35 N.J. Eq. 534 | N.J. | 1882
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The facts of this case are so fully presented in the opinion of the chancellor, that it seems unnecessary to repeat them in detail.
A judgment in favor of Ayres, Lufbery & Co. was entered agaiust John T. Hewit, in the minutes of “the circuit court of Union county. The summons and proceedings were upon a claim, under the mechanics’ lien law, previously filed in the elerk’s office, and were against Hewit as both builder and owner. The judgment, as entered in the minutes, was both general and special, as permitted by the statute. If such was the judicial determination of the court, it is conceded that the judgment was a lien on the lands described therein, prior to a mortgage thereon
Upon the ground of the admitted mistake in the record, the chancellor decreed that the indebtedness, represented by the
This decree is objected to on several grounds. The main contention is that the relief granted is not within the power of the court of chancery. The case shows that Kline has unsuccessfully applied to the circuit court for the correction of the record. The hardship of his case, upon the conceded facts, inclines us
It will be perceived that the question thus presented is not whether a court of chancery may control or even prohibit the inequitable use of a judgment of a court of law, or the-process issued thereon. Such a power has been long conceded to that court, and beneficially exercised. But the question here is whether the court of chancery may go behind the record of a court of
No aid in the solution of this question is derived from the fact that the parties in this cause have admitted the mistake, and have thus submitted the matter to a court of equity. Consent cannot confer jurisdiction. If such jurisdiction exists, it extends to all cases. It will justify a court of equity in taking proof to determine whether or not the official recorder of another court
Considering the judgment in question, without reference to its peculiar character under the mechanics’ lien law, there are certain rules which are fundamental, and so established as to need no citation of authorities. Respecting the record of judgments, two questions may be raised. One respects the jurisdiction of
This rule excludes even the minutes of the court whose record is under consideration, if offered to contradict the record. Den v. Downam, 1 Gr. 135.
I cannot think any doubt can exist that the decree in this case violates these rules. The record is admitted; the jurisdiction of the circuit court over the subject matter has not been
Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, between whom and Lord Coke occurred the memorable contest respecting the right of equitable interference with proceedings at law, has laid down the principles on which such interference would be justified. Earl of Oxford’s Case, and the note in 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 76. He said :
In the opinion of the chancellor, but one case is cited in support of this power.- It is the case of Loss v. Obry, decided by Chancellor Zabriskie, and reported in 7 C. E. Gr. 52. Upon examination it will be found that what was decided in that case cannot be considered authority for the assertion of power contained in this decree. The bill was filed to reform two deeds on
In the opinion in that case, Chancellor Zabriskie declared that mistakes in the records of courts may be corrected by a court of equity. An examination of the cases he cited in support of the declaration will render it manifest that he did not intend to be understood as referring to other mistakes than such as appeared in the case then before him — that is, mistakes not of the court or its officials, but of the parties.
In De Riemer v. Cantillon, 4 Johns. Ch. 85, the mistake corrected occurred in a sheriff’s deed, which did not include all the premises actually sold.
I do not find in these or in any other cases which I have discovered, any assertion of a right on the part of a court of equity
My conclusion therefore is, that if this judgment were one of an ordinary character, the record must be accepted by every ■other court as truly expressing the adjudication of the court, and cannot be examined into or contradicted. If there be any error, the court, whose record it is, has power to correct it.
But the judgment in question is in fact one of a peculiar character. It was rendered in proceedings taken to enforce a mechanics’ lien claim. The right to such a lien is purely the
While the court of chancery, in dealing with the lands subject to such a Hen, may marshal the claim in its proper place and preserve -its position as regards other encumbrances, that court has not been entrusted by the statute with the power of determining whether the lieu can be enforced against the lands. The statute has entrusted that power to the circuit court. If the
The record shows that such was the determination of the circuit court respecting the claim of Ayres, Lufbery & Go., representing the debt now owned by Kline. The decree below now imposes that debt as a lien on the lands. In so doing, the court of chancery has adjudicated upon a matter which the record shows was once judicially determined in the statutory mode.
If this judgment is not what the circuit court ought to have rendered, it could have been amended in that court on a proper application, or reviewed by a writ of error.
Whether the judgment is what the circuit court intended to render, cannot be questioned, because, as we have seen, the record must be considered as absolutely expressing such intention.
With these views of the case I think the decree below cannot be sustained.
This renders it unnecessary to consider the other questions
The true remedy of Kline was to procure an amendment of the judgment by the circuit court. If he postponed his application to that court for so long as to render the refusal of the amendment proper, he may have lost his remedy. If not guilty of laches, it may yet be within his power.
For affirmance — Scudder, Van Syckel, Cole — 3.
For reversal — Depue, Dixon, Magie, Reed, Green, Kirk — 6.