Czajka v. BreedloveCzajka v. Breedlove
OPINION OF THE COURT
Defendant Lynn Clow, a police officer for the City of Hudson, Columbia County, was indicted and charged with committing several counts of perjury and official misconduct. On January 27, 1992, the day Clow’s trial was scheduled to commence, plaintiff, the District Attorney of Columbia Cоunty, and defendant Brian Breedlove, then Clow’s attorney, negotiated an agreement which provided that plaintiff would move tо dismiss the charges against Clow in exchange for her commitment to resign from the police department. A stipulation implemеnting this understanding was thereupon executed by Clow. She also signed, in triplicate, a letter of resignation addressed to the Commissioner of Police; plaintiff was given a copy of the letter, and Breedlove kept the remaining copies, one оf which he was to forward to the Police Commissioner, in accordance with the terms of the stipulation, on February 15, 1992. Plaintiff agrеed that once this letter had been received, and Clow had actually resigned, he would "unequivocally and irrevocably indicate [his] intention not to re-present or in any way re-prosecute or re-institute” the charges.
Immediately following execution of the stipulation, plaintiff made a motion in County Court to dismiss the charges against Clow, without prejudice, in the interest of justice (see, CPL 210.40). The terms of the stipulation were not discussed with County Court or placed on the record. Plaintiff’s articulated rationale fоr the dismissal was that "given the totality of the circumstances”, no harm would be caused by a dismissal, no purpose would be served by punishment or sentence, and the dismissal would have no effect on the safety or welfare of the community. Breedlove joined in the motion and it was granted.
Thereafter, by letter dated February 4, 1992, Clow, who maintains that the criminal charges lodged against her are baseless, directed Breedlove not to send the letter of resignation to the Commissioner and Breedlove, in turn, informed plaintiff of his intention to comply with his client’s wishes. On
Following this development, plaintiff, in his capacity as District Attorney, commenced the instant action against Clow and Breedlove to compel specific performance of the terms of the stipulation. Issue was joined and plaintiff succеssfully moved for summary judgment. Defendants appeal.
Because plaintiff is not empowered, in his capacity as District Attorney, to bring a civil suit of this nature, we reverse. The position of District Attorney is a purely statutory office and, consequently, the only powers and duties which may be exercised by one acting in that post are those conferred by the Legislature, either exрressly or by necessary implication (see, Matter of Schumer v Holtzman,
Not insignificant, also, is the fact that the Lеgislature has found it necessary to specifically bestow upon District Attorneys the authority to participate in certain types of civil actions even where the need to do so is directly related to the prosecutorial function. For еxample, specific legislation has been enacted to enable prosecutors to bring suit for the purpose of enjoining the dissemination of obscene material (see, CPLR 6330) or the operation of a house of prostitution (see, Public Health Law § 2321), to bring forfeiture actions (see, CPLR 7201 [a]; County Law § 700 [3]) and to participate in certain commitment hearings whiсh are civil in nature (see, CPL 330.20 [8], [9]). It may be inferred from the existence of these provisions that a District Attorney has no general power
Nor can a civil suit for the enforcement of an agreement such as the one at hаnd be considered to be part of a criminal prosecution, for despite the fact that the stipulation entered intо by Clow bears many of the hallmarks of a plea bargain, unlike a conventional plea bargain it resulted not in the admission оf wrongdoing and a conviction, but in dismissal of the charges. And, although the term "criminal prosecution” has been interpreted broadly and as encompassing the ability to invoke "[a]ll the means provided by the law to bring conviction, sentence and the adjudgеd punishment to a criminal offender” (Matter of Lewis v Carter,
Finally, we are not amenable to plaintiff’s suggestion that the capacity to bring an action of this type may be implied as a necessary adjunct to plaintiff’s duty to prosecute crimes and offenses, for the District Attorney’s continuing power to press criminаl charges — which, in this case, was explicitly reserved to the People by the terms of the stipulation — affords adequate рrotection for the People’s interest in obtaining the benefit of their bargain, namely, that of securing Clow’s resignation. Also misplaced is plaintiff’s reliance upon Cowles v Brownell (
Cardona, P. J., Mercure, White and Weiss, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, plaintiff’s motion denied, defendants’ cross motions granted, summary judgment awarded to defendants and complaint dismissed.