D'OLIMPIO v. Crisafi, 718 F. Supp. 2d 340

D'OLIMPIO v. Crisafi

718 F. Supp. 2d 340

S.D.N.Y.

2010

Check Treatment

Docket

MEMORANDUM ORDER

JED S. RAKOFF, District Judge.

On August 18, 2009, Plaintiff Matthew D’Olimpio brought this action (docket-numbered 09 Civ. 7283) against defendants Louis Crisafi, Brendan Vallely, Thomas D’Amicantonio, James Giglio, Michael Moffett, and Paul Nadel for malicious prosecution, false arrest, unlawful detention, and various other violations of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. An amended complaint filed on October 29, 2009 joined Michael Kaplan as a plaintiff and added a claim against defendants Nadel, Jennifer Treacy, Kenneth Post, and Timothy Dewey for unconstitutionally retaliating against Kaplan based on his reports of misconduct committed by defendant Crisafi, a fellow investigator employed by the New York State Department of Health’s Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, Metropolitan Area Regional Office (“BNE-MARO”), in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and § 1983.

On December 18, 2009, defendants Giglio, Moffett, and Nadel moved to dismiss all of D’Olimpio’s claims against them, and defendants Crisafi, Vallely, and D’Amicantonio moved to dismiss D’Olimpio’s malicious prosecution claim. That same day, defendants Nadel, Treacy, Post, and Dewey moved to dismiss Kaplan’s claims against them. Meanwhile, on December 3, 2009, Crisafi had filed what was styled as a complaint against Kaplan (docket-numbered 09 Civ. 9952) alleging that Kaplan defamed him through publication of the reports of Crisafi’s misconduct discussed in Kaplan’s complaint. On the parties’ consent, the Court converted Crisafi’s complaint into a compulsory counterclaim in the action docket-numbered 09 Civ. 7283 and consolidated the two cases. See Transcript, 1/14/10, Crisafi v. Kaplan, No. 09 Civ. 9952. On January 22, 2010, Kaplan moved to dismiss that counterclaim.

By Order dated March 1, 2010 (the “March 1 Order”), the Court granted the motion of Nadel, Treaey, Post, and Dewey to dismiss Kaplan’s retaliation claim; granted Kaplan’s motion to dismiss Crisafi’s defamation counterclaim; and denied all other motions to dismiss. 1 The Order also promised that a Memorandum would issue in due course stating the reasons for these rulings. With apologies to counsel for the extended delay, the Court here provides that Memorandum.

The Court turns first to the motions of defendants Crisafi, Vallely, and D’Amicantonio to dismiss D’Olimpio’s malicious prosecution claim, as set forth in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on October 29, 2009. 2 The relevant allegations are as follows:

Sometime before November 16, 2007, D’Olimpio, a resident of Brooklyn, was prescribed Vicodin by his doctor. FAC ¶ 17. He called that prescription into his pharmacy and obtained the Vicodin. Id. ¶ 18. D’Olimpio’s pharmacy contacted the BNE-MARO after it had not received a hard copy of the prescription from D’Olimpio’s doctor within seven days. Id. ¶ 19. A MARO official called D’Olimpio’s doctor’s office and spoke to an unknown individual there, who either stated by phone that he was not aware of D’Olimpio’s Vicodin prescription or provided a faxed affidavit purportedly signed by the doctor to that effect. Id. ¶ 20. Based on these occurrences, and without any further investigation, MARO investigator Crisafi began planning Crisafi’s arrest. Id. ¶ 21.

On or about November 16, 2007, D’Olimpio was exiting his doctor’s office in Brooklyn and walking toward his car when Crisafi and defendants Vallely and D’Amicantonio, also MARO investigators, showed D’Olimpio their badges and asked to speak with him. Id. ¶¶ 4, 27-28. They asked D’Olimpio his name, where he was coming from, what he was doing at the doctor’s office, and whether the car was his. Id. ¶ 29. D’Olimpio replied it was his wife’s car. Id. ¶ 30. Crisafi asked D’Olimpio if they could search him for weapons; D’Olimpio consented to be frisked, but not to a full search. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. Crisafi then frisked D’Olimpio, reached into his pockets, and took out his car keys. Id. ¶33. Crisafi asked D’Olimpio whether he would consent to a search of the car; D’Olimpio refused, but Crisafi nonetheless carried out the search. Id. ¶¶ 34-36. During the search, Crisafi found a bag containing a bottle marked for Klonopin but containing both Vicodin and Klonopin pills, all of which were lawfully prescribed to Crisafi and which he carried in one bottle for convenience. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Upon finding the bottle and discovering that there were two types of pills inside, Crisafi handcuffed D’Olimpio and moved him into the police car, without making any effort to find out whether the drugs were legally prescribed. Id. ¶¶ 39-40.

While D’Olimpio was being driven to the police precinct and again when he was being escorted to a bathroom prior to questioning, D’Olimpio requested an attorney, but these requests were denied. Id. ¶¶ 41-44. Before questioning began, D’Olimpio asked Crisafi to call an ambulance so that he could take the Klonopin that he needed; Crisafi told D’Olimpio to call his wife and ask her to come to the precinct with his medication. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. When D’Olimpio’s wife arrived, D’Olimpio was brought into a different room, and his wife was given his possessions. Id. ¶ 48. Crisafi then offered D’Olimpio a blue pill, which he took, but D’Olimpio now believes that pill was not a Klonopin pill, as he experienced side effects of confusion and drowsiness after taking it, which he had never felt previously when taking Klonopin. Id. ¶ 50. Crisafi began to interrogate D’Olimpio, and at one point threatened to rescind his father’s physician license. Id. ¶ 51. D’Olimpio at that point again requested an attorney, and Crisafi again denied his request. Id. ¶¶ 52-53.

