We must decide whether a standing Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee enjoys absolute quasi-judicial immunity for scheduling and noticing a bankruptcy confirmation hearing. We agree with the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) that the Trustee and her assistant enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the decision to schedule the bankruptcy confirmation hearing. Because we further conclude that the giving of notice is a part of the discretionary scheduling function, however, we reject the BAP’s holding that immunity does not extend to the failure to give notice of the hearing.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Cherry Barbara Castillo filed this Chaptеr 13 bankruptcy case on September 18, 1997. Nancy Curry was appointed as Trustee in Castillo’s case. A staff attorney employed by her, Julie Feder, assisted Curry with certain matters in the case. After Castillo’s petition was filed, Curry conducted an 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) meeting of creditors on October 29, 1997. At the meeting, Curry decided on the basis of various irregularities in the petition that the § 341(a) meeting should be continued to January 20,1998. She believed that she could not determine the feasibility of Castillo’s proposed plan until the court adjudicated objections to the plan on December 4, 1997. As Curry conceded in her briefs to the Bankruptcy Court, due to a clerical error in her office, the confirmation hearing was actually set for December 3, 1997. Neither Castillo nor her counsel was notified of the rescheduled confirmation hearing date. Nevertheless, on December 3, 1997, a confirmation hearing was held. Castillo did not appear, and therefore did not provide proof that she had made the plan payments as required for confirmation. The Trustee informed the court that a plan payment had not been made because one had not been recorded on the Trustee’s books, even though Castillo had in fact mailed a late payment to the Trustee sometime after November 22, 1997. As a result, the debtor’s Chapter 13 case was dismissed on December 16,1997.
Castillo’s counsel, G. Thomas Leonard, received notice of the dismissal sometime after it was served on December 19, 1997, but did not take any action during the
Before the bankruptcy court, Castillo contended that (1) the Trustee was negligent in scheduling the December 3, 1997 confirmation hearing without due notice to Castillo or her counsel; (2) the Trustee was not immune from suit; and (3) the requirement that Castillo bring her state law claim against her bankruptcy attorney for any malpractice on his part in state court created a danger of conflicting rulings. The bankruptcy court granted Castillo’s motion after hearing on February 16, 1999, by order entered March 23, 1999. The court reasoned that the Trustee had a duty to “provide due process to the debt- or” аnd that “in this case debtor and debt- or’s counsel were not given the proper ... due process,” which resulted in “serious” consequences. The court also noted that the debtor had complied with her Chapter 13 requirements.
The Trustee sought reconsideration of the bankruptcy court’s orders. In addition, attorney Leonard moved the bankruptcy court for leave to cross-complain against Curry and Feder in state court. The bankruptcy court denied Curry’s motion for reconsideration after hearing on May 6, 1999, by order entered May 20, 1999. It also granted Leonard’s motion for leave to sue Curry and Feder on July 23, 1999.
The BAP granted leave to appeal what it viewed as the interlocutory bankruptcy court decision, citing In re Kashani,
II. Jurisdiction
Curry challenges the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to grant Castillo and Leonard leave to sue and, in turn, appellate jurisdiction of the BAP and оur court to review those orders.
A. Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court
Curry asserts that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to hear Castillo’s and Leonard’s motion for leave to file suit against the Trustee because the case had previously been dismissed and a bankruptcy court may not sua sponte reopen a dismissed bankruptcy case. Curry has couched her argument as a challenge to the bankruptcy court’s power to “reopen” a previously dismissed case. However, as the bankruptcy judge noted, although the Chapter 13 case had been dismissed, it had not been closed. Thus there was no need to reopen the case to hear the motion. In any event, a bankruptcy court has broad discretion to reopen a case sua sponte:
*945 The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (“A case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”).
