‘s name and image have been disclosed and circulated on a variety of national news outlets.5 In fact, M.C.‘s identity has already been reported on in relation to this very case. See David Minsky, Grindr Sued Over Teen‘s Death, Alleged Negligence In Fla., Law360, June 5, 2025, https://www.law360.com/articles/2349955 (last visited June 27, 2025). While not dispositive, prior public disclosures pertaining to a party‘s identity weighs against permission to proceed anonymously. See, e.g., Raiser v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 182 F. App‘x 810, 811 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In cases where the sensitive information has already been disclosed . . . the social interest in allowing a party to proceed anonymously is limited.“); Doe v. Drake Univ., No. 4:16-CV-00623-RGE-SBJ, 2017 WL 11404865 (S.D. Iowa June 13, 2017) (“Because of the prior and ongoing disclosure of Plaintiff‘s identity, much of the contemplated harm in unveiling his identity has already occurred and this Court is unable to mitigate the damage from the previous disclosures.“).
In sum, upon consideration of the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that requested relief is not warranted and fails to overcome the strong presumption in favor of openness. See Chiquita, 965 F.3d at 1247. Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that sensitive content may need to be introduced into the record in this case. To that end, the Court will entertain requests to seal or redact certain documents on an individual basis, if appropriate.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
- “Plaintiff‘s Motion for Leave to Proceed Anonymously” (Doc. 2) is DENIED.
- Plaintiff D.W. is DIRECTED to file an amended complaint that discloses his or her name on or before July 11, 2025.
- This ORDER is stayed for fourteen days.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 27th day of June, 2025.
TOM BARBER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE