158 Iowa 507 | Iowa | 1912
Lead Opinion
The facts leading up to the controversy involve a family history covering a period of more than half a century, with a multitude of details concerning some of which there is no material dispute and very many others about which there is a radical divergence in the testimony. It is manifestly impracticable to embody in this opinion- all the facts having more or less bearing, upon the merits of such a controversy, and the best we can. hope to do is to select so much of the material contained in the record as will fairly illustrate the nature of the claims we have to consider.
Returning now for a time to a consideration of the land in controversy, .the record indicates that until about 1871 it remained uncultivated and unproductive of any substantial income. It does not appear who, if any one, looked after the property, or who paid the taxes thereon during this period. About the year mentioned Mrs. Andrews began to lease the premises to tenants.. A few years later James D., visiting his mother, learning that some difference had arisen between her and a tenant, went to Mills county, and, having made some sort of a settlement of the matter, he thenceforth, with her consent, kept the business in charge and himself, through agents of his selection, attended to the leasing and the collecting of rents:. According to the testimony of the sister Jessie, he thereafter began and continued sending his mother $50 per month. Whether this was intended as in the nature of a payment or accounting by him for the rents and profits of the land does not appear except as a matter of inference, which may or may not be justified from the circumstances we have mentioned. Some seven years after taking up her home with James D. in New York, Mrs. Andrews, then being about eighty-three years of age, made to him a warranty deed of the Iowa land for the expressed “consideration of one dollar and other valuable considerations.” The circumstances under which this conveyance was made are involved in considerable obscurity. According to the story told by Jessie Andrews, her mother showed her the instrument before it was signed, saying it was something which James D. wished her to execute to give him the power to act for her about the land, but that she expressed a reluctance to do so, saying she wanted to keep it in her own power as long as she lived, expressing at the same time her willingness, that James should do business for her and her confidence that he would do what was right. The witness says, that she herself saw that the paper was a deed of some kind, but did not understand that
In the year 1898 James D. Andrews became a helpless paralytic, in which condition he lived about two years. While physically prostrate and speechless, it is shown that he retained his mental faculties, and by the use of various devices those who ministered to his wants learned to communicate with him. A few months before he died he executed a conveyance of the land to his son and daughter, his only children. This deed was not delivered, and on March 26, 1900, before his death in May of that year, he made and delivered to his daughter, Mary S. Armagast, as sole grantee, a warranty deed of the land for the expressed consideration of one dollar. His mother survived him until the year 1903, when she died intestate at the age of ninety years. The only heirs of said deceased are her daughter, Jessie L. Andrews, her granddaughter, Belle A. Curtis, only child of Margaret Andrews Gray, deceased, and her grandchildren James D. Andrews, Jr., and Mary S. Armagast, only children of James D. Andrews, deceased. On April 5, 1909, Belle A. Curtis, as heir to one-third of the estate left by her said grandmother, began this action alleging that the conveynce from Margaret Andrews to her son was obtained by fraud, and the title so procured was held by the grantee in trust for the grantor, and asking that a decree be entered accordingly, that said con
Turning to our own statute we find a provision somewhat similar to .the one alleged to prevail in New York but making the period five years. It is also provided that actions for the recovery of real property may be brought within ten years. Code, Section 3447. But the time during which a defendant is a nonresident of this state shall not be included in computing any of these limitations. Code, Section 3151. It is evident therefore that the statute of New York furnishes no defense to an action brought in this state, unless
That the New York courts would not and could' not enforce a remedy of this nature would seem to need neither argument nor citation of authorities, but see Gillett v. Hill, 32 Iowa, 220; Blackman v. Wright, 96 Iowa, 541; Carpenter
There is yet another reason why Code, Section 3452, is inapplicable. The terms of that section expressly exclude from its operation causes arising in this state. Now, while the alleged wrong for which the prayer for relief is predicated was committed in New York, the cause of action for the relief here demanded did not arise there. A cause of action cannot be said to “arise” in any jurisdiction whose courts cannot take cognizance of the complaint and administer appropriate, relief. No matter where the alleged wrong
2. Same: laches. Nor do we find any merit in the plea of laches. The appellants, so far as appears, have in no manner been misled to their injury by the delay in bringing suit, , ... ■, . , ■, • , and no equities have intervened which re-
quire the court to hold the plaintiff estopped from pursuing the remedy she has chosen. Hemphill v. Holford, 88 Mich. 293 (50 N. W. 300).
