Cybyske v. Independent School District No. 196, Rosemount-Apple Valley

rеquire jury LaForge’s disregard the to assume intent been established but not prejudge regulations isolated fact would a presumably from an the is that he had jury which the should reach of present opposing political conclusion intent to the * * presumption its own volition *. An [TJhis view to an interested audience. intent overriding presumption with the conflicts public to interfere with the transaction with the law endows of innocence which ingress egress the to and business at at the accused.” U.S. S.Ct. public building a logically from does nоt 256. Morissette was reaffirmed first in flow from the decision demonstrate Gypsum, v. States United States United opposed ballroom the hallways. the 57 L.Ed.2d 854 U.S. S.Ct. phrase “prima We find that the use of the (1978), then in in Sandstrom. Since defining facie evidence” without it and the trial, disputed tent a at the was element Mann disputed jury use the instruction prosecution proving had it the burden impermissibly have the shifted burden very beyond reasonable In the a doubt. persuasion LaForge, in the minds of Supreme recent States Court deci United jury the members as to the cruсial issue of _ Johnson, sion in Connecticut v. U.S. Under Sandstrom intent. the instruction _, 103 S.Ct. 74 L.Ed.2d 823 it is therefore unconstitutional and lower decided that a Sandstrom error (a con judgment court is reversed. presumption) clusive cannot be deemed Reversed. error” except very rare, “harmless narrow circumstances when the issue of intent has

been conceded or waived some manner.

The Connecticut court stated that “an erro presumption

neous disputed on a element of

the crime renders irrelevant the evidence on

the issue because jury may have relied

upon presumption rather upon than that evidence.” 103 S.Ct. at 977. CYBYSKE, Appellant, E. be Since cannot said that producing burden of evidence of intent is INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT burden, very analyzed low it must be with NO. VAL- ROSEMOUNT-APPLE looking strength out at the of the addition LEY, Minnesota, al., Respondents. et al evidence to determine the constitutionali Rather, ty of presumption.6 a rational No. C9-83-593. connection must be established between Supreme of Minnesota. Court provided the basic facts and the ultimate presumed. fact presumption’s accura April 1984. cy analyzed. in the run of must cases be County, Ulster at U.S. 99 S.Ct.

2226. necessary correlation between proved presumed fact and the fact has case. -no been shown There was

showing that business was trans

acted or over the noon interfered with

hour. The most said to have that can be jury jury that dem- to find The fact viewed the еntire intent.” 103 S.Ct. at requisite is an that onstration indication evidence, n. 15. There is more- videotape contrary there some of intent to interfere evidence over, that fact lunch hour was time with the use of But even in public property. chosen the demonstration when it was Johnson, agreed Connecticut the court to be known business was public suspend- "the had been unnecessary presumption ed. evidence was instructed sufficient properly P.

Mark Wine and Kathleen Hvass San- berg, appellant. Minneapolis, for Sip- E. Knutson and M. James Thomas kins, Paul, respondents. St. for SIMONETT, Justice. teacher claims she was not

hired be- defendant school district cause of “marital status” discrimination rights. and in of her violation constitutional granted summary judgment trial court ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍the school district. reverse dismiss- depriva- claim al constitutional for right tion of the to freedom of association but otherwise affirm. Lynne Cybyske

Plaintiff-appellant E. by defendant-respondent hired Inde- was (Rose- pendent School District No. 196 mount-Apple Valley) long-term substi- year, teaсher tute 1979-80 school teaching grade art and fifth at the West- job Elementary view School. When this 1980, Lynne expired applied June of teaching position open in another that was Valley Rosemount-Apple system, and apparently had an initial inter- favorable position grade for the of fifth teacher view Elementary Path Diamond School. however, Lynne, get job. In- did stead, district school hired another position, allegedly woman for the on the applicant stronger grounds other had a appeared more background in art and to be student-oriented.

