[¶ 1] D.D. аppeals from the district court’s judgments and orders denying her motion to change custody, denying her motion for a new trial, and excluding an affidavit. We affirm.
[¶ 2] A.K.-D. (“the child”) was born on March 15, 1991. The рarents never married. D.D. (“the mother”) had permanent custody from the child’s birth until September 8, 1997, when G.K. (“the father”) was granted permanent custody. The father previously had temporary сustody during two separate periods while the mother was incarcerated. Following the change of custody, the mother had the child medically evaluated. Dr. Wendy L. Ward, a pediatric psychologist, diagnosed the child as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), inattentive subtype. In February 1999, the mother moved for a change in custody back to her, allеging a significant change of circumstances.
[¶ 3] On June 30, 1999, and July 6, 1999, the district court held hearings. The mother attempted to introduce the affidavit of another parent whose child had ADHD and аttended the same school. The district court excluded the affidavit. On July 6, 1999, the district court denied the motion to change custody. The moth
[¶ 4] The mother argues the district сourt erred by denying her motion to change custody. We disagree. A district court’s custody modifiсation decision is a finding of fact subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. Interest of K.M.G.,
[¶ 5] The district court incorrectly made its finding under the significant or material change in circumstances analysis found in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6), rather than applying the more rigorous requiremеnts of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(l)-(5). See Interest of K.M.G., at ¶¶ 4-5. Section 14 — 09—06.6(1)—(5), N.D.C.C., limits the permissible bases for custody modifications brought or made within two years after a custody determination. Subsections (l)-(5) apply in this case because a custody determination was made in September 1997, and the mother moved for modification in February 1999. The legislature enacted more rigorous requirements for motions brought less than twо years after a determination to allow “something of a moratorium for the family” during the twо-year period after a custody determination. See Hearing on S.B. 2167 Before the Judiciary Committee, 55th N.D. Legis. Sess. (January 21, 1997) (testimony of Sherry Mills Moоre, Chair of the Family Law Task Force). This statutory public policy is clearly contradiсted by allowing modification hearings to take place before the two-year period has expired, unless prima facie proof of a statutory exception has been demonstrated. The district court erred by incorrectly applying N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, but no objeсtion was raised by either party.
[¶ 6] On appeal, the mother now asserts this Court should remand for a determination under N.D.C.C.- § 14-09-06.6(1) — (5) or, in the alternative, find the statute is satisfied. This Court does not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Messer v. Bender,
[¶ 7] The mother also argues the district court erred by (1) excluding, as not relеvant, the affidavit of another parent whose child with ADHD attended the same school, аnd had problems until transferring schools and taking the prescription drug Ritalin; (2) finding the psychologists disаgreed over the child’s ADHD diagnosis; and (3) denying introduction of the child’s visual examination results as nеw evidence.
[¶ 8] We will not address these arguments because even if such evidence had been admitted the mother still would not
[¶ 9] The district court’s judgments and orders denying the motion to change custody, denying the motion for a new trial, and excluding an affidavit are affirmed.