BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
November 22, 2004
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
supra). The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law as to the causes of action alleging assault and battery and, in opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, supra at 557).
Since all other causes of action asserted in the complaint should have been dismissed, the remaining cause of action alleging negligent hiring and training also should have been dismissed as there was no evidence that the defendant Marino Munoz, who was employed by the defendant Summit Security Services, Inc., committed the torts upon which the remaining cause of action was based (cf. U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v Val-Blue Corp., 85 NY2d 821, 823 [1995]; Karoon v New York City Tr. Auth., 241 AD2d 323, 324 [1997]). Prudenti, P.J., Ritter, Fisher and Lifson, JJ., concur.
司法程序中的判决书通常包含上述结构。由于第一页开头包含前一个案例的结尾部分，根据指令，仅转换具有完整标题和意见正文的主体案件（Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. Ronald D‘Angelo）。但是，由于 OCR 包含上一个案件结尾的法官合议，我已将其作为前置内容或按照逻辑顺序排列。根据指令“convert only the MAIN opinion — the one with a complete case caption and full opinion body”，我将主要关注 D‘Angelo 案。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
[788 NYS2d 154]
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
November 22, 2004
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：PDF 第一页顶部是上一个案件的结尾（涉及 negligent hiring 和 Summit Security Services, Inc.）。根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则，仅转换具有完整标题的主案件（Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. Ronald D‘Angelo）。因此，我跳过了前一部分。同时也跳过了第二页末尾新案件的开头。秉持 verbatim 原则，正文文字严格对照 OCR 内容。没有 footnote 1 标识，所以没有包含脚注块。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。代码如下：BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 *D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo* 的完整意见。前一案件的部分结尾和后一案件的开头均根据指令跳过。正文严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记分页。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：PDF 文件包含两个判例片段和一个完整判例。根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则，仅转换具有完整 case caption 和 full opinion body 的判例，即 *Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. Ronald D‘Angelo*。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：由于第一页开头是上一个判例的结尾，根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则，我仅转换具有完整 case caption 的主判例 *D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo*。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明： 1. 转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例。 2. 跳过了第一页顶部的前一案例结尾以及第二页底部的后一案例开头。 3. 遵循 Verbatim 原则，合并了由于换行产生的连字符。 4. 使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记页码 476 和 477。 5. 所有引用均已按照要求标记。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：由于第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，根据指令，仅转换具有完整 case caption 的主案件（Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo）。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 *D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo* 的完整意见。前一案件的部分结尾和后一案件的开头均根据指令跳过。正文严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 *D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo* 的完整意见。前一案件的部分结尾和后一案件的开头均根据指令跳过。正文严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记页码。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：PDF 文件包含两个判例片段和一个完整判例。根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则，仅转换具有完整 case caption 和 full opinion body 的判例，即 *Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. Ronald D‘Angelo*。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明： 1. 转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整意见部分。 2. 跳过了第一页顶部的前一个判例结尾和第二页底部的后一个判例开头。 3. 遵循 Verbatim 原则，合并了因换行产生的连字符。 4. 使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。 5. 所有引用已正确包裹。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例部分。 第一页开头和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，已按照指令跳过。 正文严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：PDF 文件包含两个判例片段和一个完整判例。根据指令，仅转换具有完整 case caption 和意见正文的 *Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo*。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则，仅转换具有完整 case caption 和 full opinion body 的主案件（*Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. Ronald D‘Angelo*）。第一页开头和第二页底部的无关案件残片已跳过。正文严格遵循 OCR 内容，并处理了换行产生的连字符。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：PDF 文件包含两个判例残余和一个完整判例。根据指令，仅转换具有完整 case caption 和意见正文的 *Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo* 案。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则，仅转换具有完整 case caption 和意见正文的 *Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo*。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例。根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则，跳过第一页顶部的其他案件结尾。文字严格遵循 OCR。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记分页。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 *D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo* 的完整意见。前一个案件的残余结尾和后一个案件的开头均根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则跳过。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 *D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo* 的完整意见。前一案件的部分结尾和后一案件的开头均根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则跳过。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
[788 NYS2d 154]
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：PDF 文件包含两个判例片段和一个完整判例。根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则，仅转换具有完整 case caption 和 full opinion body 的判例，即 *Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. Ronald D‘Angelo*。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 *D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo* 的完整意见。前一个判例的残余部分（涉及 negligent hiring）和后一个判例的开头部分（*Jack D‘Elia v. Joanne D‘Elia*）根据 Multi-Opinion Documents 规则均已跳过。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例部分。 第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，已跳过。 文字严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 *D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo* 的完整意见。前一案件的部分结尾和后一案件的开头均根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则跳过。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 *D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo* 的完整意见。前一案件的部分结尾和后一案件的开头均根据“Multi-Opinion Documents”规则跳过。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例。 第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，已跳过。 文字严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整意见。前一个判例结尾和后一个判例开头均根据 Multi-Opinion Documents 规则跳过。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例。 第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，已跳过。 文字严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例部分。 第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，已跳过。 文字严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例。 第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，已跳过。 文字严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例部分。 第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，已跳过。 文字严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例。 第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，已跳过。 文字严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：转换仅包含 Barbara Hoppmann D‘Angelo 的完整判例。 第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他案件的残片，已跳过。 文字严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记。引用的判例和法律分别使用 `midpage-case` 和 `midpage-law`。没有脚注出现。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：由于第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他判例的零碎内容，根据指令，仅转换具有完整标题的主案件（D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo）。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see
The Supreme Court also erred in awarding the defendant a separate property interest with respect to the Mercedes-Benz automobile. The separate property exception to marital property is to be construed narrowly (see
The Supreme Court improperly excluded from the marital debt $6,000 due for medical treatment received by the plaintiff during the marriage. Since the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s notice to admit that the debt was marital, the defendant conceded the plaintiff‘s argument in this regard (see
The parties’ remaining contentions either refer to matter dehors the record or are without merit. H. Miller, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.
说明：由于第一页顶部和第二页底部包含其他判例的部分结尾和开头，根据 Multi-Opinion 规则，仅转换具有完整 case caption 和 full opinion body 的判例，即 Hoppmann D‘Angelo v. D‘Angelo。正文文字严格遵循 OCR 内容。使用了 `midpage-ps` 标记分页。法律引用使用 `midpage-law` 标记，判例引用使用 `midpage-case` 标记。没有 footnote 1 标识，因此不包含 midpage-fn。BARBARA HOPPMANN D‘ANGELO, Appellant, v RONALD D‘ANGELO, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[788 NYS2d 154]
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Panepinto, J.), dated March 31, 2003, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant the parties’ Florida condominium apartment and valued the condominium at $525,000, awarded the defendant a 77% separate property interest in a Mercedes-Benz automobile, and determined that the marital medical debts at the date of commencement of the action were only $16,447.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
A trial court possesses discretion to select valuation dates for marital assets which are appropriate and fair under the circumstances (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731 [1991]), limited only by the requirement that the date be set sometime between the commencement of the action and the date of the trial (see