Lynne She then sued the school district. hired claimed that the she was not reason Daniel was because she was married to did Cybyske, and that the school district “pro-teacher” not like her views. views at with the husband’s odds school spring In the before had Consequently, present- district. the issues teaching posi- hired for the substitute Assuming plaintiff’s been ed here are: version tion, correct, her husband Daniel had been elected a of the facts is does refusal of a neigh- schоol member of the board of school hire a district to teacher because of boring Appar- Burnsville School District. pro-teacher husband’s attitudes consti- ently strong been Daniel had elected tute marital status discrimination under the support in the teacher Burnsville district Minnesota Secondly, Act? and, member, as a board school became a does such refusal violate vocal, bigger “a controversial advocate for rights speech freedom and association voice” for tеachers school district deci- under the Federal Constitution? Other is- sionmaking. While a school mem- board by plaintiff-appellant sues raised are ber, paid by Daniel the Minnesota Edu- summary judgment prema- whether cation Association conduct two seminars ture and deny whether was error to pro-teacher how for teachers on to elect complaint her amendment of include to candidates to school boards. husband’s claim. Lynne Cybyske’s complaint Plaintiff I. against Rosemount-Apple Valley School We consider first claim under District and three of its administrators al- § Rights our Human Act. Minn.Stat. 363.- leged on the of discrimination basis marital part: subd. 1 reads of the status violation Minnesota Human §§ Act, Rights (1982). Except Minn.Stat. 363.01-14 when based on a fide oc- bona alleged cupational that the qualification, She also discrimination it is an unfair fringed rights employment practice: on her to freedom associa- tion and freedom of choice in her marital relationship, in violation of U.S.C. race, employer, For an because of § 1983 and the first and fourteenth amend- color, sex, creed, religion, origin, national ments to the Federal Constitution. Exten- status, regard marital status with to discovery filing followed the of the sive assistance, public membership activity or complaint. In November the trial commission, disability, age, in a local or court heard defendants’ for summa- motion (a) maintain to refuse hire or to a

