In this case of first impression in Georgia, we are called upon to decide whether a 12-year-old student may lawfully be expelled permanently from a county’s public schools.
The facts are not in dispute. D. B. was found in possession of a knife on school property after a fight in which she stabbed another student. After an administrative disciplinary hearing, D. B. was expelled permanently from all public schools in Clarke County. 1 Be *331 cause the audiotape of the disciplinary hearing was undecipherable, the Clarke County Board of Education did not review the record of that hearing. Instead, it granted D. B. a de novo evidentiary hearing. After hearing evidence, the board voted unanimously in favor of permanent expulsion. The local board’s decision was appealed to the State Board of Education and then to the superior court, both of which affirmed the decision imposing permanent expulsion. We granted D. B.’s application for discretionary appeal to review the propriety of this disciplinary measure.
D. B. does not dispute the fact that she violated both school rules and state law. She contends only that the punishment administered — permanent expulsion — is unlawful and that her right to due process of law was violated because she had no notice before the incident that her conduct might result in permanent expulsion.
1. D. B. contends that permanent expulsion violates her right to a free public education, which is granted by the Georgia Constitution of 1983.
“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution,” nor is it implicitly so protected.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez,
The protection afforded by the Georgia Constitution is clearly both broader and more specific than that provided by the federal constitution in this area. The right to a free public education is not unlimited, however, under the Georgia Constitution. Even in those states recognizing an entitlement to education, courts have declared that “[t]his entitlement does not allow the child to escape the consequences of misconduct in a public school, nor does it contradict the inherent authority of a school board to maintain order and discipline *332 in public schools. [Cit.]” C. L. S. v. Hoover Bd. of Ed., 594 S2d 138, 139 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).
The Georgia Supreme Court recognized in Crim, supra, that in this state, the right to a free public education could be, and has been, limited by statute. Therefore, to determine whether the right of students in Georgia to a free public education may be restricted by means of permanent expulsion as a punishment for disciplinary infractions, we must look to the relevant statutes.
In enacting the Public School Disciplinary Tribunal Act, OCGA § 20-2-750 et seq., the Georgia General Assembly recognized that local boards properly may limit students’ access to education in response to disciplinary infractions. The Act provides that local boards of education may establish tribunals with authority to impose both suspension and expulsion as disciplinary measures; it sets forth certain procedures that must be followed. OCGA § 20-2-751 defines expulsion as “expulsion of a student from a public school beyond the current school quarter or semester.” OCGA § 20-2-751 (1). Contrary to D. B.’s argument, this definition is not ambiguous. OCGA § 20-2-751 clearly sets no time limit for the permissible duration of expulsion. Under the statute, permanent expulsion is therefore authorized.
In addition, the parties set forth cogent but conflicting policy arguments for and against permanent expulsion, and they support their arguments with citation to foreign authorities. The board points out that certain misconduct is of such grave nature that the offending student’s presence must be viewed as detrimental to the education of many other students. See
Fortman v. Texarkana School Dist.,
However compelling these concerns may be, they must be addressed in another forum. The Georgia Constitution has delegated the administration and management of local school districts to county and area boards of education. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. I. In OCGA § 20-2-754 (c), the legislature has provided that in such matters, the local board “may take
any action
it determines appropriate.” (Emphasis supplied.) It has been held consistently that the courts will not interfere with a local board’s administration of its schools unless the board’s actions are contrary to law or it appears that the board has grossly abused its discretion.
Bedingfield v. Parkerson,
Other courts have addressed this argument, and we agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Bd. of Ed. v. School Comm. of Quincy,
Neither do we find that the board has grossly abused its discretion. “[A] gross abuse of discretion which will authorize resort to the courts must be such as of itself amounts to a violation of the law. [Cit.]”
Bedingfield,
supra,
2. D. B. also contends she was denied due process because she had no notice in advance of her action that such action could result in permanent expulsion. She also argues that the board did not have jurisdiction to permanently expel her because permanent expulsion is not permissible under local board policy or state law.
We do not agree. The Clarke County School District Code of Student Conduct, distributed to all students, informed them that carrying weapons to school is prohibited. The Code provides that for weapons infractions, “[t]he principal will recommend to the disciplinary hearing officer that the student be expelled from the Clarke County Schools.” In addition, the Code defines expulsion as “losing the privilege of continuing school for the remainder of the grading period, year, or longer.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Code thus clearly notifies students, including D. B., that expulsions longer than the school year are possible. By failing to limit the length of any expulsion, it permits permanent expulsion.
We have already determined that permanent expulsion is permissible under state law. Contrary to D. B.’s argument, it is also permissible under local board policy. The Clarke County Board of Education Policy Manual provides that “[e]xpulsion shall mean the denial to a student of the right to attend school and take part in any school function for an academic quarter, the remainder of a school year, an entire school year, or indefinitely.” (Emphasis supplied.) We see no meaningful distinction between permanent expulsion and indefinite expulsion. Consequently, D. B.’s due process rights were not violated.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Under a recently enacted statute, other school systems have the right to refuse to enroll a student who is under a disciplinary order from another school district. OCGA § 20-2- *331 751.2 (b). Therefore, as D. B. correctly notes, she could also be barred from any public school in Georgia.
We reject, however, the arguments of amicus Florence Moise-Stone Center For Law And Education that the Georgia Constitution provides a “fundamental” right to a free public education requiring strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis. The Georgia Supreme Court has held unequivocally that “education per se is not a ‘fundamental right.’ ”
McDaniel v. Thomas,
D. B. was charged in the juvenile court with carrying a concealed weapon as well as aggravated assault. The weapons charge was dismissed, however, because the knife did not meet the definition of a weapon in OCGA § 16-11-127.1 (a) (2); its blade was determined to be less than three inches long.