During the interrogation, Crisafi asked D’Olimpio to confess to charges of criminal possession of a controlled substance for possessing the Vicodin and to charges of criminal impersonation for allegedly calling pharmacies and using false information to obtain prescriptions. D’Olimpio, under the influence of the pill, signed a one-page confession presented to him by Crisafi. Id. ¶ 54. At Crisafi’s request, Vallely signed a form falsely indicating that he had seen Crisafi inform D’Olimpio of his Miranda rights. Id. ¶ 55. D’Olimpio’s forged signature was also added to this “Miranda sheet.” Id. ¶ 56. Crisafi, perhaps with the assistance of Vallely or D’Amicantonio, also wrote a four-page confession and forged D’Olimpio’s signature and initials on it. Id. ¶ 57. Furthermore, Crisafi, possibly with the assistance of Vallely and D’Amicantonio, drafted an affidavit falsely attesting that D’Olimpio illegally possessed Vicodin and that he impersonated a doctor to obtain his prescriptions. Id. ¶ 58.

D’Olimpio was then taken to the Manhattan Detention Center, where he was held for 24 hours prior to being arraigned. id ¶¶ 59-60. Based on the four-page confession and the affidavit, he was arraigned on the criminal possession and impersonation charges and then released on his own recognizance. Id ¶¶ 61-62. According to the Complaint, D’Olimpio appeared in court about seven times before the charges against him were finally dropped on September 4, 2008. Id ¶ 76.

On the basis of these allegations, D’Olimpio’s third cause of action claims that Crisafi, Vallely, and D’Amicantonio maliciously prosecuted D’Olimpio by initiating the criminal charges. 3 These defendants moved to dismiss this malicious prosecution claim, primarily on the basis that the charges against D’Olimpio remained pending against him as of the time of their motion, as demonstrated by a Court Action Sheet of the Criminal Court, New York County. Decl. of Ivan Rubin, 12/22/09, Ex. 1. Because the favorable termination of the prosecution is a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir.2009), the pendency of criminal charges would be fatal to this cause of action.

In his opposition to the motions to dismiss, D’Olimpio asserted that the Assistant District Attorney prosecuting D’Olimpio’s criminal case had committed to move orally to dismiss that case at the next court hearing, which was scheduled for February 2, 2010. Based on that representation, this Court granted leave for D’Olimpio to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) following that hearing. The Second Amended Complaint, filed on February 18, 2010, did indeed include the representation that the criminal charges were dismissed on February 2, 2010. SAC ¶ 110. Since D’Olimpio had now sufficiently alleged the favorable termination of the criminal charges against him, the March 1 Order therefore denied the motions to dismiss D’Olimpio’s malicious prosecution claim. 4

Defendants Giglio, Moffett, and Nadel moved to dismiss D’Olimpio’s second cause of action, which charged them with various constitutional violations based on their supervisory authority over Crisafi and their involvement with an alleged policy leading to D’Olimpio’s false arrest. In this regard, the FAC contains the following allegations with respect to these defendants: At the time of the events alleged, James Giglio was the director of the BNE, and worked in the BNE’s office in Troy, New York. Id. ¶ 5. Michael Moffett was the BNE’s Section Chief with responsibility over BNE investigators, and also worked in the Troy office. Id. ¶ 6. Paul Nadel was the BNE’s Program Director for the MARO, and worked in the same Manhattan office as Crisafi, Vallely, and D’Amicantonio. Id. ¶ 7. All three of these defendants had supervisory authority over Crisafi, Vallely, D’Amieantonio, and Kaplan. Id. ¶¶ 5-7.

The FAC further alleges that at the time of Crisafi’s arrest, MARO followed the following protocol in order to determine whether a narcotics prescription was legitimate: First, when a patient called in a prescription to a pharmacy, the pharmacy would expect to receive a hard copy of the prescription from the patient’s doctor within a week. Second, pharmacies were instructed to contact the MARO if they faded to receive a hard copy by the end of the seven-day period. Third, when the MARO was contacted by a pharmacy because the pharmacy did not receive a hard copy, a MARO officer would call the doctor’s office and would either speak with the doctor to inquire whether the prescription was legitimate or would ask the doctor to fax an affidavit stating that the prescription was legitimate. Id. ¶ 11. With respect to this last step, MARO had a practice of confirming complaints from doctors by telephone and fax without taking any other steps to verify the doctors’ identities. Id. ¶ 12.

The FAC also includes the following allegations regarding the failure of Giglio, Moffett, and Nadel to supervise Crisafi: On March 22, 2007, the New York Times published an article detailing the abuse of parking placards by government officials. This article included a photograph of a car belonging to Crisafi. Id. ¶ 13. Shortly after the publication of that article, the New York State Inspector General’s Office began an investigation of Crisafi, which unearthed evidence of other misconduct. Id. ¶ 14. Sometime before November 16, 2007, plaintiff Kaplan, a MARO investigator, sent Nadel a written complaint informing him that Crisafi was violating suspects’ Fifth Amendment rights. Id. ¶ 15. Nadel took no action in response to this complaint. Id. ¶ 16. Kaplan followed up with a series of other complaints, including a report to the Inspector General, which are discussed more fully below in the context of Kaplan’s retaliation claim. The Inspector General’s investigation culminated in a report issued on December 8, 2008, written by Inspector General Joseph Fisch (the “Fisch Report”), which found that Crisafi committed numerous abuses, including many of those alleged by Kaplan, some of which were assisted by Vallely and D’Amicantonio. The Fisch Report also found that Giglio and Moffett failed to supervise Crisafi and the MARO office, and noted the fact that Nadel, who was responsible for approving law enforcement operations, was a licensed pharmacist with no previous law enforcement experience. Id. ¶¶ 78-79.

