Curtis v. StateCurtis v. State
The trial court did not err in finding that victim‘s statement to her emergency care physician that she was assaulted by her boyfriend qualified as a statement made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis under
Evidence >
The trial court did not err in admitting victim‘s statement as an excited utterance under
On January 4, 2021, the State filed a criminal indictment against Ms. Hockaday‘s boyfriend, Mr. Sheldon Lyvonne Curtis (“Appellant“).
Appellant was tried before a jury in October 2021 in the Circuit Court for St. Mary‘s County, Maryland. The jury acquitted him of attempted second-degree murder but convicted him on two counts of first-degree assault of Ms. Hockaday. At the sentencing hearing on May 12, 2022, the circuit court merged Appellant‘s convictions for first-degree assault and imposed a sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve years suspended.
Appellant noted a timely appeal and claims the trial court‘s admission of two hearsay statements over defense counsel‘s objections constituted reversible error. He frames the issues as follows:
- “Did the lower court err in admitting a statement which identified not the cause of the injury, but the perpetrator, pursuant to the hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis?”
“Did the lower court err in admitting an excited utterance where the declaration was made an unknown amount of time after the startling event, away from the scene of the incident?”
We discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s admission of Ms. Hockaday‘s statements through the testimony of the emergency care physician and her neighbor. First, we hold that Ms. Hockaday‘s statement to her emergency care physician that she was assaulted by her boyfriend qualified as a statement made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis under
Second, we hold that Ms. Hockaday‘s frenzied demeanor, her palpable fear of continuing and imminent danger, and her pleas for help constituted a sufficient foundation for the court to find that she was still “under the stress of excitement caused by” a startling event when she told her neighbor that she was afraid of her boyfriend.
BACKGROUND
The following account is derived from the evidence adduced at Appellant‘s jury trial on October 12 and 13, 2021, viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Molina v. State, 244 Md. App. 67, 87 (2019). Our summary of the trial record provides the necessary
At approximately 7:30 A.M. on December 11, 2020, the St. Mary‘s County Sheriff‘s Department received emergency calls reporting that a woman outside of an apartment complex in the River Bay community was screaming for help. Deputy Courtney Edwards was dispatched to the scene and upon arrival she was approached by a woman later identified as Sarah Hockaday. Deputy Edwards observed that Ms. Hockaday “had a lot of blood in her mouth and on her hands” and was “crying” and “[v]ery fearful.” Ms. Hockaday reported to Deputy Edwards that she was in severe pain and that “he was going crazy.” Emergency medical personnel transported Ms. Hockaday to the hospital for treatment.
After alerting Ms. Hockaday‘s sister of the incident, Deputy Edwards attempted to gain entry to Ms. Hockaday‘s apartment but was unable to do so. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Edwards spoke with Ms. Hockaday while she was being treated. After obtaining Ms. Hockaday‘s statement, the Sheriff‘s Department applied for and obtained a warrant for Appellant‘s arrest. Ms. Carleigh Ruleman, a crime lab technician with the Sheriff‘s Department, collected DNA samples from Ms. Hockaday.
On December 28, 2020, Appellant turned himself in to the Sheriff‘s Department. Tragically, by then Ms. Hockaday had passed away on December 23, 2020, from causes unrelated to the assault.
A grand jury indicted Appellant on five charges: (1) attempted second-degree murder of Ms. Hockaday; (2) first-degree assault of Ms. Hockaday by strangulation; (3)
During the course of their investigation, on April 17, 2021, police presented Ms. Deanna Day—Ms. Hockaday‘s neighbor and an eyewitness to the assault—with a photo array prepared by the crime lab technician, Ms. Ruleman. Ms. Day identified Appellant—Photo Number 2 in the array—as the boyfriend and perpetrator of the assault. Deputy Richard Wilhelmi, the officer who presented the photo array and observed Ms. Day‘s reaction, noted that she identified Appellant after approximately ten seconds. According to Deputy Wilhelmi, Ms. Day stated that her level of certainty about the identification was “I‘m pretty sure. I believe so.” After Deputy Wilhelmi followed up on Ms. Day‘s confidence about the veracity of the identification, Ms. Day reiterated “um, I believe so.”
