ANTHONY CZESAK and BOGUSLAW CZESAK, Plaintiffs, v. RAVINDRA KASHYAP, MD, AIYUB PATEL, MD, “JOHN DOE,” and THE METHODIST MEDICAL CENTER OF ILLINOIS, Defendants.
Case No. 1:24-cv-01006-JEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PEORIA DIVISION
April 14, 2025
1:24-cv-01006-JEH #34 Filed: 04/14/25 E-FILED Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
Now before the Court is Defendant Ravindra Kashyap, MD, Aiyub Patel, MD, and Methodist Medical Center of Illinois‘s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Second Amended Pro Se Civil Rights Complaint (D. 30).1 For the reasons set forth, infra, the Motion is GRANTED.
I
On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff Anthony Czesak (Anthony) filed a pro se complaint against Defendants Ravindra Kashyap, MD and Aiyub Patel, MD, both pulmonologists, alleging violations of
On November 5, 2024, the Court granted the Defendant doctors’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint (D. 17) finding: Anthony‘s Section 1983 claim failed because the doctors’ healthcare decisions were not state action; the individual Defendants were not subject to a claim under the ACA; Anthony failed to state claims against Methodist under Section 1557 of the ACA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) where he failed to demonstrate that he was a “handicapped individual” or that he was denied any specific benefit for which he was “otherwise qualified“; Anthony failed to demonstrate his standing to assert a Section 1557 suit or ADA suit on his father‘s behalf; Anthony‘s claims under the EMTALA against the individual Defendants failed as a matter of law, and he lacked standing to assert such a claim on his father‘s behalf; and Anthony could not assert a claim under the cited Illinois laws on behalf of his living father. 11/5/2024 Order and Opinion (D. 25). The Court granted Anthony leave to amend his complaint to cure the defects the Court identified in its order. Id.
On February 28, 2025, a Second Amended Complaint (D. 29) was filed in which Anthony‘s father, Boguslaw Czesak (Boguslaw) was added as a plaintiff. In their 13-count Second Amended Complaint, they allege violations of Section 1983, Section 1557 of the ACA, the Rehabilitation Act, the EMTALA, the ADA, the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act, and the Illinois Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law. They also allege intentional infliction of emotional distress and five counts of common law fraud.
II
Anthony experienced stress due to the repeat “death threats” (as he calls the instances when the doctors “threatened” to “pull the plug“) and he was thereafter hospitalized, had to take time off work, and was diagnosed with and treated for post-traumatic stress disorder and other physical and mental health problems. Before the first “death threat” and continuing after the second one on January 6, 2022, Methodist staff denigrated Boguslaw‘s quality of life because of his ARDS. Methodist staff did not answer Anthony‘s questions about Boguslaw‘s condition, did not share Boguslaw‘s requested medical records with Anthony for over 30 days, would not give Anthony time to get an independent doctor‘s second opinion, and told Anthony numerous times that it was not a triage issue and there were open hospital beds at
III
A
1
The Defendants argue Anthony improperly adds his father, Boguslaw, as a plaintiff where considering several factors - Anthony simply added Boguslaw‘s name
All of the Plaintiffs’ federal claims have a two-year statute of limitations. See Towne v. Donnelly, 44 F.4th 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in Illinois is two years); Scherr v. Marriott Int‘l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1075 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining Illinois‘s two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries applied where the plaintiff‘s ADA claim was most closely related to a personal injury action); Rutledge v. Ill. Dep‘t of Human Servs., 785 F.3d 258, 260 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining the Seventh Circuit has held Illinois‘s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury suits applies to suits filed in Illinois under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); and
An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party‘s identity.
The Defendants do not and cannot argue that Boguslaw asserts claims that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in Anthony‘s original pleading; the entirety of Anthony‘s original complaint pertained to the treatment his father received while at Methodist. As for the other relation-back requirements, the Defendants certainly had fair notice of Boguslaw‘s claims against them and will not cause the Defendants undue prejudice if allowed where the alleged facts in support of those claims appeared in the original complaint. See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2000), (rejecting the “mechanical[]” application of Rule 15(c)‘s mistake requirement to the addition of a new plaintiff and focusing,
The addition of Boguslaw as a plaintiff in this case relates back to the date this case was filed – January 5, 2024 – and so his claims are not time-barred. As for the Defendants’ other challenges to the addition of Boguslaw, there is no requirement a pro se party enter a formal appearance in a case, the Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that a newly named plaintiff must submit an IFP petition where the filing fee has already been paid in full, and nothing before the Court definitively shows that Boguslaw has no knowledge of this case or did not affix or direct that his electronic signature be affixed to the Second Amended Complaint.