The record in this case tends to support the conclusion that the deed to James D. Andrews was made without any present valuable consideration and, if valid, was in the nature of a gift or ante mortem disposition of the principal part of the grantor’s estate, and we see no reason why the court may not inquire into all the circumstances attending the transaction, including all matters of fact having any legitimate tendency to show the capacity of the giver and the influences, if any, leading her to make the gift. Upon the trial both parties availed themselves of the benefit of this rule to a very liberal extent, with the result that more or less of incompetent hearsay may be found in the record; but, when all this has been eliminated, considerable remains which may properly be considered.
Were the appeal to be disposed of upon answer to the first inquiry, we should have no serious hesitation in reversing the decision of the trial court. The burden of showing actual fraud is upon the party pleading it, and in our judgment plaintiff fails to make such a ease. It is unnecessary for us to recite the evidence upon this issue. It is enough to say that no witness speaking of his or her own knowledge testifies to any misrepresentation, falsehood, or deceit on the part of
The other question is more difficult of solution. What is called “constructive fraud” does not necessarily negative integrity of purpose. Lampman v. Lampman, 118 Iowa, 140. It has been defined as “ an act which the law declares fraudulent without inquiry into its motive.” McBroom v. Rives, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 72. Or “such contracts or acts as, though not originating in any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate a fraud, yet by their tendency to deceive or mislead, or to violate confidence, are prohibited by law.” Bouvier, Law Dictionary. It has also been said to be such fraud as “the law infers from the relationship of the parties or the circumstances by which they iare surrounded, regardless of any actual dishonesty of purpose.” 14 Am. & Eng. Eney. of Law (2d Ed.) 21.
The use of the phrase “constructive frqrnd” has frequently been severely criticised by the courts and lawwriters as being misleading and unscientific, but it has become so fixed in the literature and terminology of the law that any attempt to substitute a more fitting name for the thing to which it is applied would result in confusion. The necessity of considering this phase of the law arises most frequently in controversies which grow out of dealings between persons when one occupies fiduciary or confidential relations to the other. As between such persons, a contract by which the one having the advantage of position profits at the expense of the other will be held presumptively fraudulent and voidable, and the burden is placed upon him who claims the benefits thereof to rebut that presumption by an affirmative showing that such contract was fairly procured without undue influence or other circumstance tending to impeach its fairness. Though strictly of differing signification, the phrases “fiduciary relations” and “confidential relations” are ordinarily used as convertible terms and have reference to any
This is in no manner inconsistent with the undoubted right of parents to dispose of their estate as they may think best. They may by deed or will dispose of it to persons outside of the family, or may give it all to one or more of their
"With reference to transactions between parent and child, the law presumes that the influence of the parent over the child during the tender years of infancy is so controlling that it regards transfers from child to the parent on arriving at majority or immediately thereafter as having been made under the influence of overweening confidence. As the child matures and acquires experience and independence, the presumption weakens and at last ceases. As the parent, however, advances in years, the condition of dependence may be reversed by the hand of time. If life draws to a close with a failing intelligence and enfeebled frame, the parent naturally looks to a son or daughter for advice and protection. The parent becomes the child with the same dependence, overweening confidence, and implicit acquiescence which had made the other in infancy the willing instrument of the other’s desires. Highberger v. Stiffler, 21 Md. 338 (83 Am. Dec. 593); Martin v. Martin, 1 Heisk. 653; Comstock v. Comstock, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 453; Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 557. If, under such circumstances, a son obtains a conveyance from a parent, the court will not permit it to stand unless he establishes by*524 abundant proof that the contract was free and fair and made with the utmost good faith.