At trial on October 12, 2021, the primary issues became establishing Appellant‘s identity as the perpetrator of the assault on Ms. Hockaday and proving the severity of Ms. Hockaday‘s injuries. The State presented its case-in-chief over two days, calling eight witnesses. Appellant exercised his right to not testify at trial and further opted to not call witnesses or present evidence, instead taking the position that Ms. Hockaday‘s level of intoxication on the morning of the assault rendered her reporting unreliable. Defense counsel also underscored during opening argument that “[w]e don‘t know who else she had contact with” due to the presence of other DNA from other male contributors found under her fingernails.
Next, over defense counsel‘s objection, Ms. Day was permitted to relate that Ms. Hockaday, after entering Ms. Day‘s residence, stated that she was “afraid of her boyfriend.” In overruling the objection, the court engaged in the following discussion with counsel:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection to hearsay, she‘s testifying about what was (indiscernible).
[THE STATE]: It‘s an excited utterance. I mean, crying, fearful, immediately coming in, obviously she had a startling event.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If I can be heard?
THE COURT: Sure.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Number one, I don‘t think a sufficient foundation has been laid for that, that this particular utterance was an excited utterance. You have to lay a foundation for that.
Number two, the statement would have to be about an event that immediately -- that immediately preceded . . . .
[THE STATE]: . . . . as far as the foundation, the foundation is as simple as the demeanor of being -- appearing under a startling event, and still being under that demeanor, which is the crying, the fearful, and running into her house, she then said what happened. That is an excited utterance.
THE COURT: . . . is it the State‘s position that this assault had already occurred at this point? [THE STATE]: Part of it. Some of it.
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THE COURT: Based on her testimony as to the fact that Ms. Hockaday came running out, was without shoes, approached her, was crying, and the witness’ statement that she was afraid and went into the residence with the witness, I am going to overrule the objection.
Ms. Day resumed her testimony, explaining that she agreed to let Ms. Hockaday stay “downstairs” in her residence for the night. She said that, after she went upstairs to go to sleep, she “saw [Appellant] and they started to argue” inside her apartment. Ms. Day had “no idea” how Appellant entered her apartment. She testified that Ms. Hockaday began running up the stairs and “[h]e ran up the stairs” in pursuit. She saw Appellant hit Ms. Hockaday and “heard her fall down the stairs.” Because she was afraid, Ms. Day stayed in her bedroom and eventually left her apartment later that night. Ms. Day said that when she returned the next day, the damage caused her home to look “like a completely different place.” At the end of her direct examination, Ms. Day explained that she went to the police station where she identified Appellant in a photo array as the boyfriend and perpetrator of the assault.
On cross-examination, Ms. Day denied that Ms. Hockaday exhibited any outward signs of intoxication. When asked how long Ms. Hockaday was in her apartment before she heard the boyfriend downstairs, Ms. Day responded, “maybe an hour and a half or an hour . . . I told her, you know, stay here and get comfortable. If you leave, lo[c]k my door, I‘m going upstairs and go to bed.”
Dr. Adrienne Wilson, an emergency urgent care physician, treated Ms. Hockaday after she was taken to MedStar St. Mary‘s Hospital by ambulance. At trial, Dr. Wilson was accepted as an expert in emergency care and physical trauma. Through her testimony, the State moved into evidence several photographs taken of Ms. Hockaday‘s injuries depicting severe bruising, lacerations, a significant amount of blood, and marks around Ms. Hockaday‘s neck.
Dr. Wilson was asked whether, during her assessment of a patient like Ms. Hockaday, she asks the patient any questions in order to treat the patient. Dr. Wilson responded affirmatively and explained that she asks questions “[t]o try to figure out what trauma has happened to their body, in order to figure out what potential injuries could be there.” When asked whether “all injuries are apparent to your eyesight when the . . . patients present to you,” Dr. Wilson responded “No.” Dr. Wilson then explained that she asked Ms. Hockaday what happened to her, and that the purpose of her question was:
To assess what was the cause of injury in order to figure out what may be the injuries that she sustained, so I will know what to order, and also to ascertain her, you know, safety, to see if she needed any assistance as well.
