8 Vt. 38 | Vt. | 1836
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is an action for money had and received. The plaintiff is a pensioner. The defendant has received his pension money, amounting to over $1000, and claims to have received it as guardian duly and legally appointed, according to the 14th section of the statute in relation to the settlement of the poor, and to have regularly accounted therefor. The question involved and to be decided is, was the defendant legally appointed guardian ? If he was, it is immaterial to enquire whether he has properly accounted therefor. It is not found that the defendant has ever been discharged from his guardianship. The remedy for the plaintiff, if he has sustained any injury, provided the defendant is his guardian, must be under the 15th section of the statute before mentioned.
It appears that two justices of the peace, on the complaint of the select men and civil authority of the town of Chelsea, on the 26th of May, 1827, appointed or attempted to appoint, the defendant as guardian to the plaintiff. We have not the preceedings here; but it seems an objection was raised at the county court, because no evidence was offered that the complaint was made by a majority of the select men and civil authority of Chelsea, other than the recital contained in the complaint. It is, however, very certain, that if a complaint was made, purporting to be made by a majority of the select men and civil authority of the town, and the magistrates acted on that complaint, it must be deemed •prima facie to be the complaint of a majority. The mere count
There is nothing in the subject matter of the statute to require that this should be done by the overseers of the poor of the town where the person is legally settled. The town receives no direct benefit from the proceeding. They are only ultimately benefited by his being compelled, together with his family, to earn their subsistence, and by having his estate prudently and discreetly managed, instead of being squandered in riotous living.
The statute, however, makes use of the term, the toivnto which he belongs; and if this expression is tobe considered as equivalent to, and synonymous with the expression “legally settled,” then the objection is well taken to the proceedings had in this case.
But we find the term may as well imply an inhabitant of, or a resident in a town, as a person legally settled. The definition, then, must he gathered from the subject matter of the statute, as well as from the use made of the same expressions in other parts of the same statute.
To say that this power of appointing a guardian, can only be exercised on the complaint of the select men and civil authority of the town where a person is legally settled, would exclude from the operation of the statute, a number of persons who have no legal settlement in the state, and who certainly ought to be subject to its control, as much, or more than those who are' legally settled in the statei
The person who dwells among us, who is raining himself and family, and exposing them to wretchedness and misery, by the constant and habitual practice of those vices which are mentioned, and who must in a very short time be, with his family, relieved and supported by the town where he resides; who can look to no other town for remuneration, is, certainly, as proper a subject to be placed under guardianship, as though he had a legal settlement. The interest of community and of the town where he dwells, as imperiously demands it. The subject matter of this section would
If any poor person, belonging to any town, shall apply for relief, &c. the overseers may make application to a justice' of the peace, who, with the overseers, are to determine both as to the fact of his being in indigent circumstances, as well as the extent of the relief to be administered.
It was considered, in the case of Washburn vs. Vernon, Wind-ham county, 1832, that this 20th section applies as well to those persons who had no settlement in the state, but who were poor, for whom the town was obliged to provide, as to those who had a legal settlement in the town ; and that the term “belonging,” in this section, does not intend that the person has a legal settlement. It appears, in the case now before us, that the plaintiff has no settlement in this state. With respect to such persons, we have no hesitation in saying, that they are proper subjects for the exercise of the power contemplated in the 14th section of the statute, and that it may and must be exercised on the complaint of the select men and civil authority of the town where such person resides. If such-spendthrift has a legal settlement in the state, in a town different from the one where he resides, we are not called on to decide who must be the complainant. The construction which has been put on the 11th section of the statute in relation to persons confined in gaol, is in no way at variance with this construction, but rather confirmatory of it. It was a long time a matter of doubt, whether this 11 th section extended to persons in gaol. The apparent inconsistency of considering a person as a transient person, who was actually confined within the walls of a prison, led many to doubt, whether persons confined in gaol should not apply for relief to the overseers of the poof of the town where they resided, and from which they were taken when carried to prison, rather than to those of the town where the gaol was situated. But it is now settled that the application must be made to the overseer of the poor of the town where the gaol is situated.
The town of Chelsea, therefore, was the town which was endangered or exposed to expense, if the plaintiff while in prison, and having no settlement in the state, became a subject of relief under the statute, rather than the town from which he was taken and which could not be endangered or exposed, in conseqnence of his
This view of the case must, of course, dispose of the other branch of the argument in behalf of the plaintiff. For if the defendant has expended this pension money in payment of debts rather than in support of the pensioner arid his family, and if that is a subject of which the plaintiff may complain, he must apply to the county court. But we cannot yield to the argument which has been advanced, that this pension was designed, exclusively, to be expended by the pensioner himself. It was designed, most undoubtedly, for the comfort and support of himself and family ; and when he is incompetent to expend it for. this purpose, whether from a defect of understanding, or from profligacy, it could never be supposed that the local authorities of the state might not place him under guardianship and do that for him which he could not do himself. The very fact that guardian, in this and similar cases, can possess himself of the money from the agent of the government, shows most conclusively, that although a transfer of a pension, by the pensioner himself, is not recognized ; yet a transfer, by authority of law, to the person appointed to take care of him and his family, and expend his property with discretion, is recognized. If we were to assist the plaintiff to recover this money, yet we must first repeal our statute before we could say, that the guardian should not control and expend it in such a manner as the plaintiff ought to do. The want of any proviso in the act of congress, that the pension money shall not be paid to the guardian, when one is appointed; the fact that the money is so paid, make it sufficiently evident, that the government never contemplated that the pensioner should have the entire control of the money due to him, and expend it in a manner not conducing to his comfort and support or that of his family, and subject them to the various provisions made for the support of paupers. It surely could not
We have not examined the account of the guardian, because, from the view already expressed, we think it is not to be done in this suit.
The result is, that judgment must be affirmed.