163 Mass. 95 | Mass. | 1895
The evidence offered and excluded upon the cross-examination of the plaintiff was in effect that his personal reputation as to credit among dealers was so poor that he could not get credit to carry on the business in which he attempted to work after his wrongful discharge from the defendant’s service. Assuming that the defendant was entitled to show that the plaintiff might have earned more money than he did between the time of his discharge and the time of trial; evidence of the plaintiff’s poor reputation for credit among dealers did not tend to show that he could have succeeded in the business; and it was rightly excluded, as it might have had a tendency to prejudice the jury against the plaintiff. Its only other tendency would seem to be to enhance the plaintiff’s damages, and we do not see how the defendant was harmed by its exclusion.
The remaining question is whether the jury should have been allowed to assess damages for the period of time subsequent to the trial. The plaintiff was hired for five years from April 25, 1892, and was discharged about the middle of July, 1892. He brought suit on November 10, 1892, and the verdict was rendered on March 15, 1894. The verdict assessed at the sum of $3,180.95 the plaintiff’s whole damages for breach of the contract of hiring, and stated that of this amount $1,392.95 was the damage to the time of trial. The defendant concedes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for an entire breach so far as such damages can be ascertained, but contends that, as the trial occurred before the expiration of the contract period, it was impossible for the jury to ascertain or assess the damage for the unexpired portion of the contract period subsequent to the time of trial. In support of this contention the defendant cites the cases of Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. 381, Fowler v. Armour, 24 Ala. 194, Lichtenstein v. Brooks, 75 Tex. 196, and Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355, in which cases it seems to have been held that, if the suit is begun before the expiration of the contract period, damages can only be allowed to the time of the trial. He asserts that in the case of Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, in which full damages were given, the writ was brought after the expiration of the contract period. On the other hand, it has been held in Vermont that, if there has been such a breach as to authorize the plaintiff to treat it as entirely putting an end to the contract, he may recover damages for an entire non-fulfilment, and is not limited to what he has actually sustained at the time of his bringing suit or the time of trial. Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582. And in Maine, in an action for breach of a contract of hiring brought before the expiration of the contract period, it was held that the just recompense for the actual injury sustained by the illegal discharge was the stipulated wages less whatever sum the plaintiff actually earned, or might have earned, by the use of reasonable diligence. Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Maine, 64.
Exceptions overruled.