Based on the above allegations, Crisafi in his second cause of action asserted § 1983 claims against Giglio, Moffett, and Nadel arising from (1) their creation of a policy allowing MARO personnel to initiate criminal charges based on a phone conversation or faxed affidavit without confirmation of the doctor’s identity or that the alleged signature on the affidavit was authentic (the “Policy”); (2) their failure to supervise Crisafi and the MARO; (3) their allowing Nadel, a pharmacist with no prior law enforcement experience, to be the MARO Program Director; and (4) their deliberate indifference to D’Olimpio’s rights. Id. ¶¶ 122-25.

Defendants attack these claims on several grounds. First, they assert that these claims are based on a broad theory of “supervisory liability” that has been discredited by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Prior to Iqbal, well-established Second Circuit law provided five bases for showing that a supervisory defendant had sufficient personal involvement with the alleged violation to maintain a § 1983 claim. A plaintiff could plead personal involvement by showing any of the following:

(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.

Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995). Defendants argue that Iqbal’s discussion of supervisory liability took a narrower approach than did Colon, therefore rendering D’Olimpio’s reliance on some of the Colon categories unwarranted.

By way of background, the plaintiff in Iqbal brought a “Bivens ” action against several high-ranking federal officials, including the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, based on allegations that following the September 11 attacks, the FBI “arrested and detained thousands of Arab and Muslim men” substantially on the basis of their race, religion, or national origin, and that as a result plaintiff was unlawfully subjected to harsh confinement conditions substantially on these discriminatory bases. 129 S.Ct. at 1951. The Supreme Court, however, held, inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a claim for intentional discrimination with respect to the Attorney General or FBI Director, and, as part of that discussion, observed that neither Bivens itself (i.e., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)) nor § 1983 imposes supervisory liability simply on the basis of respondeat superior; rather, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. at 1948; see also id. at 1949 (“[T]he term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer.... [Ejach Government official ... is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). The Court went on to note that the required showing of personal involvement “will vary with the constitutional provision at issue”; as the plaintiffs claim in Iqbal was for “invidious discrimination” in violation of the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause, “the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 1948. Accordingly, the Court rejected the plaintiffs theory that “a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution.” Id. at 1949.

The defendants here note that certain courts in this District have read these passages of Iqbal to mean that “[o]nly the first and part of the third Colon categories pass Iqbal’s muster ... [t]he other Colon categories impose the exact types of supervisory liability that Iqbal eliminated.” Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., 2009 WL 1835989, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009); see also Newton v. City of N.Y., 640 F.Supp.2d 426, 448 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“passive failure to train claims pursuant to section 1983 have not survived the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.”); Joseph v. Fischer, 2009 WL 3321011, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2009) (“Plaintiff’s claim, based on [defendant’s] ‘failure to take corrective measures,’ is precisely the type of claim Iqbal eliminated.”). This Court respectfully disagrees. As Iqbal noted, the degree of personal involvement varies depending on the constitutional provision at issue; whereas invidious discrimination claims require a showing of discriminatory purpose, there is no analogous requirement applicable to D’Olimpio’s allegations regarding his search, arrest, and prosecution. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). Colon’s bases for liability are not founded on a theory of respondeat superior, but rather on a recognition that “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations” can be shown by nonfeasance as well as misfeasance. 58 F.3d at 873 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the five Colon categories for personal liability of supervisors may still apply as long as they are consistent with the requirements applicable to the particular constitutional provision alleged to have been violated. See, e.g., Sash v. United States, 674 F.Supp.2d 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“It was with intent-based constitutional claims in mind, specifically racial discrimination, that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that ‘a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution.’ Where the constitutional claim does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, but instead relies on the unreasonable conduct or deliberate indifference standards of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, the personal involvement analysis set forth in Colon v. Coughlin may still apply.” (citation omitted)).

Apart from this argument based on Iqbal, Giglio and Moffett assert that D’Olimpio’s claims against them should be dismissed insofar as they allege a failure to supervise the MARO investigators. They maintain that D’Olimpio’s allegations in this regard are too conclusory to state a claim. The Court disagrees. The FAC incorporates by reference the Fisch Report, which summarizes an investigation beginning in March 2007, describes various acts of misconduct by Crisafi that took place prior to D’Olimpio’s arrest, contains a section headed “Lack of Supervision of Crisafi and MARO,” and indeed concludes that there was a “lack of appropriate supervision by [Crisafi’s] supervisors at MARO and at BNE’s headquarters in Troy,” where Giglio and Moffett were in charge. Fisch Report, 12/8/08, at 4, 16-17, available at http://www.ig.state.ny.us/ pd fs/Investigationdf% 20Employee% 20Misconduct% 20at% 20the% 20DOH% 20Bureau% 20of%> 20Narcotics% 20En-forcement.pdf (cited in FAC ¶ 78). These findings by the Inspector General strongly suggest that defendants Giglio and Moffett “fail[ed] to act on information indicating unconstitutional acts were occurring,” or were “grossly] negligen[t] in failing to supervise ... subordinates who commit ... wrongful acts,” or were otherwise deliberately indifferent to suspects’ rights, and also demonstrate “an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and [plaintiffs] injury.” Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir.2002). For the foregoing reasons, the March 1 Order held that the claims against Giglio and Moffett in this respect cannot be dismissed.

