657 N.E.2d 372 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1995
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *444
This is a consolidated appeal brought by the Child Support Enforcement Agency of Cuyahoga County from decisions of the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. All five cases were filed with the juvenile court as objections to determinations of child support amounts made by the Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA"). All five filings were made under R.C.
The procedures through which these five actions came before this court are substantially similar except for one difference. The matter of Lozada encompasses two of the actions presented before this court in this consolidated appeal. In Lozada (case Nos. 67463 and 67553), Jacqueline Glenn, the mother/obligee, filed the objection with the juvenile court to the award of child support ordered to be paid by David Lozada for the support of his son, Tevin Glenn. Lozada was *445 found to be the father of Tevin Glenn through an administrative determination of paternity.1
In the three remaining actions, Underwood, Wright andMartinez, the fathers/obligors filed their objections with the juvenile court to the award of child support. In Underwood (case No. 67654), Gerard Baylor filed his objection to the award of child support ordered to be paid for the support of his son, Brandon Underwood. Baylor was found to be the father of Brandon Underwood through an order made by an administrative hearing officer. In Wright (case No. 67639), Curtis Looney filed his objection with the juvenile court to the award of child support ordered to be paid for the support of his daughter, Whitney Wright. Looney was found to be the father of Whitney Wright through an order made by an administrative hearing officer. InMartinez (case No. 67659), Julio Martinez filed his objection with the juvenile court to the award of child support ordered to be paid for the support of his son, Hidarmis Martinez. Julio Martinez was found to be the father of Hidarmis Martinez through an order made by an administrative hearing officer.
Following the objections to the administrative determinations of child support, the juvenile court made the following determination in each of the five actions:
In Lozada, the referee added the CSEA as a party to the action and allowed the Cuyahoga County prosecutor's office to make an oral notice of appearance as attorney of record to represent the interests of the CSEA. As attorney of record, the prosecutor entered into discovery to determine the income of the obligor, David Lozada. The trial judge disapproved the referee's joining of the CSEA as a party and removed the CSEA, along with the prosecutor's office, as a party. Due to this fact, neither the prosecutor's office nor the CSEA was notified of subsequent hearings before the juvenile court, nor were they present for the argument before the court.
In the three remaining actions, the juvenile court dismissed the CSEA as a party; however, the court relied upon different statutes as authority for dismissing the CSEA.
In Wright and Martinez, the juvenile court dismissed the CSEA on the basis that there was no authority for it to be a party to the action under R.C.
Appellant separately and timely filed its notices of appeal in all five cases. On October 25, 1994, finding that the cases represented similar issues of law and fact, *446 this court consolidated the above cases on motion of the appellant. Appellant has presented the following six assignments of error for our review2:
"I. The trial court erred in dismissing the Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency as a party in these actions.
"II. The trial court's dismissal of the CSEA as a party in an action for child support pursuant to R.C.
"III. The trial court erred in dismissing the state of Ohio, CSEA, from these actions without notice, as CSEA is a real party in interest.
"IV. The trial court erred by not following the mandatory requirements of R.C.
"V. Whether the trial court erred in failing to comply with the requirements of R.C.
"VI. The trial court erred in dismissing the state of Ohio, CSEA, sua sponte where the defendants did not raise the defense in any pleading."
All plans for child support enforcement that are designed by the states must meet the mandates of Title IV-A and Title IV-D of the Social Security Act of 1975, codified in Sections 601 through 615 and 651 through 666, Title 42, U.S.Code. The IV-D amendment provides an outline for state programs to follow. These state programs are to be designed for "[t]he purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their children." Section 651, Title 42, U.S.Code. Specifically, Section 654 states as follows:
"A State plan for child support must —
"* * *
"(6) provide that (A) the child support collection or paternity determination services established under the planshall be made available to any individual not otherwise eligiblefor such services upon application filed by such individual *447 with the State, including support collection services for thespouse (or former spouse) with whom the absent parent's child isliving (but only if a support obligation has been established with respect to such spouse, and only if the support obligation established with respect to the child is being enforced under the plan) * * *; [and]
"(7) provide for entering into cooperative arrangements with appropriate courts and law enforcement officials (A) to assist the agency administering the plan, including the entering into of financial arrangements with such courts and officials inorder to assure optimum results under such program * * *[.]" (Emphasis added.)