Dr. Wilson‘s testimony was suspended at this juncture while the court heard defense counsel‘s objections outside the presence of the jury:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . . The statements are hearsay. The question is are they admissible under [Maryland Rule] 5-803 (b) (4), as a statement for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis. The Defense agrees that the description of what was done to Ms. Hockaday would qualify under that exception . . . .
However, the identity of the assailant is inadmissible. State versus Coates, 405 Maryland 141 is a 2008 case, identity of alleged abuser to forensic nurse is inadmissible as irrelevant to the treatment and diagnosis.
THE COURT: [State‘s counsel]?
[THE STATE]: Well, Your Honor, State versus Coates, I believe that was a specific, when they get to who did it, which in this case, she asked what happened . . . and that‘s different. And that in both State versus Griner, 168 Maryland App. 714 and Webster v. State in 151 Maryland App, 527, they both speak to that . . . .
When it‘s part of her statement, that does not make it inadmissible, because that‘s her statement. If you read Coates . . . after they say what happened, they specifically asked about identity. Asking about identity, has nothing to do with medical diagnosis. Correct. And if you read Griner, that was also a dual purpose case, in which, again, that statement, the child‘s statement to the nurse and the doctor in that case, because it was part of his statement of what happened to you, and he said my mom, and then went on to describe the injury . . . .
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . . The legal analysis is that the identity of the perpetrator is irrelevant to treatment. It‘s a relevancy issue. It‘s not a -- it‘s not how the question was phrased issue. It does not affect the doctor[‘]s treatment whatsoever who the perpetrator is.
The doctor just wants to know what are the physical events that happened that lead her to make certain treatments. That‘s what gives the otherwise inadmissible hearsay reliability. It‘s not a back door through which the prosecution can substantively admit the identity of the perpetrator. . . .
* * *
THE COURT: All right . . . The doctor testified that it was for the purposes of assessing what medical treatment needed to be done, and the Court does find that the question was asked specifically for determining what happened as opposed to who did it, that the statement, very clearly, the statement was
made to the doctor to determine basically what happened, and the list of injuries was included in that. The Court is going to deny the motion . . . .
Dr. Wilson then testified that Ms. Hockaday stated, in response to her inquiry about what happened to her, that “she was assaulted by her boyfriend multiple times since approximately one a.m.” and experienced “an episode of loss of consciousness” which lasted approximately two minutes. Ms. Hockaday described her symptoms and the levels of pain “all over her body,” including, more specifically, “headache, bilateral ear pain, right greater than left, facial pain, right greater than left,” “bilateral chest wall pain[,]” and “pain at her C spine and sacrum.” She also reported being choked, experiencing incontinence, and having pain on swallowing. Dr. Wilson observed bruising on Ms. Hockaday‘s neck but explained that a CT scan “didn‘t note any acute abnormalities.” With regard to Ms. Hockaday‘s face, there were several soft tissue hematomas and she “had a laceration of her upper inner lip that needed to be sutured[.]” Dr. Wilson then performed an assessment during which Ms. Hockaday noted pain or tenderness in and around her face, chest, and down her spine. Based on her observations, Dr. Wilson concluded that Ms. Hockaday‘s injuries “were consistent with her story that she was assaulted.” Dr. Wilson further concluded that Ms. Hockaday‘s symptoms were also consistent with having been strangled.
On cross-examination, Dr. Wilson explained that laboratory testing revealed Ms. Hockaday‘s urine to have contained high levels of alcohol and was positive for the presence of unidentified opiates. Before closing arguments, the trial court agreed to provide a
As part of its case-in-chief, the State also called Ms. Tiffany Keener, a forensic scientist with the Maryland State Police. She explained that she had performed Y-STR DNA analysis, comparing the swabs submitted by Ms. Ruleman with known samples from Ms. Hockaday and swabs taken by another officer containing known samples from Appellant. The results of her analysis showed that the DNA of three other male contributors were found on Ms. Hockaday‘s hands, and, that Appellant “could not be excluded” as the major contributor of DNA found on Ms. Hockaday‘s right hand.1
As previously noted, on October 13, 2021, the jury reached a verdict, finding Appellant not guilty of attempted second-degree murder, but guilty of two counts of first-degree assault.