Nadel also argued that the claims against him for his failure to supervise Crisafi must be dismissed because there were no specific allegations of Nadel’s personal involvement. The FAC does allege, however, that Kaplan complained to Nadel in writing of Crisafi’s misconduct prior to D’Olimpio’s arrest. FAC ¶ 15. The Fisch Report, although it does not dwell on Nadel’s actions, cites Nadel’s lack of prior law enforcement experience and describes complaints by MARO investigators that the lack of a Program Director with law enforcement experience allowed Crisafi “to attain an inappropriate degree of power within the office.” Fisch Report at 1, 16. Because the Court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, must “take all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff, Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 75 n. 1 (2d Cir.2009), and because, as noted, the FAC incorporates by reference the allegations of the Fisch Report, the Fisch Report’s conclusion that there was a general failure to supervise Crisafi must be taken for these purposes to apply to Nadel, Crisafi’s immediate supervisor. 5 Thus, the March 1 Order denied the motion to dismiss the claim alleging Nadel’s failure to supervise.

With respect to those aspects of plaintiff D’Olimpio’s second cause of action that relate to the alleged “Policy,” that Policy allegedly permitted BNE investigators to rely on unverified telephone communications with, or faxed affidavits from, doctors’ offices to satisfy the requirement of probable cause to arrest suspects or initiate criminal charges. While defendants appear to concede that Giglio, Moffett, and Nadel were sufficiently involved with the formation and operation of this Policy to satisfy the personal involvement requirement of § 1983, they argue that the alleged Policy is not unconstitutional, or at the very least, that the doctrine of qualified immunity should bar further proceedings with respect to these allegations.

“In general, probable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is

committing a crime.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996). The probable cause determination is based on the “totality of the circumstances,” and does not readily lend itself to being reduced to a “neat set of legal rules.” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “in the context of a qualified immunity defense to an allegation of false arrest, the defending officer need only show ‘arguable’ probable cause.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). The Supreme Court has held that tips from informants can provide probable cause to arrest, but only if either the informant or the information in his/ her tips has been shown to be reliable or has been sufficiently corroborated. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 242, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (“[E]ven in making a warrantless arrest[,] an officer ‘may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge.’” (emphasis added)); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (anonymous call to police reporting that person was carrying a gun lacked indicia of reliability sufficient to satisfy “reasonable suspicion” standard with respect to a police officer’s stop-and-frisk search, even though that standard requires a lesser showing than probable cause to arrest); see also United States v. Elmore, 482 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir.2007) (“Even a tip from a completely anonymous informant — though it will seldom demonstrate basis of knowledge and the veracity of an anonymous informant is largely unknowable — can form the basis of reasonable suspicion or probable cause if it is sufficiently corroborated.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 647 (2d Cir.1994) (“Information about criminal activity provided by a single complainant can establish probable cause when that information is sufficiently reliable and corroborated.” (emphasis added)).

Defendants argue that the Policy provides BNE officers with probable cause (either on the merits or sufficient to entitle them to qualified immunity) because the information provided by the doctors’ offices is sufficiently reliable to support a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed. For this proposition, the defendants rely primarily on two out-of-circuit cases, United States v. Fooladi, 703 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.1983), and Edwards v. Cabrera, 58 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1995). While these cases do support the proposition that it may be error to discount information provided by disinterested informants absent reason to doubt these informants’ veracity, even when their names are not known to the law enforcement officer, these cases do not stand for the proposition that such information alone suffices to establish probable cause. Rather, in Fooladi, the probable cause determination was not based solely on information provided by a representative of a glass manufacturer, which the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court had erroneously disregarded. Instead, the arrest was based not only on the employee’s tip that the manufacturer had shipped glassware to a purported business address that was in fact the arrestee’s personal address, but also on, among other things, the law enforcement agent’s personal observation that the arrestee’s residence emanated an odor characteristic of methamphetamine manufacturing and that the arrestee left the premises “holding his gloved hands away from his body as if a chemical were on them.” 703 F.2d at 181-84. Similarly, in Edwards, the Seventh Circuit found that probable cause existed not just because of a tip from a bus driver, relayed through a dispatcher, that the driver thought he saw several men participate in a drug transaction in a bus station, but also based on the police officer’s own personal observations of several men, including the arrestee and his brother, who matched the driver’s description standing together outside the bus station; the officer’s personal observation that the arrestee’s brother was so nervous that he appeared to have urinated on himself; and the officer’s subsequent consent search of the brother’s garment bag, which yielded a plastic bag appearing to contain marijuana. 58 F.3d at 292.

These cases are thus consistent with the law in this Circuit, as articulated in Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2002). The plaintiff in Caldarola, a New York corrections officer challenged his arrest on charges that he was unlawfully collecting job injury benefits even though he was no longer a New York resident and thus was not qualified to receive such benefits. The arresting officer determined there was probable cause to believe the plaintiff had moved from New York to Connecticut based on an investigative file containing reports from two private investigation firms that had been hired by the officer’s supervisors. The reports themselves contained, among other things, summaries of investigators’ personal interviews with the plaintiffs New York neighbors, surveillance tapes showing the plaintiff emerging from a home in Connecticut and dropping his children off at school, a deed and mortgage for a Connecticut home in the plaintiffs name indicating that it was his primary residence, and work attendance records indicating that the plaintiff had a Connecticut telephone number. The Second Circuit held that it was reasonable for the arresting officer to conclude that these private investigative firms hired by his supervisors were reliable and that the investigators’ reports provided information corroborating their conclusions. Id. at 163-68. Thus, accepting arguendo defendants’ assertion that Caldarola stands for the proposition that information gathered by private investigators can support probable cause even in the absence of personal knowledge by the arresting officer, the decision certainly does not suggest that an unadorned, unverified phone call or fax can, by itself, without further meaningful corroboration, satisfy probable cause or support qualified immunity.