In Fitch v. Reiser, 79 Iowa, 34, this court had to consider a conveyance by an old man to his daughter, upon whom he largely depended for advice and in whom he placed great reliance. After considering the evidence, we said:
"We are not prepared to say that the evidence shows an absolute want of mental capacity to make a testamentary disposition of property. But in consideration of the extreme mental weakness of the deceased at the time the deed was executed, and as the property in controversy embraced substantially all of his estate, and as the deed was without consideration, and in view of the relation of trust and confidence between the parties to the conveyance, we think the learned district judge was right in entering a decree annulling the deed. The control of the defendant over the deceased appears to have been absolute. Under such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the defendant to show that the conveyance was made voluntarily and without the exercise of any influence on her part to procure the same.
In Reese v. Shutte, 133 Iowa, 682, the court, speaking by Sherwin, J., said: ‘ ‘ It is well settled that transactions of this kind between an aged and infirm parent who has reposed confidence and trust in the child will be closely scanned by the court, and that the burden is on the grantee to show the bona fides thereof.” The same rule is approved in Spargur v. Hall, 62 Iowa, 500. In Davis v. Dean, 66 Wis. 109 (26 N. W. 740), where a deed from mother to son was in question, the court, after discussing the evidence of mental competency, uses this language: ‘ ‘ The transaction, if upheld, practically disinherits her daughter and her other heirs. Assuming her mental competency, this strange and unnatural disposition of her property of itself strongly suggests the existence of improper influence upon her mind. ’ ’ Of the burden of proof the court further says: “The grantee has failed to satisfy the requirements of the rule, and the presumption of injustice,
A gift made by a parent to a child on account of the affection of the former for the latter, even where it is made at the solicitation of the child, is not the object of suspicion, and there is no presumption against its validity unless the relation between them is something mo,re than the ordinary relation between parent and child. Where, however, the natural positions of the parties become reversed — where the parent defers to, trusts in, and yields to the child, when there exists between them what in law is termed a fiduciary relation in which the parent is dominated by the child, and where the child prepares or causes to be prepared and executed an instrument conveying to him property of the parent as a gift or upon a grossly inadequate consideration — the presumption arises that the transfer was .obtained through undue influence, and'the burden rests upon him to show that the conveyance was the result of full and free deliberation on the part of the parent. This is not peculiar to transactions where the parties are parent and child, but is the law in any case where a fiduciary relationship exists, where the conveyance is from the dependent to the dominant party, and where the donee or grantee prepares or procures the preparation and execution of the deed or other instrument; and the rule is applied under such circumstances wherever that relation exists, no matter whether the parties are related by blood or not. (Rickman v. Meier, 213 Ill. 507, 72 N. E. 1121.)
