Curtis v. JacquesCurtis v. Jacques
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Starr
Upon satisfactory showing the plaintiff Willie Curtis, an inmate of the branch State prison at Marquette, Michigan, was granted leave to file a pеtition in forma pauperis, which petition will be considered as a complaint, in which he asks that the defendants be enjoined from “their usurpаtions and abuse of petitioner’s civil rights and general welfare.” The attorney general of Michigan has filed answer on behalf of the defеndants, denying plaintiff’s right to the relief sought and moving to dismiss his suit.
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Curtis bases his action on
It should be noted that the plaintiff does nоt question his guilt of the crime for which he was sentenced, nor does he question the legality of his conviction, sentence, and confinement in рrison. The charges in his complaint relate principally to matters of internal management of the State prisons and the supervision аnd disciplining of the plaintiff by prison authorities. The law is well established that Federal courts do not have the power, and that it is not their function оr responsibility, to control or regulate the management of State prisons and the treatment and disciplining of prisoners, or to interfere with .the conduct of State prisons by State authorities. The only function of the courts is to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained. In United States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 213 F.2d 294, 295, the court said:
“The federal courts have held that they do not have the power to control or regulate the ordinary internal management and discipline of prisons operated by the states. Siegel v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 180 F.2d 785, 788. In U. S. ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 7 Cir., 209 F.2d 105, a prisoner in an Illinois state penitentiary complained that Negroes were discriminated against by not being permitted to participate in radio programs which were transcribed at the prison for later broadcasts. In that opinion we said, 209 F.2d at page 107: ‘Inmates of State penitentiaries should realize that prison officials are vested with widе discretion in safeguarding prisoners committed to their custody. Discipline reasonably maintained in State prisons is not under the supervisory direction of federal courts. Kelly v. Dowd, supra [7 Cir., 140 F.2d 81]. “We think that it is well settled that it is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment - and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined.” Stroud v. Swope, 9 Cir., 187 F.2d 850, 851. ,A prisoner may not approve of prison rules and regulations, but under all ordinary circumstances that is -no basis for coming into a federal court seeking relief evеn though he may claim that the restrictions placed upon his activities are ‘in violation of his constitutional rights.’ -
“In a companion case, Morris v. Igoe, 7 Cir., 209 F.2d 108, this court held that while Morris wás a prisоner in the Cook County Jail in the custody of Sheriff Babb and Warden Scanlan his constitutional rights *922 were clearly not violated by the officials censоring the Chicago newspapers for which the petitioner had subscribed. In Adams v. Ellis, 5 Cir., 197 F.2d 483, 484, a prisoner in the Texas State Penitentiary filed an action for damages and an injunction under the Civil Rights Laws alleging that the prison officials had conspired to and did enforce a set of rules which required censorship of his mail, prevented him from reading law books or making notes, and prevented him from staying in his cell for the purpose of attending to ‘ “emergency legal matters.” ’ However, the court there held, 197 F.2d at page 485, that the plaintiff while a prisoner did not have ‘unrestricted freedom in the reсeipt and transmission of mail’, and that, therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing his petition. The Supreme Court said in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356: ‘Lawful incarcerаtion brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.’ ”
In Siegel v. Ragen, D.C., 88 F.Supp. 996, affirmed, 7 Cir., 180 F.2d 785, certiorari denied 339 U.S. 990, 70 S.Ct. 1015, 94 L.Ed. 1391, аn inmate of a State prison under sentence by a State court, alleged that the defendant warden and others committed certain acts in their conduct in disciplining him which deprived him of his rights, privileges or immunities under the Constitution and the laws of the United States. In affirming the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, the appellate court said, 180 F.2d at pages 787-789:
“The Federal Civil Rights Act provides,8 U.S.C.A. § 43 , that every person who under color of state law subjects any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of the rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States shall be liablе to civil action by the party injured.
“It is on this section that plaintiffs base their claim for relief according to the allegations of their amended complaint. They ask that the defendants be required to cease and desist from the aforesaid acts; they pray that an acсounting be had; each asks for damages in the sum of $100,000 and that the court find that malice is the gist of the action. * *
“The Government of the United States is not concerned with, nor has it power to control or regulate the internal discipline of the penal institutions of its constituent states. All such рowers are reserved to the individual states. * * *
“The Civil Rights Act of the United States was passed to implement the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to our Federal Constitution.
“The 14th Amendment does not empower Congress to legislate on matters within the domain of the States’ powers, nor to legislate against the wrоngs and personal actions of individuals within the State nor to regulate and control the conduct of private individuals. In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835. It is plain that the Federal Civil Rights Act was never designed nor intended to redress the breach by a trustee of his equitable duties to the trust beneficiaries.”
See also Adams v. Ellis, 5 Cir., 197 F.2d 483; Sturm v. McGrath, 10 Cir., 177 F.2d 472; Dayton v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 176 F.2d 108; Shepherd v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 163 F.2d 872; United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, D.C., 112 F.Supp. 143.
To grant the рlaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief would, in effect, amount to control and regulation of the management of the State prisons and the trеatment and discipline of the plaintiff as a prisoner, and as that is not the proper function and responsibility of this *923 court or within its power, thе plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought. For the reasons stated herein the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s suit is granted and an order will be entеred accordingly.
Notes
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“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
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“(3) Tо redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”