Returning to the allegations in the FAC, D’Olimpio has asserted that, consistent with the Policy, his arrest was predicated on nothing more than his pharmacy’s report that it had failed to receive a hard copy of the prescription within a week, which prompted a MARO official to call D’Olimpio’s doctor’s office and speak with an unknown person there, who either stated that he was not aware of any such prescription or effectuated the fax transmission of an affidavit bearing an unverified signature of the doctor. None of the above-cited cases suggests that this information originating from an unidentifiable person in a doctor’s office can even come close to satisfying probable cause to arrest, absent corroboration or other indicia of reliability. Unlike Caldarola, here there is no underlying data providing support for the informant’s conclusion. There is no indication that the identity of the informant here could ever be determined. Cf. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (“Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, ‘an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.’ ” (citation omitted)). There is no suggestion that the MARO investigators had any reason to rely on this particular doctor’s office; to the contrary, there are numerous reasons why a doctor or her staff might inadvertently provide inaccurate information, especially given that the relevant information is not affirmatively provided by a tipper, but rather can be elicited by the investigator from whoever happens to pick up the phone in the doctor’s office. Moreover, if the doctor herself were involved in wrongdoing with respect to the prescription of narcotics, she would have an incentive to affirmatively mislead the investigators. In sum, while a report from a doctor or her staff denying knowledge of the prescription might be a reasonable basis for further investigation, it is patently deficient as the sole ground for an arrest.

For the foregoing reasons, under the facts alleged and the clearly established law cited herein, defendants lacked even arguable probable cause to arrest D’Olimpio. Because the circumstances of this arrest were consistent with the Policy (as alleged), and because defendants do not dispute that Giglio, Moffett, and Nadel had personal involvement with the establishment and enforcement of this Policy, the March 1 Order declined to dismiss the second cause of action with respect to these allegations.

The Court turns next to those portions of the FAC that assert claims by plaintiff Kaplan, all of which the defendants moved to dismiss. Kaplan’s claim of retaliation for expressing his First Amendment rights (the sixth cause of action in the FAC) is based on the following allegations: Kaplan (as noted) is a MARO investigator. FAC ¶ 3. During at least some of the times covered by the FAC, Crisafi was Kaplan’s supervisor. Id. ¶ 64. As described above, Kaplan complained to Nadel about Crisafi prior to November 16, 2007, but Nadel took no action. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. On or about November 17, 2007, Kaplan again went to Nadel and raised concerns about Crisafi: in particular, he stated that Crisafi took prescription narcotics while on duty; that Crisafi would experience facial tics and “zone out”; that Crisafi accidentally discharged his weapon while on duty; that Crisafi lied about his previous job experience; that Crisafi had investigators perform “ill-conceived” and dangerous arrests and searches; that Crisafi was violating suspects’ Miranda rights; that Crisafi, without authorization, put sirens and lights on his car; and that Crisafi was working outside jobs during work hours. Id. ¶ 63. Despite the fact that Kaplan told Nadel that he was afraid of Crisafi and Nadel assured Kaplan that the conversation would be kept confidential, Nadel reported this conversation to Crisafi. Id. ¶¶ 63-64. Thereafter, on or about November 20, 2007, Crisafi threatened Kaplan by walking up behind him and saying, “Bang bang, you’re dead.” Id. ¶ 65. At around that same time, Kaplan filed a Workplace Incident Report with the Department of Health’s Bureau of Employee Relations detailing these threats and reporting Crisafi’s other misconduct, of which he had previously complained to Nadel. Id. ¶ 66. In response, Crisafi sabotaged Kaplan’s work product on several occasions and began to spread rumors about him, including rumors that Kaplan appeared tired and slept while at the office. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. Kaplan then called the Inspector General to report these concerns about Crisafi, and the Inspector General then widened his ongoing investigation of Crisafi to address these issues. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. Because, however, the Inspector General’s investigation led to interviews with all the MARO inspectors except for Kaplan, Crisafi and Nadel were able to infer that Kaplan was the whistleblower. Id. ¶ 71.

Kaplan, after spraining his ankle while on duty, went on workers’ compensation leave on or about February 27, 2008. Id. ¶ 72. A bullet was shot at Kaplan’s house on April 17, 2008, and on April 25, 2008, his house was vandalized. Id. ¶¶ 73-74. On August 12, 2008, after Kaplan was notified that Employee Relations never received his first Workplace Incident Report, Kaplan resubmitted it. Id. ¶ 75.

After publication of the Fisch Report, Giglio resigned as the director of the BNE. Id. ¶ 81. In December 2008, defendant Jennifer Treacy was appointed Deputy Director of the New York State Department of Health, with supervisory authority over the BNE and the MARO. Id. ¶ 82. The Inspector General attempted to persuade Kaplan to return to work, as Crisafi was on leave and would face discipline for his conduct. Id. ¶ 83. Kaplan agreed to return to work and received a physician’s evaluation that he was fit to return. Id. ¶¶ 84-86. Nonetheless, Kaplan was required to undergo three additional physical examinations; after reviewing these, the relevant administrator concluded that Kaplan was fit to return, provided the he be closely monitored, specifically for falling asleep at work. Id. ¶¶ 87-90. He was scheduled to return to work on April 10, 2009. Id. ¶ 91. The FAC alleges that Treacy, who was romantically involved with Giglio, was upset about Giglio’s resignation and blamed Kaplan for causing it; therefore, she ordered the acting director of the BNE not to allow Kaplan to return. Id. ¶¶ 92-93. On April 9, 2009, Kaplan was told not to return because of a lack of staff, and on April 23, the Department of Health sent him a letter informing him that he was terminated for failing to complete a study to confirm he did not have a sleep disorder. Id. ¶¶ 94-95. Kaplan filed a grievance and, after a hearing, was allowed to return to work. Id. ¶ 96.

