The appellant, DfcM Construction Company, appeals from the Commission’s finding that the appellee, Steve Archer, suffered a compensable injury to his hand while employеd by appellee, Robert Schwitzer, an uninsured subcontractor of D&M Construction Company, within the meaning of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1306 (Repl. 1976). Under § 81-1306, the prime contractor is liable for compensation to the employees of the subcontractor when the subcontractor fails to secure compensation coverage. Here, no dispute exists that D&M was a prime contractor and Schwitzer had no coverage. Rather, appellant contends that the Commission erred in finding: (1) Archer was an employee (not an independent contraсtor) of Schwitzer, (2) Schwitzer was an uninsured subcontractor (not an independent contractor), and (3) Archer’s injury occurred within the scope of employment. We affirm.
Appellant’s first point for reversal is that Archer was an independent contractor rather than Schwitzer’s employee. As an independent contractor, Archer would not be entitled to reliеf from D&M Construction under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1306. As we stated in Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert,
Appellant relies upon Sandy v. Salter,
In Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert, supra, we gave examples of factors that may be used in determining the right to control, including the right to determinе the manner of completing the work, the right to terminate, the right to hire or control the hiring of helpers, the method of payment and the furnishing of necessary tools and equipment. In aрplying those factors to the case at bar, we note that Schwitzer hired Archer to haul rock from a quarry in Harrison to a dump site near Yellville. Archer was to be paid twenty-five рercent of Schwitzer’s gross pay for each load of rock with no withholding for taxes or Social Security. Schwitzer furnished the truck and equipment and paid expenses. Schwitzer took Archer to the job site and told him what to do. On the day of the accident, Schwitzer instructed Archer to take the truck to Imboden, one hundred miles from the job site, to have a broken spring rеpaired. Archer testified that Schwitzer would be the one to tell him “what to do or who to see.” The question on appeal is not whether the facts at bar would have supported the opposite conclusion, but whether these facts supported the decision the Commission made. Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc.,
Appellant’s second point for reversal is that Robert Sсhwitzer was an independent contractor rather than an uninsured subcontractor and thus not entitled to relief under § 81-1306. Appellant relies upon Hollingsworth v. Evans,
The Court set out the definition of a subcontractor as follows:
“One who takes a portion of a contract from principal contractor or another subcontractor.. . . One who has entered into a contract, express or implied, for the performance of an act with the person who hаs already contracted for its performance.”
Id. at 394,
“A subcontractor is one who enters into a contract with a person for the performance of work which such person has already contracted to perform. In other words, subcontracting is merely ‘farming out’ to others all or part of work contracted to be performed by the original contractor.”
Hollingsworth at 394-95,
We believe those definitions precisely describe Schwit-zer. He entered into a contract with appellant D&M to perform a portion of D&M’s contract with the Corps of Engineers. In other words, D&M “farmed out” to Schwitzer a part of its work (hauling rocks) to be performed in making repairs on Crooked Creek near Yellville. The evidence clearly supports the Commission’s finding that Schwitzer was appellant’s subcontractor.
Appellant’s last point for reversal is that Archer’s actions that gave rise to his injury were not within the scope of his employment. Citing no authority, appellant contends that the purpose of § 81-1306 would be subverted by applying it to this case because the provision apрlies to the performance of work that is necessarily done by employees of a subcontractor in actions related to or in furtherance of the general contractor’s performance. Applying the section to the instant case would create “almost limitless liability for a general contractor when an employee of an uninsured subcontractor is injured,” appellant contends.
In Dallas County Pulpwood Co. v. Strange,
In the instant case Archer testified that Schwitzer instructed him to drive the truck to a repair shop in Imboden, one hundred miles away, and to help repair the truck because it was necessary to have it available for Archer to continue working the next morning. Schwitzer also testified that he instructed Archer to drive the truck to Imboden and that it was necessary to have the truck repaired to be on the job the next mоrning, although he denied instructing Archer to assist with repairs. The Commission found that Archer acted at his employer’s direction in driving the truck to Imboden for repairs, that the repairs were being mаde on an emergency basis so that the truck could be used to conduct appellant’s business the next morning, and that the speed in making repairs would accrue to appеllant’s benefit. To that end, Schwitzer was performing services for appellant at the time his employee, Archer, was injured, and as a consequence, Archer was insured under the аppellant’s policy pursuant to § 81-1306.
We believe that the Commission’s reasoning illustrates exactly the purpose for which §81-1306 was written and that substantial evidence supports its findings. Therefore, we affirm.
Affirmed.