Standard of Review
Whether the trial court properly admitted a particular statement under an exception to the rule against hearsay often requires separate inquiries with divergent standards of review. Gordon v. State, 431 Md. 527, 538 (2013). We review for clear error the trial court‘s preliminary findings as to the factual circumstances under which the statement was made. Id. at 537 (citing State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 325 (1997)) (footnote omitted). However, the trial court‘s holding as to whether those circumstances, as well as the content of the statement itself, render it admissible under a hearsay exception is a legal determination that we review without deference to the trial court‘s determination. Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 7-8 (2005).
I.
Statement for Purposes of Medical Treatment or Diagnosis
A. Parties’ Contentions
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by permitting Dr. Wilson to testify that, after she asked Ms. Hockaday what happened to her, she told Dr. Wilson that she was assaulted “by her boyfriend.” Appellant stresses that “[w]hile Ms. Hockaday‘s statement that she was assaulted was certainly pathologically germane, the identification of her alleged assailant is irrelevant to the course of treatment.” Quoting from the Supreme Court of Maryland‘s decision in State v. Coates, 405 Md. 131, 146 (2008), Appellant urges that “[s]tatements to a medical practitioner as to the identity of the person who caused an injury are unlikely to be regarded by the declarant as related to diagnosis or treatment.” Appellant
The State counters that Dr. Wilson‘s testimony was properly admitted because, based on the circumstances, “the trial judge could reasonably [have found] that Dr. Wilson had a medical purpose in asking what happened” and that Ms. Hockaday believed her response was for a medical purpose. The State distinguishes the present case from Coates because Ms. Hockaday‘s statement “was made in a hospital setting hours after the assault, not 14 months later as in Coates.” Also, the State points out that in the instant case “there was no question equivalent to the child in Coates asking ‘are you going to find him now?‘” suggesting the child believed she was being interviewed for an investigatory purpose. Especially because Ms. Hockaday “was actively suffering from her injuries[,]” the State presses, the trial court could have reasonably found that Ms. Hockaday “understood that she was speaking with Dr. Wilson for a medical purpose.”
In the alternative, the State contends that even if the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Wilson‘s testimony, the error was harmless because other evidence admitted at trial established Appellant‘s identity as the perpetrator. Specifically, the State points out that
B. Contours of the Medical Treatment Exception
Because a “patient‘s statements to his [or her] doctor are apt to be sincere when made with an awareness that the quality and success of the treatment may largely depend on the accuracy of the information provided[,]”
(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or external sources thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment.
We have previously held that, in the direct aftermath of an assault, a victim‘s statements describing the assault can be admissible under
Under the circumstances presented at trial, we concluded that the victim‘s statement was properly admitted because the victim was capable of understanding the medical purpose of the examination, even if there was also an overarching investigatory purpose.
Thornier issues have arisen, however, in determining whether statements identifying the perpetrator of an assault, rather than merely describing it, may be admissible under
Initially, we explained that the child at age five had attained a sufficiently advanced level of cognitive development and was apprised of the medical nature of the examination—i.e., to discover why she had been bleeding from her genital area. Id. at 34-35. Accordingly, we concluded that the victim “knew that her statements would be used to provide appropriate treatment” and that she made them in contemplation of treatment or diagnosis. Id. at 35. Notably, we also determined that there was a medical purpose to ascertaining the identity of the child‘s assailant because the “blood and [] abnormally dilated hymen” presented the danger that the child “had been exposed to a venereal disease, and may have required antibiotics” or had been penetrated by a foreign object, raising the possibility that “a tetanus shot might have been required.” Id. at 36. We surmised that learning the identity of the abuser “was also important in the instant case because effective treatment might have required [the child‘s] removal from the home.” Id.
In Griner v. State, we focused appropriately on the state of mind of the declarant-victim in holding that statements made to a uniformed nurse were admissible under
We began our analysis by noting that the medical treatment or diagnosis exception “specifically contemplates the admission of statements describing how the patient incurred the injury for which he is seeking medical care.” Id. at 745 (quoting Webster, 151 Md. App. at 536). Applying that rationale, we concluded that “there was enough evidence that [the child], who was four-years and eight-months old, understood that there were medical reasons for telling [the nurse] what happened.” Id. at 746. We reasoned that the child reasonably understood the medical purpose of the interview considering that “[his] eye was still nearly swollen shut[,]” the nurse “explained to [him] that she was going to take care of him,” and the child “was able to respond appropriately” to the nurse. Id. Accordingly, because the child understood that the purpose of the interview was to obtain treatment for his injuries, his statements were admissible. Id.