In May 2009, defendant Kenneth Post was appointed as director of the BNE, and defendant Timothy Dewey was appointed as BNE Section Chief. Id. ¶¶ 97-98. In June 2009, Kaplan returned to work, and was informed that he would only be given a temporary assignment and would not perform fieldwork. Id. ¶ 99. After his reinstatement, Kaplan was denied access to a state car and was not given a badge, gun, or firearms training; he was confined to desk duties and menial document review. Id. ¶ 100-101. On July 14, 2009, Kaplan met with Dewey to complain about his treatment. Id. ¶ 102. D’Olimpio filed his original complaint in the instant action on August 18, 2009. In September 2009, Stephanie Jubic of Employee Relations confiscated the computers of Crisafi, Vallely, D’Amicantonio, and Kaplan — Kaplan believes Jubic downloaded his emails to find grounds to terminate him. Id. ¶ 105. On October 8, 2009, Kaplan was placed on administrative leave and told not to contact anyone at the BNE. Id. ¶ 108. On October 16, Jubic mailed Kaplan a letter stating that he would be interrogated on October 27 and would possibly face discipline. Id. ¶ 109. Also on October 16, Kaplan had a grievance hearing to discuss being denied his proper job responsibilities. At this hearing, Post stated that as BNE director, it was in his discretion to decide what duties Kaplan should have. Id. ¶ 110.

Based on these facts, Kaplan alleges in that defendants Treacy, Post, Dewey, and Nadel retaliated against him with respect to speech that was protected by the First Amendment. These defendants have moved to dismiss Kaplan’s claim on several grounds, including that Kaplan’s speech was made pursuant to his official duties and hence is not protected by the First Amendment.

A public employee’s cause of action for his employer’s discipline based on his speech can proceed only if the employee “spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern”; otherwise, the employee’s speech is outside the scope of the First Amendment. Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation mark omitted). In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006), the Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Though not without reluctance, the Court concludes that this “official duties” exception, as recently elaborated on by the Second Circuit in Weintraub v. Board of Education, 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir.2010), is fatal to Kaplan’s retaliation claim.

Weintraub made clear that for purposes of determining whether a public employee’s speech is protected, a public employee’s “official duties” are to be construed broadly. The plaintiff in Weintraub was a public school teacher, and the allegedly protected speech consisted of a grievance he filed with his union challenging a school administrator’s decision not to discipline a disruptive student. Quoting Garcetti, the Court of Appeals stated that the inquiry into whether a public employee speaks pursuant his official duties is “a practical one,” and that the employee’s duties should not be interpreted narrowly. 593 F.3d at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Weintraub held:

[U]nder the First Amendment, speech can be “pursuant to” a public employee’s official job duties even though it is not required by, or included in, the employee’s job description, or in response to a request by the employer. In particular, we conclude that Weintraub’s grievance was “pursuant to” his official duties because it was “part-and-parcel of his concerns” about his ability to “properly execute his duties,” as a public school teacher — namely, to maintain classroom discipline, which is an indispensable prerequisite to effective teaching and classroom learning.... Weintraub’s speech challenging the school administration’s decision to not discipline a student in his class was a “means to fulfill,” and “undertaken in the course of performing,” his primary employment responsibility of teaching.

Id. at 203 (citations omitted). The court went on to note that its conclusion was supported “by the fact that [Weintraub’s] speech ultimately took the form of an employee grievance, for which there is no relevant citizen analogue.” Id. Whereas actions like writing a letter to a newspaper or informally discussing politics with coworkers are equally available to government employees and ordinary citizens, “[t]he lodging of a union grievance is not a form or channel of discourse available to non-employee citizens.” Id. at 203-04.

Here, the speech that Kaplan claims is protected falls within Kaplan’s official duties as defined by Weintraub. In the FAC, Kaplan alleges that the retaliation he allegedly suffered was in response to the following statements: (1) his complaints to Nadel about Crisafi’s behavior; (2) his Workplace Incident Reports; and (3) his complaint to the Inspector General. With the possible exception of the latter, each of these statements, as Kaplan concedes, was “made privately though channels available through his employment,” and was “made in a manner that would not be available to a non-public employee citizen.” Kaplan Supp. Mem., 2/5/10, at 5. Moreover, the common theme of all these statements was that Crisafi was violating suspects’ rights and was not performing his job properly, and by implication that Crisafi was interfering with Kaplan’s ability to perform his own duties. It is clear that Kaplan’s duties as a MARO officer included ensuring that investigations and arrests of narcotics abuses are lawfully conducted. See, e.g., Fisch Report at 2-3 (describing policies and training manuals applicable to BNE investigators). All of Kaplan’s relevant speech was therefore, either directly or indirectly, “‘part-and-parcel of his concerns’ about his ability to ‘properly execute his duties’ ” as a BNE investigator. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 203. Just as the speech in Weintraub was in furtherance of the teacher’s duty to maintain classroom discipline, Kaplan’s speech here, which related to ensuring the “safety of citizens” and the “constitutional rights of suspects,” Kaplan Supp. Mem. at 5, was made in furtherance of his law enforcement duties as an investigator endowed with the power to arrest. Cf Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 693 F.Supp.2d 203, 211 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (“All of plaintiffs’ complaints to their superiors ... related to their concerns about their ability to properly execute their duties as police officers, as they expressed concern [that various acts] affected their ability to perform their job assignments safely and that they were told not to issue summonses to certain individuals and businesses.... Plaintiffs’ speech in challenging ... defendants’ alleged cover-ups of officer misconduct ... was undertaken in the course of performing one of their core employment responsibilities of enforcing the law and, thus, was speech made pursuant to their official duties.”). Accordingly, Kaplan’s allegations cannot support a First Amendment retaliation claim.