2
The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs’ claims against Methodist and “John Doe” are time-barred because they do not relate back to the original complaint. They contend Anthony made no “mistake” when he did not add Methodist as a Defendant in the original complaint. Whether a plaintiff commits a “mistake” which would permit an amendment to relate back depends on “what the prospective defendant knew or should have known” and “not what the plaintiff knew or should have known.” Herrera v. Cleveland, 8 F.4th 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010)) (emphasis in original). “A plaintiff‘s ‘deliberate but mistaken choice,’ does not entirely foreclose an amendment from relating back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).” Id. at 498 (quoting Krupski, 560 U.S. at 549).
Here, Anthony originally named only two individual doctors at Methodist as Defendants, but Anthony also listed they were employed with Methodist, alleged
Methodist and its staff were expressly identified from the very beginning of this case and allegations as to Methodist were expressly made in the original complaint. But for Anthony‘s, a pro se plaintiff, “wrong action or statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge or inattention,” Methodist knew or should have known the action would have been brought against it as well. Krupski, 560 U.S. at 548-49 (quoting Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary‘s definition of “mistake“). Moreover, the Defendants do not and cannot argue the claims against Methodist did not arise out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in Anthony‘s original pleading. Methodist also surely received notice4 of this lawsuit such that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits given the allegations as to Methodist that appeared therein and where its two physicians were identified as being employed by Methodist in the original complaint.
Whereas the Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Methodist are not time-barred as they relate back to the original complaint‘s filing date of January 5, 2024, claims against Defendant “John Doe” are untimely and “John Doe” must therefore be dismissed. See Herrera, 8 F.4th at 498 (“naming a John Doe defendant does not constitute a ‘mistake’ within the meaning of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)“).
The original defect the Court identified as to the Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims appears again in the Second Amended Complaint. Namely, the Plaintiffs fail to allege state action to support a Section 1983 action against the Defendants. See Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000) (“In order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the defendants acted under color of state law.“) (emphasis added); see also Babchuk v. Ind. Univ. Health, Inc., 809 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding private hospital was not a state actor under Section 1983); Reed v. Columbia St. Mary‘s Hosp., 782 F.3d 331, 337 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding district court properly dismissed plaintiff‘s Section 1983 claims where the hospital was a private entity and nothing in the complaint suggested it was acting under color of state law) (Reed 1). The allegations in their Second Amended Complaint and citations to authority are nearly identical to the arguments made and authority cited in Anthony‘s opposition to the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint which the Court rejected in its November 5, 2024 Order and Opinion (D. 25). For the reasons set forth in that Order and Opinion, the Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims are dismissed.
C
The Defendants next argue that the Plaintiffs’ claims under the ACA, Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA are inadequately pled and without basis for relief.
As an initial matter, the November 5, 2024 Order and Opinion provided the parties did not dispute that the individual Defendant doctors are not subject to a claim under the ACA. The Order and Opinion also found that Anthony failed to demonstrate his standing to assert a Section 1557 suit on his father Boguslaw‘s behalf, and Anthony‘s alleged injuries of hospitalization for heart and chest pain, a diagnosis of PTSD, and other mental conditions as a result of Methodist‘s actions toward his father were not injuries that may give rise to an associational claim. See McCullum v. Orlando Reg‘l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1143 (11th Cir. 2014) (“the threshold
Section 1557 of the ACA states:
[A]n individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under . . .
section 794 of title 29 , be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments).
