Curley v. Consolidated Rail Corp.Curley v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Plaintiff commenced an action against his employer Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail), pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (45 USC § 51 et seq.), to recover damages for injuries sustained while he was driving one of Conrail’s vehicles. After a jury trial, a judgment and verdict was rendered in plaintiff’s favor.
The Appellate Division modified, on the law, vacating the judgment and verdict and dismissing the complaint, on the ground that plaintiff had not satisfied the standard of review applicable to actions brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), i.e., "whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought” (Rogers v Missouri Pac. R. R. Co.,
Plaintiff’s evidence consists primarily of the testimony that the vehicle he was driving at the time of the accident had been frequently complained about and repaired, had been in
The dissent’s position to the contrary is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, there is nothing in the Appellate Division’s ruling to indicate that it departed from existing law and limited its review of the evidence solely to the plaintiff’s proofs. Second, the additional evidence submitted by defendant Conrail does not support plaintiff’s case. For instance, the testimony of Conrail’s expert, so heavily relied upon by the dissent, refers generally to the effects on police vehicles of their increased use. There is no relationship between that testimony and the car in which plaintiff was injured in particular. Further, the cross-examination testimony of Conrail’s service manager is not supportive of plaintiff’s case. Finally, the dissent’s enumeration of more examples of "possible” negligence on Conrail’s part does not add anything but mere speculation to the proof that Conrail caused plaintiff’s injuries.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse the order of the Appellate Division and reinstate the judgment of Supreme Court, predicated on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $983,000.
This Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) action to recover for permanently disabling back injuries sustained while plaintiff was employed as a police officer by the defendant Conrail is governed exclusively by well-settled Federal law principles (see, Basham v Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,
On March 6, 1984, plaintiff was driving a Conrail company car, No. 360, at approximately 40 to 45 m.p.h., when the car came to an abrupt stop, skidded and threw him forward and
A Ford Motor Company engineer called as an expert witness by defendant Conrail stated on cross-examination that due to the additional abuse and stress placed on police cars, 150,000 miles on such cars would be "harder” miles than those accumulated on ordinarily used cars; also, parts wear out faster than those on nonbusiness used cars with similar mileage. The expert witness also stated that, at the odometer range of car No. 360, parts would be constantly wearing out and breaking; and that if something had broken off and jammed into the gears or the differential, this could cause a car to slow down or stop abruptly. Plaintiff testified that car No. 360 had done just that at the time of the accident.
Defendant Conrail also presented testimony of its service manager, who inspected car No. 360 after the accident. While this witness on direct examination refuted plaintiff’s account of how the accident happened, he acknowledged on cross-examination that he had not inspected either the transmission or the emergency brake cable, and that it was possible that a malfunction in either of these parts could have caused the wheels to lock up, as plaintiff described the happening and cause of the accident.
This testimony, in conjunction with the documentary evidence, which established that car No. 360 needed repairs frequently and was the subject of complaints on numerous occasions by all three of the officers who drove it, supports the inference that car No. 360 was subject to the degree of wear and deterioration attributed by defendant’s expert witnesses to police cars at this odometer range. Plaintiff testified that since it had been assigned to West Haverstraw, the car made several unexplained noises, including "whooshing” and "grinding” sounds, and that each time the vehicle stopped he would hear a "hard clunk”.
One of the officers testified that in 1982, when car No. 360 had approximately 140,000 miles on it, and again in 1983, he experienced the same problem with it that occurred on the date of plaintiff’s accident, i.e., the car would come to an abrupt stop and then not be operational for a few minutes.
Conrail required its officers to report any problems with cars to their supervisors. Plaintiffs problems were noted in his daily vehicle reports, as were those of his co-officers. The supervising lieutenant at the time of the accident testified at trial as a witness for Conrail that it was his responsibility to oversee the maintenance of the cars. He admitted that he did not usually look at the daily vehicle reports because it was not "necessary”.
Under traditional appellate review standards, and especially under the strictures governing a FELA jury verdict, courts cannot devalue or disregard substantial portions of testimonial and documentary evidence simply because it was presented by defendant’s witnesses. In any sufficiency of the evidence review situation, appellate courts must consider all the evidence, including that which is presented by or elicited from a defendant (National Bank v Systems Home Improvement,
More compelling, still, for reversal is the evident disregard by the reviewing appellate courts of the governing Federal standards as they should be applied to this case. Under Federal law, a FELA case must be sent to the jury — and its verdict must be accorded a unique level of deference — when the plaintiff has presented proof, which may be entirely circumstantial, "from which the jury may with reason” infer that the "negligence of the employer played any part, however small, in the injury or death which is the subject of the suit” (Rogers v Missouri Pac. R. R. Co.,
Notably, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v Toops (
In the instant case, plaintiff offered, as a layperson driver, direct evidence of what happened. On this base, complemented by defendant’s significant additional expert and documentary proof and plaintiff’s evidence of frequent repairs and complaints, plaintiff built the inference that the employer was negligent. The employer either failed to seek or locate the source of the problem with car No. 360, or neglected to take car No. 360 out of service when the employee-drivers’ complaints could not be rectified. Under the slim minimum requirements of Federal law, the jury is also allowed to infer negligence solely from the failure of the employer’s supervisor to review the daily vehicle reports in which operator-employees had documented the persistent problems with car No. 360 —the very types of things that happened in the pertinent accident. The fact that these inferences of negligence may, as the majority accentuates, include some degree of speculation, should not be fatal to plaintiff’s case, because the inferences are in significant part supported by the whole of the proofs at trial (see, Rogers v Missouri Pacific R. R. Co.,
Significantly, Basham v Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (
Since a jury verdict in a FELA case may be overturned only "when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support” the verdict (Lavender v Kurn,
Acting Chief Judge Simons and Judges Kaye, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Smith concur; Judge Bellacosa dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion.
Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.