The rule of the cited cases has been very frequently affirmed and prevails in practically all the states. For example, in addition to the eases hereinbefore cited, see Coffey v. Sullivan, 63 N. J. Eq. 296 (49 Atl. 520) ; Henson v. Cooksey, 237 Ill. 620 (86 N. E. 1107, 127 Am. St. Rep. 345); Soberanes v. Soberanes, 97 Cal. 145 (31 Pac. 910) ; Brummond
Under the rule upheld by these precedents, we think there is no room for doubt that the burden in the ease before us is upon the defendants to affirmatively show that the deed under which they claim was obtained without undue influence and was the free, voluntary, intelligent, and unrestrained act of the grantor. James D. Andrews, the grantee, was not merely the son of the grantor. He was her agent, and for nearly twenty years had been intrusted by her with the management of these lands comprising practically all her worldly estate. She had also placed in his hands a part of her small savings for investment. She was a.member of his family living under the same ro:of with him. She unquestionably regarded hinl with great affection and put implicit trust and confidence in his ability and his purpose tp do whatever was right with respect to her property and property interests. The deed which she made to him was absolute in form and vested him with title to all the land — her entire estate — without reservation or power of recall. So far as appears, there was no agreement or promise on his part to provide her maintenance or home for the remainder of her life. Doubtless he expected to do so; but, legally speaking, there was no reason why he might not on the next day decline to render her further support. What is still more to the point, no thought appears to have been taken of the possibility that his mother* might outlive him, as in fact she did, and that in such case the
Among all the very many eases in which a child has been held to the burden of negativing presumptive fraud or inference of undue influence in the procurement of an advantageous contract from a parent, it will be difficult to select any in which the showing is stronger than the one here presented. As we have already shown, it is not necessary to the application of this rule that the court should find or presume an actual intent upon the part of the son to wrong his mother. Indeed, if there were any such actual intent, the fraud would be express and not constructive. He had so long had a free hand in managing the land that he doubtless felt something akin to a sense of proprietorship. The evidence tends to show that in conversation with strangers and third persons he was •in the habit of sp'eaking of the property as his own. His mother and sisters were evidently women of simple tastes and habits, living in his family, and we may presume that he expected to continue to> provide for them. Under such circumstances, it would perhaps be natural and evince no moral turpitude on his part if he secured from her the title to the land so long as he was willing to give to her and his sisters the one substantial benefit they could derive from its ownership — a home and the supply of their reasonable personal wan-ts. But the end which the principle which we have been discussing is intended to promote may not be defeated by a showing of good intentions. The rule has not been formulated to punish active or premeditated wrong, but to close the door against resulting wrong. In the very nature of the situation, where the parties occupy such intimate relations, it is rarely, if ever, possible to prove the extent to which the weaker or dependent party’s action has been influenced
Again, it is strenuously argued that this conveyance was but the natural and proper recognition by Mrs. Andrews of
We have left therefore only to consider whether the evidence offered in support of the defense sufficiently sustains the burden of proof as to the validity of the deed. This in our judgment must be answered in the negative. We may further add that such must be our conclusion even if we eliminate from the record .all the testimony offered by the plaintiff concerning the alleged declarations of Mrs. Andrews. It does sufficiently appear that the deed was prepared and executed at the request or by the procurement of James D. Andrews, that it was wholly without valuable consideration, that it conveyed to him with no power of revocation on her part the mother’s entire estate without any provision or binding legal obligation of the son for her support or for the support of her daughters, and that at the date of such transfer the son receiving such valuable gift was her agent and the sole manager of her property interests. It further appears, as we have already shown, that at this time she was eighty-three years of age, with at most no more than an average mental strength, which is normal in persons of her years, that she was an inmate of the son’s family and depended upon him with entire faith and confidence in his judgment and fidelity. The defendants made no affirmative showing whatever of the conversations or negotiations between mother and son or of the promises or undertakings, if any, on his part. They do offer evidence of witnesses to the execution of the deed that the grantor appeared to be of sound mind and to have an intelligent conception of wha.t she was doing, but this falls far short of negativing the presumption or inference of undue influence. In a large majority of the cases herein-before cited the mental capacity of the grantor to make a valid conveyance is conceded, but it is universally held that this showing does not of itself fill the requirements of the
The importance of the interests involved in the controversy and of the rules of law upon which the decision depends is our only apology for the unusual length to which we have pursued its discussion.