Thereafter, in State v. Coates, the Supreme Court of Maryland provided crucial guidance on the boundaries of
The Supreme Court affirmed our decision, noting that although there were medical purposes to Bresee‘s examination, “the overarching purpose was forensic in nature” because Bresee “sought information as to the identity of the perpetrator and the details of his criminal misconduct.” Coates, 405 Md. at 143 (citation omitted). The Court clarified that, although the intent of the medical provider is a relevant circumstance to consider, the crucial inquiry is “whether the declarant believed that there was a medical purpose for the examination.” Id. at 144 (citation omitted). The Court did not consider that to be the case given that “Jazmyne T. did not present with any symptoms at the time of her examination” and clearly understood the investigatory nature of the interaction as evidenced by her
C. Analysis
Returning to the present case, we begin with what is undisputed: Ms. Hockaday‘s statements relating that she was assaulted, the nature of the assault, and her ensuing symptoms, were admissible as statements for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis under
In defense of the trial court‘s admission of the statement, the State appropriately focuses on the fact that it “was made in a hospital setting hours after the assault” while Ms.
Here, the record establishes that Ms. Hockaday readily perceived the medical purpose of Dr. Wilson‘s examination. Indeed, the circumstances presented here are nearly indistinguishable from Webster considering that Ms. Hockaday, like the victim in that case, “was questioned in emergent circumstances, within a few hours of the assault, in a hospital setting” by a medical provider who simply asked her “what happened.” Webster, 151 Md. App. at 551. These facts are far removed from the situation presented in Coates, where the victim was questioned by a forensic nurse practitioner approximately fourteen months after the alleged offenses. See Coates, 405 Md. at 134. Moreover, the questioning in Coates, as the Court observed, took the form “of a child-friendly interrogation, akin to a prosecutorial probing of ‘whodunnit,’ rather than an inquiry related to medical concerns.” Id. at 143 (quoting Coates, 175 Md. App. at 627). It is evident that the child-victim in that
Still, as Appellant points out, the Coates decision highlights that a statement relating the identity of the perpetrator must be considered very carefully. The Coates Court warned that “[s]tatements to a medical practitioner as to the identity of the person who caused an injury are unlikely to be regarded by the declarant as related to diagnosis or treatment” because “it is unlikely that a patient would believe statements fixing fault to an individual” to be germane to treatment. Coates, 405 Md. at 146 (citation omitted). We pay special regard to the instruction in
The logic of Rachel T., Griner, and Webster naturally extends to the present situation involving intimate partner violence. We observe that other state appellate courts, in applying the medical treatment exception under their respective evidentiary rules, have
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, for example, observed in State v. Koederitz, 166 So. 3d 981, 985-86 (La. 2015), that the medical relevance of ascertaining the identity of the perpetrator in circumstances of intimate partner violence reflects “the current integrated approach to the treatment of domestic violence cases in the medical community” due to the emotional, psychological, and physical injuries which may be inflicted by recurrent domestic abuse, as well as the need to remove the victim from the harmful situation. Id. at 985 (citation omitted).2 See also State v. Williams, 154 P.3d 322, 328 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (“Generally, statements of fault are inadmissible, but . . . [i]n domestic violence and sexual abuse situations, a declarant‘s statement disclosing the identity of a closely-related perpetrator is admissible under [Washington State Evidence Rule] 803(a)(4) because part
As in Maryland, federal courts have held that “[w]hen the abuser is a member of the [child] victim‘s immediate household, however, a statement of identity may be reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis because the doctor has an obligation to insure the child is removed from the abusive environment.”3 7 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 803:4 (9th ed. 2022) (internal citations to U. S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436-38 (8th Cir. 1985) removed); see also U. S. v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 99 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing that “[s]exual abuse involves more than physical injury; the physician must be attentive to treating the victim‘s emotional and psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which often depend on the identity of the abuser[,]” which “may be pertinent to the diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases“); U.S. v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575, 579–80 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a child victim‘s statement to her doctor, that her mother‘s partner sexually assaulted her, was admissible under