In addition, the speech contained in Kaplan’s Workplace Incident Reports and his complaint to the Inspector General were unprotected by the First Amendment because these statements were required by law. See N.Y. Labor Law § 27-b(6)(a) (“Any employee ... who believes that a serious violation of a workplace violence protection program exists or that an imminent danger exists shall bring such matter to the attention of a supervisor in the form of a written notice.”); N.Y. Exec. Law § 55(1) (“Every state officer or employee in a covered agency shall report promptly to the state inspector general any information concerning corruption, fraud, criminal activity, conflicts of interest or abuse by another state officer or employee relating to his or her office or employment .... The knowing failure of any officer or employee to so report shall be cause for removal from office or employment or other appropriate penalty.”). 6 Speech made pursuant to a public employee’s legal obligations is not made “as a citizen.” 7

For the foregoing reasons, the March 1 Order denied the sixth cause of action in the FAC, and, as the Court now clarifies, the dismissal was with prejudice because it rests on a legal ground that cannot be cured by repleading. Cf Oliver Schs., Inc. v. Foley, 930 F.2d 248, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1991). The Court notes, however, that the dismissal of Kaplan’s First Amendment claim brought pursuant to § 1983 does not alter Kaplan’s opportunity under applicable New York law to seek protection from the retaliatory acts he alleges. See N.Y. Labor Law § 27 — b(6)(e) (prohibiting retaliation based on an employee’s filing of a report of workplace violence); N.Y. Exec. Law. § 55(1) (providing that employees who report “improper governmental action” to the Inspector General “shall not be subject to dismissal, discipline or other adverse personnel action”).

The Court comes finally to Crisafi’s counterclaim for defamation, which insinuates that the aforementioned Workplace Incident Reports filed by Kaplan, Kaplan’s complaint to the Inspector General, and even Kaplan’s allegations in the FAC are defamatory. Crisafi subsequently conceded, however, that the only potentially actionable statements not protected by privilege or barred by the statute of limitations are those that were allegedly republished on December 8, 2008 by the Inspector General and the New York Times. Crisafi Mem. Opp. Kaplan’s Mot. to Dismiss, 2/5/10, at 4-5. In this respect, the counterclaim, which was filed on December 3, 2009, alleges the following: Kaplan filed Workplace Incident Reports on or about November 20, 2007 and August 12, 2008 reporting various misconduct by Crisafi, and made a complaint to the Inspector General to the same effect on or about November 20, 2007. Crisafi Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17, 20, Exs. C-E. Crisafi alleges, based on information and belief, that Kaplan’s report to the Inspector General “prompted an investigation” focused on Crisafi and relating to Kaplan’s complaints. Id. ¶ 19. Also upon information and belief, Crisafi alleges that a copy of the Fisch Report was provided to Kaplan in advance of its public release. Id. ¶ 35. This report was also provided to the New York Times, which described this report in an article published on December 8, 2008. Id. ¶ 36 & Ex. F. Upon information and belief, Crisafi alleges that Kaplan gave the Fisch Report to the New York Times. Id. ¶ 37. The Fisch Report was published on the New York Times’s and Inspector General’s websites, where it remains accessible. Id. ¶¶ 39-40. Crisafi alleges that the contents of the New York Times article and the Fisch Report reflect false and defamatory statements made by Kaplan, and have caused Crisafi to be vilified and his reputation to suffer. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 21, 23-33, 41-43. Accordingly, Crisafi asserted two causes of action alleging that Kaplan defamed him. Kaplan then moved to dismiss these counterclaims on the basis that Kaplan is not responsible for the republication of his allegedly defamatory statements by the New York Times or the Inspector General.

Under New York law, a plaintiff “may not recover damages from the original author for ... slander arising from the republication of defamatory statements by a third party absent a showing that the original author was responsible for or ratified the republication.” Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 59 (2d Cir.2002). Crisafi argues that a more lenient standard applies, permitting liability based on Kaplan’s mere knowledge or reasonable expectation that his allegedly defamatory statements would be republished. See, e.g., Campo v. Paar, 18 A.D.2d 364, 368, 239 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1st Dept.1963). The Court need not resolve which standard applies: Crisafi’s counterclaim is deficient under either test because it fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Even accepting as true Crisafi’s nonconclusory factual allegations, including those made only on information and belief, it is simply implausible that Kaplan in any legally relevant sense caused the republication of his statements in the Fisch Report or New York Times article. Crisafi alleges that Kaplan’s complaint prompted the Inspector General investigation, but this allegation is contradicted by the Fisch Report itself, which indicates that the investigation began after the New York Times published an article in March 22, 2007 describing abuses of government-issued parking placards. Fisch Report at 3-4. In any event, even if Kaplan’s complaint served to expand the scope the investigation, and included allegations consistent with what the Fisch Report eventually concluded, the Report clearly did more than merely parrot Kaplan’s charges. The Report, in a section headed “Methodology,” states that the investigation was based on, among other things, interviews with Crisafi himself, other BNE employees, Giglio, and Moffett, as well as other police officers and district attorneys who had interacted with Crisafi. Id. at 4. Indeed, the Inspector General is required by statute to “investigate,” not merely repeat, allegations of malfeasance. N.Y. Exec. Law § 53. And even if, as alleged, Kaplan acted to bring the Report to the attention of the New York Times, the New York Times article, which consists entirely of a summary of the Fisch Report, reflects Kaplan’s allegations only to the extent that such charges were ratified by the Report itself. See Crisafi Compl., Ex. F.