The codification of the state of Ohio's programs for determining parentage and child support enforcement mandated under Title IV-D is found under R.C. Titles 31 and 51. Specifically, R.C.
"The division of child support is hereby created in the department of human services. The division shall establish and administer a program of child support enforcement, which program shall meet the requirements of Title IV-D of the `Social Security Act,'
Prior to the amendments of R.C. Chapters 3111 and 3113, the role of the child support enforcement agencies in Ohio was limited. The effectiveness of child support enforcement laws was greatly expanded by the changes to R.C.
For example, in State ex rel. Athens Cty. Dept. of HumanServ. v. Wolf (1991),
The holding of Athens Cty. was subsequently bypassed by the General Assembly with the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B. 10 and the enactment of the present R.C.
"(A) An action to determine the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship may be brought by * * * the child support enforcement agency of the county in which the child resides if the child's mother is a recipient of public assistance * * *."
With the enactment of R.C.
Since the enactment of the Social Security Act of 1975, the Ohio General Assembly has grappled with the task of meeting the mandates expressed therein. It has been the purpose of the General Assembly to create a program through which residential parents can easily seek out the absent parents who owe support obligations to their children. As stated in Title IV-D, the overriding concern of this program is to ensure optimum results in helping parents secure the proper amount of child support from the absent parents of their children. The amendments contained within Am.Sub.S.B. 10 have allowed the Ohio program to more effectively meet these federal mandates; however, the legislation still has not entirely met the mandates of the federal law. The guidelines which the Ohio program follow in carrying out its child support enforcement duties are contained primarily within R.C. Chapters 3111 and 3113. We must therefore consider the purpose of these chapters in meeting the federal mandates in determining whether or not the CSEA was intended to be a party to all child support enforcement actions.
Both R.C.
It is clear that the procedure outlined in R.C.
Initially, we recognize that it is a well-settled principle of law that courts have the authority to construe statutes in order to effectuate their intent. Lessee of Burgett v. Burgett
(1824),
"Remedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice."5
The business of writing statutes is often a complex and cumbersome affair. In determining the intent of the General Assembly, it is to be presumed that a code of statutes relating to one subject is governed by one spirit and policy and intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts. SeeCincinnati v. Connor (1896),
The underlying spirit and policy of both R.C. Chapter 3111 and 3113 are concern for "the best interest of the child."Marker v. Grimm (1992),
Appellant contends that the trial court's action in allowing the CSEA as a party where the residential parent legitimates his child through probate court but dismissing the CSEA as a party where the residential parent legitimates his child *451 through the administrative process violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution6 and Ohio Constitutions7.
R.C.
"(A) The natural father, natural mother, or other custodian or guardian of a child, [or] a child support enforcement agency * * * in person or by mail, may file an acknowledgement of paternity in the probate court * * *." (Emphasis added.)
When a parent legitimates his or her child through the probate court, R.C.
"(C) * * * After the probate court enters the acknowledgement upon its journal or the father voluntarily signs the birth certificate as an informant as provided in section
Therefore, under R.C.
"(A) The natural mother, each man presumed to be the father * * *, each man alleged to be the natural father, and, if the party who initiates the action is a recipient of public assistance * * * or if the responsibility for the collection of support for the child who is the subject of the action has been assumed by the child support enforcement agency * * *, the child support enforcement agency of the county in which the child resides shall be made parties to the action brought pursuant to sections
The general plan presented by R.C.
The presence of the CSEA at these proceedings is important in two ways. One, it fulfills the major concern of the state by ensuring that the best interest and welfare of the child are represented at all stages of the proceedings, and, two, it ensures that the pecuniary interest of the state is protected by guaranteeing that the appropriate methods and factors of support are considered at the proceedings.
With R.C.
Appellant contends that this difference between probate court legitimation and administrative legitimation results in some residential parents enjoying the services of the CSEA and the prosecutor's office while other residential parents do not enjoy those services. In essence, appellant contends that this result would punish those parents who, in an attempt to obtain support for their children, are often forced to avail themselves of a legitimacy finding through the administrative process. This, appellant contends, is a violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
Section
Therefore, we must first determine if this statutory omission of the CSEA as a party in these actions is rationally related to the legitimate end of government expressed by R.C. Chapters 3111 and 3113, the best interests of the children.
