51 Ga. App. 306 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1935
Mose Curd brought three suits against Travelers Insurance Company, alleging, in brief, that he was an employee of the Peerless Woolen Mills; that the defendant company issued to the Peerless Woolen Mills a group-insurance contract in which the Peerless Woolen Mills was named as the assured; that the Peerless Woolen Mills paid for the insurance and gave it to its employees; that the master policy was designated as G-728; that the insurance provided for a death benefit and a disability benefit; that under this group contract of insurance plaintiff had three certificates issued to him, they being certificates No. 662, dated September 26, 1924, No. 926, dated February 25, 1927, and No. 1480, dated March 2, 1931; that each certificate was for $500 and increased $100 per year; “that on or about December 22, 1932, petitioner became afflicted with a duodenal ulcer,” and since said date has been unable “to engage in any occupation for remuneration or profit;” and that on October 11, 1933, plaintiff filed his'claim for disability. The three suits were based on the three certificates, and the aggregate amount of principal sued for was $3100, together with interest at 7% and a penalty of 25% of principal and interest for bad faith on the part of the defendant company.
The defendant answered, in brief, that the certificates “were effective only during the period of [plaintiff’s] employment by said Peerless Woolen Mills,” and that each of them “was canceled by the assured, Peerless Woolen Mills, . . by reason of the fact that the plaintiff had left its employment on or just before” the dates of cancellation, certificate No'. 662 being canceled on May 22, 1926, No. 926 on July 13, 1930, and No. 1480 on May 2, 1932; that at no time while the plaintiff was insured under any of the certificates did he become wholly disabled; and “that he did not .file with this defendant any proofs of disability within the time contemplated and provided for in said certificate [s] sued upon.” The cases were tried together, and at the conclusion of the evidence the court directed a verdict for the defendant in each case and rendered judgments thereon; and the plaintiff filed motions for a new trial on the ground that there were issues of fact raised by the evidence which should have been submitted to a jury, and on the further ground that the court erred in admitting in evi
The 'evidence shows that the Peerless Woolen Mills was the assured, was the party who contracted -with the defendant company, and the party who paid for the insurance) that under the contract, only employees of the Peerless Woolen Mills could become beneficiaries of the-insurance; that the assured notified the insurance company of what employees were covered by the insurance, when they became eligible to receive insurance by virtue of employment, and when their services terminated. This was the only method provided for the insurance company to get its record of whom the assured wished to insure, whom the assured had employed, when their employment began and when it terminated; and on that record the insurance certificates were issued and canceled. The employee, in accepting the insurance, had full knowledge of this, because his certificate provided that “this contract shall remain in force until the assured shall notify the company to terminate the insurance as to such employee.” (Italics ours.)
There is some conflict in the evidence as to the period of the plaintilFs service for the Peerless Woolen Mills; but the evidence is undisputed that the assured (the mill) notified the insurance company that the plaintiff finally left the company on May 2, 1932, and the assured did not remit to the company any premium for his insurance after that date. The insurance company was bound to act in accordance with the notice furnished by the assured, the other party to the contract and the one paying the premiums. Harold M. Adams testified that he was employed by the Travelers Insurance Company; that “all records of the Travelers Insurance Company pertaining to coverage extended, cancellation of insurance, and insurance in force under group contracts or policies are in my control and in my custody;” that a group contract was issued to the Peerless Woolen Mills; that the insurance company required the employer to furnish a card called “registration card” for each employee eligible for insurance under the contract in order that the insurance company might have a record of the employees covered; that “the insurance in force as to any employee insured under a group contract such as G-728, terminates automatically in accordance .with the contract provisions. In order that the files of
According to the record, the last certificate that the plaintiff claims to hold, No. 1480, terminated on May 2, 1932. Moreover, if plaintiff did not go back to work until November 22, 1932, as Shown by his time record, he could not have had insurance at the time he says he stopped work in December, because, under the contract of insurance, his time of service would have rendered him ineligible for insurance. Furthermore, plaintiff sued for an aggregate amount of $3100, and the master policy, which is a part of the contract, provides that $2000 is the maximum amount of insurance that any employee can have, no matter how long in the service of the employer.
It is true that the master policy and the certificate are interlocked, and the beneficiary named in the certificate can bring suit on the contract if the certificate is in force under the terms of the contract. However, the group insurance in this case is not a contract between the insurer and the employee. It is a contract between the insurer and the employer. The employer is making a gift to its employees and paying the premiums for them, and the
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Conine, 37 Ga. App. 500 (140 S. E. 784), wherein it was held that the petition of the beneficiary under a group contract of insurance set out a cause of action, it was recognized that the contract was between the employer and the insurance company; that it was not in the power of the beneficiary “to keep the group contract in force or to abrogate it;” that “the •notice which under the contract would destroy plaintiff’s rights as beneficiary had to come from” the employer; and “that if such notice had been given, the defendant . . could plead it in defense to the action.” The principle is just as applicable to the notice of the termination of a certificate of one employee as. to the termination of the group contract including all the employees, where both are paid for by the employer who is a party to the contract. The policy in the instant case provides that the contract shall remain in force “until the assured shall notify the company to terminate the insurance as to such employee.” In Magee v. Equitable Life Assurance Soe., supra, it was held that “Where such ‘terms and conditions’ require that the names of those insured in the group life insurance policy be certified to the Assurance Society by the employer, and premiums for such employee paid monthly, the failure to include such employee in the list insured and to pay premiums upon insurance for him precludes recovery against the Assurance Society upon the aforesaid certificate. See also Baker v. Travelers-Ins. Co., supra.
Whether the employer gave the defendant company correct or incorrect information as to the termination of plaintiff’s employment, the employer was the one from whom the notice as to termi
Judgments affirmed.