In U.S. v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993), Melvin Joe admitted to the murders of his wife and his neighbor, but denied specific intent on the grounds that he was “intoxicated and enraged over [his] impending divorce[.]” Id. To impeach Mr. Joe, the prosecution presented testimony by Ms. Joe‘s family physician that eight days before the murder, while treating Ms. Joe for injuries she sustained from a rape, she identified her assailant as her husband and said that “she was ‘afraid sometimes’ because Mr. Joe suspected her of having an extramarital affair and had threatened to kill her if he caught her with another man.” Id. The court of appeals held that her statements were admissible under
In line with these persuasive decisions, we conclude that application of the medical treatment exception may permit identification of the abuser in cases of intimate partner violence. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting Ms. Hockaday‘s statement to Dr. Wilson under the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis under
Second, Ms. Hockaday‘s statement described the external cause of her symptoms (i.e., the Appellant) and was reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment of her injuries as a victim of intimate partner violence, with all the attendant psychological and emotional injuries which may derive therefrom. Dr. Wilson testified that she asked what happened, “[t]o assess what was the cause of injury in order to figure out what may be the injuries that she sustained, so I will know what to order, and also to ascertain her, you know, safety, to see if she needed any assistance as well.” Clearly, by telling Dr. Wilson that her boyfriend had assaulted her multiple times, and that she was unconscious for a period of time, Ms. Hockaday was letting Dr. Wilson know that she may need to take tests and examine her for physical injuries and mental trauma that may not otherwise be apparent.
And even assuming it was error to admit the statement, we hold, upon our own independent review of the record, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976). In making that determination, we “consider whether the evidence presented in error was cumulative evidence“—i.e., that which “tends to prove the same point as other evidence presented during the trial[.]” Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 743-44 (2010). Here, the impact of Ms. Hockaday‘s identification of her
Contrary to Appellant‘s contentions, there was other evidence adduced at trial which pointed to Appellant as the culprit. Ms. Hockaday‘s mother testified that Appellant himself called her and confessed to the assault. DNA evidence also suggested that Appellant was the perpetrator of the assault. Certainly, the DNA evidence might not be inherently incriminating considering Appellant‘s relationship with Ms. Hockaday, but the presence of his DNA on her right hand and fingernails, as pointed out by the State in closing argument, would also be consistent with Ms. Hockaday attempting to fight off Appellant in the course of the assault.
In short, we are convinced that because of the other evidence presented, Ms. Hockaday‘s statement to Dr. Wilson identifying “her boyfriend” as her assailant did not contribute to the guilty verdicts, especially when the trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction directing the jury to only consider Ms. Hockaday‘s statement for the purposes of explaining the reasons for Dr. Wilson‘s medical opinions.
Excited Utterance
A. Parties’ Contentions
Appellant assigns error to the trial court‘s ruling, over defense counsel‘s objection, to permit Ms. Day to testify that Ms. Hockaday told her that she was afraid of her boyfriend. According to Appellant, the State failed to lay a sufficient foundation to show that Ms. Hockaday was still under the stress of a startling event when the statement was made and, therefore, the State failed to prove the statement fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Appellant points out that Ms. Hockaday only gave the statement after she had entered Ms. Day‘s apartment, “thus physically removing herself from any imminent danger.” Appellant also observes that there was “no indication given as to how much time elapsed before Ms. Hockaday purportedly made her statement” once inside Ms. Day‘s apartment. Appellant emphasizes that Ms. Hockaday “had been in no fewer than three separate locations before she purportedly made her statement to Ms. Day.” Accordingly, Appellant posits that the record does not sufficiently establish that Ms. Hockaday was still under the stress of whatever startling event prompted her to enter Ms. Day‘s apartment.
