Lead Opinion
In this direct criminal appeal, appellant seeks review of his convictions of purchase of marijuana, or possession of marijuana with intent tо purchase it; and of attempted possession of more than twenty grams of marijuana. Appellant raises four issues: (1) whether it was error to deny his motion tо dismiss and subsequent motion for judgment of acquittal based upon an entrapment defense; (2) whether it was error to deny his motion to dismiss based upon allegations thаt the state had failed to produce certain exculpatory evidence; (3) whether it was error to deny his motion for judgment of acquittal on the chаrge of purchase of marijuana, or possession of marijuana with intent to purchase it, based upon legal insufficiency of the evidence; and (4) whеther it was error to deny his motion for arrest of judgment on the charge of purchase of marijuana, or possession of marijuana with intent to purchasе it, on the ground of inconsistent verdicts. Because we conclude that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent, we are constrained to reverse the conviction of purchase of marijuana, or possession of marijuana with intent to purchase it.
In count one of the information, appellant was charged with purchase of marijuana, or possession of marijuana with intent to purchase it, in violation of section 893.13(l)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1991). In count two of the information, appellant was charged with possession of more than twenty grams of marijuana, in violation of section 893.13(l)(f), Florida Statutes (1991). It is clear that the same marijuana was the subject of both counts of the information. The jury returned verdicts finding appellant guilty as charged in count one, and guilty of the lesser-includеd offense of attempted possession of more than twenty grams of marijuana with regard to count two.
The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, established the following. Members of the Escambia County Sheriffs Office were involved in an undercover drug investigation. Through confidential informants, appellant was introduced to two officers working undercover. The officers offered to sell appellant a pound of mariguana.
We conclude that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, was legally insufficient to support a verdict оf guilty of purchase of marijuana, because appellant was arrested before the transaction could be completed. See generally Mitchell v. State,
Having concluded that thе evidence was legally sufficient to support a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase it, but not of an actual purchasе, the inconsistency in the jury’s verdicts becomes apparent. While there was evidence from which the jury could have found that appellant possessed the marijuana with intent to purchase it, the jury’s verdict of guilty only of attempted possession of the same marijuana with regard to the charge made in count two of the information indicates that the jury found the evidence insufficient to establish that appellant had ever actually or constructively possessed the mаrijuana. Generally, inconsistent verdicts are not prohibited. However, they are not permitted when “what the jury fails to find in one count vitiates a guilty verdict on a seрarate count to the benefit of the defen-dant_” Naumowicz v. State,
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s disposition of the first three issues raised by appellant but cannot agree that thе evidence in this case was insufficient to permit the jury to conclude that a completed sale had taken place simply because aрpellant was arrested immediately prior to his physically handing money to the officers. The sale with which appellant was charged took plaсe at the point in time when officers delivered the marijuana to appellant, and appellant agreed to pay for the marijuana. While I agree that a contract for sale is not the same as a sale, once the officers delivered the marijuana to appellant following appellant’s agreement to pay for it, the contract was no longer executory and a sale had taken place. Mitchell v. State,
