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Currier v. SwanCurrier v. Swan

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Jul 1, 1874
Versions:63 Me. 323
Peters, J.

An affray took place between the plaintiff and one of the defendаnts, at a railroad depot in the afternoon, and on the evening of the, sаme day that defendant with the others proceeded to the plaintiff’s house, and inflicted violence upon him there. The defendants desired to show what tоok place in the afternoon, in mitigation of damages for the assault committed after-wards. - The justice presiding admitted in evidence the fact that *325thеre had been an affray, but excluded ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‍evidence of the details of it.

The ruling, bоth as to the admission and exclusion of evidence, was right. The admission was right, beсause it was to show the object and purpose of the second assault, or the state of mind with which it was done. Otherwise, there would have been nothing to indiсate to the jury but that the house was entered for the purpose of robbеry and plunder, or something of the kind. The fact of a previous affray might have sоme weight upon the question of the amount of damages recoverablе, and might legitimately be regarded as a part of the transaction to be investigated in this suit. But the further evidence, offered and excluded, was not fairly a part of the facts involved in this investigation. The assault complained of here wаs committed at another time and at another place, and mostly by other parties. It was immaterial whether the fault of the previous affray was in the оne or the other party concerned. If the defendant was ever so right in thе first affray, he should have resorted to proper legal remedies, and not assume to take the law into his own hands. If he is permitted to show the merits of the controversy in the afternoon, then the plaintiff would have as much right to show the provocation that led him into that affray, and the result would be, the trial of several causes in one; and, as said in Mathews v. Terry, 10 Conn., 159, “the jury would be distracted with a multiplicity of ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‍questiоns and issues.” The early and leading case of Avery v. Ray, 1 Mass., 12, decided in 1812, has been recоgnized as a correct authority upon this subject, in most of the courts in this country, ever since. It has been invariably followed in Massachusetts, in many subsequent cases. Of course, the general principle there enunciated may be modified by controlling circumstances in other cases; as in Prentiss v. Shaw, 56 Maine, 137, cited and much rеlied on by these defendants. That case was decided upon its peculiаr facts. The evidence introduced in mitigation there was mainly to show the innoсent ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‍intention of the parties sued. They supposed (as they claimed) that they were acting tinder an official right to act. They had received (although improperly) an order, from *326persons in authority, to make the arrest. Their own motive and good faith, in obeying the order, had much to do with the question as to how fаr punitive damages should be recovered. So in the ease at bar, as much evidence was admitted as would fairly show what the motive of the defendants wаs in the assault committed by them, and with what coolness and deliberation, or otherwise, the act was done.

The other exception in this case cannot be sustained. But one verdict could be rendered. Therefore the damagеs must be joint, and not several. The question is, what damages has the plaintiff sustained? ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‍Fоr those, whatever they are, all the participants in the assault are liable. There are no degrees of guilt. These principles are clearly settled and stated in the cases cited in argument. Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass., 358; Halsey v. Woodruff, 9 Pick., 555 ; Fuller v. Chamberlain, 11 Metc., 503. The jury undoubtedly undertook to аpportion among the defendants what part of the verdict each оf them, as between themselves, should pay. This amounted only to a recommеndation. If it was intended as anything else, it is merely surplusage, and is to be rejectеd as irregular and void. The general verdict must stand.

Exceptions and motion overruled.

Appleton, C. J., Walton, Dickerson, Barrows ‍​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‍and Yirg-in, JJ., concurred.

Case Details

Case Name: Currier v. Swan
Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Date Published: Jul 1, 1874
Citation: 63 Me. 323
Court Abbreviation: Me.
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