The State responds that we must view the factual circumstances surrounding Ms. Hockaday‘s statement “with deference to the lower court‘s understanding of the facts and in consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement.” The State emphasizes that the trial court‘s ruling to permit the hearsay was “[b]ased on [Ms. Day‘s] testimony . . . that Ms. Hockaday came running out, was without shoes, approached her,
B. Foundation Requirements of an Excited Utterance
Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
The proponent for the admission of a hearsay statement as an excited utterance must lay a foundation meeting several requirements, as indicated by the text of
Second, the proponent must establish that the statement relates to the underlying startling event. In Harrell, the Supreme Court of Maryland explained that some mere indicia of the spontaneity of the challenged statement is not sufficient to meet this burden; instead, the term “relating” in
Third, the proponent of a statement purporting to fall within the excited utterance exception must establish the spontaneity of the statement. In other words, the proponent must show that the declarant was still under the stress of the startling event at the time the statement was made and that the statement was not the product of reflective thought. The Harrell case is again instructive here because the Court found that a portion of the victim‘s statement—that Harrell “beat me up“—qualified as an excited utterance. Harrell, 348 Md. at 74, 76-83. The Court held that he “beat me up” was a spontaneous statement that related directly to the startling event. Id. at 82. The Court explained that the victim was still “emotionally engulfed” by the situation, considering that she was crying, and “appeared very emotional and upset[,]” and less than two minutes had passed from the time of the battery to the interview. Id. at 74, 78. Although the Court noted that “one primary consideration” in determining whether a statement was spontaneous “is the time between the startling event and the declarant‘s statement[,]” the Court also noted that the amount of time elapsed “is not alone determinative.” Id. at 77 (citing Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 689 (1982)).
Similarly, in Davis v. State, this Court confronted a situation in which the victim‘s statement followed the predicate assault by approximately fifteen minutes. 125 Md. App. 713 (1999). In that case, Officer Robert Neuens—the State‘s key witness at trial—
With that evidentiary foundation, we concluded that the victim‘s statement to Officer Neuens was properly admitted as an excited utterance. Id. at 716-17. With respect to the timing of the statement, we noted that although “Officer Neuens testified that the victim was ‘calmed down’ to where she could answer his questions,” she nonetheless remained “emotionally agitated by the events she had experienced a short time before the police arrived.” Davis, 125 Md. App. at 716. We found the statement was “spontaneous” and explained that “nothing more [was] required to establish an excited utterance” especially given the severity of the startling event and the fact that “the time from the startling event to the recitation by the victim was a scant fifteen minutes.” Id. at 716-17, 719.
In Harmony v. State, we explained that the temporal limitations of the excited utterance exception may vary even further depending on the evolving nature of the startling event. 88 Md. App. 306 (1991).5 There, the defendant was accused of battery and sexual
Despite the approximately 3 hours that intervened between the unwanted touching and the victim‘s emotional call with her sister, we concluded that her statement that the defendant grabbed her “not for the first time” constituted an excited utterance. Id. at 317-18, 319. We explained that the “utterance need not be contemporaneous or simultaneous with the principal act” so long as “the exciting influence has not lost its sway or been dissipated by meditation.” Id. at 320 (quoting Deloso, 37 Md. App. at 106). Thus, “the crucial factor is not so much the lapse of time or change of location but the continuance of a situation which insures that what is said is, in fact, a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence[.]” Harmony, 88 Md. App. at 320 (quoting Deloso, 37 Md. App. at 106). We reasoned that even if “the declaration [to the victim‘s sister] was made three hours after the
It is axiomatic that the ongoing nature of the exciting event bears on whether the declarant was under the stress of the event at the time of the statement. In Stanley v. State, the defense objected to admission of statements made by the victim of a battery under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule where the “record did not disclose with specificity the amount of time that elapsed between the alleged attack and her statements” to the officer riding in the ambulance with her. 118 Md. App. 45, 54 (1997), aff‘d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 351 Md. 733 (1998). We held that the trial court was correct in its determination that the victim was still under the stress and excitement of the event at the time of her statements, explaining:
[t]he traumatic and exciting event remained ongoing at least until the victim was separated from appellant, and perhaps continued further. When the victim made her statements to Trooper White, she had been physically separated from appellant for only a matter of minutes. Nevertheless, the victim, while undergoing medical treatment in the ambulance, could see appellant standing just outside.