ry judgment. At time moved to employment system unreason- which complaint amend her to add her husband ably person seeking employ- a excludes plaintiff party Daniel as an additional ment; or include of his his claim violation first right, speech. to free The trial amendment (c) against person to discriminate amend, court denied this motion to and it tenure, hire, respect compen- his summary judgment granted the motion. sation, terms, conditions, upgrading, fa- appeal This follows. cilities, privileges employment. or granted summary judg- The trial court added.) (Emphasis grounds ment on the that there were no pro of material and that While “marital is not a genuine issues fact status” VII,1 аllege it is plaintiff’s complaint had “failed tected class under Title included many rights status un- state human acts. Some actionable marital Clearly, narrowly, or der either State Federal law.” states have construed the term dispute holding genuine there was a factual as to that it refers to the status namely, person job applicant, had not hired be- whether that whether been married, divorced, political single, separated, entertained or cause husband amended, VII, (codified (1976)). 2000e 1. Federal Civil Act of tit. аs U.S.C. § 88-352, § Pub.L. No. 78 Stat. 253-55 person plaintiff job applicant Thus refusal to hire because widowed.2 would be person spouse doing, namely, is married of what her states have pro-teacher discrimination. Other advocating “disloyal” unlawful views term “marital status” more construed the while a board member of another school encompasses broadly, holding that it also district. job appli- situation of the identity words, In other “marital status” view, spouse.3 an em- cant’s Under Act discrimination under our to retaliate may not discriminate because ployer one because of the or what that applicant’s who the spouse? views or associations of the other adopted a broad spouse does. This court no, relying The school district answers Kraft, status construction Human ex rel. State Division of State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn.1979). Inc. v. Spencerport, Village Howarth v. prohib- company that a rule There we held There A.D.2d 434 N.Y.S.2d hiring more than one iting the full-time mayor secretary fired his because of family an immediate was unlaw- member of public secretary’s dissatisfaction with the under our ful marital status discrimination husband, assessor, the tax who had made acknowledged Rights Act. We unpopular tax assessments. lower interpretation to mari- giving were a broad Appellate pointed York out that New Court status, stating: tal likely secretary just it was “marital sta- reject the view that fired if the tax assessor had have been tus,” the fact that one is while it denotes father, brother, been her or other relative. married, does not embrace or is words, In other the New York court rea- spouse. one’s identity or situation of soned the claim did not arise married, respondent employ does Since political marital status but from retal- from individuals, single to hold and divorced noted, however, that iation. It should be otherwise would condone discrimination to the New York is committed narrow view class, portion protected a of a referring of the term marital status as i.e., job applicants already married to employee being mar- to the condition employees. full-time Kraft [Citations Hut, In re Manhattan Pizza Inc. v. ried. ignore the To do so would omitted.] Rights Appeal Human New York State prohibition against arbitrary classi- broad Board, 950, 415 434 51 N.Y.2d N.E.2d Rights fications embodied in the Human anti-nep- (upholding an N.Y.S.2d 961 sub- Act and would elevate form over rule). otism stance. added). (emphasis 284 N.W.2d at 388 that marital In we said status Kraft “identity the or situation” of one’s cludes held, Kraft, a bona fide In absent not, however, spouse. We did elaborate employer the occupation qualification, that by “identity or situation.” what was meant appli- joba cоuld not discriminate is, people nature what it have Human spouse was cant because what his or her employer their likes and dislikes. An working full doing —which spouse variety employee’s an for a question dislike employer. time the same reasons, unlikely legis- holding but it seems should this case is whether that disliking give lature intended kind prohibit be extended to N.Y.2d (1980) 415 N.E.2d 434 N.Y.S.2d 961 2. E.g., George's County Prince v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., Md.App. (anti-nepotism A.2d 745 rule was not marital sta- (1981) (refusal couple permit discrimination). unmarried tus development ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍cooperative housing live in a discrimination); not marital status Thomson Trustees, Mont., E.g., Thompson v. Board of N.J.Super. Inc., Express, Sanborn’s Motor (1981) (anti-nepotism 627 P.2d 1229 rule inval- (App.Div.1977) (employer’s A.2d id); Washington Washington Water Power Co. v. anti-nepotism crimination); marital status dis- rule was not Commission, Wash.2d. Human State Hut, Inc. v. In re Manhattan Pizza 586 P.2d 1149 Board, Rights Appeal New York State Human always entity rise to a discrimination It contrary lawsuit.4 and is “legislative to the significant, example, that section judgment protected reflects the sta- [that] 363.03, prohibit subd. does not discrimi- tus the institution marriage enjoys nation on the basis beliefs or society.” our Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 388. status, although proscribe it does discrimi- Also, in Kraft, we employer said for the religion.5 nation for creed or employ married, others who were single, or divorced but not spouse those married to a question If the before us is whether already employed by company, was an “political spouse of one’s status” arbitrary here, classification. In our case protected Act, under our however, no distinct invidious classification Plaintiff-aрpellant answer is no. seeks emerges. by rephrasing to evade this result ques argues tion. get She that she did not We adhere to our broad construc teaching job simply because she was mar tion of marital status as enunciated in Cybyske; ried to Daniel that the discrimi i.e., Kraft; in determining whether marital unpopularity nation lies not in the of her exists, status discrimination the identity husband with the defendant school district and situation of the is an important in the fact but her husband’s factor. apply approach, however, “identity” imputed or “situation” is to her. construing context of a statute to imputation solely Since this is based on the legislative effectuate legisla intent. The marriage itself, relationship there is mari ture proscribe did not intend to particular tal status discrimination under the Act. political posture, employee whether of an We can plausibility plain- concede the employee’s or of spouse, in the Human argument, proves tiff’s but it too much. Rights Act. Nor do we think the term adopt plaintiff’s argument To mean would marital status should bе construed to in any employer predilection bias or to- legislature clude what the excluded. Here imputed wards which is to the alleged immediate reason for the dis employee, not, whether of substance or crimination not directed at the institution subject to a lawsuit. itself, marriage at least not with the We do think legislature had this same directness and closeness as in Kraft. mind. hold, therefore, Lynne Nor differently. do we think holds Kraft Cybyske does not have a cause of action quite properly struck down an anti- for marital status discrimination under our nepotism rule as marital status discrimina- Act. company provided tion. The rule that a person would appli- not be hired where the II. cant’s already employee. was anti-nepotism An The next just way appellant rule is another issue is whether saying Lynne Cybyske of that an has a refuses to hire cause of action under § couple. way, a married Put the rule is 42 U.S.C. 1983 the defendant a direct attack on the husband and wife as school district and its administrators for extending In Marital Status Discrimination: An Amоr- We have found no case Prohibition, (1980), phous employees 54 Fla.BJ. 217 status discrimination to in a author, Alley, setting. John-Edward lists six where areas retaliation willingness at least some courts have indicated a 363.03, 1(2) (1982), 5. Minn.Stat. subd. § also by employ- to find marital status discrimination prohibits employment (a) discrimination for "mem- employees required ers: where are to be activity bership married; or in a local (2) commission.” "Lo- single anti-nepotism either rules; commission,” however, narrowly cal (3) mothers; (4) defined refusal to hire unwed by agenciеs statute to include those "creat- dependents refusal to hire women with while " * * purpose dealing ed for the hiring (5) with dis- dependents; hiring men ** 363.01, crimination Minn.Stat. subd. couples only; requiring § married and female (1982). membership 24 It does not include employees change on a upon their last names mar- neighboring riage. school board.