A bankruptcy “court’s decision to reopen is entirely within its sound discretion, based upon the circumstances of each case.” In re Elias,
[Numerous courts have ruled that jurisdiction is not automatically terminated with the dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case, and that bankruptcy courts have discretion to retain jurisdiction over adversary proceedings.- The rationale for retention of jurisdiсtion over an adversary proceeding is that some cases “have progressed so far that judicial interference is needed to unravel or reserve the rights of parties.”
In re Statistical Tabulating Corp., Inc.,
Even if the bankruptcy court had reopened a dismissed case, its decision could only be set aside for an abuse of discretion. In re Slyman,
Regardless of whether the dismissal constituted some sort of constructive closure, we do not believe that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by sua sponte setting aside the dismissal for the limited purpose of allowing the hearing on the motion to proceed, and allowing the entry of an order granting the motion. It was appropriate for the bankruptcy court to reopen the case to determine whether to grant leave because:
it is generally held that without leave of the bankruptcy court, no suit may be maintained against a trustee for actions taken in the administration of the estate. A court other than the appointing court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action against the trustee for acts within the trustee’s authority as an officer of the court without leave of the appointing court.
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPT-CYt 323.03[3] (15th ed. rev.2001). The requirement of obtaining leave from the appointing court to sue a trustee is longstanding. See Barton v. Barbour,
B. Appellate Jurisdiction
Contrary to the BAP’s conclusion, the bankruptcy court’s orders denying Curry’s claim of quasi-judicial immunity were not interlocutory. Under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
Here, the bankruptcy court’s orders granting Castillo’s and Leonard’s motions for leave to sue are orders denying immunity. They were final and appealable orders under the collateral order doctrine, so the BAP had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. f§ 158(a)(1) and (b)(1). Similarly, the BAP’s partial affirmance was final, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
III. Standard of Review
We review de novo a decision of the BAP. In re Dunbar,
IV. Immunity
Curry asserts immunity from suit under the theory that bankruptcy trustees are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for actions that are integrally related to the adjudication of the bankruptcy case. Lonneker Farms, Inc. v. Klobucher,
A. Judicial Immunity
Anglo-American сommon law has long recognized judicial immunity, a “sweeping form of immunity” for acts performed by judges that relate to the “judicial process.” Forrester v. White,
B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity for Nonjudicial Officers
Absolute judicial immunity is not reserved solely for judges, but extends to nonjudicial officers for “all claims relating to the exercise of judicial functions.” Burns v. Reed,
military and naval officers in exercising their authority to order courts-martial .... to grand and petit jurors in the discharge of their duties as such; to assessors upon whom is imposed the duty of valuing property for the purpose of a levy of taxes; to commissioners appointed to appraise damages when property is taken under the right of eminent domain; to officers empowered to lay out, alter, and discontinue highways; to highway officers in deciding that a person claiming exеmption from a road tax is not in fact exempt, or that one arrested is in default for not having worked out the assessment; to members of a township board in deciding upon the allowance of claims; to arbitrators, and to the collector of customs in exercising his authority to sell perishable property,*948 and in fixing upon the time for notice of sale.
