118 Tenn. 496 | Tenn. | 1907
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Complainant filed this bill on the 9th of September, 1905, to recover of the heirs of E. W. Tipton an undivided one-third interest in a tract of land, comprising two hundred acres, conveyed by Isaac Sampson to E. W. Tipton on July 15, 1863. The hill also seeks a partition of said tract of land. The theory of the bill is that Isaac Sampson and the complainant were tenants in common of said land, and that Isaac Sampson individually conveyed it by metes and bounds to E. W. Tipton. The heirs of E. W. Tipton in their answer set up an, estoppel against complainant, growing out of certain partition proceedings in the county court of Dyer county in the year 1895, and defendants by a cross bill ask
It is conceded in the record that complainant has the legal title to the land in question, and the whole controversy is whether he has estopped himself .from asserting it. In order to settle the legal question presented it will be necessary to make a more extended statement of the facts: In the year 1851, the State of Tennessee granted to one A. P. Greene two tracts of land, situated in Dyer county; one tract, comprising 5,000 acres, being grant No. 12,425, and the other tract, containing 3,000 acres, being grant No. 12,427. It is conceded that these two grants as a matter of fact only .contained 5,352 acres. Subsequently Isaac Sampson acquired an undivided two-thirds interest in said two grants; and at a still later period the complainant, George Currens, became the owner of the remaining undivided one-third interest in said grants. It thus appears that complainant and Isaac Sampson became tenants in common in the whole land embraced in said grants. Before complainant acquired his one-third in
It was further stipulated that the report of these commissioners “should become and be made the judgment of the county court.” This agreement was signed by the complainant, George Currens, and the other parties whose names have already been stated. Accordingly said commissioners laid off the two 1,000-acre tracts conveyed by Isaac Sampson to his two 'daughters out of the
It is said on behalf of defendants that complainant, although originally a tenant in common with the Tip-tons in the 200-acre tract, has estopped himself by the partition proceeding to claim his right of partition. It is also insisted that complainant is bound under the rule of acquiescence and on account of his laches. It is said in the first place that complainant should have made all parties who had purchased any of these lands parties to the partition proceedings, and, having failed to do so, he is estopped to file another bill for partition.
“While it is well settled that one tenant in common cannot convey a specific part of the common property by metes and bounds to the prejudice of his cotenant, it does not necessarily follow that all such conveyances are wholly void. The true doctrine, as deducted from actual decisions, seems to be that such conveyances are absolutely void as against cotenants whose rights are prejudiced thereby and \vho have not consented to them or ratified them, but that, when confirmed or assented to by the other cotenants, such conveyances are valid as against all parties. The assent of the cotenant in such' cases need not necessarily be by deed, but may be'inferred from long acquiescence in the grantee’s title. In any case it seems that a tenant cannot complain of a conveyance of a specific part of the common estate by a co-tenant, where his own rights are not injuriously affected thereby; and á court of equity will respect the rights of the tenants, so far as this can be done consistently with the rights of the other cotenants, and, wherever practicable, will confirm the title of the grantee by allotting to the grantor that portion of the land conveyed.” Am.' & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.), vol. 17, p. 684; Hartford Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn., 112; Goodwin v. Keney, 49 Conn., 563; Johnson v. Stevens, 7 Cush. (Mass.),
Says Mr. Pomeroy, in Ms work on Equity Jurisprudence (volume 2, section 818) :
“Acquiescence, consisting of mere silence, may also operate as a true estoppel in equity to preclude a party from asserting legal title and rights of property, real or personal, or rights of contract. The requisites of such estoppel have been described. A fraudulent intention to deceive or mislead is not essential. All instances of this class, in equity, rest upon the principle: ‘If one maintain silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent.’,A most important application includes all cases where an owner of property, A., stands by and knowingly permits another person, B., to deal with the property as though it were his, or as though he were rightfully dealing with it, without interposing any objection, as by expending money upon it, making improvements, erecting buildings, and the like. Of course, it is essential that B. should be acting in ignorance of the real condition of the title, and in the supposition that he was rightful in his own dealing.” Dan-iell’s Suits in Chancery (2d Ed.), section 68; Robertson v. Winchester, 85 Tenn., 188, 1 S. W., 781; Owens v. Dunn, 85 Tenn., 131, 2 S. W., 29.
Now, as already seen, complainant stood by for over
Tbe present bill was not filed .until ten years after the confirmation of the partition proceedings by the county court of Dyer county in 1895, and after all the land allotted had been sold to innocent purchasers, and when another partition of the land would be wholly impracticable.
We are therefore of opinion there has been an acquiescence on the part of complainant in the sale by Isaac Sampson to E. W. Tipton on July 15, 1863, by the great lapse of time, and also that said sale was ratified and confirmed by complainant by the written stipulation contained in written agreement signed by him, where the commissioners were directed to assign, “according to quality and quantity, the remaining portions of the land contained in said two grants, which have not heretofore been sold,” etc.
We are of opinion that cross-complainants have acquired a perfect legal title to \he land in controversy, and it results that complainant’s bill must be dismissed, and the decree of the chancellor affirmed, with costs.