262 tion, 563, 1731, infringement right of her to freedom of 391 U.S. 88 S.Ct. marriage (1968). court, however, choice in and to freedom of asso- The L.Ed.2d 811 balance; ciation under the first and fourteenth attempt did not to strike the steаd, amendments to the Federal Constitution. “good exception it found a faith” has, plaintiff-appellant We hold that liability section 1983 of the school board case, Strickland, posture current of this established a 308, Wood under 420 U.S. de- 992, (1975). constitutional claim sufficient defeat S.Ct. 43 L.Ed.2d summary judgment. fendants’ motion for “good in Sullivan exception applied faith” explained by was further and limited Cybyske’s nonhiring Lynne While Supreme Court in Owen v. United States regula was not based on set rule or City Independence, U.S. tion, though property right she had no S.Ct. 63 L.Ed.2d 673 where it district, she to be hired the school municipality was held that a could not as- prevail if she can establish that the decision good sert faith of its officers as a public employer hire her not to policy defense where neither nor tradition made of her exercise of constitu because at the time of the enactment of section tionally protected rights and freedoms. justified immunity. See also such Healthy City See Mt. School District Trotman v. Board Trustees Lincoln Doyle, Board Education v. U.S. (3d Cir.1980), University, 635 F.2d 216 (1977); 97 S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d 471 cert, denied, 451 U.S. 101 S.Ct. Independent Burris v. Willis Dis School 68 L.Ed.2d 844 trict, Inc., (5th Cir.1983) 713 F.2d 1087 (both involving cases nonrenewal of the If the Sullivan dictum has mer teachers). contracts of untenured it, Lynne Cybyske it would seem could alleged deprivations this case have an enforceable action district, Lynne Cybyske’s assuming good were to freedom of asso- school even faith marriage exception might ciation and freedom of choice exist to shield the district under first and fourteenth amend- administrators. If the failure to hire respects Lynne ments. These claims arе some was indeed based on her husband’s v. Meade ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍Sullivan membership opinions similar to the claims and known a mem Independent School District No. board, neighboring ber of a school (8th Cir.1976). Cybyske’s F.2d 799 There a teacher associational freedoms were discharged incompetent thereby compromised. midterm as “The Constitution * * * teaching right continue insisted on she affords of association with cohabitating single persons variety purposes.” with a man. The trial other for a and, Sullivan, (citations supra, court dismissed her sеction 1983 action 530 F.2d at 804 omitted). appeal, eighth Surely, right circuit affirmed. The to associate court, however, appellate acknowledged person purpose with another for the of probable infringement marriage right. pub of the teacher’s is a basic Where the association, privacy rights employer against job of and at the lic discriminates but recognized applicant same time the state’s vital con- dislikes the maintaining properly applicant’s spouse, particu cеrn in “a moral scho- activities of the 804, quot- larly exercising lastic environment.” 530 F.2d at where that is ing Municipal Separate Andrews v. Drew rights his or her first amendment in the District, (5th 611, public School performance 507 F.2d 614 of service as a school cert, dismissed, Cir.1975), member, 559, job 425 U.S. 96 it would seem that the board 1752, (1976). applicant’s S.Ct. 48 L.Ed.2d 169 associational freedoms have Russell, v. eighth explained impaired. circuit teacher’s been Cf. Elfbrandt 11, 1238, rights they were not absolute and 86 S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d 321 384 U.S. when (loss legitimate (1966) public employment conflicted with the state’s con- of for mem cerns, Id. at bership party “a balance must be struck.” Communist violates free 804, association). citing Pickering v. Board Educa- dom of To avoid of

