118 Ala. 125 | Ala. | 1897
Lead Opinion
1. There was no error, under the facts set out, in excusing the two jurors, Wood and Tylor, on suggestion of the solicitor, from sitting on the jury to try defendant. .The fact that the persons composing jury number one, were in the box, at the time the parties announced ready for trial, did not imply necessarily that they were ready to try with those persons as a jury. The State had a right to challenge these two jurors for any reason. The solicitor, for the reasons set out, asked that the two jurors be excused from
2. There was no error in admitting the conversation between M. L. Smith, of the firm of Smith Bros., to whom the alleged forged mortgage was transferred. The conversation related to collateral securities which defendant proposed to give said firm for advances to be made to him, and a promise that he would bring them later, which he did do, — about two weeks after-wards, — and on the transfer of which, — including the alleged forged mortgage, — and in consideration of which, Smith Bros, made advances in goods, provisions, etc., to defendant. This conversation tended to show the motive of defendant to forge and utter the instrument, and to injure and defraud said firm. T'he alleged forged mortgage purports to have been executed on the 24th of April, three days only before, as the evidence shows, it was transferred by defendant to Smith Bros.
3. The witness, Hayden, testified that he did not know that he had ever seen a paper that was forged, and that he had no skill or experience in comparing forged handwritings Avitli genuine ones. He was asked to compare the alleged signature of Charles Cross, as a witness to the forged instrument, Avitli his genuine signature to a paper, not in evidence, offered for the purpose of comparison, and state if the signature of the said witness to the mortgage Avas genuine. This the court properly disalhwed. — Griffin v. The State, 90 Ala. 596; Moon v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79; Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626.
4. Charge 1 given for the State is, in substance, that the laAV presumes eArery one intends the necessary consequences of his OAvn act, and that when one does an act legally wrong in itself, the law presumes t'he intent to do that act, the act itself, evidencing the illegal intent. — Stein v. The State, 37 Ala. 133; 3 Gr. Ev., §13.
Nor Avas there error, as applicable to the facts in this case, in charge 2 requested by the State. — Hobbs v. The State, 75 Ala. 1; Allen v. The State, 74 Ala. 557.
f There was no error in giving charge No. 4 by the State. The predicated fact is hypothesized as • absolutely true, and therefore beyond reasonable doubt. We have several times upheld such charges. — Clark v. The State, 105 Ala. 91; Wilkins v. The State, 98 Ala. 1; Hammil v. The State, 90 Ala. 577; Bush v. The State, supra.
Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurs in the foregoing opinion in its entirety. Other members of the court express their opinions as to the principle announced in paragraph 2 of the opinion, as indicated by Brickell, C. J.
“It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence, that facts and circumstances, which, if proved, are incapable of affording a just, reasonable inference or presumption in relation to a material fact involved in the issue on which the jury are to pass, are irrelevant and inadmissible. Testimony to be admissible must relate to and be connected with the transaction it is intended to elucidate, and the connection with it must not be remote, or a forced, strained, or mere conjectural conclusion. It must have a reasonable tendency to prove or disprove a material fact in issue. Of itself, it may not be full proof or disproof; it may be but a single fact or a collection of facts, or a single link in a chain of circumstances, or it may be merely corroborative. When it is without either of these properties; when it is of remote and collateral facts, from which no fair and reasonable inference can be drawn, it is juadmissible, since, as is said by Starkie, it is ‘at least useless, and may be mischievous, and may tend to distract the attention of the jury, and frequently to prejudice and mislead them.’ — Governor v. Campbell, 17 Ala. 566; Seals v. Edmondson, 71 Ala. 509; State v. Wisdom, 8 Port. 511.” — Karr v. State, 106 Ala. 1, 7.
Again, it has been said: “In the course of trials by jury, a grave duty resting on the court, not infrequently attended with much difficulty, is to guard against the
My own opinion is, that the evidence that Smith Bros, had refused to make further advances to the defendant, without additional security, and that afterwards upon the uttering to them of the mortgage alleged to be ,forged, they made such advances, was irrelevant and should have been excluded. It had no tendency to establish the material fact upon which the guilt of the defendant depended — it related to remote and collateral facts from which no fair and reasonable inference could be drawn, was mischievous, tending to distract the attention of the jury from the real issue, and to prejudice and mislead them.
My brothers, Coleman and Head, are of opinion, the evidence may be admissible to show the relations and course of dealing between the defendant and Smith, but do not concur in the opinion of our brother Haralson, that it was admissible for the purpose of showing a motive on the part of the defendant to forge, or utter the mortgage knowing it to have been forged. As well ¡could it be said that to prove larceny, or any kindred offense, it would be permissible to give evidence that the pecuniary necessities, or the poverty of the accused, generated a motive for the commission of the offense, in all other respects there is concurrence in the opinion of our brother Haralson.