This Court‘s more recent opinion in Morten v. State, 242 Md. App. 537 (2019), highlights why the identity of the declarant and the content of the challenged statement are also significant considerations in determining whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the startling event, and whether the declarant was still under stress of that startling event when the statement was made. In Morten, we examined the admissibility of an anonymous 911 call that was recorded and played for the jury at trial as an excited utterance. Id. at 542-43. The call came in approximately 35 minutes after the shooting, the underlying startling event, and described in meticulous detail two individuals running up an alley and discarding an item into a nearby backyard, as well as the race, approximate age, and clothing of the suspects. Id. Because the declarant was an observer, rather than a victim, and only claimed to have heard a gunshot from several blocks away, we could not accept that the statement was an “uncontrolled emotional spasm in response to overpowering excitement.” Id. at 552. Instead, we emphasized that the content of the statement reflected “a conscious and reflective choice of a good citizen to help the police solve a crime” through a “cool and controlled narrative.” Id. Accordingly, we concluded that the statement was “an admirably unexcited utterance.” Id.
C. Analysis
We return to the case at bar and examine whether the trial court erred in admitting, under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, Ms. Day‘s testimony that Ms. Hockaday told her that she was “afraid of her boyfriend.” In doing so, we examine the totality of the circumstances and consider the factors identified in our decisional law that
Initially, we observe that in this case personal knowledge and the ongoing stress of the startling event were established because the statement was given by the victim while her assailant remained nearby. Morten, 242 Md. App. at 549 (citation omitted); Stanley, 118 Md. App. at 56. And there is no dispute that the statement by Ms. Hockaday identifying her assailant as her boyfriend “relat[ed] to a startling event or condition.”
The record establishes that Ms. Hockaday ran, barefoot and crying, out of her home in the early morning hours of December 11, 2020. Upon encountering Ms. Day, Ms. Hockaday pleaded for help and then she ran into Ms. Day‘s apartment. Ms. Hockaday‘s emotional state as described by Ms. Day suggests that she was running from a startling event and that she was “still in the throes” of that event. Harmony, 88 Md. App. at 320. Because of the ongoing nature of the intimate partner abuse in this case, it was reasonable
As to the latter point, we agree that the record does not reveal the exact amount of time that passed between Ms. Day‘s initial encounter with Ms. Hockaday and the statement at issue. However, applying the principles distilled from the caselaw examined above, we conclude that, under the circumstances, it was not necessary to establish the precise quantum of time that elapsed between the event that caused Ms. Hockaday to run out of her home in the middle of the night and the statement that she made after she ran inside Ms. Day‘s apartment. We note that, based on Ms. Day‘s testimony, the time that elapsed between the initial encounter in the parking lot and Ms. Hockaday‘s statement inside the apartment does not appear to have been significant. Indeed, Ms. Day offered Ms. Hockaday‘s statement in response to the State‘s question: “When she went into your house, what did you do next?” However, even if we assume the time lapse was more than a few minutes—because Ms. Day did testify that she and Ms. Hockaday spoke for approximately one hour before Ms. Day went to her bedroom—we still conclude that the statement was admissible as an excited utterance under the circumstances.
In this regard, we consider Harmony to be particularly instructive. In that case, despite a time lapse of approximately three hours between the sexual assault and the
Here, just like the victim in Harmony, Ms. Hockaday was in the midst of an evolving situation when she spoke to Ms. Day in her apartment. Ms. Day testified that Ms. Hockaday was crying and fearful when she made her statement. Ms. Hockaday‘s fears were realized when her boyfriend, Appellant, entered Ms. Day‘s apartment where he beat and strangled her. With the threat of violence and the nearby presence of her abuser, it is highly probable that Ms. Hockaday was “emotionally engulfed” by the earlier, as well as the ongoing, events. Harrell, 348 Md. at 78 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we hold that Ms. Hockaday‘s frenzied demeanor—established by the testimony that she ran out of her home, barefoot and crying, in the middle of the night—together with Ms. Hockaday‘s pleas for help and her palpable fear of continuing and imminent danger, constituted sufficient foundation for the court to find that Ms. Hockaday was still under the stress of a startling event when she made her statement to Ms. Day. And, for the same reasons provided at the conclusion of our analysis in Section I of our discussion, we hold that if there was any error in admitting the statement, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976).
Accordingly, we shall affirm Appellant‘s convictions.