The appeal cannot bg sustained, and the decree, below is Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — I am unable to concur in the majority opinion. After a careful study of the record herein, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the merits of the case are with the defendant. The majority opinion is made to rest upon the theory of constructive fraud, in that fiduciary relations existed between the parties to the deed at the time of its execution, and that the burden is upon the defendant to support the deed with extrinsic evidence and to rebut thereby a legal presumption of fraud. As to the general proposition of law thus set forth in the majority opinion, I make no controversy. As applied to this record, however, .such proposition is perhaps overemphasized in the majority opinion, and I am inclined to make that criticism upon it. The deed under consideration is an old one. Both parties to it were dead many years before this action was brought. Direct evidence from the parties themselves is therefore impossible. The extrinsic evidence upon which the defendant must necessarily rely is largely circumstantial and is to be found in the history of the family, extending over a period of .forty, years. This history is suceintly stated, in the main, in the majority opinion. I will avoid repetition as much as possible, but I cannot wholly avoid it without rendering my own statement unduly disconnected.
In 1857 the Andrews family consisted of the parents and the son, James D., and the daughters, Jessie and Margaret. The father was a drunkard and of no assistance to
Beginning in 1857, James D. sent of his wages to his mother and sister from $150 to $200 every .year until he was married in 1871. . It is said by Jessie that his contributions ceased during his married life. But his; married life was very brief; his wife dying in 1874, leaving him with two children, a son and a daughter. At this time, James D. was in the government service in New York City. He continued his benefactions and visited his mother and sisters often. In 1879 the farm began to pay a .revenue, and he looked after it through a resident agent. It is assumed in the majority opinion that James D. got the benefit of the
In 1889 he invited his mother and sisters to come to New York and make their home with him. Such arrangement was entered into. The family at Iowa City at that time consisted of the mother and two daughters and Mabel Stuart, a daughter of the plaintiff herein by her first marriage. James D. rented a residence near Sheepshead Bay, which was occupied by the family until it was broken up by death. It is urged in appellee’s argument and somewhat assumed in the majority opinion that this invitation was extended by James D. for his own advantage and in order to obtain the help of his mother and sisters in taking care of his own children. The record warrants no such assumption. His children were already quite grown up and were away at school. The oldest, the daughter (now Armagast, the defendant herein), had attained her majority. The son became engaged in business and never made his home there after such date. Prior to 1889 James D. had already become a mere boarder. It is too plain for argument that the home thus provided operated greatly to the advantage of the mother and sisters and the niece Mabel. The services rendered by the mother and daughters which is much paraded in argument was a service principally to themselves. Jessie testified on this subject as follows:
The circumstances under which the family moved to Brooklyn were these: My brother had his two children in*535 school. He was boarding. He asked me to come on and stay with his daughter Mary. She wished to attend some concerts down at Brighton Beach. I spent the summer of 1888 with him. The next summer she came out and stayed with us. Her father came after her. He asked Mother if she would not come to New York and keep house for him. He was tired living in a boarding house. He was going to build a house. The family moved to Brooklyn on his solicitation. He was boarding, and he wanted a home for his children. He thought it would be nice for us all to be together. He only hesitated on account of Mother’s age, for fear she might not like the change; but she was willing to go. We were to live with him as one family. He expected to build a house for us. One inducement was that my sister was very fond of flowers, and he was planning- a greenhouse for her. We removed to Brooklyn in November, 1889. He advanced the money to go there. Mabel Stuart went with us. She was Mrs. Gray’s granddaughter, and the daughter of Mrs. Curtis, the plaintiff. She was a member of our family at the time we removed to Brooklyn. Her mother was living in Omaha part of the time and part of the time in St. Paul. Mrs. Curtis was unfortunate in her first marriage and left her husband. She had to go to work. .She was a stenographer and held a very good position, but left Mabel with us. I wrote to my brother before going to New York and asked him how it would be about Mabel coming. Mrs. Gray thought perhaps there would be objection to it. He wrote back that she was perfectly welcome to come with the rest of us. I do not think Mother would have gone to New York without Mabel. Mabel was then eight years old and had lived in the family four years. My sister and I did most of the work of the family. My brother’s two children were in school. Mabel was in school and Mother was not able to do very much work. We never had any servant except a woman in to wash two or three times during that time. His daughter did some sewing for herself after she was out of school. Aside from my board, I do not think I ever got more than $50 in money; that is, $50 a year. It did not cover the expense of my clothes. Some of those were given to me. The cost to my brother for our clothes I could hardly say. We did not have such a lot of clothes. We made them ourselves. I think, to take it on an average, it would not be more than $100 a year for me. Mrs. Gray got a little more than I did.*536 I do not know whether she got more than $100 a year or not. Mother required very little. He looked after us all as my father would look after his children. He always seemed like a father to me. He always seemed to regard us with love.