263 association,” “guilt by “[wjere right marriage the association claim not so would have to be disavowed. If the nonhir- by attenuated marriage fact that itself ing any imputation is views based not on subject is not the of the School Board’s but rather in retaliation policy i.e., right were the more directly — job applicant, job attack on the involved—then we perhaps, shоuld reach a applicant’s rights only that associational is different result.” Id. at 1065. In our case course, much more evident. Of a teacher’s plaintiff’s right-to-marriage claim is no compromised can be associational freedom directly more it involved than was in Keck- by if setting outweighed in the school eisen, at the but same time the strong appropriate public employer. concern offsetting public purpose for the 'employ- See, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consoli- actions, er’s which presеnt in Keckeis- District, 410, School 439 415 n. dated U.S. en, missing here. 4, 693, 4, S.Ct. n. 99 696 58 L.Ed.2d 619 plaintiff really What seeking is a (institutional efficiency); v. Norbeck “rights-in-marriage” constitutional claim. District, Davenport Community School cert, need, We see no the federal constitutional denied, (8th Cir.1976), F.2d 545 63 431 is, as undeveloped law as it to estab- 917, 2179, 97 53 L.Ed.2d 227 U.S. S.Ct. lish, case, at least in rights-in- this new (1977)(maintaining discipline and coworker claim, marriage and Sullivan, we decline to harmony); (maintaining do so. supra environment). might To the extent moral there be such proper and scholastic us, howevеr, claim think already merged the record it is On before there in the Cybyske’s no indication that Daniel activi- constitutional freedom of association claim neighboring ties on the school board recognized. which we have here any impact have on his wife’s effectiveness Plaintiff-appellant has made a

as a teacher defendant suf for the Rosemount- showing Apple Valley genuine ficient that a School District. factual dis pute exists as to whether her husband’s infringement As to the claimed on free- wеre a activities “substantial” or “motivat marriage, dom choice in freedom “[t]he ing” nonhiring factor her the school marry long recognized has one been board, stage the proceedings personal rights vital essential to the * * appears dispute there also a factual be orderly pursuit happiness Lov- as to whether the school district would not 1, 12, ing Virginia, U.S. 87 S.Ct. have hired even absence ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍of 1817, 1824, (1967). In this L.Ed.2d her activities. See Mt. Healthy husband’s case, refusal to defendants’ hire City Doyle, District v. School U.S. Cybyske deny right did not her thе to mar- S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 471 did, however, ry; allegedly discriminate hold, therefore, that the trial particular her her because of choice granting summary court erred in judgment partner. challenge of marital A similar depri section claim Independent was raised in Keckeisen (8th right 509 F.2d vation of School District constitutional free cert, Cir.), denied, 423 U.S. 96 S.Ct. dom of association. cir- eighth 46 L.Ed.2d 51 where the upheld validity cuit of a school district’s III.

policy employing couples of not married we hold of plaintiff-appel- Since that one administrator-teacher situations. Balanc- summary lant’s claims survives defendants’ ing “right marriage” the against claim motion, judgment that claim returns to the employer’s prevent the concern conflicts trial favoritism, proceedings, court further thus cir- eighth of interest and the rendering appellant’s moot further anti-nep- com- cuit concluded the school district’s plaint impermissible summary judgment prema- that otism rule was not fringement discovery on individual constitutional ture because her was not com- noted, rights. however, pletеd. The court that Rights question Act.” The is whether

