42 Iowa 665 | Iowa | 1876
I. The plaintiffs claim the land in controversy as the widow and heirs at law of Seymour J. Curtis, deceased, who, they claim, died seized of the land by virtue of the following chain of titles:
1. The lands were entered in 1855 by Walter C. Brock.
2. Brock conveyed two hundred acres of the land on the first day of February, 1859, to James McMillan. The deed was recorded October 28, 1872.
3. McMillan conveyed to Curtis, plaintiffs’ ancestor, October 9, 1871, by deed recorded October 28, 1872.
4. Brock conveyed the remaining tract (eighty acres) October 29, 1859, to James Moore, by deed recorded October 28, 1872.
5. Moore conveyed the last mentioned tract to plaintiffs’ ancestor October 29, 1859. Deed recorded October 28, 1872.
II. On the 30th day of May, 1870, Brock, for the consideration of $1,000, executed to D. N. Smith, one of the defendants, a quit claim deed for all of the lands.
1. In 1868 the lands were sold for delinquent taxes of previous years, as far back as 1858, to E. T. Bergen and the usual certificate of sale was given to him, which was assigned to Smith January 3,1871, and a treasurer’s deed executed thereon to the assignor February 17, 1871.
2. November 9, 1871, Smith conveyed all of the lands to defendant, George W. Frank.
3. March 11, 1872, Frank conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the property to Edward K. Ginn, who is made a defendant.
4. Afterwards Frank conveyed his remaining interest in all the lands to another defendant in the action, McNair. Other defendants acquired an interest in the property, or subdivisions of it were conveyed to them.
It is not important to a proper determination of the questions which, in our opinion, are decisive of the case, to specify more particularly the property acquired by the several defendants.
Upon these facts it is claimed that Smith acquired no right under the assignment other than he would hold as a redemp
If Smith honestly supposed he was entitled to redeem, the ease is not different. His belief does not change the law nor the fact. If, believing he had the right to redeem, he induced Bergen, on that ground, to assign the certificate to him with the intention, on the part of both, to clothe him with the right to take the tax deed, the fact that lie was not authorized to redeem would not make the assignment a redemption. Nothing is plainer. In that case it would be an innocent mistake of the parties. But plaintiffs are not prejudiced for the very same reason that they were not prejudiced if it was a fraud. If Smith through such innocent mistake has wronged any one, it is Bergen, not plaintiffs. A state of facts presenting the question as to the effect of fraudulent representation whereby one induced the holder of a tax title to convey to him, is presented in Porter v. Lafferty, 33 Iowa, 254. We held that the party contesting the validity of the tax title could not complain and had no ground of relief on account of the fraud upon the holder of the tax title; he, if any one, was the party wronged and entitled to relief.
It cannot be claimed that any relation of the kind just mentioned existed between Smith and the plaintiffs who held the title to the land. The quit claim deed surely created no fiduciary relation to plaintiffs for it was obtained in direct hostility to, not under or in subordination of, plaintiffs’ title. And as it carried with it nothing to Smith, it certainly could
YII. We need enter into no inquiry as to the condition and rights of the parties holding under Smith, whether they are purchasers with notice, etc. If Smith’s tax title is not obnoxious to attack on the'grounds above considered, they acquired the rights held by him, though they had notice of the matters charged against his title.
YIII. It may be remarked that the plaintiffs assail the tax title only on the grounds we have discussed. They do not allege any irregularity in its inception or consummation. As the assignment to Smith is held valid, we are required to consider no other matters affecting his title, for it alone is the ground of objection. Neither do they claim a right to redeem from the tax sale on any other ground than the fraud of Smith in procuring the assignment. We need not inquire if they held such right on any other ground.
The foregoing discussion disposes of all questions necessary to be considered in this case. The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing plaintiffs’ petition is
Affirmed.