OPINION
On appeal from a summary judgment for the city in this special-assessment dispute, pro se appellant argues that the district court miscalculated the filing deadline for challenging a special assessment when it ruled that appellant’s appeal was untimely and, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to address the challenge. We agree and reverse.
FACTS
On April 19, 2005, the City of Minneapolis sent notice of a public hearing, to be held May 3, 2005, to residents regarding the Bryn Mawr renovation project. The street reconstruction рroject included new curbs, gutters, and other paving improvements. The city sought to divide project costs between general city funds and special assessments to benefited properties.
The city’s notice informed recipients that a public hearing would be cоnducted “pursuant to Chapter 10, Section 6 of the
At thе time of the public hearing, the Committee will provide an opportunity for all interested persons to be heard regarding the proposed assessments and the Committee will consider all written and oral objections and statements.
Should a person be unable to аttend and wishes to object or comment, please send a written objection or statement in sufficient time for it to arrive prior to the time of the public hearing ... If the proposed assessment is adopted or adopted as modified and the owner of the property is dissatisfied with the assessment against the property, the owner may appeal the assessment to the District Court. To appeal, there must be a written Notice of Appeal served on the Mayor or City Clerk of the City of Minneapolis within 30 days after the City Council аdoption of the assessment. Also, a copy of the written Notice of Appeal must be filed with the Court Administrator of the District Court within 10 days after its service upon the Mayor or City Clerk and accompanied by the appropriate filing fees.
It is undisputed that appellant did not file any objections with the city prior to the public hearing. At the public hearing, appellant and other affected residents submitted a signed petition, declaring a violation of their due process rights and requesting the city to stop all proceedings until Bryn Mawr residents received more information. Appellant conceded that the petition did not state objections to his assessment.
On May 13, 2005, the Minneapolis City Council approved the special assessment. Appellant filed an appeal challenging the speсial assessment with the Minneapolis mayor and the city clerk on June 10, 2005. On June 20, 2005, appellant filed an appeal with Hennepin County district court.
The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, focusing on the jurisdictional issues that no objections were filed by appellаnt prior to the public hearing and that appellant’s June 20 filing with the district court was untimely. This appeal followed.
ISSUE
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment?
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact, and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03;
DLH, Inc. v. Russ,
“[A]ppeals by property owners from assessments are wholly statutory, there being no common-law right to such appeal, and that the conditions imposed by the statute must be strictly complied with.”
Wesson v. Village of Deephaven,
Chapter 429 provides thаt if the city proceeds under its charter rules for special assessments, “such provisions shall be deemed to include a requirement that notices of proposed assessments inform property owners of the procedures they must follow under the charter in order to appeal the assessments to district court.” Minn.Stаt. § 429.021, subd. 3 (2006) (emphasis added). The city complied with this statutory requirement by including the following language in the notice sent to residents:
If the proposed assessment is adopted or adopted as modified and the owner of the property is dissatisfied with the assessment against the prоperty, the owner may appeal the assessment to the District Court. To appeal, there must be a written Notice of Appeal served on the Mayor of City Clerk of the City of Minneapolis within 30 days after the City Council adoption of the assessment. Also, a coрy of the written Notice of Appeal must be filed with the Court Administrator of the District Court within 10 days after its service upon the Mayor or City Clerk and accompanied by the appropriate filing fees.
This appeals language also complied with the appeals process disclosure requirement in the city charter rules. Minneapolis, Minn., City Charter ch. 10, § 8 (2005). Specifically, section 8 states that a dissatisfied property owner “may appeal to district court by serving a notice upon the Mayor or the City Clerk within thirty days after the City Council has adopted the assessments and by filing the notice with the clerk of the district court within ten days after its service....”
Id.
Section 6 of the charter rules directly addresses appeals of special assessments. Under sec
Section 6 is ambiguous. Within the same sentence it states that a property owner may 2 file written objections before an assessment is confirmed, and later indicates thаt only persons who objected have the right to appeal. The “may” language in section 6 differs from Minn.Stat. § 429.081 (2006), the statutorily prescribed appeals process:
Within 30 days after the adoption of the assessment, any person aggrieved, iwho is not precluded by failurе to object prior to or at the assessment hearing, or whose failure to so object is due to a reasonable cause, may appeal to the district court.
(Emphasis added.) The statute requires either a prior objection in writing or an objection at thе assessment hearing. The charter rules, however, do not include that requirement.
The district court cites
Wessen
for the proposition that failing to file objections prior to the public hearing provides a basis for dismissal. In
Wessen,
however, Minn. Stat. § 429.081 was utilized
and not the city’s charter rules.
Given the disclosure requirement of Minn.Stat. § 429.021, subd. 3, which is deemed included if charter rules arе utilized, and section 8 of the charter, both of which require disclosure of the appeals process, it is unreasonable that the city would be able to disclose less than the full appeals process. Such would be the case if a property owner was rеquired, under the charter, to preserve a right to appeal by filing a written objection prior to the public hearing, where no mention of this step was made in the notice letter. Section 8 requires disclosure and provides language of the appeals prоcess to be included in the notice sent to affected property owners. If there were an “additional” step required for property owners to preserve the right to appeal, this would always provide the city with an escape route to challеnges of special assessments by property owners. Therefore, we conclude that under the charter rules prior objections are not required.
The district court found that appellant’s appeal was untimely. The question becomes what the charter rulе states as the timeframe for filing an appeal. Appellant argues that he timely filed, understanding from the city’s April 19th notice that he had 30 days from the city’s adoption of the special assessment to file a notice of appeal with the mayor or city clerk, and “an additional” ten days to file with the district court.
The interpretation of a statute, charter, or ordinance involves a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.
We accept the latter interpretation given that section 8 requires disclosure of the appeals process to affected property owners, and the language in section 8 is what appears in notices sent to property owners. Therefore, appellant had the right to reasonably assume he had 30 days to file his apрeal with the mayor or city clerk and then an additional ten days to file with the district court. The city adopted the special assessment on May 13, 2005. Appellant filed an appeal with both the mayor and the city clerk 28 days later, on June 10, 2005. Then appellant filed the nоtice with the district court on June 20, 2005. Consequently, appellant timely filed.
Respondent argues that appellant relies upon a theory for reversal of the summary judgment order that was not previously argued before the district court. Respondent contends that apрellant asserts a new theory by now claiming that he complied with section 8 filing requirements. Generally, a party may not “obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different theory.”
Thiele v. Stick,
DECISION
Because appellant timely filed his appeal with the mayor, city clerk and the district court, the district court erred in granting the city’s summary judgment motion.
Reversed.
Notes
. The charter references chapter 429 only by stating the "attention of the user is called to the following special acts relating to local improvements and assessments therefore: ... (3) Laws 1969, Ch. 499, authorizing the city, at its option, to make local improvements and levy special assessments eithеr under its Charter or under M.S. Ch. 429 or other statutory authority.” Minneapolis, Minn., City Charter ch. 10, special references (2005).
. Chapter 10 does not define "may.” See Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subds. 15, 15a, 16 (2006) (providing that "may” is permissive, as opposed to "must” and "shall” which are mandatory).
. Section 6 states, in relevant part, that
such person so objecting shall have the right to appeal from such order of confirmation of the City Council, to the District Court ... at any time within thirty days after such order. Such appeal shall be made by serving a written notice of such appeal upon the Mayor or City Clerk ... and by filing the notice of appeal upon the clerk of district cоurt within ten days after its service.
Minneapolis, Minn., City Charter ch. 10, § 8.
. Section 8 states, in relevant party that "the owner may appeal to district court by serving a notice upon the Mayor or the City Clerk within thirty days after the City Council has adopted the assessments and by filing the notice with the clerk of district court within ten days after its service....” Minneapolis, Minn., City Charter ch. 10. § 8.
