62 P.3d 741 | Nev. | 2003
OPINION
In this petition, we are asked to determine how to calculate the thirty-day period for requesting a trial de novo after notice of an arbitration award is served by mail. We conclude that the three additional days for service by mail must be added directly to the thirty-day period and that, consequently, the district court was compelled to strike the trial de novo request as untimely.
FACTS
Custom Cabinet Factory of New York, Inc. (Custom Cabinet) entered into a contract to build and install custom furniture at the home of Ronald and Theresa McMillan (the McMillans). A dispute arose regarding the quality of the work, and the McMillans refused to pay the balance owed under the contract. Custom Cabinet then filed suit in Clark County to recover the remaining balance owed under the contract.
Custom Cabinet countered that the McMillans were entitled to thirty-three days only and filed a motion to strike the request for trial de novo. The district court denied Custom Cabinet’s motion to strike. Custom Cabinet then filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to strike the McMillans’ request for trial de novo and to further compel the district court to enter judgment on the arbitrator’s award.
DISCUSSION
The primary issue in this matter involves the method used to compute the filing deadline for a request for trial de novo in response to an arbitration award. In the underlying case, the thirtieth day following service of the arbitration award fell on a Saturday. Because the arbitration award was served by mail, it is uncontested that each party was entitled to three additional days to file a request for trial de novo.
Custom Cabinet claims that the three-day allowance for mailing begins on the thirty-first day, regardless of whether the thirty-first day is a non-judicial day. In support, it cites this court’s decision in Ross v. Giacomo.
In response, the McMillans note the dearth of Nevada case law on the subject and rely on federal case law to support their contention that the three-day allowance should be added only after computing the appropriate filing period and adjusting for nonjudicial days. The McMillans contend that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tuschner v. United States District Court for the Central District Court of California
Decisions of the federal district court and panels of the federal circuit court of appeals are not binding upon this court.
Additionally, following the federal courts’ interpretation of the relevant procedural rules would potentially result in an additional five to seven days to file motions.
Here, the district court should have added the three days allowed for mailing on the thirty-first day, even though the thirty-first day was a Saturday, a non-judicial day. This computation would result in the thirty-fourth day falling on Tuesday, a judicial day. Thus, there would be no need to extend the deadline further.
Custom Cabinet also contends that the district court abused its discretion by treating the provisions of NAR 18 as procedural, not jurisdictional. The district court never addressed the issue of whether Rule 18 was procedural or jurisdictional, nor did it need to. Instead, the court merely used a computational method favored by the federal courts, but contradicted by Nevada precedent.
Nevada has established a precedent in Ross that requires an addition of three days for service by mail before considering whether additional days are required to avoid having a deadline fall on a non-judicial day. Consequently, the district court was compelled to grant petitioners’ motion to strike the trial de novo request and manifestly abused its discretion in denying that motion. Our intervention by way of extraordinary relief is therefore warranted, and we grant this petition.
NRCP 6(a).
97 Nev. 550, 635 P.2d 298 (1981).
Id. at 553, 635 P.2d at 300.
Id. (citing NRCP 50(b)).
NRCP 6(e).
Ross, 91 Nev. at 553 nn.1 & 2, 635 P.2d at 300 nn.1 & 2.
. at 553 n.2, 635 P.2d at 300 n.2.
829 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.1987).
Id. at 855-56.
See, e.g., Treanor v. MCI Communications Corp., 150 F.3d 916 (8th Cir.1998); Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1996); Thielking v. Kirschner, 859 P.2d 111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir.1970).
Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Ct., 103 Nev. 623, 633, 748 P.2d 494, 500 (1987), aff’d sub nom. Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S 538 (1989); see also Rahn v. Warden, 88 Nev. 429, 498 P.2d 1344 (1972).
For example, a motion could theoretically be permitted an additional seven days if the thirtieth day fell on Thanksgiving Day. The next judicial day would be four days in the future. Under the federal interpretation, three more days would be added if notice were served by mail resulting in a total increase of seven days. Under this court’s interpretation, the total increase would be a more reasonable four days.
See NRCP 6(a).
NRS 34.160; Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 637 P.2d 534 (1981); Smith v. District Court, 113 Nev. 1343, 950 P.2d 280 (1997).