99 P. 420 | Or. | 1909
Opinion by
This is a special proceeding to review the judgment of an inferior court. The petition for the writ sets forth the facts relating to the commencement of a criminal
“A plea of guilty must in all cases be put in by the defendant in person, in open court.” Section 1368, B. & C. Comp.
The statute regulating the practice in other tribunals, so far as material herein, is as follows:
“A criminal action in a justice’s court is . commenced and proceeded in to final determination, and the judgment therein enforced, in the manner provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, except as in this title otherwise specially provided.” Section 2263, B. & C. Comp.
The complaint is to be deemed an indictment. Section 2265, B. & C. Comp. When the defendant is brought
“Defendant appeared in person, as well as by J. J. Whitney, his attorney, the State of Oregon appearing by Gale S. Hill, deputy district attorney, and the defendant pleads guilty to the crime charged in the complaint, and by consent the court fixes October 11, 1907, at 1 P. M., for pronouncing judgment against said defendant.”
It affirmatively appears from such recital that the plea was interposed by Curran himself, and, as a writ of review presents questions of law alone arising on the record of the inferior tribunal, if such record be false, it cannot be contradicted on re-examination by the reviewing court. French v. Harney County, 33 Or. 418, 421 (54 Pac. 211).
“The court may, at any time before judgment, upon a plea of guilty, permit it to be withdrawn, and a plea of not guilty substituted therefor.” Section 1369, B. & C. Comp.
This enactment probably grew out of the principles of the common law upon that subject, for in 2 Hawkins’ Pleas, Crown, 466, it is said:
“And where a person upon his arraignment actually confesses himself guilty, or unadvisedly discloses the*158 special manner of the fact, supposing that it doth not amount to felony, where it doth, yet the judges, upon probable circumstances, that such confession may proceed from fear, menance, or duress, or from weakness or ignorance, may refuse to record such confession, and suffer the party to plead not guilty.”
The absolute right of a party, after pleading guilty to a criminal charge, to withdraw such admission and to interpose a plea of not guilty, is generally denied; the rule being that the determination of the question rests in the judicial discretion of the trial court. 12 Cyc. 350; Wharton, Crim. Pl & Pr. (8 ed.), § 414; People v. Lee, 17 Cal. 76; Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 468. Whether a plea of-guilty can be withdrawn after judgment has been rendered thereon seems to be a controverted question; but, as supporting the doctrine, see the case of Gardner v. People, 106 Ill. 76, where no reference is made to any statute, and also Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (44 Am. Rep. 29), where the rules of the common law were invoked to justify the relief granted.
No error having been committed by the circuit court in dismissing the proceedings, its judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.