Burns,
Judicial or quasi-judicial immunity is not available only to those who adjudicate disputes in an adversarial setting. Rather, the immunity is extended in appropriate circumstances to non jurists “who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process.” Cleavinger v. Saxner,
In Antoine, the Supreme Court worked a sea change in the way in which we are to examine absolute quasi-judicial immunity for nonjudicial officers. Antoine,
Antoine involved a section 1983 action against a seriously delinquent court reporter, who despite payment therefor and several court orders, failed to deliver a complete transcript of a сriminal trial on appeal. Reasoning that the making of the official record of a court proceeding by a court reporter is “part of the judicial function,” we concluded that the reporter was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for actions within the scope of her authority. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.,
The Supreme Court disagreed that the issue could be- decided by asking whether court reporters were part of the judicial function. It noted that the determination of which officials perform functions that might justify absolute immunity turns first
The Court noted the “doctrinе of judicial immunity is supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability.” Id. Thus it is only when the judgment of an official other than a judge involves the exercise of discretionary judgment that judicial immunity may be extended to that nonjudieial officer. The Court concluded that “court reporters do not exercise the kind of judgment that is protected by the doctrine.” Id. at 437,
Consistent with Antoine’s teachings, we must first inquire as to the immunity historically accorded a bankruptcy trustee at common law, during thе development of the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity. We next consider whether the particular functions of the bankruptcy trustee at issue in this case— the decision to schedule a bankruptcy confirmation hearing, and the failure to give notice of that hearing — are functions involving the exercise of discretionary judgment. Id. at 436,
C. The Bankruptcy Trustee
The Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee is a creature of the Bankruptcy Code, which enumerates specific duties, rights, and powers of the bankruptcy trustee. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 704, 1106, and 1302(describing the role, capacity, and duties of trustees). The bankruptcy trustee’s role, functions, and duties are ultimately shaped, however, by the history and peculiar needs and purposes of bankruptcy proceedings.
i. Bankruptcy Officers at Common Law
The first United States bankruptcy law, passed in 1800 pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, had as its conceptual origin the English bankruptcy system familiar to the Framers of the United States Constitution. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). Much of the language of the 1800 Act was taken verbatim from the contemporary English bankruptcy law. See, Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. Bankr.Inst. L.Rev. 5, 7 & n.ll (1995). English bankruptcy law was initially a function of the chancery, which the Lord Chancellor delegated in turn to bankruptcy “commissioners” to supеrvise the process. Id. at 8. The bankruptcy commissioners had a role similar to both the modern bankruptcy trustee and bankruptcy judge, performing trustee — -like activities such as collecting, liquidating, and distributing the debtor’s property to creditors, and more traditional judicial activities, such as seizing property, summoning persons to appear before them, and committing people to prison. Id. at 8-9. In time, the trust
In the United States, the bankruptcy system in the nineteenth century was based on the contemporary English system of chancellor, commissioner, and as-signee. The district courts were given original jurisdiction as “courts of bankruptcy.” They were directed, however, to appoint one or more “registers in bankruptcy” to assist the district court judge. These registers were the predecessors of the- twentieth century referee and bankruptcy judge. Assignees, on the other hand, continued to carry out trustee-like functions in supervising the liquidation. Id. at 19. Thus the common-law and nineteenth century antecedents of the modern bankruptcy trustee were entrusted with both administrative and adjudicatory functions. To the extent the trustee performed the functions, of a modern-day bankruptcy judge, immunity would have extended to the performance of these common-law adjudicatory functions. See Antoine,
ii. The Current Bankruptcy Trustee System
Although the bankruptcy system evolved over the next two centuries, the duties of bankruptcy trustees (and their antecedents) remained relatively constant throughout this period. Today, under the United States Trustee Program, the Attorney General appoints regional U.S. Trustees. These U.S. Trustees are charged with the responsibility of supervising the administration of bankruptcy cases. In regions with sufficient volume of Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, the U.S. Trustee for that region “may, subject to the approval of the Attorney General, appoint one or more individuals to serve as standing trustee,” 28 U.S.C. § 586(b), a position that is also referred to as a “private trustee.” H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 101, 106-06 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6062, 6066-68. Standing trustees must satisfy the eligibility requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 321, and qualify under 11 U.S.C. § 322 and 28 U.S.C. § 586. Once appointed, the standing trustee-operating under the supervision of the U.S. Trustee and pursuant to legislative and judicial directives — performs a wide vai-iety of functions previously performed by bankruptcy judges. The United States Trustee is the “wаtchdog” of the bankruptcy system, H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5966, charged with preventing fraud and abuse and with “fill[ing] the vacuum” caused by possible creditor inactivity. H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 100 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6061. The establishment, maintenance, and supervision of the panel of bankruptcy trustees is the United States Trustee’s “primary function, and his most important contribution to the administration of the bankruptcy system.” H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 439 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6394-95.