For these reasons, the Court concluded that there is no basis for holding Kaplan liable for the republication of his allegedly defamatory statements, even if he intended that his allegations be republished in this manner and gave the New York Times a copy of the Fisch Report. “The rationale for making the originator of a defamatory statement liable for its foreseeable republication is the strong causal link between the actions of the originator and the damage caused by the republication.” Van-Go Transp. Go. v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 971 F.Supp. 90, 102 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the duty of the Inspector General to investigate complaints prior to publishing a written report, the fact that the Fisch Report was based on numerous sources beyond Kaplan’s allegations, and the fact that the New York Times article merely summarized the Fisch Report together sever any causal link that might exist between Kaplan’s actions and the December 8, 2008 republications. Thus, the March 1 Order dismissed Crisafi’s counterclaim with prejudice. 8

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby confirms its decisions to dismiss the sixth cause of action (i.e., all of Kaplan’s claims) and to dismiss both of Crisafi’s counterclaims, all with prejudice, and to otherwise deny the motions to dismiss. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the entries numbered 33, 34, 35, 42, and 47 on the docket of case number 09 Civ. 7283 and to close case number 09 Civ. 9952.

Notes

. Although the Order did not explicitly so state, all the dismissals were with prejudice (which, as it happens, is also the default position when an order does not state whether a dismissal is or is not with prejudice).

. The first five causes of action in the FAC are D’Olimpio’s claims. The sixth cause of action is Kaplan's claim.

. In the first, fourth, and fifth causes of action in the FAC, D’Olimpio respectively alleges that Crisafi, Vallely, and D’Amicantonio violated various constitutional rights, falsely arrested him, and unlawfully detained him. No motions to dismiss were filed with respect to these claims.

. Defendants also asserted that the malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed because D’Olimpio’s allegations failed to demonstrate the element of malice — i.e., that there was “some deliberate act punctuated with awareness of 'conscious falsity' ” with respect to the institution of criminal proceedings. Bradley v. Vill. of Greenwood Lake, 376 F.Supp.2d 528, 534-35 (S.D.N.Y.2005). But D’Olimpio’s allegations regarding the false affidavits and confessions were clearly more than sufficient to plead malice.

. Defendants' reply memorandum asserted that contrary to what was pleaded in the FAC, Crisafi was a Senior Investigator at the time of D'Olimpio's arrest and thus did not report to Nadel at that time. In support of this, it cited to the Fisch Report, which mentions that Crisafi was temporarily promoted between 2006 and March 2008. Fisch Report at 16. The Report does not, however, state that Crisafi ceased reporting to Nadel during this period. The FAC alleges that Nadel, as MARO Program Director, had supervisory authority over all MARO investigators. FAC ¶ 7. In light of the allegations in the FAC, and taking all inferences in favor of D’Olimpio, the Court cannot conclude that Nadel lacked supervisory authority over Crisafi during this period. In any event, it is undisputed that Nadel supervised Vallely and D'Amicantonio, who are also alleged to have violated D’Olimpio’s constitutional rights.

. It is these statutory obligations, as well as Weintraub’s broad definition of speech made in the course of official duties, that distinguish Kaplan’s speech from that of the plaintiff in Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir.2006). The plaintiff in Freitag, a California correctional officer, claimed she was retaliated against after reporting to the California Inspector General that she and other prison guards were being sexually harassed. Although the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff "acted as a citizen” in complaining to the Inspector General and in writing letters to a state senator regarding this harassment, the court’s holding was based on the fact that "[i]t was certainly not part of [plaintiff’s] official tasks to complain to the Senator or the IG about the state's failure to perform its duties properly.” Id. at 545. Under New York law, however, such complaints are within the official duties of BNE investigators.

. Because Kaplan’s speech was made pursuant to his official duties and thus is not constitutionally protected, the Court need not reach other required elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim, including whether his speech addressed matters of "public concern,” see Sousa, 578 F.3d at 170, and whether the complaint sufficiently alleges a causal connection between the protected speech and the retaliatory acts, see Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.2001).

. This result is not inconsistent with Campo v. Poor, 18 A.D.2d 364, 368, 239 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1st Dept.1963), which declared that "[a]nyone giving a statement to a representative of a newspaper authorizing or intending its publication is responsible for any damage caused by the publication.” This broad pronouncement was made in the context of a narrower holding that the defendant, Jack Paar, could be held responsible for the New York Post’s publication of his statement, made by him to a reporter during an interview, that the plaintiff "lacked certain qualities which would fit him to be a performer desirable to [Paar’s] program.” Id. at 365, 239 N.Y.S.2d 494. The causal link between Kaplan's statements and the findings of the Fisch Report, which were subsequently summarized by the New York Times, is obviously much more attenuated than the relationship in Campo between Paar's statement to the newspaper reporter during an interview and the reporter's publication of that statement.