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616 F. App'x 265
9th Cir.
2015
MEMORANDUM**
MEMORANDUM**
Notes

Francisco ALVARO-IRAETA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 14-72646

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Sept. 4, 2015

618 Fed. Appx. 265

Agency No. A094-455-554

MEMORANDUM**

The 90-day stay of proceedings in this case expired on July 7, 2015. Thus, respondent‘s motion to lift the stay is denied as moot.

Francisco Alvaro-Iraeta, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge‘s (“IJ“) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT“). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency‘s factual findings, including adverse credibility findings. Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency‘s adverse credibility determination based on the inconsistencies between Alvaro-Iraeta‘s asylum application and his testimony regarding events in El Salvador and his reason for fleeing. See Ceballos-Castillo v. INS, 904 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir. 1990); Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2011). We reject Alvaro-Iraeta‘s contention that the IJ failed to properly consider his explanations for the inconsistencies. See Zamanov, 649 F.3d at 974. In the absence of credible testimony, Alvaro-Iraeta‘s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Alvaro-Iraeta does not raise any arguments challenging the agency‘s denial of CAT relief. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not supported by argument are deemed abandoned).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

Terrell D. CURRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-15314

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Submitted Aug. 25, 2015.* Filed Sept. 4, 2015.

618 Fed. Appx. 265

Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Terrell Curry, Lancaster, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Thomas S. Patterson, Esquire, Supervisory, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, Kenneth T. Roost, Esquire, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

MEMORANDUM**

California state prisoner Terrell D. Curry appeals pro se from the district court‘s summary judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA“) alleging that defendants’ refusal to provide him with a Kemenic religious food diet violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and RLUIPA. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Curry‘s RLUIPA claim because defendants met their burden to show that their refusal to provide Curry with a Kemenic food diet, as conceived of and described by Curry, of mostly raw, vegan, non-genetically modified and non-irradiated food was the least restrictive means of furthering the prison‘s compelling interests in prison security and cost-efficient food service. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (stating that under RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise” of a prisoner unless the government establishes that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means“); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 890 (explaining that a prison cannot meet its burden unless it “demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court did not err in refusing to entertain new theory of liability raised for first time at summary judgment stage).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Curry‘s free exercise claim because Curry failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ refusal to provide him with a Kemenic food diet, as conceived of and described by Curry, was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987) (holding that a prison regulation that “impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights” is valid “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests“).

We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

Notes

*
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Case Details

Case Name: Curry v. California Department of Corrections
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 4, 2015
Citations: 616 F. App'x 265; 13-15314
Docket Number: 13-15314
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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