Appellant Lynne Cybyske also man employment plaintiff teacher can be denied error in claims the trial court committed identity that act because of the and under denying complaint her the motion to amend mar- situation of the man to whom she is party to add her husband Michael as a Appeals York Court of ried. New infringe include his claim for interpret narrowly chose to marital status rights. Plain ment of his first amendment Rights York Human Law under the New filing of delayed year tiff over a after the by holding that discrimina- marital status defendants’ complaint, until the eve of only mar- tion means status of motion, to make her summary judgment ried, motion, single, separated, or widowed divorced argued lack to amend. Defendants beyond and does not look the individual’s prejudice trying in all of timeliness and conjugal identity state to embrace the or say the trial together. We cannot claims In re spouse. situation of individual’s denying in its discretion court exceeded Hut, Manhattan Pizza Inc. v. New York Lynne Cybyske motion. observe that We Board, Rights Appeal State Human into the lawsuit bring tries to her husband 506, 511, 950, 952, N.Y.2d 415 N.E.2d amending pleadings under Rule by her own (1980). Thus, State Di- N.Y.S.2d not move to inter 15.01. Her husband did Rights vision Human ex rel. Howarth joined party, as a nor is he vene or to be Village Spencerport, 78 A.D.2d do not see how appeal. here on We by respon- 434 N.Y.S.2d 52 relied on claim. standing here to assert Daniel’s has dents, is irrelevant to our decision here. part. in part Affirmed in and reversed interpreting Rights In our own Human Act, rejected the view that “marital WAHL, (dissenting part, in Justice con- identity stаtus” does not embrace the curring part). in spouse. Kraft, situation of one’s agree plaintiff Lynne Cy- I that cannot part-time employ- The four N.W.2d of action byske does not have a cause in plaintiffs ee were denied full-time Kraft marital status discrimination under company just employment with that Rights To Minnesota Human Act. so hold they precisely were married but significantly is to narrow the broad con- were, who their in because of husbands gave struction we “marital status” discrim- case, employees full-time of Kraft. State, Krаft, Inc. v. ination in 284 N.W.2d employment We held this to be discrimina- (Minn.1979). recognized in We Kraft on the basis of marital status under tion “[b]y including marital status within If, Rights plaintiff in the Human Act. Act, parameters of the Human alleges, employ- this case she was denied legislature clearly intended to outlaw by ment as a teacher defendant school dis- relating arbitrary to mar- classifications precisely trict because of who her husband riage.” at 388. We found 284 N.W.2d was, “pro-teacher” school board member that, acknowledging the funda- further district, constitutеs, neighboring in a marriage relationship mental nature of the Kraft, employment under discrimination on Act, legislature intended that an the basis of marital status. Nowhere employer may differentiate on the basis of holding anti-nepo- did we limit our where a business neces- status employment policies. upheld tism rath- If, Id. overriding. sity compelling prohibition er the broad of the Act Kraft, mere business as we determined arbitrary classification. basis for dif- convenience is an insufficient consistently We have held that the reme ferеntiation, certainly bias dial nature of the Minnesota “pro-teacher” of one’s views requires Act liberal construction of its be so. See, Minneapolis e.g., City terms. Wilson, not, opin- (Minn. question majority as the State 310 N.W.2d 485 1981) suggests, ‘political (holding status’ “race” includ ion “whether per- our Hu- ed discrimination for association with protected of one’s under race); Continental Can sons of another State, (Minn.1980) v.

Co. 297 N.W.2d 241

(holding “sex” discrimination included em-

ployer sexually deroga- inaction face of

tory statements and verbal sexual ad- employee by

vances directed at one fellow

employees); City Minneapolis Rich- ardson, 307 Minn. 239 N.W.2d 197

(1976) (term “discriminate” as used Hu-

man Act means distinction in treat- upon

ment of individuals based irrelevant ‍‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‍factors). impermissible Our continued

adherence to a broad construction of “mari-

tal status” under the Act is not re-

quired by but also furthers the Act’s objective encouraging employers all employment decisions on the merits of

base applicant. individual This construction unnecessarily employers.

does not burden legitimately

An establish requirements employees,

certain its occupational qualifications,”

“bona fide requirements inherently

where those are

required by the nature of the business. § 363.03,

Minn.Stat. subd. 1 here has stated a cause of

action for marital status un-

der the Minnesota Human Act as

well as for violation of her constitutional

rights. grant I would reverse the of sum-

mary judgment and remand for trial on

both claims.

YETKA, (dissenting). Justice join

I in the dissent of Justice Wahl. ROBERTSON,

Johnny Respondent,

SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.

1, Appellant.

No. C9-83-349.

Supreme of Minnesota. Court

April

Case Details

Case Name: Cybyske v. Independent School District No. 196, Rosemount-Apple Valley

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Apr 6, 1984

Citation: 347 N.W.2d 256

Docket Number: C9-83-593

Court Abbreviation: Minn.