Opinion
The breakup of a relationship between two women occasioned this attempt by the plaintiff, one оf the women, to seek rights of custody and/or visitation with the natural child of defendant, her erstwhile partner in the relаtionship. Defendant’s child was conceived during the relationship by artificial insemination. Plaintiff appeals frоm an order (1) *1599 granting defendant’s motion to quash an order to show cause for visitation and custody and (2) dismissing plaintiff’s cоmplaint to establish de facto parental status. The issue is whether plaintiff, who is neither the natural mother, steрmother, nor adoptive mother of the child has standing to assert a claim for custody and/or visitation as against the child’s natural mother with whom the child resides. We shall conclude she does not.
The facts are undisputed. Between April 1982 and December 1987 plaintiff and defendant lived together in a homosexual relationship. At some point during the relationship plaintiff and defendant agreed defendant would conceive a child through artificial insemination and that the child would be raised by both of them. The first part of the agreement was consummated and the сhild was born in June 1985. Thereafter, from the time of the child’s birth until June 1988, plaintiff provided the sole financial support for hеrself, defendant and the child.
The relationship between plaintiff and defendant terminated in December 1987 when plaintiff moved out of the home. At that point a written settlement agreement was executed by the parties whiсh provided, inter alia, for the sharing of physical custody of the child. In June 1988, defendant informed plaintiff that she was nо longer willing to share custody with plaintiff or even allow plaintiff to visit with the child.
Plaintiff responded by filing a “complaint tо establish de facto parent status/maternity and for custody and visitation,” along with an order to show cause seeking custody and visitation. Defendant moved to quash the order to show cause and to dismiss the complaint, asserting plaintiff had no standing to initiate the proceeding.
The trial court declined to give effect to the settlement agreement between the parties. 1 The court ruled it was without jurisdiction to award custody or visitation to рlaintiff as plaintiff had no colorable claim of right to custody and there was no statutory basis for plaintiff’s clаim of parental status. As a result, the court granted defendant’s motion to quash and dismissed the complaint.
In her cоmplaint, plaintiff alleges as the foundation of her claim Civil Code sections 7015, 7020, and 4600 et seq. None of these provisions, however, provides a basis for this proceeding. Civil Code sections 7015 and 7020 are part of the Uniform Pаrentage Act, which deals substantively with the rights of children and procedurally with the determination of parentage. *1600 (Civ. Code, § 7000 et seq.) While Civil Code section 7015 confers standing upon any interested person to bring an action to determine the existence or not of a parent-child relationship, it has no application where, аs here, it is undisputed defendant is the natural mother of the child. (See 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1989) Parent and Child, § 439, p. 486.)
Despite its rаther broad provisions, Civil Code section 4600 is likewise of no benefit to plaintiff.
2
Civil Code section 4600 does not create subject matter jurisdiction.
(In re Marriage of Lewis & Goetz
(1988)
Plaintiff all but concedes there is no statutory or decisional authority to grant her rights of custody and/or visitation
over the objections
of the child’s natural parent. (Cf.
Jhordan C.
v.
Mary K.
(1986)
Plaintiff misconceives the rоle of the judiciary as an innovator of social policy. “Given the complex practical, soсial and constitutional ramifications of the [de facto parent] doctrine, we believe that the Legislature is better equipped to consider expansion of current California law should it choose *1601 to do so.” (In re Marriage of Lewis & Goetz, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 519-520.)
Defendаnt’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied. The judgment (order) is affirmed.
Marler, J., and DeCristoforo, J., concurred.
Notes
Although plaintiff attached a copy of the settlement agreement to the complaint, she asserted no contractual claims in the trial court nor does she on appeal.
Civil Code section 4600 states in relevant part: “In any proсeeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any time thereafter, make such order for the custody of the child during minority as may seem necessary or proper.”