iii. Duties of the Bankruptcy Trustee under the Bankruptcy Code
The statutory duties of a bankruptcy trustee operating under the aegis of the U.S. Trustee are enumerated in 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1302, 1304. Generally, the trustee is to gather and liquidate the property of the estate, to be accountable fоr the estate, ensure that the debtor performs his or her obligations, investigate the finances of the debtor, review the proofs of claim, and where appropriate, oppose the debtor’s discharge, be available to provide relevant information to parties-in-interest, and by court order, operate the business on a short-term basis. The trustee also must
Thus in combining administrative duties with adjudicatory functions, Congress created a hybrid official. The bankruptcy trustee, both at common law and today, performs some functions historically viewed as judicial in nature, and others that are not. Although, like the common-law bankruptcy judicial officers, the trustee is charged with many legal, adjudicative, clerical, financial, administrative, and business functions, quasi-judicial immunity attaches to only those functions essential to the authoritative adjudication of private rights to the bankruptcy estate. Antoine,
D. Quasi-Judicial Immunity for Scheduling and Noticing the Bankruptcy Hearing
We agree with the BAP that the scheduling of hearings by the bankruptcy trustee is a discretionary function protected by absolute immunity. This conclusion is uniform among the circuit courts that have addressed the question. Castillo,
In Rodriguez v. Weprin, the Second Circuit held that court personnel are immune from administrative tasks if these tasks are “judicial in nature and an integral part of the judicial process.”
The D.C. Circuit has ruled similarly. Wagshal v. Foster,
obviously involve substantial discretion, a key feature of the tasks sheltered by judicial immunity and the one whose absence was fatal to the court reporter’s assertion of immunity in Antoine .... [t]he tasks appear precisely the same as those judges perform going about the business of adjudication and case management.
Id. (citing Antoine,
The BAP went astray by segregating what is essentially one function — controlling the docket — into two discrete tasks. Both the scheduling and giving of notice of hearings are part of the judicial functiоn of managing the bankruptcy court’s docket in the resolution of disputes. This function is unquestionably discretionary in nature. The Seventh Circuit has also reached this conclusion, holding that a prisoner review board is absolutely immune from liability for failing to give notice of a board review hearing. It reasoned that activities, such as giving notice, that are:
*952 inexorably connected with ... and are analogous to judicial action invoke absolute immunity.... Thus, not only the actual decision ... but also activities that are part and parcel of the decision process justify absolute immunity.
Wilson v. Kelkhoff,
Antoine and Forrester [v. White,484 U.S. 219 ,108 S.Ct. 538 ,98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) ] do not support the proposition that judicial acts that are part of the judicial function are excluded from absolute immunity because they could be characterized as nondiscretionary or even ministerial....
... [T]he fact that the activity is routine or requires no adjudicatory skill renders that activity no less a judicial function.
Id. at 1444-45 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moreover, we have extended absolute quasi-judicial immunity in post -Antoine decisions to court clerks and other nonjudicial officers for purely administrative acts — acts which taken out of context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in context are actually a part of the judicial function. Moore v. Brewster,
The concern for the integrity of the judicial process that underlies the absolute immunity of judges is reflected in the extension of absolute immunity to certain others who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process.
Moore,
Our conclusion that we must consider the scheduling and notice of the hearing as one act is supported by our decision in the pre-Antoine case Ashelman v. Pope,
Most importantly, the giving of notice is part of the process due litigants. Fundamental fairness to the parties before the court requires notice of proceedings; notice is an essential part of the adjudicatory process. Therefore, we find immunity extends to the giving — or failure to give— notice, as well as to the scheduling of the hearing. The judicial function at issue meets both prongs of Antoine. At com
We do not hold that all of the Trustee’s many functions are covered by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Cf. Lonneker Farms,
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