The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs make several conclusory statements but fail to allege any facts that Defendants denied Boguslaw access to a program or activity specifically because of a disability. In opposition to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant doctors sought to deny Boguslaw access to their hospital and medical treatment based on his disability. Even accepting as true the Plaintiffs’ allegations and all reasonable inferences therefrom and even while giving them “fair and meaningful consideration,” the Plaintiffs fail to state claims for discrimination. Donald v. Cook Cty. Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996) (repeating that a trial court must ensure a pro se litigant‘s claims are given a fair and meaningful consideration). The details Plaintiffs provide do not “present a story [of discrimination] that holds together. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). Rather, the Plaintiffs’ allegations tell the story of Boguslaw‘s hospital admission for purposes of medical treatment during which the Defendant doctors and other Methodist staff (as referred to several times in the Second Amended Complaint) provided that treatment, provided information to Anthony based upon their medical judgment, suggested a course of treatment based on the medical information and knowledge they had as to Boguslaw, and the Plaintiffs were simply upset by the experience. Those allegations are, in reality, complaints about the medical care, attention, and decisions made as to Boguslaw to which the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are not responsive. See McDaniel v. Syed, 115 F.4th 805, 825 (7th Cir. 2024) (“As a general matter, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do not apply to issues of allegedly inadequate medical treatment“); Ruffin v. Rockford Mem‘l Hosp., 181 F. App‘x 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (stating the plaintiff “cannot challenge a medical treatment decision under the ADA“); Underhill v. Lawrence Cty. Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, No. 4:20-cv-00125, 2021 WL 2312813, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 7, 2021) (“But inadequate medical care cannot serve as the basis for a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.“). Moreover, the Plaintiffs’ ADA claim fails for the additional reason that they complain of past events and only seek money damages. Money damages are not available to private parties under Title III of the ADA. Ruffin, 181 F. App‘x at 585 (citing
While the Court is not unsympathetic to how unpleasant the trajectory of Boguslaw‘s illness must have been for him and his son, Anthony, none of the occurrences of which the Plaintiffs complain amount to disability discrimination. Notably, Boguslaw does not allege he did not receive treatment by reason of his ARDS or that the Defendants refused to treat him because of his ARDS. As the Defendants point out, Boguslaw does not allege that Defendants denied him access to a program
The Plaintiffs fail to state claims under the ACA, Rehabilitation Act, and ADA.
D
The Defendants next argue the Plaintiffs’ claims under EMTALA are vague and fail to meet the criteria under that Act. “The EMTALA imposes two primary obligations on certain federally funded hospitals,” one of which being “if the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition, then the hospital must either ‘stabilize’ the medical condition or must arrange for the transfer of the individual to another medical facility.” Thomas v. Christ Hosp. and Med. Center, 328 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
Though Defendants argue the Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts showing Methodist is a “participating hospital” as required by the EMTALA, the Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Methodist receives reimbursements from Medicare and Medicaid. See Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 246 F.3d 1248, 1260 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Redbud was a ‘participating hospital’ because it was a ‘hospital’ which participated in Medicare.“) (citing
The Plaintiffs rest their EMTALA claim on the fact that the Defendant doctors and Methodist threatened to remove Boguslaw‘s life-sustaining care such that he would no longer be stabilized “while his vital signs crash until he died.” Second Am. Compl. (D. 29 at ECF p. 16). Those allegations fall short of stating a plausible EMTALA claim. As the Defendants argue, the Plaintiffs merely predict what may have occurred. Very clearly, Methodist‘s medical staff sought to stabilize Boguslaw upon his admission to the hospital and expended efforts to keep him stable.
No one actually removed his life-sustaining care as illustrated by the Plaintiffs’ allegations that Boguslaw “is home and 100 percent NOT in a persistent vegetative state.” Id. at ECF p. 3 (emphasis in original). Similarly, their allegations make clear he was not actually transferred to another hospital in Chicago in spite of the fact Methodist and its staff “tried” to do so. Second Am. Compl. Id. at ECF p. 4; see Beller v. Health and Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cty., Ind., 703 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 2012) (providing one of the duties the EMTALA imposes on hospitals with respect to patients who come to their emergency rooms, as to any emergency condition, is to stabilize the patient prior to any transfer to another facility) (citing
Boguslaw fails to state a claim for violation of the EMTALA.7
E
As the Plaintiffs fail to state claims under Section 1983, the ACA, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the EMTALA, no federal claims remain in this case. “A district court has ‘supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.‘” West v. Hoy, 126 F.4th 567, 575 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting
IV
For the reasons set forth, supra, Defendants Ravindra Kashyap, MD, Aiyub Patel, MD, and Methodist Medical Center of Illinois‘s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Second Amended Pro Se Civil Rights Complaint (D. 30) is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case.
It is so ordered.
Entered on April 14, 2025
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE