206 F. Supp. 741 | E.D. Pa. | 1962
These are two companion actions brought by tugboat operators against various labor organization defendants and certain of their officers and representatives.
The second cause of action is brought under § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 2-13 of the first cause of action by reference and then states that the plaintiff in each case had a contract with Locals 1800 and 1700 of the Inland Boatman’s Union of SIU and with Local 101, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, under which it was agreed that employees of plaintiffs represented by the Locals would perform their duties without engaging in strikes. None of these three Locals is named as a party defendant in either of these suits. The Complaints allege that the defendants induced plaintiffs’ employees who were represented by the said Locals not to perform their contracts and to engage in work stoppages. Also, it alleges that (a) each of the plaintiffs had reasonable expectation of business relationships with others, (b) the defendants induced the others not to enter into a business relationship with plaintiffs, and (c) the plaintiffs were prevented from performing tugboat services by the actions of the defendants.
The Answers of SIU and Cardullo
Since paragraph 9 of the Complaints alleges that Cardullo “is an offi
Section 301 enables unions to sue and be sued for violation of contract.
These allegations do not assert violation of a contract to which defendants are a party, but rather sound in tort for recovery for inducing breach of contract or interfering with business relationships. Although the question is not free from doubt,
Since the second cause of action alleges “a second ground of recovery
. The Complaints are virtually identical except in their references to facts concerning the identity and business of plaintiffs.
. See Document No. 4 in the Clerk’s file in each case.
. See Document No. 5 in the Clerk’s file in each case.
. “All the statute talks about is a suit for violation of the contract * * Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, etc., 204 F.2d 495, 496 (3rd Cir. 1953). In Schatte v. International Alliance, etc., 84 F.Supp. 669 (S.D.Cal.1949), the court stated at p. 672: “Whatever else may be said * * * any right of recovery under Section 301 must rest upon a contract and its asserted violation.” See, also, Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1956); Consolidated Laundries Corp. v. Craft, 185 F.Supp. 631, 634 (S.D.N.Y.1960); and 93 Cong.Rec. 6445 (1947).
. Cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, etc., supra; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 653 v. Bay City Erec. Co., 300 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1962).
. The above legislative history indicates that Congress intended to make a defendant union such as SIU liable for violation of contracts to which it was a party under § 301, rather than for causing breaches of contract to which a defendant union is not a party. The following language of Senator Taft is found at p. 3055 of the Congressional record:
“Mr. President, Title III of the Bill, on page 53, makes unions sueable in the Federal Courts for violation of contract. As a matter of law unions, of course, are liable in theory on their contracts today, but as a practical matter it is difficult to sue them. They are not incorporated; they have many members; in some states all of the members must be served; it is difficult to know who is to be served. But the pending Bill provides they can be sued as if they were corporations and if a judgment is found against the labor organization, even though it is an unincorporated association, the liability is on the labor union and the labor union'funds, * * *
Senator Smith made the following statement appearing at p. 4410:
“I come now to Title III, which is very brief, and merely provides for suits by and against labor organizations, and requires that labor organizations, as well as employers, shall be responsible for carrying out contracts legally entered'into as the result of collective bargaining. That is all Title III does. I cannot conceive of any sound reason why a party to a contract should not be responsible for the fulfillment of the contract; it is outside my comprehension how anyone can take such a position.” (Emphasis supplied.)
. Cf. Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, Inc., 233 F.2d 180, 184 (3rd Cir. 1956).
. Curtis Bay is a Pennsylvania corporation and Martin a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Philadelphia. The union defendants are unincorporated associations. The Complaints allege that Cardullo, Parise and Askew reside in Philadelphia and Wall in New Jersey. There is no allegation as to citizenship of the individual defendants. Cardullo has denied that he resides in Philadelphia (see Document No. 4, par. 4, in the Clerk’s file in each case).