As previously stated, the pecuniary interest of the state in child support matters arises from the probability that the state may be able to recoup some of the funds which have already been expended in support of the child. See Crittendon, supra; Vancev. Banks (1994),
State statutes require that support payments be made to a department of human services or a child support enforcement agency, regardless of whether the parent is a public assistance recipient. See R.C.
This state interest is most evident in the method of review set forth for support orders. The review of support orders by the CSEA is clearly presented in R.C.
"(A) * * * [T]he department of human services shall adopt rules * * * for determining when existing administrative support orders should be reviewed to determine whether it is necessary or in the best interest of the child * * * to modify the administrative support order and to calculate any modification * * *."
This statute plainly empowers the CSEA to administratively review all existing child support orders whenever it deems it is in the best interest of the child. With this empowerment, the General Assembly plainly gave the CSEA the power to review and modify support orders if it determined that those orders were not in the best interest of the child. At the very least, this empowerment shows that *454 it is necessary for the CSEA to be a party to ensure not only that the child's best interests are protected but also that the pecuniary interests of the state are protected.
The state's pecuniary interest in all child support orders derives from its legitimate governmental duty to protect the public fisc. While the primary responsibility for the protection of children lies with their parents, it is the responsibility of the state to protect the welfare of its citizens. It is the state's welfare responsibility that requires it to step in to take the place of a parent who abdicates his or her responsibility to support a child. It is also this welfare responsibility that requires the state to properly protect public funds, hence creating a pecuniary interest in child support actions which could have the result of depleting or injuring the public fisc.
This pecuniary interest of the state was clearly delineated by the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals inCarelli v. Howser (1991),
"* * * The state's enforcement actions for non-AFDC recipients enable the state to obtain child support payments in order to obviate the potential need for such individuals to collect AFDC.
"* * *
"* * * We see no reason to conclude that the statute must be read to protect needy families with children to the exclusion of protecting the public fisc or vice versa. It seems eminently reasonable that Congress intended both purposes to be served. Indeed, needy families have as much interest in the protection of the public fisc as anyone else."
Most instructive to our discussion regarding the state's pecuniary interest are the remarks contained within footnote 4 of Carelli:
"Illuminating on this issue are the remarks of Representative Conable during the debate on the floor of the House prior to the adoption of the 1984 amendments to Title IV-D:
"`A major focus in the child-support debate during the 98th Congress has been the underlying purpose and intent behind the child-support enforcement program. Some maintained that it should aim primarily at recovering AFDC expenses incurred because families without child support must rely on welfare. Others contended that this Federal program ought to be available as a service to all families in need of assistance in securing child support, regardless of whether they receive welfare or not. This conference agreement reflects the rationale *455 stated in both House and Senate bills which reaffirms that the program should be available to all who need services. * * *'
"Carelli [v. Howser (S.D.Ohio 1990)], 733 F. Supp. [271] at 276-77 (quoting 130 Cong.Rec H23040 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1984))."Id. at 1211, fn. 4.
Hence, the holding of Carelli finds that the state of Ohio has a legitimate governmental interest in enforcing all child support actions. Moreover, Carelli defines part of this interest as the protection of the public fisc.
We agree with the ruling of the Carelli court and find that the state of Ohio has an interest in all child support actions by virtue of either the residential parent's assignment of rights as public assistance recipients or the interest in enforcing child support awards in order to protect and ensure the integrity of the public fisc.
Further, we hold that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions to allow the aid and support of the CSEA in an action for child support brought by parents who have established their parentage through the probate court and residential parents who are on public assistance while denying the aid and support of the CSEA to parents who have established their parentage through the administrative process.
The legitimate state interest to be served in both situations is the proper collection of child support from those people who are legally bound to pay for the support in order to serve the best interest of the children and protect the public fisc, as defined in Carelli v. Howser, supra.
We find no rational basis to exclude the child support enforcement agencies as parties in some of these actions and allow them in others. It is the statutory duty of the child support enforcement agency of each county to develop a method for the proper collection and enforcement of child support. R.C.
Moreover, the exclusion of the CSEA as a party has the effect of improperly giving some children and parents the advantage of representation by the CSEA while denying in contravention of the Equal Protection Clauses that same representation to other children and parents who are similarly situated. This is not a result that is in the best interest of the children, nor is it rationally related to a legitimate end of government.
