105 Ga. 180 | Ga. | 1898
On December 13, 1895, the General Assembly passed an act to change the county-site of Fannin county from Morgauton to Blue Nidge. Acts of 1895, p. 420. The preamble of this act recites that on the 13th day of August, 1895, an election was held in that county for the’ purpose of changing the county-site, and that “ at said election so held two thirds of the legal votes cast at said election were in favor of the removal of said county-site from the town of Morganton to the town of Blue Nidge, in said county.” Certain citizens and taxpayers of the county brought an equitable petition against the •county commissioners to enjoin them from building a jail for the county in Blue Nidge. This petition was predicated upon two grounds: First, because the above-mentioned act was unconstitutional, for the reason that it ivas “ a local bill, and notice of the intention to introduce said bill, as required by the constitution of the State, was not given nor published in the locality affected by such bill,” and, second, because “less than two thirds of the votes cast at said electipn were in favor of removal of said county-site, as the consolidated returns of said election showed.” The injunction was denied, and the plaintiffs excepted.
Section 394 of the Political Code, which relates to elections of this kind, declares that “ the certificate of the secretary of State showing that said election was held and that two thirds of the qualified voters of said county (as indicated by the tax digest) voted at said election in favor of ‘removal,’ shall be sufficient evidence of the holding of said election and the number of votes cast.” In Wells v. Ragsdale, 102 Ga. 53, it was held that in so far as this section undertook to require the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters of the county, it was violative of the constitution, which only required the assent of two thirds of those voting at the particular election. Pealing with this section as construed in the case just cited, a certificate from the secretary of State showing that two thirds of those voting at an election upon the question of removing a county-site voted in favor of removal would be sufficient evidence as to the facts therein recited. It will be observed that the secretary of State is not required to furnish the General Assembly with a transcript of the return of the election made to him, but it would seem lawful for him to state in a certificate the result of the election; and again, it will be noticed that while such a certificate is sufficient evidence as to the facts, the law does not say that it shall be the exclusive evidence to be acted upon by the General Assembly. We do not know, as already remarked, whether the secretary of State furnished a certificate of any sort to the General Assembly in the present instance, or, if he did, what the certificate contained; and we repeat that the transcript offered in evidence and rejected was not relevant or admissible for the purpose of contesting the constitutionality of the law under review.
Judgment affirmed.