James D. was not a man of wealth. At the time of his death he had been in the government service for a great many years, beginning with a salary of $1,500, which had been increased to $2,400 in the last ten years of his life. This was the highest salary he had ever received. It is the testimony of Jessie that he bore every expense of every kind for the family. It goes without saying that he could not bear such expense out of a salary of $2,400, and it may be fairly assumed that the proceeds of the farm were devoted to that end. The farm was in the mother’s name. I shall’assume for the purpose of this dissent that it belonged to her both legally and equitably, although it was once in the name of James D. and was conveyed to his mother while he was yet a minor. But I can entertain no reasonable doubt upon this record but what it was the understanding of the family that James D. was to have this land. But for his contributions for more than twenty years this land could not have been kept in the family. On October 8, 1896, the mother conveyed this land to her son James D. According to Jessie’s testimony, the mother talked with her about it and showed her the deed before she signed it. She signed the deed in the absence of James D. and in the presence of Jessie alone. She not only signed it, but she wrote her name in its appropriate blank space in the body of the deed. It was two or three days after she signed it before she went to the city to acknowledge it. It was acknowledged and witnessed in a formal manner.'The witnesses to the deed have both testified as witnesses herein. Jessie was present with her mother. There was nothing in the conduct of the parties to attract the particular attention ’ of the witnesses. It is shown practically without dispute that the mother, although eighty-three years of age, was
There was no secrecy about the execution of the deed. It was known to each member of the family. Considering the age of the mother, the sisters, Jessie and Margaret, might well have deemed their interests affected by such a transaction. The fact that these never questioned it in any way, but acquiesced in it, as a matter of course, is a strong circumstance indicating that the conveyance was in full accord with the family understanding. That this continued to be the state of mind of Jessie for many years after her mother’s death is indicated by a letter written by her in August, 1907, from which I quote as follows: “When mother deeded the land to by brother, she was not obliged to do so by law, but from a sense of justice for what he had done for her. He promised many things. My sister and I were to have a home and enough to keep us. We had nothing in writing, and I do not' think he dreamed but what :we would be all right. As far as I am concerned I want nothing, but my sister left a daughter who has to be kept. ’ ’ Going back for the moment to their early experience, the record contains a letter written in 1865 by Margaret Gray, the mother of the plaintiff, under whom plaintiff claims. I quote the following reference
The conduct of the parties subsequent to the making of the deed is very significant, not only in its acquiescence, but in disclosing their understanding of the transaction. The deed purported in terms to have been made “for several valuable considerations.” Jessie discloses her mother’s understanding subsequent to the execution of the deed as follows: “ Q. Did you have any talk with your mother about the deed from the time it was acknowledged in New York until her death? A. Yes, sir. Q. What was it? Well, during my brother’s life she always spoke with reference that he would do what was right. I know the time when my brother deeded the land in question to Mary, now Mary Armagast. I knew of the conveyance. Q. After your brother’s death, did you have any talk with your mother about the land ? A. Yes, sir; she talked about it. Q. What did she say? A. She thought things were always going the same as they had when my brother was alive, the house would be kept, and everything would go on the same. She thought that'was understood.”