From a thorough reading of R.C. Chapters 3111 and 3113, together with the mandates of Title IV-A and Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, we find that the General Assembly intended that the child support enforcement agencies be parties to all actions for the collection of child support; any other result would *456 hinder the legitimate state interest spelled out by the General Assembly for the enforcement of child support orders as well as the mandates of Title IV-A and Title IV-D.
Therefore, the dismissal of the CSEA in all of the actions presented before this court was improper, as it was against the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
Accordingly, we find appellant's first, second, third and sixth assignments of error well taken.
R.C.
"[T]he amount of child support that would be payable under a child support order, as calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule in division (D) of this section and pursuant to the applicable worksheet * * * is rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount of child support due, and the court or agency shall order that amount to be paid as child support unless both of the following apply with respect to an order issued by the court:
"(a) The court, after considering the factors and criteria set forth in division (B)(3) of this section, determines that the amount calculated * * * would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child.
"(b) The court enters in the journal the amount of child support calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and pursuant to the applicable worksheet * * * its determination that that amount would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child, and findings of fact supporting that determination."
In Martinez, the annual amount of presumed child support that was calculated for two children was $5,039. The trial court, however, ordered child support in the amount of $4,680. InUnderwood, the annual amount of presumed child *457 support that was calculated was $4,200. The trial court, however, ordered child support in the amount of $3,600. In both cases, neither the referee's report nor the trial court's entry indicated any findings of fact supporting these downward deviations.
The Ohio Supreme Court has explicitly dealt with the latitude which R.C.
"2. The terms of R.C.
"3. Any court-ordered deviation from the applicable worksheet and the basic child support schedule must be entered by the court in its journal and must include findings of fact to support such determination."
Since the holding in Marker, the General Assembly has changed some of the wording of R.C.
In Martinez, the referee noted that the father offered to pay $4,550 per year. The referee went on to note that "that figure is within 10%" of the actual annual obligation required by the worksheet. This note by the referee requires further analysis. It appears that the referee is allowing a deduction of "within 10%" without any further explanation. However, the strict compliance with R.C.
The acceptable procedure for ordering an amount of child support which deviates from the amount "rebuttably presumed" to be the correct amount is for the court to fully comply with the requirements of R.C.
In Underwood, the referee listed the father/obligor's income as $22,000. In addition, the referee deducted $1,800 from the father/obligor's gross income, labeling it as "school loans." The trial court deducted the father/obligor's school loans as an ordinary and necessary business expense for self-employed individuals. This deduction from the schedule was improper for two reasons. One, the father/obligor is not self-employed; rather, he is employed at LCI Corporation as *458 an Installation Coordinator with a base rate of $10.67 per hour, which is a gross yearly income of $22,193.60. Two, school loans do not qualify as ordinary and necessary business deductions for self-employed individuals. This inappropriate deduction by the trial court caused the schedule to be improperly calculated, resulting in a deviation of close to $70 per month in the amount of child support due from the father/obligor.
As stated in Marker, supra, the computation of a child support worksheet must be strictly complied with in order to protect the "best interest of the child." Following the holding of Marker, we find that the present cases of Martinez andUnderwood present facts which show that the trial court did not strictly comply with the deviation procedures contained within R.C.
Accordingly, appellant's fourth assignment of error is well taken. We reverse and remand the decision of the court inUnderwood for a recalculation by the juvenile court of the amount of child support owed by the father/obligor. In addition, we reverse and remand the order of the court in Martinez for a determination pursuant to R.C.
R.C.
"(C) In any action or proceeding in which a child support order is issued or modified * * * [t]he court shall issue a separate order that includes all of the following:
"(1) A requirement that the obligor under the child support order obtain health insurance coverage for the children who are the subject of the child support order * * *."
In all of the actions presented within the consolidated appeal before this court, the trial court failed to issue a separate order encompassing the myriad of requirements outlined in the thirteen separate paragraphs of R.C.
Accordingly, appellant's fifth assignment of error is well taken. We therefore reverse and remand all of the causes before us to the juvenile court to issue a *459
separate order to obtain health insurance pursuant to the requirements of R.C.
Judgments reversed and causes remanded.
PORTER and O'DONNELL, JJ., concur.
"The parent, guardian, or custodian of a child may bring an action in juvenile court under this section requesting the court to issue an order requiring a parent of the child to pay an amount for the support of the child without regard to the marital status of the child's parents."
"Except as otherwise provided in division (A)(2) of this section, no person may bring an action under sections
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
"All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have a right to alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly."
