Curtis Echols v. A.G. ThomasCurtis Echols v. A.G. Thomas
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- Before:
- Kravitch
CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VI SECTION VI PARAGRAPH IV OF THE GEORGIA CONSTITUTION,
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND THE HONORABLE JUSTICES THEREOF.
Curtis Lee Echols, Jr., a Georgia prisoner, appeals to this court from the judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denying his petition for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to
Echols entered guilty pleas in the Douglas County Superior Court to three counts of armed robbery (counts one, three and four) and two counts of aggravated assault (counts five and seven).
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The court sentenced him to life imprisonment on each of the armed robbery counts and ordered that the terms for counts three and four be served concurrently. It also imposed twenty years’ imprisonment on each of the aggravated assault
Echols subsequently sought habeas corpus relief in the Superior Court of Tattnall County. He contended that the three life sentences were not authorized by Georgia law and that his court-appointed attorney was ineffective for failing to so advise him in connection with his guilty pleas or to challenge their imposition. Ecohols’ grounds for relief were based upon an alleged conflict between
[ejxcept in cases in which life imprisonment or the death penalty must be imposed, upon a verdict or plea of guilty in any case involving a misdemeanor or felony . . . the judge fixing the sentence shall prescribe a determinate sentence for a specific number of months or years, which shall be within the minimum and maximum prescribed by law as the punishment for the crime.
The superior court did not address the foregoing statutory claim. Instead, it concluded, after an evidentiary hearing, that the life sentences were authorized by
Echols then filed the instant federal petition in which he reasserted the same grounds for relief. The district court found that the State habeas corpus court’s reasoning for affirming the life sentences was erroneous because Echols was not and could not have been sentenced as a recidivist under the terms of
We therefore submit the following for consideration by the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Were the life sentences imposed by the Douglas County Superior Court authorized by the Georgia legislature at the time of Echols’ sentencing?
Nothing in this certification, including the particular phrasing of the foregoing question, is intended to limit the Supreme Court of Georgia in its consideration of the problem presented. See Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 952 F.2d 1304, 1310-11 (11th Cir.1992). The entire record in this case, together with copies of the briefs of the parties, shall be transmitted by the clerk of this court to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. These crimes were committed in May 1987. Echols pleaded guilty and was sentenced on August 17, 1987.
. Although the statute permits the death penalty, the Georgia courts have consistently vacated such punishment in armed robbery cases as disproportionate to the penalties imposed for crimes of similar magnitude. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 205-06, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2904, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 892-93 (1976).
. The phrase “may be imposed” was substituted for “must be imposed” effective May 1, 1993.
See
Upon a verdict or plea of guilty in any case involving a misdemeanor or felony the judge fixing such sentence shall prescribe a determinate sentence for a specific number of years . . . except in cases in which life imprisonment or capital punishment is imposed.
1974 Ga.Laws 352, 354 § 4 (emphasis added).
. This conclusion was based upon the State’s failure to notify Echols that he was subject to recidivist sentencing and upon the fact that no mention was made of such a possibility in either the indictment or at the time of the guilty plea and sentencing hearing, as required by the statute. See Anderson v. State, 176 Ga.App. 255, 335 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1985). The Respondent does not dispute these findings on appeal.
. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent all decisions of the former united States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981.