About two years after the execution of the deed, James D. executed a conveyance to the land to his two children. This was known to the mother and the sister and was acquiesced in. This conveyance was not in fact delivered. But in the early part of the year 1900 and about three months before his death, while he was helpless in his sickness, he executed a conveyance to his daughter Mary, the defendant herein, and this was known to the mother and to the sisters and acquiesced in. In 1899 James D. executed a bill of sale of all the farm
There is another circumstance in this record that tends to explain why no provision was made by Mrs. Andrews for Mrs. Margaret Gray in the distribution of her estate. There was an older son, Peter, who went to California in an early day and spent his life there. He never married. At the time the deed in question was made, the plaintiff herein was in California with her Uncle Peter. He died intestate shortly thereafter leaving a substantial estate. The plaintiff received it all. Margaret Gray had been the most dependent of the family and had received the most assistance. In a sense, she brought into the family the burden of three generations. Her brother had supported not only her, but her daughter and her granddaughter. She was the least capable one of the family. According to Jessie’s.testimony, she received all her mother’s money with the understanding that she would take care of Margaret. This was what James had done for forty, years before the conveyance was made to him, and it is a fair inference from this record that he was undertaking to do so to the end. It is undisputed in this record that Mary bore every, expense needed by Margaret from the time of her father’s death to the time of Margaret’s death.
Mrs. Andrews died in 1903. Margaret Gray died in 1906. Before the death of Mrs. Gray every statute of limitations under the laws of New York had run against an action to assail the conveyance. During all that time it had never been questioned and never was questioned until the plaintiff brought this action in 1909. The conduct of all parties interested directly or indirectly was at all times consistent with the good faith of the conveyance and was at all times inconsistent with any other theory. It seems to me that this kind of evidence ought to be more satisfactory as extrinsic proof than any mere words. The fault that I find with the majority opinion
The. original cost of this land was about $1,000. The conceded contributions of the young man to his mother from 1857 to 1871 alone would have paid for it more than twice over. Without these contributions, the mother must have sold it and absorbed the proceeds in living expenses. Instead of investing his money in property for himself, he gave it generously to his mother.
The law could give him no cause of action for his generosity, but the ‘mother could. She recognized her moral obligation and distributed her property accordingly. From the parental point of view it was just.
According to-Jessie’s understanding, as heretofore quoted from her letter of 1907, the conveyance was made “from a sense of justice for what he had done” and upon promises of continued provision for support of the family. These promises of support were faithfully performed by James while he lived, and, after his death, by his daughter as his successor in title.
By the same arrangement the life insurance went first to the mother, and then to Jessie. If James D. had known that his daughter took nothing by his conveyance of the land to her, surely he would have made other provision for her. The only other provision he could have made for her was to make her payee of his life insurance. The mother and sisters not only availed themselves of the immediate fruits of the eon
II. I am not fully satisfied with the majority opinion of the question of the statute of limitations, nor am I ready to say that it is erroneous. If it is not erroneous, it is because of legislative oversight. The parties were all residents of New York. Every statute of limitations in their own state had run against them. If they were not barred in this state, it is because there is no statute of limitations applicable to them. An action could be brought twenty years hence as well as now. It is a deplorable state of the law, to say the least.
III. I am fully convinced that the action ought to be deemed barred by laches. If an action had been brought in New York to declare the conveyance fraudulent, it is clear that a plea of laches would lie as being kindred to the plea of statute of limitations. To allow the statute of limitations to run before bringing an action is prima facie laches. If failure to bring this action before 1909 would be deemed laches by the courts of the state of the parties to the. transactions, it ought to be deemed such here. The long delay has resulted in manifest disadvantage to the defendant. Especially is this so, if she is required to support her title by positive and detailed and direct extrinsic proof. I do not care to discuss this point further than to cite two'of our previous eases and adopt here what we said there. Mathews v. Culbertson, 83 Iowa, 434, McBride v. Caldwell, 142 Iowa, 228.
I would award decree to the defendant on the merits.