Anthony D’Elia, Respondent, v 58-35 Utopia Parkway Corp. et al., Defendants, and Paul Alicanti et al., Appellants. (Action No. 1.) Glen Leslie, Respondent, v 58-35 Utopia Parkway Corp. et al., Defendants, and Paul Alicanti et al., Appellants. (Action No. 2.)
Action No. 1 | Action No. 2
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
843 N.Y.S.2d 339
Ordered that the appeals from the orders are dismissed as abandoned; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents payable by the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, this Court’s power is as broad as that of the trial court and it may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, taking into account that in a close case the trial judge had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; Matter of Fasano v State of New York, 113 AD2d 885, 887-888 [1985]). We decline to disturb the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendants Paul Alicanti, Richard Alicanti, and Victor Alicanti are liable to the plaintiff in action No. 1, Anthony D’Elia, on the causes of action to recover damages for assault and battery asserted by D’Elia against them.
There is no merit to the contentions of the defendants Richard Alicanti and Victor Alicanti that the Supreme Court erred in holding each of them liable to D’Elia for his injuries in their entirety because no evidence was adduced at trial that either of those defendants struck the blows that caused D’Elia’s most significant injury, the injury to his right eye. The theory of concerted action liability “rests upon the principle that ‘all those, who in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts, for their benefit, are equally liable with him’ ” (Bichler v Eli Lilly & Co., 55 NY2d 571, 580-581 [1982], quoting Prosser, Torts § 46, at 292 [4th ed]; Vanacore v Teigue, 243 AD2d 706 [1997]; Shea v Kelly, 121 AD2d 620, 621 [1986]). D’Elia established, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that when Victor Alicanti and Richard Alicanti, along with Paul Alicanti, attacked him, they acted in concert in furtherance of a common plan.
The damages awarded to D’Elia do not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see
There is no merit to the contentions of Victor Alicanti and Richard Alicanti that the plaintiff in action No. 2, Glen Leslie, failed to establish a prima facie case against them to recover damages for false arrest. Although liability may not be premised on merely furnishing information to law enforcement authorities (see Levy v Grandone, 14 AD3d 660, 661 [2005]; Mesiti v Wegman, 307 AD2d 339, 340 [2003]), “[o]ne who wrongfully accuses another of criminal conduct and induces or procures that person’s arrest may be liable for false arrest” (Dunn v City of Syracuse, 83 AD2d 783, 783 [1981]; Vernes v Phillips, 266 NY 298 [1935]). Leslie established, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he was arrested by police officers based on false allegations made against him by the Alicanti defendants.
“Punitive damages are not to compensate the injured party
Paul Alicanti’s contention that the Supreme Court erred in dismissing his action against D’Elia, which was tried jointly with action Nos. 1 and 2, is not properly before this Court, as no appeal was taken from the judgment in that action.
Spolzino, J.P, Santucci, Florio and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.
